




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
ATTITUDES TOWARDS JEWS AND MUSLIMS **IN NORWAY 2017**

POPULATION SURVEY AND MINORITY STUDY

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**CENTER FOR STUDIES OF
THE HOLOCAUST AND
RELIGIOUS MINORITIES**



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FOREWORD

This report presents the findings of two surveys on attitudes towards Jews and Muslims in Norway in 2017. In part, it follows up the population survey conducted by the Center for Studies of the Holocaust and Religious Minorities (CHM) on attitudes towards Jews and other minorities conducted in 2011 and published in 2012. Repeating the same study five years later has made it possible to study trends in attitudes over time. The present surveys also contain several new features. The findings from the first population survey showed considerable social distance from Muslims. The prevalence of Islamophobia has been well documented in several West European countries, but little systematic data has previously been collected on attitudes among the Norwegian population. The present study therefore contains an expanded section dealing with attitudes towards Muslims. Another new feature in the 2017 study is a separate survey of Jews and Muslims. This minority survey covers the same topics as the population survey, but explores the experiences of these minorities in Norway in more depth. In addition to the statistical surveys, group interviews were conducted with Jewish and Muslim informants.

CHM was commissioned to undertake the surveys by the Ministry of Children, Equality and Social Inclusion in response to an announcement in 2015. The surveys have been funded by five ministries: the Ministry of Children, Equality and Social Inclusion, the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, the Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation, the Ministry of Education and Research, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Data collection was undertaken by Kantar TNS between 11 January and 6 April 2017. The group interviews were conducted between May 2016 and May 2017.

CHM is grateful for being awarded this commission and for the confidence it bestows. We are proud to submit a new and expanded report five years after the previous one. CHM's long history of research in the fields of antisemitism and Islamophobia has been a decisive factor in conducting this survey. Professor Christhard Hoffmann has again led the work on the surveys, as he did for the survey conducted in 2011. This year's surveys have been conducted and analysed by the same team that was behind the previous project. Project coordinator Vibeke Moe (CHM) has coordinated a comprehensive body of research. We would also like to extend our gratitude to the rest of the project group: emeritus professor Werner Bergmann (Center for Research on Antisemitism, Technische Universität Berlin), project assistant Kristine Bjørndal (CHM), senior researcher Cora Alexa Døving (CHM), emeritus professor Ottar Hellevik (University of Oslo), researcher Øivind Kopperud (CHM), senior researcher Claudia Lenz (CHM) and emeritus professor Irene Levin (Oslo and Akershus University College of Applied Sciences).



Guri Hjeltnes, Director
Center for Studies of the Holocaust and Religious Minorities, December 2017

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SUMMARY

This report presents the findings from two surveys conducted by the Center for Studies of the Holocaust and Religious Minorities: a population survey on attitudes towards Jews and Muslims and a minority study in which Jews and Muslims in Norway were asked about their experiences and attitudes. Data collection was undertaken by Kantar TNS between 11 January and 6 April 2017. The report also presents findings from qualitative group interviews of Jewish and Muslim informants conducted between May 2016 and May 2017.

The surveys have mapped attitudes along three dimensions: a cognitive dimension (prejudice), an affective dimension (feelings such as sympathy and antipathy) and one that measures degree of social distance. These dimensions are to some extent independent of each other. For example, prejudice against a group often tends to be more prevalent than antipathy or social distance. This tendency is also found in the present study.

THE NORWEGIAN POPULATION'S ATTITUDES TOWARDS JEWS

A key premise for the population survey conducted in 2017 was that the findings should be comparable with the first survey conducted by CHM in November 2011. Asking identical questions will bring to light any changes in attitudes and trends.

The findings show that stereotypes of Jews still prevail in Norwegian society in 2017 but that they are less prevalent than in 2011. Overall, the proportion of the general population with marked prejudice against Jews has decreased from 12.1 per cent to 8.3 per cent (3.8 percentage points). At the same time, the proportion of the general population that does not support any negative statements about Jews increased from 55 per cent to 69 per cent; that is, by as much as 14 percentage points. Some antisemitic notions clearly still prevail in the general population, though they are far less pronounced than five years

ago. For example, 13 per cent of respondents support the statement "World Jewry is working behind the scenes to promote Jewish interests" (in 2011 the corresponding figure was 19 per cent), and 18 per cent support the statement "Jews consider themselves to be better than others" (in 2011 the corresponding figure was 26 per cent). The same trend emerges regarding negative feelings towards and social distance from Jews. Overall, the indices show that 6.7 per cent of respondents harbour a dislike of Jews (2011: 9.8 per cent) and 5.9 per cent of the general population would dislike having Jews as neighbours or in their circle of friends (2011: 8.5 per cent). The decrease in the incidence of antisemitic attitudes in Norway between 2011 and 2017 cannot be explained by changes in the explanatory variables, such as level of education, opinion on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or level of xenophobia. The explanation may lie in a shift in public opinion, where media and politics have shown increased awareness of antisemitism as a problem in Norwegian society in response to, among other things, terrorist attacks on Jews in Europe.

While the general trend clearly points in a positive direction, some findings are more concerning. In particular, the findings show that attitudes towards Jews are influenced (and heightened) by opinions on Israel and the Middle East conflict (see below).

THE NORWEGIAN POPULATION'S ATTITUDES TOWARDS MUSLIMS

We also asked respondents about their attitudes towards Muslims. Indices similar to those used in 2011 and 2017 for attitudes towards Jews were developed for negative attitudes towards Muslims. The findings regarding feelings and social distance are directly comparable, but those regarding perceptions (the cognitive dimension) are not, because the statements used in the indices for Jews and Muslims differ.

The findings show that negative stereotypes of Muslims are widespread in Norwegian society.

Overall, 34.1 per cent of the general population displays marked prejudice against Muslims. As many as 47 per cent of the respondents support the statement “Muslims largely have themselves to blame for the increase in anti-Muslim harassment”; 42 per cent support the statement “Muslims do not want to integrate into Norwegian society”; 39 per cent support the statement “Muslims pose a threat to Norwegian culture” and 30 per cent with the statement “Muslims want to take over Europe”. A relatively large proportion of respondents also express negative feelings towards and social distance from Muslims; 27.8 per cent dislike Muslims, and overall 19.6 per cent would dislike having Muslims as neighbours or in their circle of friends. But these findings do not show a negative trend; in fact in 2011 slightly more respondents wanted to keep a social distance from Muslims.

Where there is a basis for making direct comparisons between the general population’s attitudes towards Jews and its attitudes towards Muslims, dislike of Muslims is far more prevalent than dislike of Jews (for social distance: 19.6 per cent compared with 5.9 per cent; for dislike: 27.8 per cent compared with 6.7 per cent).

The incidence of both antisemitic and Islamophobic attitudes is higher among men than among women, among older people, and among people with lower levels of education. Moreover, xenophobia, scepticism towards immigrants and opinion on the Middle East conflict (see below) are important explanatory variables. Closer analysis shows that antisemitism and Islamophobia are attitudes that have more similarities than differences..

MUSLIMS’ ATTITUDES TOWARDS JEWS

The question of whether Muslims in Norway are “more antisemitic” than the general population has been widely debated in the Norwegian media, though without sufficient empirical evidence. The present

survey now shows that Muslim immigrants who have lived at least five years in Norway stand out on the cognitive dimension of antisemitic attitudes and support negative statements about Jews to a larger extent than the general population (28.9 per cent compared with 8.3 per cent). For example, as many as 42 per cent of respondents in the Muslim sample believe that “Jews have too much influence on the global economy” (compared with 13 per cent of the general population) and only 9 per cent (but 46 per cent of the general population) reject this statement. Twenty-eight per cent of respondents in the Muslim sample support the statement “World Jewry is working behind the scenes to promote Jewish interests” (compared with 13 per cent of the general population). While stereotypical ideas of Jewish power and influence are highly prevalent in the Muslim sample, only a minority of those who expressed an opinion supported the view that Jews have themselves to blame for being persecuted (17 per cent supported it while 37 per cent did not). The difference between the Muslim sample and the population sample is minimal regarding social distance (would dislike having Jews as neighbours or in their circle of friends) and the affective dimension (dislike of Jews).

As in the general population, negative attitudes towards Jews in the Muslim sample are also found to be more prevalent among men, people aged over 45, and people with lower levels of education. The proportion of Muslims with antisemitic attitudes is particularly large among older people (aged over 60). Higher levels of prejudice against Jews among Muslims than among the general population are also found in surveys conducted in other European countries. Although the findings are not directly comparable, there is much to indicate that the difference between Muslims and the general population on this issue is smaller in Norway than in countries such as Belgium, France, the UK and Germany.

JEWS' ATTITUDES TOWARDS MUSLIMS

Similarly, we asked respondents in the Jewish sample about their attitudes towards Muslims. The findings show that negative attitudes towards Muslims are far less prevalent in the Jewish sample than in the general population. This difference is apparent on all attitudinal dimensions (cognitive (14.7 per cent compared with 34.1 per cent), affective (14.5 per cent compared with 27.8 per cent) and social distance (13.5 per cent compared with 19.6 per cent). Whereas 39 per cent of the population sample considers Muslims to represent “a threat to Norwegian culture”, the corresponding figure for the Jewish sample is 22 per cent.

Furthermore, more respondents in the Jewish sample than in the general population believe negative attitudes towards Muslims to be widespread in Norway and that anti-Muslim harassment should be combated. Eighty-seven per cent of respondents in the Jewish sample support the statement that acts of violence against Muslims represent “an attack on our society”, and 71 per cent believe that such acts show that hatred of Muslims has become a serious problem in Europe. These findings must be interpreted in the light of the significantly large proportion of highly educated respondents – as much as 76 per cent – in the Jewish sample. Moreover, the Jewish minority’s own experiences of discrimination may have contributed to heightened sensitivity to and caution towards negative attitudes against other groups.

JEWS AND MUSLIMS IN NORWAY: EXPERIENCES OF DISCRIMINATION

To supplement the attitudes survey, we asked the Jewish and Muslim minority populations in Norway about their experiences. Only a small number report having had personal experiences of discrimination in the past 12 months: 35.5 per cent of Muslim respondents and 28 per cent of Jewish respondents have

“often or sometimes” been made to feel that they do not belong in Norwegian society. Fewer respondents (27 per cent of Muslims and 18.5 per cent of Jews) have experienced people behaving negatively towards them when they learn of their religious affiliation, and fewer still (14 per cent of Muslims and 11 per cent of Jews) have been directly subjected to harassment. Experiences of discrimination in everyday life occur slightly more often among Muslims, but the feeling of vulnerability is more widespread among Jews. As much as 64 per cent of Jews (and 26 per cent of Muslims) report that they avoid showing their religious affiliation out of fear of negative attitudes. Furthermore, both minorities see a negative trend and believe that prejudice among the Norwegian population against their own groups has become more widespread over the past five years. In both samples, the majority of respondents that expressed an opinion (75 per cent of Jews and 48 per cent of Muslims) report that Jews and Muslims share some common experiences as minorities in Norway, and clear majorities in both samples (81.5 per cent of Jews and 70 per cent of Muslims) believe they could cooperate on combating prejudice and discrimination.

ANTISEMITISM AND ISLAMOPHOBIA AS SOCIAL ISSUES

How does the Norwegian population itself assess the prevalence of negative attitudes towards Jews and Muslims in Norway? Does it see the necessity to combat harassment against these minorities? In 2017, as in 2011, far more respondents (81 per cent) believe negative attitudes towards Muslims to be widespread in Norway than believe that the same applies for negative attitudes towards Jews (19 per cent). In their attempts to explain negative attitudes towards Jews, respondents often cited Israel’s role in the Middle East conflict and the media coverage of it, as well as old prejudices and ignorance. Negative

views of Muslims were explained by (Islamist) terror and extremism, cultural conflicts in multicultural Norway, and xenophobia in general. Compared to the 2011 survey, there is a greater tendency to cite circumstances outside the minorities as reasons for antisemitism and Islamophobia.

Most of those who answered believe that measures to combat anti-Jewish harassment (41 per cent) and anti-Muslim harassment (56 per cent) are needed. With reference to the incidents of antisemitic and Islamophobic violence in Europe in recent years, a large majority of the general population (approximately 75 per cent) disapproves of acts of violence against Jews and Muslims, and sees them as “an attack on our society”. A minority of respondents, however, considers violence to be justifiable. As much as 12 per cent of the population sample and 20 per cent of the Muslim sample support the statement “Considering how Israel treats the Palestinians, harassment and violence against Jews are justifiable”. Ten percent of the population sample and nine percent of respondents in the Jewish sample support the corresponding statement “Considering recent terror attacks, harassment and violence against Muslims are justifiable”.

THE HOLOCAUST

In 2011 there was broad support in the Norwegian population regarding the importance of education about the Holocaust. In 2017 almost everyone (96 per cent) reports having heard about the Holocaust. Among Muslim immigrants, however, the corresponding proportion is only 64 per cent. It is particularly Muslims who received their education in Norway or elsewhere in Europe that have heard about the Holocaust. An overwhelming majority of the population sample and the Jewish sample and a clear majority of the Muslim sample consider knowledge about the Holocaust important for preventing oppression of minorities today. However, opinions

differ on whether Jews can demand any special treatment on account of this history. One-third of the population sample (in 2011 the corresponding proportion was only 26 per cent) support the view that Jews today are, because of the Holocaust, entitled to their own state, where they can seek protection from persecution. Compared to 2011, far fewer (31 per cent compared with 44 per cent) now reject this statement. In the Muslim sample, too, more respondents support (30 per cent) than reject (23 per cent) the statement that Jews are entitled to their own state because of persecution during the Holocaust. At the same time, 22 per cent of the population sample (in 2011 the corresponding figure was 25 per cent) and 30 per cent of the Muslim sample believe that Jews today exploit the memory of the Holocaust for their own benefit.

OPINIONS ON ISRAEL AND THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT

When asked about their opinions on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, two to three times more respondents in the population sample expressed support for the Palestinians than for Israel. However, more than half of the respondents expressed no opinion or did not respond. Attitudes in the two minority samples are more clearly divided: 59 per cent of the Muslim respondents support the Palestinians (and only 3 per cent support Israel), and 80 per cent of the Jewish respondents support Israel (and only 2 per cent support the Palestinians). Although opinions on the conflict are generally divided, there is one statement with is supported by clear majorities (over 70 per cent) in all three samples, namely: “Both the Israelis and the Palestinians are entitled to a state of their own”.

When the general population’s spectrum of opinions on the conflict are divided into three types (pro-Israel, pro-Palestinian and anti-Israel) and compared with the findings from 2011, the pro-Israel atti-

tudes remain relatively stable at around 20 per cent; the pro-Palestinian attitudes have remained high but have fallen slightly from 66 per cent to 60 per cent; and anti-Israel attitudes have risen slightly, from 25 per cent in 2011 to 27 per cent in 2017. More respondents in 2017 than in 2011 (20 per cent compared with 16 per cent) support the statement “As long as the State of Israel exists there can be no peace”. Fewer respondents than in 2011 (32 per cent compared with 38 per cent) support the statement that Israel treats the Palestinians “just as badly” as the Nazis treated the Jews during World War II. Nonetheless, one in three respondents in the population sample still supports this statement. The proportion of respondents in the Muslim sample (51 per cent) that support it is even larger. Not a single respondent in the Jewish sample supports this statement.

Which side the respondents support in the Middle East conflict, and what other opinions they may have on the conflict, are clearly related to their attitudes towards Jews and Muslims. Respondents who support the Palestinians and respondents who display anti-Israel attitudes are also more negatively inclined towards Jews. Respondents who support Israel and who display pro-Israel attitudes score high on the index of Islamophobia.

CONCLUSION

The survey of antisemitic attitudes in Norway presents a complex picture. There is clearly a decline in support among the general population for traditional antisemitic attitudes. The findings also show positive trends in degree of social distance and dislike of Jews, but this trend is not reflected in Jews’ own assessment of the situation; they see today’s antisemitism as a serious and escalating problem in society. Two in three respondents in the Jewish sample report that they avoid showing their religious affiliation in public so as to avoid negative reactions. The same

picture (little support for traditional antisemitism in the general population but a perceived high level of antisemitic threat among Jews) has been observed in Sweden, and was explained in a recent research article by the development of three distinct forms of antisemitism in today’s Europe: classic antisemitism, Israel-derived antisemitism and Enlightenment-based antisemitism (i.e. based on religious critique). The Jews’ assessment of the situation is often influenced by the latter two.¹ There is much to indicate that opinions on the Middle East conflict are also a decisive factor in Norway. In the prevailing pro-Palestinian – and to some extent anti-Israel – climate in Norway, the Jews are alone in their fundamentally positive attitudes towards the state of Israel. Although support for traditional antisemitism has decreased in the general population in recent years, anti-Israel attitudes have not. The most alarming finding, however, is the justification of violence and harassment against Jews based on Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians. In 2011, 4 per cent of the Norwegian population considered the shots fired on the synagogue in Oslo to be justified by Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians. In 2017, 12 per cent of the population sample and 20 per cent of the Muslim sample believe that violence and harassment against Jews could be justified using the same argument.

The survey of Islamophobia in Norway shows that negative attitudes towards Muslims are quite prevalent in the Norwegian population; between one-fifth and one-third score high on the various indices. This is reflected in the Norwegian population’s own assessment, where over 80 per cent believe negative attitudes towards Muslims to be highly or quite prevalent. In fact, Muslims view the situation less negatively than the population sample, though more than half (52 per cent) share its assessment. Regarding perceptions of whether negative attitudes towards Muslims have become more or less

¹ Dencik and Marosi (2016).

prevalent in Norway in the past five years, Muslims see a negative trend more clearly than the general population. Almost two in three Muslims believe that negative attitudes today are more prevalent than they were five years ago, while only one in three in the general population shares the same view. We only have data on the actual trend in social distance, where the trend from 2011 to 2017 has moved slightly in a positive direction. Negative attitudes towards Muslims in Norway are clearly linked to xenophobia and scepticism towards immigration. This connection can be traced back to the heated public debates of recent years over the refugee crisis, the integration of Muslims in Norway, and the threat of terrorism. The discussion of immigration and integration in these debates has centred largely on *Muslim* immigration and integration in Norway. Moreover, Islamophobic ideas have been used for political mobilisation and have thereby become part of an ideological worldview, particularly on the far right of the political spectrum. Although a large majority of the Norwegian population is convinced that negative attitudes towards Muslims are widespread in Norway, fewer consider it necessary to do something to combat anti-Muslim harassment.

Based on the divided opinions about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, antisemitism and Islamophobia are often seen as polar opposites, but this is only partly the case. These attitudes are, to a greater extent, closely related phenomena, and are linked to xenophobic ideas in the general population. Respondents who display prejudice towards and dislike of foreigners score high on *both* indices (that is, for Islamophobia *and* antisemitism). The minorities' experiences of discrimination point in the same direction; they show that Jews and Muslims share a number of the same problems associated with being minorities in Norway. Large majorities in both groups therefore see a possibility to cooperate on combating prejudice and discrimination. The picture is more complex, however, because the survey also found that a larger percentage of the Muslim sample expressed negative attitudes towards Jews than did the general population. Some distinctions are in order here, too: the negative attitudes among Muslims are based largely on classic stereotypes of Jewish power and influence in the world and not on social distance or dislike of Jews in everyday life. These may, nonetheless, pose a serious obstacle to cooperation between these minorities.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. ACTION PLAN AGAINST ISLAMOPHOBIA

The findings of the present survey show widespread Islamophobic attitudes in the Norwegian population. They also show a clear connection between xenophobia, Islamophobia and antisemitism. An action plan on Islamophobia should be developed that includes plans for research, education and evidence-based measures to combat such attitudes.

2. EMPHASIS ON DIVERSITY AND DIFFERENCES IN PORTRAYALS OF JEWS AND MUSLIMS

While traditional antisemitic ideas are less widespread in the population than previously, the findings also show a connection between anti-Jewish and anti-Israel attitudes that gives cause for concern. This applies to both the general population and to the Muslim sample. There is a need to focus attention on diversity among Jews, particularly in respect of the relationship between the State of Israel and Jews. Portrayals of Muslims must also endeavour to offer a differentiating perspective and avoid group constructs. Initiatives and educational programmes should be oriented towards education in schools, activities within Muslim faith communities and journalist training programmes.

3. REGISTRATION OF HATE CRIMES MOTIVATED BY ANTISEMITISM OR ISLAMOPHOBIA

Negative attitudes can lead to acts of violence or harassment. Sound documentation of such acts is needed in efforts to combat them. To ensure a sound system of registration, separate categories should be introduced nationwide for coding hate crimes motivated by antisemitism and Islamophobia.

4. DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE JEWISH AND MUSLIM MINORITIES

The findings of the present survey show that many Jews and Muslims find that they share similar experiences as minorities and can cooperate on combating prejudice and discrimination. This is an important signal to heed. Closer dialogue should be facilitated between the Muslim and Jewish minorities in Norway.

5. ATTITUDE SURVEYS EVERY FIVE YEARS

Attitude surveys similar to the present studies should be repeated every five years in order to bring to light trends and changes in attitudes. This is in keeping with one of the recommendations in the action plan against antisemitism launched by the Norwegian government in the autumn of 2016. Such follow-up should include qualitative studies that cast light on the nuances and the complexities of these attitudes.

BACKGROUND

In July 2015 the Center for Studies of the Holocaust and Religious (CHM) prepared a project application for conducting two surveys on attitudes towards Jews and Muslims in Norway. In part, the project followed up the CHM 2011 population survey on attitudes towards Jews and other minorities. Based on the application, an agreement was reached in September 2015 between CHM and the Ministry of Children, Equality and Social Inclusion. In the autumn of 2015, an interdisciplinary project group was appointed to prepare the research premises for the survey and to develop the questionnaires. The composition of the project group was the same as for the previous survey, and comprised national and international experts in the fields of antisemitism, Islamophobia, social sciences and statistics. The surveys were funded by the Ministry of Children, Equality and Social Inclusion, the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, the Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation, the Ministry of Education and Research, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

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SUMMARY

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ADVISORY PANEL

An advisory panel comprising representatives of the Jewish and Muslim minorities was formed to participate in the work on the survey. The panel members were (in alphabetical order): Basim Gozlan, Michael Gritzmann, Eliana Hercz, Bushra Ishaq and Linda Noor.

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 New elements introduced in the 2017 survey

The population survey of attitudes towards Jews and other minorities from 2011 was the first of its kind ever conducted in Norway.² To ensure a good basis for comparison and help identify trends, the new survey largely reflects the previous survey. Nonetheless, experiences gained from conducting the previous survey revealed a need to introduce some changes in the form of new questions and new groups of respondents.

As in the previous survey, attitudes were measured by mapping three different dimensions: a cognitive dimension (prejudice), an affective dimension (sympathy and antipathy) and one that measures degree of social distance. These three dimensions are to some extent independent of each other; for example, prejudice against a group will often be more prevalent than antipathy. This division therefore captures nuances and varying patterns in what collectively can be referred to as attitudes.

Analyses of the findings from the 2011 survey showed that Muslims were among the minorities from which the general population had the highest level of social distance. The present study therefore contains a more detailed mapping of attitudes towards Muslims. This is in line with the recommendations made following the previous survey. The changes are reflected in, *inter alia*, a separate section on stereotypes of and sympathy/antipathy towards Muslims. These questions supplement the existing questions dealing with social distance. The questionnaire has also been expanded in other areas,

such as by introducing a question about the general population's views on refugees.

Another new feature is a separate survey conducted among Jewish and Muslim respondents. This feature was recommended following the previous survey, and compensates for the low level of representation of minorities in population samples. There were two reasons behind the decision to conduct the minority survey: first, to supplement the perspective expressed in the population survey by shedding light on the minorities' own experiences. The survey contains questions about issues such as respondents' experiences of inclusion and sense of belonging in Norwegian society. Secondly, to shed light on the minorities' attitudes towards each other. A meta-study published by Günther Jikeli (2015) shows that antisemitic attitudes in many European countries are more widespread in Muslim minority populations than in general populations.³ This issue has also been a topic of Norwegian public debate, but the present survey represents the first broad-based, empirical study in this field undertaken in Norway. Studies of Norwegian Jews' attitudes towards Muslims is also a new phenomenon, although some small-scale surveys have been conducted in which this topic has been included as part of a larger problem area.⁴ The present survey constitutes an important supplement to these works. In addition to the quantitative study, group interviews of Jews and Muslims were conducted to gain deeper insight into the minorities' views on the reasons for negative attitudes.

² Published in the report *Antisemittisme i Norge? Den norske befolkningens holdninger til jøder og andre minoriteter* [Antisemitism in Norway? The Attitudes of the Norwegian Population towards Jews and other Minorities], Center for Studies of the Holocaust and Religious 2012. Data collection was undertaken by TNS Gallup in November 2011.

³ Jikeli (2015).

⁴ Døving and Moe (2014); Golombek et al. (2012); Levin and Golombek (2004).

1.2 Thematic introduction

The subject areas dealt with in this report cover a broad spectrum. As described above, the central aim for the survey has been to perform a broad-based analysis of attitudes towards Jews and Muslims, both among the general population and among the minorities themselves. As in the 2011 population survey, respondents' views of other religious and national minorities and their attitudes towards immigration were also examined. Once again, respondents' opinions on Israel and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are central issues, and the surveys bring to light the correlation between these opinions, antisemitism and Islamophobia. The survey also contains several statements dealing with the extent to which attitudes towards Jews are influenced by the historical experience of the Holocaust. Mapping the Jewish and Muslim respondents' experiences of living in Norway was another central element in the minority survey.

Views on these subjects may be influenced by ongoing situations to a greater or lesser degree. The situation in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was relatively calm during the data collection period, though extremely unstable in the rest of the Middle East, with the war in Syria and conflicts in large parts of the region. The refugee crisis in Europe generated extensive media coverage, and the fact that most of the refugees were Muslims contributed to integration and attitudes towards Muslims being widely discussed in the media throughout this period. The issue of antisemitism has also attracted broad public attention since the previous population survey was conducted. One important event was the launch of the Norwegian Government's action plan against

antisemitism in the autumn of 2016. Both antisemitism and the place of Muslims in Europe have also been thematised, in connection with terrorist incidents in Europe.

1.2.1 ANTISEMITISM

The term "antisemitism" first arose in Germany in the late 1870s, and described a socio-political movement that attributed negative social trends in contemporary society to "Jewish influence" and that unified under the slogan "Fight against Jewish domination!" Although the term originated in response to certain features of modernity and was shaped by contemporary ideas about race, the phenomenon dates back to antiquity and is deeply rooted in the Christian tradition. Today the term is often used in a broader sense to include all forms of hatred of Jews, whether they be religiously motivated or historical or contemporary manifestations.

Antisemitism was already being researched in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,⁵ but systematic and interdisciplinary studies of antisemitism were first conducted after the Holocaust, predominantly since the 1980s. Today antisemitism research represents an internationally comprehensive and well established scholarly discipline. Until recently, this field of research in Norway has been dominated by historical studies.⁶ Now, however, modern-day antisemitism has become a subject of public debate and research here, too. In this respect, the CHM population survey from 2011 represented a pioneering work in that it was based on sound empirical evidence.⁷

⁵ Hahn and Kistenmacher (2014).

⁶ See, for example, Bruland (2017); Hoffmann (ed. 2016); Lien (2016); Michelet (2014); Snildal (2014); Harket (2014); Ulvund (2014); Moe and Kopperud (eds. 2011); Johansen (2006); Eriksen et al. (2005); Søbbye (2003); Johansen (1984).

⁷ See also *Attitudes Toward Jews In Ten European Countries*, in which Norway was included (ADL 2012). The study surveyed respondents' opinions on

Antisemitism can be defined as hostile attitudes towards and acts directed against Jews or anyone perceived as “Jewish” based on specific images of Jews.⁸ These images have a long history in Europe, and cover a broad spectrum of ideas, some of them self-contradictory. A common feature is the way in which Jews collectively are attributed inherent (primarily) negative traits. Certain basic themes are recurrent, such as belief in the idea that Jews represent a foreign and hostile element in a community, and that they pose a threat to society. Conspiracy theories about Jews claim that they represent a secret and dangerous global power. Antisemitic attitudes can reinforce such ideas or stereotypes of Jews or more complex theories in which Jews represent a central element in a worldview. Some examples of historically prevalent antisemitic ideas:

- Jews are powerful, and work behind the scenes to promote their own interests.
- Jews represent a threat to the established order of society.
- Jews are inferior.
- Jews are disloyal to the society in which they live, and follow their own laws.
- Jews think they are better than others.
- Jews cannot be trusted.
- Jews represent a foreign element in society.
- Jews exploit the Holocaust to their own advantage/are behind the Holocaust/created the myth of the Holocaust.

- Jews are intransigent and vindictive.
- Jews constitute a global power and control the media, the monetary system and politics.

As an ideology, antisemitism was discredited in Western society after the Holocaust. As a phenomenon, however, it did not disappear. Instead it found new forms of expression or was relegated to more marginal (private) forums. Playing down or denying the Holocaust became a new element in the form of antisemitism that emerged after World War II. Even while the war was still raging, the Nazis took measures to hide all evidence of the exterminations. Arguments for Holocaust denial are typically intended to sow doubt about the number of people murdered (almost 6 million Jews), the method used (the gas chambers) and the underlying intention (the extermination of Europe’s Jews). The years following the Holocaust saw the emergence of so-called secondary antisemitism,⁹ a term coined by Peter Schönbach (1961). Secondary antisemitism originated in the European (and particularly German) guilt and shame over the genocide, and asserts that, inter alia, the Jews exploit this guilt to their own advantage. Secondary antisemitism can therefore be said to have arisen not in spite of, but because of Auschwitz, and manifests itself in, for example, opposition to the commemoration of the Holocaust. The State of Israel is another important term of reference for post-Holocaust antisemitism. The relationship between criticism of Israel and antisemitism

four statements about Jews, and was based on telephone interviews with 500 respondents. Statistics Norway’s *The Norwegian Value Surveys, 1990* (Lisshaug 1990) included a question about social distance from Jews, namely respondents’ views on having a Jew as neighbour. A survey of pupils in Oslo schools was conducted by Perduco on commission from the Education Agency in 2011 (Perduco 2011).

⁸ See *Handlingsplan mot antisemittisme 2016–2020* [Action plan against antisemitism 2016–2020], Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation 2016, page 12. There are many definitions of antisemitism. For a thorough analysis of different definitions and their significance for mapping and combating antisemitic phenomena, see Marcus (2015). Helen Fein’s definition is often cited in the research: “A persisting latent structure of hostile beliefs towards Jews as a collectivity, manifested in individuals as attitudes, and in culture as myth, ideology, folklore and imagery, and in actions – social or legal discrimination, political mobilization against the Jews, and collective or state violence – which results in and/or is designed to distance, displace, or destroy Jews as Jews.” (Fein 1987: 67). The International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) has developed a definition that is supported by the EU, with a view to mapping antisemitic hate crime: “Antisemitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities.” https://www.holocaustremembrance.com/sites/default/files/press_release_document_antisemitism.pdf 14 September 2017.

⁹ Also referred to in German as “Schuldabwehr-Antisemitismus”.

is a subject of debate both in Norway and internationally. Criticism of Israel must not be confused with antisemitism, not even when this criticism, seen in isolation, is strong or incorrect. However, a connection is drawn between antisemitism and hostility towards Israel when criticism employs antisemitic stereotypes (such as the traditional charge of blood libel) or when negative views of Israel imply opposition towards Jews as a group. Antisemitic attitudes may also underlie anti-Israel statements or actions, even though they are not openly expressed. In a time when antisemitism as an ideology has lost its credibility, criticism of Israel can constitute a new way of expressing antisemitic attitudes.¹⁰ Correlations between views on Israel and attitudes towards Jews make up one of the topics of this survey. To identify any connections between these attitudes, a methodological distinction was made so that the questionnaire contained separate questions about attitudes towards Jews and attitudes towards Israel.

In today's Europe antisemitism is spread between highly diverse communities and groups, far from all of which hold any specific ideological positions, marked political views or religious affiliations. Antisemitic statements and violence were previously linked largely to far-right movements. In Eastern Europe this continues to be the case, but in Western Europe this situation has gradually changed since the millennium and antisemitism is found across the political spectrum, including the far left. Antisemitic manifestations have been seen in connection with, for example, anti-Israel demonstrations, and quantitative studies have revealed widespread negative attitudes among Muslims.¹¹ The trend in recent years has been characterised by new media creating arenas

for disseminating antisemitic statements and forming communities of shared attitudes across existing organisational boundaries. Surveys have shown how the increasing use of social media makes it easier to spread hate speech and provides wider reach.¹² The present study reveals the prevalence and characteristics of antisemitism in different sections of the Norwegian population.

1.2.2 ISLAMOPHOBIA

The prevalence of negative attitudes towards Muslims is well documented in several West European countries. The holding of Islamophobic attitudes is no new phenomenon that arose from Muslim immigration. Negative perceptions of Islam and Muslims are rooted in different historical periods, such as the religiously inspired enemy images of the Middle Ages and the colonial portrayals of Muslims as an inferior race. Nevertheless, the scope of this phenomenon has grown considerably in recent decades.¹³

Contemporary negative attitudes towards Muslims are based on a set of generalising ideas about Muslims. Islamophobia can be said to exist when multiple prejudices are incorporated into ideologies and used to argue that Muslims per se are dangerous and should be excluded. We find prejudice against Muslims across the left-right political spectrum, but Islamophobia is most prevalent among supporters of right-wing populist parties, and the most explicit examples can be found on certain far-right websites and Facebook groups.¹⁴ Islamophobic attitudes constitute a key element in the ideology within the emerging right-wing populist and extremist movements in Europe.¹⁵

¹⁰ See Bachner (2004) for a detailed analysis of this in a Scandinavian context.

¹¹ Jikeli (2015).

¹² See, for example, Likestillings- og diskrimineringsombudet (2015); CST Annual Review (2016); EUMC (2004).

¹³ FRA (2017).

¹⁴ FRA (2017); Pew Research Center (2017); Howden et al. (2015); Bleich (2011, 2012).

¹⁵ Wodak (2015); Hanshuus & Jupskås (2017); Whine (2012).

In international research, anti-Muslim attitudes are generally referred to as “Islamophobia”,¹⁶ and represent a growing field of interdisciplinary research. The first academic study of Islamophobia can be traced back to 1985, when Edward Said launched the term to describe anti-Muslim prejudice/hostility to Islam/fear of Islam and to provide an analogous term for “antisemitism”. But it was not until the Runnymede Trust in the UK published a report in 1997 that the term became widely known and the phenomenon recognised as relevant for wide-scale research.¹⁷ In Norway, however, few studies of Islamophobia have been conducted.

Islamophobia assumes a level of group construction and hostility to Muslims that is not necessarily present in all negative attitudes towards Muslims. But when Muslims are attributed inherent, negative traits solely by virtue of being Muslim, it should be recognized as Islamophobia. Islamophobia can be defined as widespread prejudice, acts and practices that attack, exclude or discriminate against people on the ground that they are – or are assumed to be – Muslim. Contemporary forms of Islamophobia build on a repertoire of negative stereotypes that have emerged over the past 20 years in many West European countries. Some examples are:

- Muslims want to take over Europe and take advantage of European elites to promote their goals.
- Muslims are first and foremost loyal to Islamic laws and are therefore disloyal to Norwegian/ European values.
- Muslims cannot be integrated because they don't really *want to*.

- Muslims despise democracy and represent a threat to Western culture.
- Muslims speak with two tongues.
- Muslims are guided by a hateful god.
- Muslims lack humanism.
- Muslims abuse women, and Muslim men are driven by a primitive form of sexuality.
- Muslims are violent.
- Muslims are inferior.

These negative stereotypes build on a conglomerate of ideas of culture, ethnicity and popular mindsets. In addition perceptions of “Muslims” are often directly linked to perceptions of “Islam”. Islam is thus presented as an ideology that glorifies violence and that is driven by a vision of global domination. All the nuances of Islam disappear, and Muslims, seen as representatives of Islam, are perceived as a threat.

Notions of fear are often based on allegations of an ongoing secret Islamisation of Europe. Accounts vary as to how this is happening, who is orchestrating it, and how Muslim domination is discussed generally, but the ideas are rooted in the so-called *Eurabia* theory. Put briefly, this is a conspiracy theory alleging that the EU, the Middle East and the North African states, through the Euro-Arab Dialogue, have since the 1970s harboured plans to turn Europe into an Islamic caliphate.

The claims and historical explanations regarding antisemitism and Islamophobia differ in character. Examples of such differences concern antisemitism's deep historical roots and its role in the persecutions that culminated in the genocide of the European Jews during World War II. The content of some prejudicial constructs also display clear differences.

¹⁶ As a concept, Islamophobia has established itself in public, political and academic discourse, but has proved controversial. The main objection to the term is that it is misleading, because it is Muslims, not Islam per se, that are being criticised. Another objection has to do with the suffix -phobia, which can imply pathological fear. In its defence, the term phobia is intended to allude to the role fear plays in Islamophobia as a phenomenon, where Islam is project as an ideology that glorifies violence and that is driven by a vision of global domination. All nuances of the term “Muslim” disappear, and Muslims constitute a threat in themselves. Fear based on erroneous statements is a core element of Islamophobia.

¹⁷ The title of the report is: *Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All*.

Similarities are on the other hand found in, *inter alia*, the fear of domination, where the minority is presented as having threatening political aims

and hidden agendas. First and foremost, however, these two phenomena align in the way they serve to ascribe individuals with collective, negative traits.

1.3 Method

1.3.1 TARGET GROUPS

The surveys have three target groups and samples:

1. A representative sample of the Norwegian population
2. Jews in Norway
3. Muslims in Norway of immigrant background

The population survey is limited to individuals aged 18 or above. The survey of the Jewish respondents was conducted among members of the Mosaic Religious Community in Oslo and Trondheim. The survey of the Muslim respondents is limited to Muslims aged between 18 and 75 years of immigrant background (immigrants and Norwegian-born citizens with immigrant parents) with a minimum of five years' residence in Norway and from the following countries:

- Afghanistan
- Bosnia and Herzegovina
- Iraq
- Iran
- Kosovo
- Morocco
- Pakistan
- Palestine
- Somalia
- Turkey

The sample of countries represents the key countries of origin for immigrants of Muslim background and with five years' residence in Norway.

1.3.2 QUESTIONNAIRE

The questionnaire was developed by the project group at CHM and quality-assured by Kantar TNS. Quality assurance of the questionnaire entailed conducting cognitive in-depth interviews. The primary purpose of the interviews was to obtain feedback on how the questionnaire worked and to ensure the validity of the survey. The interviews test whether the questions are understood, which questions are difficult to answer, which questions are regarded as irrelevant, as well as the questionnaire structure and question sequence and terminology. Ten cognitive interviews were conducted: six with Muslim respondents, two with Jewish respondents and two with representatives of the general population.

The final questionnaire is attached to this report. Please note that the attached form is a master version containing all the questions that were asked in the survey. The filter structure annotated in the questionnaire shows which questions were asked of all respondents (no annotation) and which questions were asked only of respondents in the Jewish and Muslim samples (annotated accordingly).

1.3.3 CONDUCTING THE SURVEY

POPULATION

The population survey was conducted electronically using GallupPanelet, Kantar TNS' access panel,¹⁸ in the same way as the previous survey in the autumn

¹⁸ GallupPanelet is Kantar TNS' access panel for surveys. The panel consists of around 55,000 individuals who regularly answer surveys. GallupPanelet is set up in such a way as to be representative, and to constitute a miniature version of Norway that reflects the entire population.

of 2011. Respondents received email invitations and completed a web questionnaire. To obtain an accurate nationally representative sample, the gross sample was stratified in advance (prior to distribution) and selected in proportion to the Norwegian population's distribution by education, gender, age and geographical region. One reminder was issued during the field period.

JEWIS IN NORWAY

The survey among Jewish respondents was conducted in cooperation with the Mosaic Religious Community in Oslo and Trondheim. The survey was primarily carried out by issuing emails to congregation members (by the congregations themselves) and inviting them to complete the web questionnaire. The questionnaire was also distributed by letter post to members of the Mosaic Religious Community in Oslo who were not listed with an email address in the membership register. Respondents who received the questionnaire by letter post were issued a user name and password so that they too could complete the questionnaire online. The Mosaic Religious Community in Oslo issued one reminder to members who received the questionnaire by email.

MUSLIMS IN NORWAY OF IMMIGRANT BACKGROUND

The sample of Muslim respondents was selected from the National Registry, and comprises individuals of immigrant background from countries with predominantly Muslim populations. Information regarding religious affiliation was not obtained from

the National Registry. The final sample of Muslim respondents was identified by asking questions about religious affiliation in the introduction to the questionnaire. Consequently, responses were also received from respondents who were non-Muslim. These responses have been included in some of the analyses as an additional basis for comparison. The National Registry contains data about all citizens' immigration status and country background based on data about their country background and that of their parents. By using the National Registry as a sample database, the questionnaire could be addressed to specific immigrant groups with background from countries where Islam is the dominant religion and thereby increase the likelihood of reaching Muslims. This approach means that the survey does not include Muslims without immigrant background, such as children of second-generation immigrants from predominantly Muslim countries or converts to Islam. It is assumed, however, that such groups are currently relatively small.

The survey among Muslims was carried out by distributing the questionnaire by letter post, with an option to complete the questionnaire online using a user name and password. Two reminders (without the questionnaire) were issued by letter post during the field period. In addition, two text messages containing a link to the online version of the questionnaire were sent to individuals who could be identified by mobile phone numbers held in Kantar TNS' telephone database (approximately half of the sample).

Samples and response rates	Gross sample (distributed)	Net sample (responded)	Population
Male	49%	49%	50%
Female	51%	51%	50%
Aged below 30	20%	15%	18%
Aged 30-44	29%	26%	27%
Aged 45-59	28%	29%	26%
Aged 60+	23%	29%	29%
Oslo and Akershus	24%	24%	24%
Rest of Eastern Norway	25%	26%	27%
Southern and Western Norway	39%	38%	31%
Trøndelag and Northern Norway	12%	12%	18%
Primary and lower secondary education (10-year compulsory education, 7-year elementary education or similar)	8%	8%	8%
Upper secondary education (general study programme, vocational education or other)	38%	39%	35%
Professional education / vocational education / craft certificate / upper secondary vocational education	26%	27%	24%
University/university college education, up to 4 years	17%	16%	20%
University/university college education, more than 4 years	10%	10%	12%
Sample	2 928	1 575	
Response rate		54%	

1.3.4 SAMPLES AND RESPONSE RATES

POPULATION 2017

A total of 2,928 panel members received the invitation to complete the population survey. After one reminder had been sent, 54 per cent of these had responded. This resulted in a total sample of 1,575.¹⁹ The table below shows the distribution by gender, age, region and education for the gross sample, the net sample and the population respectively.

The final sample contains a slight overrepresentation of respondents from southern and western Norway and a slight underrepresentation of respon-

dents from Trøndelag and northern Norway. The table also shows a slight underrepresentation of respondents with up to four years of higher education.

Kantar TNS calculated weights to correct for the observed biases in the abovementioned variables. The results from the population survey can therefore be considered representative of the population aged 18 years and older in terms of gender, age, region and education. Correspondingly, sample weights were calculated for the source data from the 2011 survey (to correct for biases in gender, age, region and education).

¹⁹ A total of 1,522 respondents participated in the 2011 population survey, and the response rate was 48 per cent.

	Distributed	Responded	Jews only
Total	584	170	162
Male	.	43%	43%
Female	.	57%	57%
Aged below 30	.	8%	8%
Aged 30-44	.	21%	22%
Aged 45-59	.	24%	25%
Aged 60+	.	46%	44%
Primary and lower secondary education (10-year compulsory education, 7-year elementary education or similar)	.	2%	2%
Upper secondary education (general study programme, vocational training or other)	.	10%	10%
Professional education/vocational education/ upper secondary vocation education	.	11%	10%
University/university college education of up to 4 years	.	27%	28%
University/university college education, more than 4 years	.	48%	48%

JEWIS IN NORWAY

The survey among Jews was distributed to 584 members: 504 in Oslo and 80 in Trondheim. Of these, 100 members of the Mosaic Faith Community in Oslo received the questionnaire by letter post. In total, 170 responses were registered, giving a response rate of 29 per cent. Eighty-seven per cent completed the questionnaire online. One hundred and sixty-two respondents who completed the questionnaire addressed to Jews stated Judaism as their religious affiliation. The table below shows the distribution of the Jewish sample by background. The Jewish sample contains considerably more highly educated and older respondents than the population sample.

MUSLIMS IN NORWAY OF IMMIGRANT BACKGROUND

The sample of Muslims of immigrant background was stratified in advance and selected according to expected response rate, based on historical figures from other surveys conducted by Kantar TNS in

recent years on the same target groups (immigrants with similar country backgrounds). The objective for this pre-stratification was to obtain a proportional net sample, where the relevant country backgrounds were correctly represented in relation to the immigrant population in Norway.

Kantar TNS received a sample of 12,450 immigrants from the countries in question from the National Registry. This sample was then cleaned against Kantar TNS' population database to add mobile phone numbers (for sending reminders by text message). The mobile phone numbers of 5,407 immigrants (43 per cent) were added. The questionnaire was sent by letter post to a random sample of 7,000 of the 12,450 in the original sample obtained from the National Registry (3,022 (43 per cent) of which were registered with mobile phone numbers). After two reminders were sent by letter post and two by text message (containing a link to the online questionnaire), 828 individuals had completed the questionnaire. This represents a response rate of 12 per

	Distribution prior to distribution (pre-stratified)	Response rate	Response distribution (net)
Total	7000	12%	828
Afghanistan	9%	14%	11%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	6%	20%	9%
Iraq	15%	13%	16%
Iran	7%	23%	15%
Kosovo	4%	11%	4%
Morocco	4%	14%	5%
Pakistan	11%	13%	13%
Palestine	2%	11%	1.4%
Somalia	35%	6%	18%
Turkey	7%	14%	9%
Male	55%	11%	57%
Female	45%	12%	42%
Aged below 30	31%	10%	27%
Aged 30-44	39%	11%	36%
Aged 45-59	23%	14%	27%
Aged 60+	7%	15%	9%

cent (as expected, based on historical figures for the respective target groups). The response rate among those who were issued reminders by text message was 16 per cent, compared with 9 per cent among those with no registered mobile phone number. A total of 60 per cent completed the questionnaire online. Five hundred and eighty-six of the 828 respondents stated Islam as their religious affiliation.

The table over shows the sample distribution by country background and demography prior to distribution of the questionnaire, the response rates, and the distribution for the same background variables following distribution of the questionnaire.

The response rate was lowest among Somalis (6 per cent) and highest among Iranians and Bosnians (23 per cent and 20 per cent respectively). The

weak response rate among Somalis was expected, and pre-stratification ensured a satisfactorily large sample of Somalis. Low response rates give cause to consider whether potential bias in non-response may have had significance for the result. The fact that the questionnaire was written in Norwegian may have contributed to non-response among individuals with poor or no Norwegian language skills. As described above, the questionnaire was tested for comprehension before data collection was conducted in order to enhance accessibility and ensure validity of the survey. The representativeness of the immigrant sample (828 respondents) was compared with Statistic Norway's population statistics for the corresponding target group. The table below shows a comparison between the immigrant sample and

	Response distribution (net)	Population distribution (immigrants aged 18-75 with 5 years residence, from specified countries). Source: Statistics Norway	Distribution Muslims (corrected for sampling bias in immigrant population)
Afghanistan	11%	8%	9%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	9%	10%	7%
Iraq	16%	15%	14%
Iran	15%	11%	4%
Kosovo	4%	7%	7%
Morocco	5%	5%	6%
Pakistan	13%	19%	24%
Palestine	1%	2%	2%
Somalia	18%	15%	18%
Turkey	9%	9%	10%
Male	57%	53%	51%
Female	42%	46%	49%
Aged below 30	27%	28%	31%
Aged 30-44	36%	37%	37%
Aged 45-59	27%	25%	22%
Aged 60+	9%	9%	10%
Primary and lower secondary education (10-year compulsory education, 7-year elementary education or similar)	19%	.	22%
Upper secondary education (general study programme, vocational training or other)	30%	.	31%
Professional education/vocational education/craft certificate/upper secondary vocational education	15%	.	17%
University/university college education of up to 4 years	22%	.	20%
University/university college education, more than 4 years	13%	.	11%

the corresponding immigrant population's actual distribution by country background, gender and age. The table also shows the distribution in the final Muslim sample (586 respondents) when these are corrected for sample biases in country background, gender and age.

The table shows that Afghans, Iranians and Somalis are slightly overrepresented in the sample, while Kosovo Albanians and Pakistanis are slightly underrepresented. The final sample was corrected for the observed biases in country background, gender and age (combined).

1.3.5 GROUP INTERVIEWS

A qualitative subproject was conducted in connection with the minority survey. A total of six group interviews was conducted between May 2016 and May 2017, three with Jewish informants and three with Muslim informants. Five of these interviews were conducted in Oslo and one in Trondheim. The groups consisted of between three and five informants. In preparation of the group interviews, discussions with four experts in relevant fields were conducted.

The group interviews were conducted to provide insight into how existing attitude and interaction patterns may play out in concrete social situations. On this basis, it was expedient for the composition of the sample to be broad. The composition of the six groups reflects a satisfactory variation in background variables such as generation, education, gender and religiosity.

The primary aim of supplementing the quantitative survey with a qualitative one was to gain deeper insight into attitudes than can be captured in a questionnaire. This applies to, *inter alia*, different interpretations of the concepts and phenomena referred to in the survey, and to some degree how the questions were understood. The following questions formed the basis for the discussion during the group interviews: *What do you think are the reasons for negative attitudes towards Jews? What do you*

think are the reasons for negative attitudes towards Muslims? These questions were also posed in the two quantitative surveys, in the form of open-ended questions (the respondents could write freely). In the group interviews, six photos were presented in order to create a visual impulse (photo-elicitation, Banks 2007). The informants could talk freely about the photos, which depicted historical and contemporary events that had relevance for the minorities and for relationships between them. The qualitative study can better reveal the dynamic aspect of the attitudes examined than can the questionnaire. Moreover, choosing group interviews as a method made it possible to shed light on the significance of social interaction; for example, when views and attitudes expressed by the informants were adjusted during the course of the interviews. Such adjustments could come about in the form of clarifications, revisions or moderations to arguments or views. The interviews also revealed how attitudes form patterns, and that some statements or responses can be linked to other subject areas. One example of this is the way in which informants drew on their own experiences to answer questions about attitudes towards the other minority. The qualitative material can thus help explain wider interpretative patterns and give important indications of which factors influence and adjust attitudes and expressions of attitudes.

<p>M1: Three men aged over 70, first-generation immigrants from Pakistan, no higher education. The informants are mutual acquaintances and attend the same mosque. The interview was attended by two other individuals who did not actively participate, one of whom was the imam of the mosque.</p>	<p>J1: One woman and two men aged between 40 and 60. The woman described herself as atheist. The two men were religious. The informants were not personal acquaintances.</p>
<p>M2: Two women and two men aged between 19 and 25, high level of education, liberal interpretation of religion (one was a convert). Socially engaged. One individual in the group was personally acquainted with the others, but all of them belonged to the same community.</p>	<p>J2: Three women and one man aged between 20 and 30 and affiliated to the Mosaic Faith Community in Trondheim. The informants were personal acquaintances, two of them were related.</p>
<p>M3: Four women, two in their twenties, two in their forties. All devoutly religious. The two older women were converts to Islam. The informants were personal acquaintances.</p>	<p>J3: Three women aged between 50 and 60, affiliated to the Mosaic Religious Community in Oslo. All the group participants had backgrounds from countries other than Norway, had family abroad or had lived for long periods outside Norway.</p>

2 FINDINGS AND ANALYSES

This chapter presents the results and analyses of the population survey and the minority survey. The chapter is divided into five sections: the first section deals with attitudes towards Jews; the second section deals with attitudes towards Muslims; section three presents views on the prevalence of and measures to counteract negative attitudes towards Muslims and Jews; section four presents Jews' and Muslims' own experiences; and section five covers views on immigration and refugees and on attitudes towards different national and religious minorities. Sections three and four include findings from the group interviews.

As already described, attitudes can be analytically divided into different dimensions: a cognitive

dimension (prejudice), an affective dimension (sympathy and antipathy) and one that measures degree of social distance. The three dimensions are to some extent independent of each other; for example, hatred of Jews does not necessarily follow from antisemitic prejudices and someone with stereotypical ideas about Muslims can still have a good relationship with his Muslim neighbour. Attitude surveys often only cover the cognitive dimension. To the extent that the other two dimensions are included in surveys, it is not unusual to find that the attitudes covered by these dimensions are less prevalent. Such a tendency is also found in the present study.

2.1 Attitudes towards Jews

Presented below are the questions about attitudes towards Jews. The first section deals with feelings of sympathy and antipathy towards Jews (the affective dimension). The questions were asked of the population sample and the Muslim sample, and were asked in the 2011 survey.

2.1.1 FEELINGS OF SYMPATHY AND ANTIPATHY TOWARDS JEWS

Changes from 2011 to 2017 (population sample)

Neither statement was supported by a majority in the population samples in 2011 or 2017. The proportion supporting the statement "I have a particular sympathy for Jews" has remained stable at 27 per cent in both surveys. However, the proportion expressing

"I have a particular sympathy for Jews." How well does this statement fit with your own opinion?




Figure 1. Sympathy for Jews (Per cent. Population 2011 and 2017, Muslims)

“I have a certain dislike of Jews.” How well does this statement fit with your own opinion?




Figure 2. Dislike of Jews (Per cent. Population 2011 and 2017, Muslims)

a dislike of Jews has decreased (7.5 per cent in 2017 and 11 per cent in 2011). This decrease of 3.7 percentage points is significant at the 1 per cent level.²⁰

Results, by sample, 2017

None of the statements was supported by a majority in the Muslim sample, either. The proportions of respondents in the population and Muslim samples who answered that the statements fitted “completely” or “rather well” with their own opinion were quite similar, but overall slightly more respondents expressed negative attitudes towards Jews, and far fewer respondents in the Muslim sample denied holding such attitudes: 7.5 per cent of the population answered that the statement “I have a certain dislike of Jews” fitted with their own opinion while 81 per cent answered either “not at all” or “rather badly”. Among the Muslim respondents, 9 per cent answered that this statement fitted with their own opinion and 49 per cent answered that it did not.

In the population sample, 27 per cent answered that the statement “I have a particular sympathy for Jews” fitted either completely or rather well with their own opinion, while 24 per cent of the Muslim

sample answered likewise. Fifty per cent of the population sample and 30 per cent of the Muslim sample did not support this statement.

Relatively many respondents answered “impossible to answer” to both questions. The proportion is larger in the Muslim sample than in the population sample; in the case of the question about dislike, it is more than three times larger (11 per cent of the population sample and 36 per cent of the Muslim sample). This result can be interpreted as a manifestation of unclear feelings or a lack of opinion. It is also possible that respondents consciously refrained from answering, for example, if they did not want to express a negative view. The result indicates the presence of different communicative boundaries, and perhaps that it is less acceptable in the general population to not have an opinion on the issue of antipathy towards Jews.

2.1.2 SOCIAL DISTANCE FROM JEWS

The two questions below measure the degree of social distance from Jews. The respondents were asked to give their views on having Jews as neigh-

²⁰ A difference that is significant means that the likelihood of it being due to chance during sampling is small; in other words, an equivalent difference probably exists in the population from which the sample is selected. The significance level, often 1 or 5 per cent, denotes the probability of the difference occurring by chance in a sample selected from a population within which no differences exist between the groups to be compared. The significance tests in this study were performed using the Zigne programme.

Table 1. Social distance: Jews as neighbours (Per cent. Population 2011 and 2017, Muslims)

To what extent would you like or dislike ... having Jews as neighbours?	Would like it	Wouldn't mind it	No response	Don't know	Would dislike it a little	Would dislike it a lot	Total
Population 2011 (1522)	13.6	73.0	0.0	2.9	7.4	3.2	100
Population 2017 (1575)	13.6	75.4	0.2	3.8	5.3	1.7	100
Muslims (586)	22.0	62.7	1.7	5.2	3.5	5.0	100

Table 2. Social distance: Jews in circle of friends (Per cent. Population 2011 and 2017, Muslims)

To what extent would you like or dislike ... having Jews in your circle of friends?	Would like it	Wouldn't mind it	No response	Don't know	Would dislike it a little	Would dislike it a lot	Total
Population 2011 (1,522)	13.9	72.8	0.0	3.4	6.4	3.4	100
Population 2017 (1,575)	17.9	70.5	0.3	4.3	5.0	2.0	100
Muslims (586)	23.6	55.8	1.6	7.8	5.3	5.9	100

bours or in their circle of friends. These questions were asked in the 2011 survey and were now asked of the population sample and the Muslim sample.

Changes from 2011 to 2017 (population sample)

In the present survey the general population's response is almost the same as in 2011, with a clear majority selecting "would like it" or "wouldn't mind it" to both questions. The proportion that would dislike having Jews as neighbours has decreased from 11 per cent in 2011 to 7 per cent in 2017. Similarly, the proportion that would dislike having Jews in their circle of friends has decreased from 10 per cent in 2011 to 7 per cent in 2017.

Results, by sample, 2017

The results show that a clear majority of respondents in both samples responded positively to having Jews as neighbours or in their circle of friends. Overall, 89 per cent of the population sample and 85 per cent of the Muslim sample answered either "would like it" or "wouldn't mind it" to the question about

having Jews as neighbours. Eighty-eight per cent of the population sample and 79 per cent of the Muslim sample responded positively to the question about having Jews in their circle of friends. Respondents in the Muslim sample more often selected answers on the most positive end of the scale. More respondents in the population sample selected "wouldn't mind it".

The proportion that responded negatively was almost the same for both samples, though a slightly higher percentage of Muslims selected responses at the far end of the scale for both questions; that is, they answered "would dislike it a lot". A slightly larger proportion of the Muslim sample responded negatively to having Jews in their circle of friends (11 per cent) than to having them as neighbours (8.5 per cent), whereas the responses of the general population to both questions were the same (7 per cent).

We also asked respondents in the population sample to give their opinion on the statement "It would be fine by me if a Jew were to become prime minister". This question is new in the 2017 survey. It touches on degree of trust, and can be seen as an extension of the

Table 3. Jewish prime minister (Per cent. Population 2017)

“It would be fine by me if a Jew were to become prime minister.” How well does this statement fit with your own opinion?	Not at all	Rather badly	Impossible to answer	No response	Rather well	Completely	Total
Population 2017 (800)	12.1	12.0	17.2	0.1	28.3	30.2	100

questions dealing with social distance. The results show that a majority would feel comfortable having a Jewish prime minister (58.5 per cent) while a quarter (24 per cent) of the general population answered that they would not. A closer analysis of the responses shows that this statement was rejected not only by respondents who expressed negative attitudes towards Jews (see [validation of the combined index of antisemitism on page 44](#)). The responses may therefore also have been motivated by factors other than antisemitism. A relatively large proportion (17 per cent) also declared the question impossible to answer. Perhaps this can be interpreted to mean that the respondents considered the issue to depend on the specific candidate and that the question could therefore not be answered on a general basis.

2.1.3 TRADITIONAL IMAGES (STEREOTYPES) OF JEWS

The contained a series of statements about Jews on which the respondents in the population sample and the Muslim sample were asked to express their opinion. The statements express stereotypical images that are commonly held in antisemitic ideas regarding issues such as power, finance and blame. Some statements express positive stereotypes, such as Jews being especially artistically talented or intelligent people. However, expressions like these are also group constructs, and as such can play a role in antisemitic attitudes. This question was asked in the 2011 survey.

Changes from 2011 to 2017 (population sample)

In both the 2011 and 2017 surveys, the majority of respondents who expressed an opinion answered “not at all” or “rather badly” to most of the statements. In both surveys the statement “Jews are very family oriented” was an exception in that it was supported by a majority (64 per cent in 2011 and 59 per cent in 2017). In 2011 the majority of respondents who expressed an opinion (38 per cent) also supported the statement “Jews have too much influence on US foreign policy”. This changed in 2017 and the majority no longer supported this statement (31 per cent supported it while 28.5 per cent did not).

All the statements received less support in 2017 than in 2011, except for the statement “Jews are more intelligent than others”, which was supported by around 9 per cent in both surveys. Some statements received notably less support in 2017: 8 per cent of the general population believed that “Jews have always caused problems in the countries in which they live” compared with 15 per cent in 2011. There was also a marked decrease (to 8 per cent in 2017) in support for the statement “Jews largely have themselves to blame for being persecuted”. In 2017 the statement “World Jewry is working behind the scenes the scenes to promote Jewish interests”, which is a classic antisemitic conspiracy theory, was supported by 13 per cent of the population sample. This represents a decrease of 6 percentage points from 2011.

How well do these statements fit with your own opinions?




Figure 3. Opinions on traditional stereotypes of Jews (Per cent. Population 2011 and 2017, Muslims)^{21*}

21 Decimals not included in the large graphs. The figures in the graphs may therefore differ from those in the report when multiple response categories are commented on collectively.

Results, by sample, 2017

Respondents in the Muslim sample supported these statements to a larger degree than respondents in the population sample. One exception was the statement “Jews are very family oriented”, for which 34 per cent of the Muslim sample answered “completely” or “rather well” compared with 59 per cent of the population sample. The statements that received strongest support among respondents in the Muslim sample were “Jews have too much influence on US foreign policy” (48.5 per cent, compared with 28.5 per cent of the population sample) and “Jews have too much influence on the global economy” (42 per cent, compared with 13 per cent of the population sample). A majority of Muslim respondents who expressed an opinion also supported the statement “World Jewry is working behind the scenes to promote Jewish interests” (28 per cent). The questions dealing with blame, on the other hand, received less support: a minority of Muslim respondents who expressed an opinion supported the statement “Jews have always caused problems in the countries in which they live” (16 per cent supported, 39 per cent rejected) and the statement “Jews largely have themselves to blame for being persecuted” (17 per cent supported, 37 per cent rejected). For these statements, the results for the Muslim sample are similar to those for the general population in the 2011 survey. One explanation for the lower support for these statements may be the experiences the respondents have of similar images of Muslims. This is also reflected in the findings from the group interviews, where generalisations of individuals’ actions and responsibility for negative attitudes are central issues. The following quotation from one of the group interviews similarly expresses the sense of sharing experiences in common with Jews: “[...] there’s nothing Muslims can identify more with in a European context than Jews. Because what we are experiencing today is to some extent what they

experienced then and to some extent what they’re experiencing today. In a way, we ought to be able to sympathise with them” (M2 27:45).

A large proportion of the respondents in both samples answered “impossible to answer” (between 22 and 55 per cent) to all the statements. There are many potential reasons for this. It may indicate that the questions were difficult to understand or that the respondents were unsure of how to answer them. It may also indicate some reservations on the part of the respondents about the generalisations made in the statements. More respondents in the Muslim sample (around 6 per cent) did not answer the questions than in the population sample (less than 1 per cent).

2.1.4 VIEWS OF JEWS IN CONNECTION WITH THE HOLOCAUST

The respondents in the population sample and the Muslim sample were asked whether they had heard of the Holocaust. Respondents who either confirmed this or were unsure were also asked to give their opinion on three statements about Jews in connection with the history of the Holocaust. These statements were also asked of respondents in the Jewish sample. The statements deal with three different aspects and possible interpretations of the subsequent history of the Holocaust, and the question concerns the degree to which attitudes towards Jews are influenced by the historical experience of the genocide.

Table 4. Knowledge about the Holocaust (Per cent. Population 2017 and Muslims)

	Yes	Not sure	No response	No	Total
Have you heard about the Holocaust?					
Population 2017 (1,575)	95.7	1.9	0.3	2.2	100
Muslims (586)	63.7	8.3	2.5	25.6	100

Table 5. Statements about Jews and the Holocaust (Per cent. Population 2011 and 2017, Jews and Muslims): How well do these statements about Jews and the Holocaust fit with your own opinions?

How well do these statements fit with your own opinion?								
		The statement fits:						Total
		Not at all	Rather badly	Impossible to answer	No response	Rather well	Completely	
<i>Jews exploit Holocaust victimhood for their own purposes</i>	Population 2011 (1,522)	13.2	31.8	30.3	0.4	18.8	5.5	100
	Population 2017 (1,535)	20.2	29.6	27.7	0.1	16.8	5.6	100
	Muslims (476)	10.1	12.5	33.8	13.8	15.9	13.8	100
	Jews (124)	72.6	16.9	4.8	2.4	2.4	0.8	100
<i>Because of the Holocaust Jews today are entitled to their own state, where they can seek protection from persecution</i>	Population 2011 (1,522)	19.7	24.2	30.0	0.3	18.7	7.2	100
	Population 2017 (1,535)	13.2	17.9	35.5	0.1	22.9	10.4	100
	Muslims (476)	11.9	10.9	33.7	13.5	16.3	13.6	100
	Jews (124)	6.5	16.9	12.9	2.4	20.2	41.1	100
<i>Knowledge about the Holocaust is important for preventing the oppression of minorities today</i>	Population 2017 (1,535)	0.7	2.5	8.9	0.1	31.4	56.4	100
	Muslims (476)	3.6	4.0	21.9	13.9	19.8	36.7	100
	Jews (124)	0.8	0.8	1.6	2.4	13.7	80.6	100

A large majority of respondents in both the population sample and the Muslim sample confirmed that they had heard about the Holocaust. The proportion in the population sample was largest, at 96 per cent. The proportion in the Muslim sample was notably smaller, at 64 per cent. Analyses showed a tendency of slightly more knowledge about the Holocaust among respondents who had received their education in Norway or elsewhere in Europe. This question was not asked in the 2011 survey.

Changes from 2011 to 2017 (population sample)

The first two statements were also used in the 2011 population survey. In both surveys the majority of respondents who expressed an opinion answered that the statement “Jews today exploit the memory of the Holocaust for their own benefit” did not fit with their own opinion. These results show an increase

from 45 per cent in 2011 to 50 per cent in 2017.

Furthermore, in the 2011 survey the majority of respondents who expressed an opinion (44 per cent) answered that the statement “Because of the Holocaust Jews today are entitled to their own state, where they can seek protection from persecution” did not fit with their own opinion. In the 2017 survey, however, the general population’s response was almost equally divided between support (33 per cent) and rejection (31 per cent).

In both the 2011 and 2017 surveys, around one-third of respondents answered “impossible to answer” to these two statements. The most notable change here was in the response to the question asking whether the Jews were entitled to their own state because of the Holocaust. The proportion here was 35.5 per cent in 2017 compared with 29 per cent in 2011.

Results, by sample, 2017

The statement “Jews today exploit the memory of the Holocaust for their own benefit” was supported by a larger proportion of the Muslim sample (30 per cent) than of the population sample (22 per cent) and of the Jewish sample (3 per cent). Correspondingly, the statement was rejected by almost 90 per cent of respondents in the Jewish sample, 50 per cent of the population sample and 23 per cent of the Muslim sample. However, almost half of the Muslim sample refrained from expressing an opinion on the statement (34 per cent answered “impossible to answer” and 14 per cent did not respond).

The statement “Because of the Holocaust Jews today are entitled to their own state, where they can seek protection from persecution” was most strongly supported by Jewish respondents (61 per cent answered “completely” or “rather well”). Support for this statement was almost as strong in the Muslim sample (30 per cent) as in the population sample (33 per cent), while far fewer respondents in the Muslim sample did not support it (23 per cent of the Muslim sample compared with 31 per cent of the population sample). This is interesting given that the Muslim respondents expressed far less support for Israel in the conflict with the Palestinians than did the respondents in the general population (see below). This may indicate an expression of sympathy for shared experiences of being a vulnerable minority. Again, the material from the group interviews may provide a deeper understanding. The result can also be viewed in relation to the fact that the Muslim sample supported the idea of both Israelis and Palestinians being entitled to a state of their own (70 per cent in both samples, [see page 39](#)).

Moreover, it is interesting that an equally large proportion (23 per cent) of the Jewish sample as of the Muslim sample did not consider Jews to be entitled to their own state because of the Holocaust. A reasonable explanation might be that the respon-

dents considered the matter from a longer-term perspective: the history of the Zionist project is much longer than that of the Holocaust. The result may tie in with a desire for the existence of Israel not to be legitimised solely by the Holocaust.

As with the responses from the population sample, the responses from the Muslim sample indicate that many respondents find it difficult to express their opinion on these statements. Thirty-four per cent answered “impossible to answer” to the first two statements in Table 5. Moreover, around 14 per cent of the Muslim respondents did not respond at all.

The third statement dealt with the relevance of knowledge about the Holocaust for today’s situation. The respondents were asked to express their opinion on the statement “Knowledge about the Holocaust is important for preventing the oppression of minorities today”. A clear majority in all three samples supported this statement. Support was highest among the Jewish respondents (94 per cent). Support in the general population was 88 per cent and among the Muslim respondents 56.5 per cent.

2.1.5 OPINIONS ON ISRAEL AND THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT

We also asked the respondents about their opinions on Israel and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This topic was also a central element in the first population survey. Now, as then, a key motive was to explore the connection between negative attitudes towards Jews and negative views on Israel’s role in the Middle East. Moreover, in the present survey the topic has gained in significance because the relevance of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to relations between Jews and Muslims extends beyond the scope of the conflict (see the introduction).

The respondents were first asked to answer a question about who they supported most in the conflict and then to express their opinion on a series

**Table 6. Opinions on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
(Per cent. Population 2011 and 2017, Muslims and Jews)**

People have conflicting views on the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. Which side do you support most?	Solely / mostly Israel	To some extent Israel	Neither	Impossible to answer	No response	To some extent Palestinians	Solely / mostly Palestinians	Total
Population 2011 (1,522)	8.1	4.7	30.3	20.8	0.0	12.7	23.3	100
Population 2017 (1,575)	8.8	4.5	31.9	22.3	0.2	10.5	21.9	100
Muslims (586)	2.9	0.4	17.3	15.5	4.7	7.2	52.0	100
Jews (124)	68.5	12.1	5.6	12.1	0.0	1.6	0.0	100

of statements. The questions were asked of the respondents in all three samples.

Changes from 2011 to 2017 (population sample)

In both the 2011 and 2017 surveys, a majority of those taking sides in the population sample expressed support for the Palestinians in the conflict. However, this proportion has decreased slightly, from 36 per cent in 2011 to 32 per cent in 2017. Correspondingly, the proportion that either supported neither side or declared the question impossible to answer has increased slightly, from 51 per cent in 2011 to 54 per cent in 2017. Support for Israel has remained stable, at 13 per cent in both surveys.

Results, by sample, 2017

As with the population sample, a majority of the Muslim sample expressed support for the Palestinians “to some extent”, “mostly”, or “solely” in the conflict. Support was stronger here than in the general population, accounting for 59 per cent. Support for Israel was correspondingly low: only 3 per cent of the Muslim sample stated reported supporting Israel. The results for the Jewish sample showed a directly opposite trend, expressing by far the strongest support for Israel: as much as 81 per cent of these respondents expressed their support for Israel, while support for the Palestinians was low, at less than 2 per cent.

Of all three samples, the proportion of respondents that either expressed support for neither side or declared the question impossible to answer was largest in the general population (54 per cent) and smallest in the Jewish sample (18 per cent). By comparison, one-third of respondents in the Muslim sample expressed no opinion.

To obtain a better picture of how different opinions on the conflict were distributed among the respondents, they were asked to express their opinion on the following statements:


Changes from 2011 to 2017 (population sample)

Many respondents in the 2017 survey believe that the existence of the State of Israel makes peace impossible. The statement “As long as the State of Israel exists there can be no peace” was supported by 20 per cent in 2017 compared with 16 per cent in 2011. Whereas in the 2011 survey half of the population did not support this statement, in the 2017 survey the corresponding proportion has decreased to 34 per cent. Despite this trend, the proportion supporting the statement “Israeli leaders genuinely want to find a solution to the conflict” has remained stable at just over 20 per cent in both surveys. Confidence in the Palestinian leaders’ will for peace, however, has decreased since 2011. The proportion supporting the statement “Palestinian leaders genuinely want to find a solution to the conflict” has decreased from 38 per cent in 2011 to 33 per cent in 2017.


How well do these statements fit with your own opinions about the Middle East conflict?

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%


Israel is at the forefront of the war on Islamic terrorism




Israel treats the Palestinians just as badly as the Jews were treated during World War II




Palestinian leaders genuinely want to find a solution to the conflict




Israel's leaders genuinely want to find a solution to the conflict



Both the Israelis and the Palestinians are entitled to a state of their own



As long as the State of Israel exists there can be no peace



■ Not at all ■ Rather badly ■ Impossible to answer ■ No response ■ Rather well ■ Completely

Figure 4. Statements on the Middle East conflict (Per cent. Population 2011 and 2017, Jews and Muslims)

In both the 2011 and the 2017 surveys, a clear majority believed that both parties in the conflict were entitled to a state of their own, but this proportion has decreased from 76 in 2011 to 70 per cent in 2017. The proportion supporting this has however remained low (6 per cent in 2011 and 7 per cent in 2017).

In the 2011 survey, 38 per cent of the population sample supported the statement “Israel treats the Palestinians just as badly as the Jews were treated during World War II”. This statement also received relatively strong support in 2017, though the proportion has decreased to 32 per cent. Meanwhile, the general population displayed a high level of uncertainty on

this issue, and far more so than in 2011: 37 per cent answered “impossible to answer” in 2017 compared with 29 per cent in 2011. This statement deals with an issue that is not uncommon in anti-Israel statements, where the historical roles of victim and perpetrator are reversed and the Jews/Israelis are depicted as Nazis. Moreover, the statement trivialises the fate of the Jews during the Holocaust.

The proportion of respondents responding to the other statements with “impossible to answer” was also large, and in some cases significantly larger in 2017 than in 2011. The greatest uncertainty was associated with the question of whether Israel was at the forefront of the war on Islamic terrorism (over 50 per cent answered “impossible to answer” in 2017).

Results, by sample, 2017

A larger proportion of respondents in the Muslim sample supported the statement “As long as the State of Israel exists there can be no peace” than in the population sample (25 per cent compared with 20 per cent). Not unexpectedly, this statement received less support among Jews (4 per cent).

The Muslim respondents also expressed far less confidence in the Israeli leaders’ will to find a solution to the conflict. Among the Muslim respondents, 9.5 per cent supported the statement “Israeli leaders genuinely want to find a solution to the conflict” compared with 22 per cent of the population sample. The statement received considerably more support among the respondents in the Jewish sample (64 per cent). By contrast, most of the Muslim respondents (43 per cent) had confidence in the Palestinian leaders’ will to find a solution. This statement was supported by 33 per cent of the population sample and 12 per cent of the Jewish sample.

Over half of the Muslim sample supported the statement “Israel treats the Palestinians just as badly as the Jews were treated during World War II”. None of the Jewish respondents supported this statement

(but 32 per cent of the population sample did).

There were also marked differences between the responses of the Jewish sample and those of the other two samples regarding the question of Islamic terrorism and the role of Israel: while a clear majority (64.5 per cent) of the Jewish sample supported the statement “Israel is at the forefront of the war on Islamic terrorism”, support among the general and Muslim populations was far weaker (19 per cent and 17 per cent respectively).

The respondents in all three samples supported the statement “Both the Israelis and the Palestinians are entitled to a state of their own”. The Muslim sample and the population sample expressed the same level of support (70 per cent), while the statement received even stronger support from the Jewish sample (81 per cent).

2.1.6 VIEWS ON HARASSMENT AND VIOLENCE AGAINST JEWS

Based on the violent attacks on Jews in some European countries of recent years, we asked the respondents about their views on harassment and violence against Jews, what lies behind such attacks, and what they say about the situation in Europe. The questions were asked of the population sample and the Muslim sample, and are new in the 2017 survey.

Results, by sample, 2017

A clear majority in both samples supported the statement “Harassment and violence against Jews concern everyone and constitute an attack on our society”. However, the statement was supported by a significantly larger proportion of the population sample (76 per cent) than the Muslim sample (47 per cent). The population sample also believed that such attacks illustrate how hatred of Jews has become a serious problem in Europe (49 per cent). The Muslim sample’s responses to the statement




Figure 5. Views on harassment and violence against Jews (Per cent. Population 2017 and Muslims)

divided equally between support (28 per cent) and rejection (27 per cent).

A majority in both samples rejected the statement “Considering how Israel treats the Palestinians, harassment and violence against Jews are justifiable”. A relatively large proportion of the respondents supported it, however, and in the Muslim sample more so than in the population sample (20 percent and 12 per cent respectively). This result can be viewed in connection with the 2011 survey and the population’s response to the statement dealing with a shooting incident at the Oslo synagogue in 2006. In that survey 4 per cent considered the incident to be

justifiable given Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians.

A clear majority of the population supported the statement that the problem of violence and harassment against Jews could be attributed to extremists. The Muslim respondents were more often unsure, and around as many answered “impossible to answer”. In both samples, the majority of respondents who expressed an opinion supported the statement that Muslim leaders must do more to combat antisemitism. Again, the Muslim respondents were more often unsure, and almost as many refrained from expressing an opinion (around 40 per cent).

2.1.7 INDICES FOR ANTISEMITISM

In this section the results are reviewed to gain a better understanding of attitudes in terms of reasons, scope and trends. To endeavour to determine the prevalence of negative attitudes towards Jews in the Norwegian population with the help of an interview survey is no easy task. The distribution of responses to a specific question will depend not only on the subject matter but also on the wording and the response options provided. It is therefore expedient to use multiple questions with varied content and form, and analyse the overall pattern of the responses. This can be done by constructing indices that combine multiple questions with related content. Using multiple questions provides more reliable measurements because it reduces the impact of random errors. It also produces more valid measurements of complex features that cannot be captured by a single question. We have therefore constructed indices for each of the three dimensions of attitudes and then combined them in an overall index.

The indices should capture the three aspects of antisemitism described above: a cognitive dimension, an affective dimension and a dimension for social distance. These were measured in the same manner in 2011 and 2017. Although there will be some uncertainty regarding the estimated *level* of antisem-

itism in each year, since this will depend on how the measuring instrument is designed, there will be less uncertainty regarding the direction of *change* in that level between the two points in time.

INDEX 1: PREJUDICE AGAINST JEWS (COGNITIVE DIMENSION OF ATTITUDES)

Table 7 shows how many respondents in 2011 and 2017 considered the six statements containing stereotypes that were used for the index of prejudice against Jews to fit with their own opinions completely, rather well, rather badly or not at all. “Impossible to answer” is also provided as a response option, and the few respondents who did not tick any responses are denoted in the table as NR (“No response”).

The statements are arranged by the proportion that answered “rather well” or “completely” in 2011. The sum of these proportions then varied between 13 and 26 per cent. In 2017 the corresponding proportions range from 8 to 13 per cent. For all the statements, the percentages that answered that they fitted with the respondents’ own opinions are smaller in 2017, showing a decrease of between 3 and 8 percentage points. All the changes are statistically significant at the one-per cent level; that is, they are reliable in the sense that the risk of their being due to chance when the sample was selected is less than 1 per cent.

Figure 6. Distribution on the index on prejudice against Jews (Per cent. Population 2011 and 2017)




Table 7. Statements used in the index on prejudice against Jews (Per cent. Population 2011 and 2017)

Presented below is a list of statements that have previously been made about Jews. How well do these statements fit with your own opinions?								
	The statement fits:							
		Not at all	Rather badly	Impossible to answer / NA	Rather well	Completely	Total	Rather well / Completely
<i>Jews consider themselves to be better than others</i>	Population 2011	15.8	21.6	36.3	19.9	6.4	100	26.3
	Population 2017	20	23.7	38.4	13.6	4.3	100	17.9
	Change	4.2	2.1	2.1	-6.3	-2.1	0	-8.4
<i>Jews have too much influence on the global economy</i>	Population 2011	17.1	24.5	37.5	16.4	4.4	99.9	20.8
	Population 2017	19.8	26	41.4	9.8	3.1	100.1	12.9
	Change	2.7	1.5	3.9	-6.6	-1.3	0.2	-7.9
<i>World Jewry is working behind the scenes to promote Jewish interests</i>	Population 2011	17.4	20.7	42.9	15.2	3.9	100.1	19.1
	Population 2017	20.9	21.2	44.8	9.6	3.5	100	13.1
	Change	3.5	0.5	1.9	-5.6	-0.4	-0.1	-6
<i>Jews have always caused problems in the countries in which they live</i>	Population 2011	27.2	30.3	27.9	11.2	3.4	100	14.6
	Population 2017	31	31.3	29.4	6	2.3	100	8.3
	Change	3.8	1	1.5	-5.2	-1.1	0	-6.3
<i>Jews have enriched themselves at the expense of others</i>	Population 2011	22.2	28.1	35.1	11.8	2.8	100	14.6
	Population 2017	23.1	28.6	36.7	9	2.6	100	11.6
	Change	0.9	0.5	1.6	-2.8	-0.2	0	-3
<i>Jews largely have themselves to blame for being persecuted</i>	Population 2011	38.6	27.1	21.7	10.3	2.3	100	12.6
	Population 2017	39.4	30.5	22	6.4	1.7	100	8.1
	Change	0.8	3.4	0.3	-3.9	-0.6	0	-4.5

On the index of prejudice against Jews, 1 point is assigned to the response "rather well" and 2 to "completely". When the scores for the six statements are added up, this produces an index varying between 0 and 12 points (Figure 6). The distributions show high proportions for the lowest score (0). This indicates that most of the respondents considered none

of the six statements to fit with their own opinions. This applied to 55 per cent in 2011 and 69 per cent in 2017, representing an increase of as much as 14 percentage points.

To create the combined index of antisemitism, each of the three sub-indices was dichotomised. On the prejudice index, the cut-off point was set

between scores of 3 and 4. According to this dichotomy, 12.1 per cent of the respondents showed high levels of prejudice against Jews in 2011, while the percentage in 2017 fell to 8.3 per cent, representing a decrease of 3.8 percentage points.

The highest index scores occur extremely rarely. The percentage of respondents scoring in the 10–12 interval was 1.3 per cent in 2011 and 1.4 per cent in 2017. Above the midpoint on the scale (7–12 points) the percentages were 4.7 percent in 2011 and 3.5 per cent in 2017. The decrease of 1.2 percentage points is negligible, though large enough for us to conclude that fewer members of the adult Norwegian population scored in the upper half of the prejudice scale (with a significance level of 5 per cent).

INDEX 2: SOCIAL DISTANCE FROM JEWS

As described above, the respondents were asked about how they would react to having Jews as neighbours or in their circle of friends. The responses were combined to construct an index of social distance. The difference in the distribution of responses to the two questions was negligible. In 2011, 11 per cent answered the question of having Jews as neighbours with “would dislike it a little” or “would dislike it a lot”, compared with 10 per cent in response to the question about having them join their circle of friends. As shown in Tables 1 and 2, the percentages in 2017 fell to 7 per cent for both types of social relations with Jews. Both these changes are statistically significant at the 1 per cent level.

On the index of social distance, each question concerning social contact is coded with 1 point for “would dislike it a little” and 2 for “would dislike it a lot”, producing scores from 0 to 4. When the index was dichotomised, the cut-off point was set between




Figure 7. Index on social distance from Jews (Per cent. Population 2011 and 2017)

1 and 2, meaning that respondents had to, at the very least, either dislike both types of relationship a little or dislike one of them a lot. This yields proportions with high scores of 8.5 per cent in 2011 and 5.9 per cent in 2017.²² The difference of 2.6 percentage points is statistically significant at the 1 per cent level.

INDEX 3: DISLIKE OF JEWS

The index of dislike of Jews is largely based on the question asking how the respondents react to the statement “I have a certain dislike of Jews”. When the index was constructed, the responses to the statement concerning sympathy were used to adjust the index score by assigning 0 for responses expressing both dislike and sympathy on the dislike index.²³ This response pattern may be due to one of the questions being answered incorrectly. It may also be due to genuine ambivalence. Feelings can be positive due to, for instance, the Jews’ particular history, yet simultaneously negative due to, for instance, Israel’s policy towards the Palestinians today. Regardless,

²² The total for the proportions for 2–4 in the figure is 8.6 per cent. The result is 8.5 per cent because two decimals are used in the calculations. The same applies for the other indices.

²³ The figures for scores 1 and 2, which yield high values when the index is dichotomised, are therefore somewhat lower in Figure 6 than the proportions that answered “rather well” or “completely” to the question about dislike of Jews. The proportions drop from 11.2 per cent to 9.8 per cent in 2011 and from 7.5 per cent to 6.7 per cent in 2017.




Figure 8. Index on dislike of Jews (Per cent. Population 2011 and 2017)

there may be grounds for disregarding such ambivalent response patterns when defining dislike of Jews and just include those respondents who only express dislike. If responses to the question of dislike are assigned 2 points for “completely”, 1 for “rather well” and 0 for other responses (as well as 0 for everyone who expresses sympathy towards Jews), we are left with an index ranging from 0 to 2 (Figure 8).

The percentage of high scores on the dichotomised index of dislike is 9.8 per cent in 2011 and 6.7 per cent in 2017, representing a decrease of 3.1 percentage points (significant at the 1 per cent level).

INDEX 4: COMBINED INDEX OF ANTISEMITISM

The three indices can be combined in an overall index of antisemitism. The sub-indices measure different aspects of negative perceptions of Jews, namely prejudice, social distance and dislike. By adding the number of high scores, we obtain a combined index of antisemitic attitudes ranging from 0 to 3.

Very few respondents exhibit all three forms of negative attitudes; only 2.4 per cent in 2011 and 2.1 per cent in 2017. The vast majority exhibited no negative attitudes: 80 per cent in 2011 and 87 per cent in 2017.

If the combined index is dichotomised so that a high value is assigned for score 2 and score 3, this




Figure 9. Combined index on antisemitism (Per cent. Population 2011 and 2017)

means that in order to be classified as having antisemitic attitudes, respondents must have a high score for at least two of the three dimensions of attitudes towards Jews (prejudice, social distance and dislike). This gives an estimate of the incidence of antisemitism in the adult Norwegian population of 7.8 per cent in 2011 and 5.5 per cent in 2017 (the decrease of 2.3 percentage points is statistically significant at the 1 per cent level).

VALIDATION OF THE COMBINED INDEX OF ANTISEMITISM

We can test whether the index captures what we understand as antisemitism by examining the correlation between index scores and various opinions where attitudes towards Jews are expected to create clear differences in the distribution of the responses. Table 8 shows such correlations, with sharply increasing or decreasing proportions as we move from score 0 to 3 on the combined index. This gives reason to conclude that the index actually measures as intended, meaning that it is a valid measure of antisemitism.

When validity was tested in the report for the 2011 survey using other test questions, the greatest difference in the distributions occurred between scores

Table 8. Correlation between position on the combined index on antisemitism and opinions on Jews and their situation (Per cent. Population 2017)

	The statement fits:	Combined index on antisemitism				% Difference High-Low
		0 Low	1	2	3 High	
<i>It would be fine by me if a Jew were to become prime minister</i>	Completely / Rather well	65	32	7	0	-65
	Impossible to answer / NA	18	21	5	0	-18
	Rather badly / Not at all	18	47	88	100	82
	Total	101	100	100	100	
<i>Harassment and violence against Jews concern everyone and constitute an attack on our society</i>	Completely / Rather well	79	62	60	33	-46
	Impossible to answer / NA	16	23	15	27	11
	Rather badly / Not at all	5	16	25	40	35
	Total	100	101	100	100	0
<i>Considering how Israel treats the Palestinians, harassment and violence against Jews are justifiable</i>	Completely / Rather well	8	30	38	54	46
	Impossible to answer / NA	26	23	19	15	-11
	Rather badly / Not at all	66	47	44	31	-35
	Total	100	100	101	100	0
<i>Jews exploit Holocaust victimhood for their own purposes</i>	Completely / Rather well	15	64	69	91	76
	Impossible to answer / NA	30	18	14	5	-25
	Rather badly / Not at all	55	18	17	5	-50
	Total	100	100	100	101	1
<i>Distribution on the index</i>		86.7	7.9	3.4	2.1	Sum 100

1 and 2 on the combined index.²⁴ This explains the dichotomisation of 0-1 versus 2-3, which produced 7.8 per cent for high level of antisemitism in 2011 and 5.5 per cent in 2017. Such a dichotomy fits with the response pattern for the proportion that did not feel comfortable with having a Jewish prime minister in Norway in Table 8, which increases from 47 per cent to 88 per cent between scores 1 and 2.

However, the difference in the distribution of responses for the other three questions in the 2017 survey, as shown in Table 8, is greater between scores 0 and 1 than between scores 1 and 2. This means that the group with score 1 more closely resembles the group with score 2 than the group with score 0. This is an argument for using the dichotomy 0 versus 1-3,

which provides the distribution 87-13 for low versus high level of antisemitism in 2017 instead of 95-5. Such a dichotomy, where more scores are assigned a high value on the combined index so that the proportion of antisemitism will increase, will imply a slightly sharper decrease in antisemitism in Norway between 2011 and 2017. The proportion of high scores will fall from 20.2 per cent to 13.3 per cent (by 6.9 points) instead of from 7.8 per cent to 5.5 per cent (by 2.3 points) using the original dichotomy.²⁵ In the further analysis, however, in order to facilitate comparison with the results from 2011, we will adhere to the original dichotomization of the index into 0-1 versus 2-3 for low versus high level of antisemitism. The same dichotomy is also used for the combined index of Islamophobia.

²⁴ Center for Studies of the Holocaust and Religious Minorities 2012, pages 56-58.

²⁵ The difference will be less if the decrease is estimated in terms of relative rather than absolute differences. Relative to the initial value, the decrease from 20.2 to 13.3 represents a 34 per cent reduction, while the decrease from 7.8 to 5.5 represents a 29 per cent reduction.

ATTITUDES TOWARDS JEWS AMONG RESPONDENTS OF IMMIGRANT BACKGROUND

Presented below is the distribution on the four indices for the results from the Muslim sample. The calculations were performed in the same way as for the population sample. To provide an additional basis for comparison, we have included those respondents in the immigrant sample who did not describe themselves as Muslim (referred to as “Others”). This provides us with both a sample of Muslims and a sample of other individuals with backgrounds from countries with predominantly Muslim populations. The “Others” sample comprises particularly large proportions of respondents from Iran, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Iraq. Immigrants from these three countries account for 70 per cent of this sample (see Table 9).

It is important to emphasize that the composition of both samples must be seen as highly diverse, not only in terms of country background and religiosity, but also in terms of other factors, such as reasons for coming to Norway. It can be assumed that many of these factors have a bearing on the attitudes discussed in the present study. More research is needed to be able to give supplementary answers to questions such as the reason for antisemitic attitudes or the absence of negative attitudes.




Figure 10. Difference between the samples for index on prejudice against Jews (Per cent. Population 2017, Muslims and “Others”)

Table 9. Composition of the sample of immigrants from countries with predominantly Muslim populations (N, 2017)

	Muslims	Others	Total
Afghanistan	72	15	87
Bosnia and Herzegovina	38	37	75
Iraq	90	46	136
Iran	34	87	121
Kosovo	25	8	33
Morocco	36	2	38
Pakistan	93	11	104
Palestine	10	2	12
Somalia	135	17	152
Turkey	53	17	70
Total	586	242	828

INDEX 1: PREJUDICE AGAINST JEWS

Prejudice against Jews is more prevalent in the two immigrant samples than in the population sample, but the difference is small for the “Others” sample. The proportion of respondents in this group that answered “rather well” or “completely” to two of the statements is smaller compared with the population sample. The difference between the population sample and the immigrant samples is greatest with regard to responses to the statement “Jews have too much influence on the global economy” and smallest with regard to responses to the statements “Jews have always caused problems in the countries in which they live” and “Jews largely have themselves to blame for being persecuted”.

The proportions in both immigrant samples that expressed no opinion on these statements were larger than in the population sample. This means that the proportion that responded “positively” in the sense that they considered the negative statements to fit rather badly or not at all was smaller than in the population sample.

Figure 10 summarises the differences between the three samples in the form of distribution on the index of prejudice against Jews. As previously

Table 10. Statements used in the index on prejudice against Jews (Per cent. Population 2017, Muslims and Others [immigrants selected from the same countries but who described themselves as non-Muslim])

Presented below is a list of statements that have previously been made about Jews. How well do these statements fit with your own opinions?								
		The statement fits:					Total	Rather well / Completely
		Not at all	Rather badly	Impossible to answer / NA	Rather well	Completely		
<i>Jews consider themselves to be better than others</i>	Population 2017	20.0	23.7	38.4	13.6	4.3	100	17.9
	Muslims	10.2	8.4	48.3	18.1	15.0	100	33.1
	Others	16.0	14.0	48.5	13.2	8.3	100	21.5
<i>Jews have too much influence on the global economy</i>	Population 2017	19.8	26.0	41.4	9.8	3.1	100	12.8
	Muslims	4.4	4.7	48.6	21.1	21.2	100	42.3
	Others	10.6	5.0	50.7	20.9	12.8	100	33.7
<i>World Jewry is working behind the scenes to promote Jewish interests</i>	Population 2017	20.9	21.2	44.8	9.6	3.5	100	13.1
	Muslims	9.1	8.1	54.5	15.1	13.2	100	28.4
	Others	14.4	9.3	53.6	14.1	8.6	100	22.7
<i>Jews have always caused problems in the countries in which they live</i>	Population 2017	20.0	23.7	38.4	13.6	4.3	100	17.9
	Muslims	10.2	8.4	48.3	18.1	15.0	100	33.1
	Others	16.0	14.0	48.5	13.2	8.3	100	21.5
<i>Jews have enriched themselves at the expense of others</i>	Population 2017	19.8	26.0	41.4	9.8	3.1	100	12.8
	Muslims	4.4	4.7	48.6	21.1	21.2	100	42.3
	Others	10.6	5.0	50.7	20.9	12.8	100	33.7
<i>Jews largely have themselves to blame for being persecuted</i>	Population 2017	20.9	21.2	44.8	9.6	3.5	100	13.1
	Muslims	9.1	8.1	54.5	15.1	13.2	100	28.4
	Others	14.4	9.3	53.6	14.1	8.6	100	22.7

explained, 1 point was assigned for the response “rather well” and 2 points for “completely”. When the index is dichotomised, the proportion with high values is 8 per cent in the population sample, 15 per cent in the “Others” sample, and 29 per cent in the Muslim immigrants sample.

INDEX 2: SOCIAL DISTANCE FROM JEWS

Regarding views on desired social distance from Jews, the differences between the samples are small.

The respondents in the Muslim immigrants sample answered more often than the population sample that they would dislike both forms of contact, while the corresponding proportion of respondents in the “Others” sample was the smallest (the difference is significant at the 1 per cent level). The proportion of respondents that would like these forms of contact is large in both immigrant samples and largest in the Muslim sample (the differences compared with the population sample are significant at the 1 per cent level).

Table 11. Difference between the samples regarding attitudes towards having contact with Jews (Per cent. Population 2017, Muslims and “Others”: immigrants selected from the same countries but who described themselves as non-Muslim)

To what extent would you like or dislike...		Would like it	Wouldn't mind it	Don't know	Would dislike it a little	Would dislike it a lot	TOTAL	Would dislike it a little + Would dislike it a lot
<i>having Jews as neighbours?</i>	Population 2017	13.6	75.4	4.0	5.3	1.7	100	7.0
	Muslims	22.0	62.7	6.9	3.5	5.0	100	8.5
	Others	20.0	64.9	12.3	1.6	1.2	100	2.8
<i>having Jews in your circle of friends?</i>	Population 2017	17.9	70.5	4.6	5.0	2.0	100	7.0
	Muslims	23.6	55.8	9.4	5.3	5.9	100	11.2
	Others	21.9	60.4	12.7	3.8	1.2	100	5.0

The result for the index shows that just over 97 per cent of respondents in the “Others” sample expressed no dislike of either form of contact, compared with 92 per cent of the population sample and 88 per cent of the Muslim immigrants sample. When the index is dichotomised, the proportion with high scores in the population sample accounts for 5.9 per cent, in the Muslim sample 9.9 per cent, and in the “Others” sample 1.5 per cent.




Figure 11. Difference between the samples for index on social distance from Jews (Per cent. Population 2017, Muslims and “Others”)

INDEX 3: DISLIKE OF JEWS

Regarding dislike of and sympathy for Jews, a slightly larger proportion of respondents in the Muslim immigrants sample than in the population sample thought that the statement “I have a certain dislike of Jews” fitted completely or rather well with their own opinion, while the proportion in the “Others” sample was slightly smaller. Since the two immigrant samples are relatively small (586 and 242 respondents), these differences are too small to be significant (5 per cent level). The proportion that expressed no opinion is far larger in the immigrant samples than in the population sample, and the proportion that rejected the statement is proportionately smaller.

For the dichotomised index of dislike of Jews, which is based on the negative response options, the proportion of high scores in the two immigrant samples is smaller than in the population sample: 4.7 per cent of the Muslim sample and 2.2 per cent of the “Others” sample, compared with 6.7 per cent of the population sample. This is partly due to the tendency among members of the immigrant samples to express both dislike and sympathy more often than the population sample. The reductions made due to respondents combining dislike with sympathy are 0.8 percentage points in the population sample, 4.4 in the Muslim immigrants sample and 3.7 in the “Others” sample.

Table 12. Difference between the samples regarding dislike of and sympathy for Jews (Per cent. Population 2017, Muslims and “Others”: immigrants selected from the same countries but who described themselves as non-Muslim)

How well does this statement fit with your own opinion?		Not at all	Rather well	Impossible to answer / NA	Rather well	Completely	TOTAL	Rather well + Completely
<i>I have a certain dislike of Jews</i>	Population 2017	48.6	32.7	11.3	5.9	1.6	100	7.5
	Muslims	35.7	13.4	41.8	6.9	2.2	100	9.1
	Others	52.5	11.2	30.4	4.5	1.5	100	6.0
<i>I have a particular sympathy for Jews</i>	Population 2017	22.0	27.6	23.3	20.8	6.3	100	27.1
	Muslims	17.7	12.0	45.9	15.3	9.1	100	24.4
	Others	22.8	7.0	42.2	19.4	8.7	100	28.1




Figure 12. Difference between the samples for index on dislike of Jews (Per cent. Population 2017, Muslims and “Others”)




Figure 13. Difference between the samples for combined index on antisemitism. (Per cent. Population 2017, Muslims and “Others”)

INDEX 4: COMBINED INDEX OF ANTISEMITISM

The combined index of the three types of negative views shows negligible differences between the three samples. When the index is dichotomised, the sample of non-Muslim immigrants (“Others”) shows the smallest proportion of high scores (only 2.6 per cent) compared with the population sample (5.5 per cent) and the Muslim sample (6.9 per cent). The differences between the population sample, the Muslim sample and the “Others” sample are significant at the 1 per cent level, while the results for the population sample and the Muslim sample do not differ significantly.

One problem when interpreting the results of these indices is that the proportion that refrains from expressing an opinion (either by selecting “impossible to answer” or by leaving questions unanswered) is larger in the two immigrant samples than in the population sample, as shown in Tables 10, 11 and 12. Only negative responses contribute to high scores (with +1 or +2) on the indices, while no distinction is made between refraining from expressing an opinion and giving a positive response (both of which are assigned a score of 0). When constructing the index, we chose to place emphasis on the extent to which a response expressed an explicitly negative view. The

question is whether this scoring of the indices has any effect on the impression of differences existing between the population sample and the Muslim sample.

We tested this by instead assigning the response options for the questions included in the index with 0 and 1 for the two positive responses and with 3 and 4 for the two negative responses, and to assign 2 for the response “impossible to answer” or to leaving a

question unanswered. This change proved to have minimal effect on the results. With the new score, the proportion of the Muslim sample with a high level of antisemitism is still only slightly and not significantly larger than the population sample on the combined index, while the proportion of the “Others” sample is significantly smaller than both. See chapter 3 for a more detailed analysis of the reasons for attitudes.

2.2 Attitudes towards Muslims

In the same way as for the questions about attitudes towards Jews, the respondents in the Muslim sample were asked questions about attitudes towards Muslims that can be analytically divided into three dimensions: a cognitive dimension (prejudice), an affective dimension (sympathy and antipathy) and one that measures degree of social distance. The questions concerning social distance were also asked in the 2011 survey.

2.2.1 FEELINGS OF SYMPATHY AND ANTIPATHY TOWARDS MUSLIMS

Presented below are the responses to the questions about sympathy and antipathy towards Muslims. These questions were asked of the population

sample and the Jewish sample, and are new in the 2017 survey.

Results, by sample, 2017

Both statements were rejected by the majority of respondents in both samples. In the population sample, however, around twice as many respondents (30 per cent) expressed a dislike of Muslims as expressed sympathy (14 per cent). The Jewish respondents expressed dislike less frequently and sympathy more often than did the general population. Moreover, the distribution of support in the Jewish sample was almost identical for both questions: 23 per cent expressed sympathy and 22 per cent expressed dislike.

The proportion of respondents in both samples that answered “impossible to answer” to both ques-




Figure 14. Sympathy for Muslims (Per cent. Population 2017 and Jews)

“I have a certain dislike of Muslims.” How well does this statement fit with your own opinion?




Figure 15. Dislike of Muslims (Per cent. Population 2017 and Jews)

tions was relatively high. This was also the case for the question about sympathy and antipathy towards Jews. Again, this may be explained by unclear feelings or lack of opinion, or by a wish not to show either. It is also reasonable to assume that the results are related to the general wording of the questions, where respondents are asked to consider their own feelings towards Muslims and Jews as groups.

2.2.2 SOCIAL DISTANCE FROM MUSLIMS

Presented below are two questions that measure the degree of social distance from Muslims. Similar to the questions that were asked about Jews, the respondents were asked to express their opinion on

having Muslims as neighbours or in their circle of friends. The questions were asked of the population sample and the Jewish sample, and were also asked in the 2011 survey.

Changes from 2011 to 2017 (population sample)

In both surveys a clear majority of the general population answered that they would like or would not mind having Muslims as neighbours or in their circle of friends. The proportion that expressed scepticism is slightly smaller in 2017 than in 2011 for both questions: (as neighbours: 26 per cent compared with 28 per cent; in circle of friends: 21 per cent compared with 24.5 per cent). The decrease of 3.5 percentage points in the proportion of respondents that would dislike having Muslims in their circle of friends is significant (at the 5

Table 13. Muslims as neighbours (Per cent. Population 2011 and 2017, and Jews)

To what extent would you like or dislike ... having Muslims as neighbours?	Would like it	Wouldn't mind it	NA	Don't know	Would dislike it a little	Would dislike it a lot	Total
Population 2011 (1,522)	6.8	62.6	0.0	2.7	15.3	12.6	100
Population 2017 (1,562)	8.1	61.1	0.2	4.7	15.1	10.9	100
Jews (162)	14.2	62.3	0.0	3.7	12.3	7.4	100

Table 14. Muslims in circle of friends (Per cent. Population 2011 and 2017, and Jews)

To what extent would you like or dislike ... having Muslims in your circle of friends?	Would like it	Wouldn't mind it	NA	Don't know	Would dislike it a little	Would dislike it a lot	Total
Population 2011 (1,522)	9.5	62.7	0.0	3.4	12.8	11.7	100
Population 2017 (1,562)	13.4	59.8	0.5	5.4	11.5	9.4	100
Jews (124)	29.0	54.3	0.6	3.7	8.6	3.7	100

Table 15. Muslim prime minister (Per cent. Population 2017)

"It would be fine by me if a Muslim were to become prime minister." How well does this statement fit with your own opinion?	Not at all	Rather well	Impossible to answer	NA	Rather well	Completely	Total
Population 2017 (775)	36.6	16.5	16.3	0.3	16.4	13.9	100

per cent level), while the decrease of 1.9 percentage points in dislike of having Muslims as neighbours may be due to random sampling error. In both surveys the general population was more sceptical about having Muslims as neighbours than in their circle of friends.

Results, by sample, 2017

The majority of respondents in the Jewish sample also responded positively to having contact with Muslims. The proportion that answered "would like it" or "wouldn't mind it" to both questions is larger than in the general population: 76.5 per cent of the Jewish respondents responded positively to having Muslims as neighbours, and 83 per cent to having Muslims in their circle of friends, compared with 69 per cent (as neighbours) and 73 per cent (in their circle of friends) of the general population. The largest difference between the two samples is in the percentage of responses on the positive end of the scale: the proportion of respondents that would like contact with Muslims was decidedly larger in the Jewish sample than in the general population. The Jewish respondents were also more sceptical about having Muslims as neighbours (20 per cent would dislike it) than about having them in their circle of

friends (12 per cent would dislike it).

We also asked the respondents in the population sample whether they would be comfortable having a Muslim prime minister. This question is new in the 2017 survey, and corresponds to the question about having a Jewish prime minister. It touches on degree of trust, and can be seen as an extension of the questions dealing with social distance. The results show that more than half (53 per cent) of the respondents rejected the idea of having a Muslim prime minister, while one-third (30 per cent) would feel comfortable with it. Similar to the question about a Jewish prime minister, however, closer analysis shows that the statement was rejected not only by respondents who expressed negative attitudes towards Muslims (see [validation of the combined index of Islamophobia on page 58](#)). The responses may therefore partly be motivated by factors other than Islamophobia. Similar to the results from the question about a Jewish prime minister, a relatively large proportion (16 per cent) also found the question "impossible to answer". Again, a reasonable explanation for this is that the respondents considered the issue to depend on the specific candidate's qualifications, and that the question could therefore not be answered on a general basis.




Figure 16. Opinions on stereotypes of Muslims (Per cent. Population 2017 and Jews)

2.2.3 STEREOTYPES OF MUSLIMS

The respondents were asked to express their opinion on a series of statements about Muslims. The statements express stereotypical images that are commonly held in Islamophobic ideas, including ones associated with the will and ability of Muslims to integrate in Norway and the West, their views on women, and violence. Some statements deal with positive images, such as Muslims as family oriented. These questions were asked of the population sample and the Jewish sample, and are new in the 2017 survey.

Results, by sample, 2017

All the statements received relatively high support in the population sample (none under 29 per cent), and the results reveal widespread prejudice against Muslims. The population sample also expressed more support for all the negative statements than did the Jewish sample. A majority in both samples supported the statement “Muslims oppress women” (69 per cent of the population sample and 59 per cent of the Jewish sample). However, the two positive statements “Muslims are very family oriented” and “Muslims are good Norwegian citizens” also received broad support. The material thus expresses complex views, or the findings can be understood to express a wish by respondents not to appear prejudiced.

In response to four of the statements, the majority of respondents who expressed an opinion answered “rather badly” or “not at all”. Nonetheless, these statements were supported by between 20 per cent and 40 per cent of both samples: 36 per cent of the population sample and 20 per cent of the Jewish sample supported the statement “Muslims do not fit into modern Western society”. The distribution of responses is quite similar for the statement “Muslims

pose a threat to Norwegian culture” (39 per cent and 22 per cent respectively). The statements deal with issues that also recurred in responses to the open-ended questions regarding the reasons for negative attitudes towards Muslims ([see pages 66–71](#)). Moreover, almost one-third of the population sample (30 per cent) and one-fifth of the Jewish sample (21 per cent) supported the statement “Muslims want to take over Europe”.

The tendency in the responses to some of the statements differed between the samples: while the statement “Muslims do not want to integrate into Norwegian society” was supported by a majority of the population sample (42 per cent), it was supported by 27 per cent of the Jewish sample (54 per cent of which did not support it). A majority in the population sample (45 per cent) also supported the statement “Muslims consider themselves morally superior to others”, while the responses from the Jewish sample were equally distributed between support and rejection (approximately 36 per cent).

Some of the statements bear similarities to traditional stereotypes of Jews. Familiarity with such prejudicial constructs may explain why they received less support among respondents in the Jewish sample. One example is the statement “Muslims largely have themselves to blame for the increase in anti-Muslim harassment”, which was supported by almost half of the population sample (47 per cent). This statement received far less support from the Jewish sample (35 per cent) and was rejected by the majority (51.5 per cent). Perhaps the difference can be explained by Jews’ experiences of similar accusations of blame for persecution of the Jews. It is interesting to note that the level of support among the Muslim respondents for the corresponding statements concerning blame for prejudice against Jews was also relatively low ([see page 34](#)).




Figure 17. Views on harassment and violence against Muslims (Per cent. Population 2017 and Jews)

2.2.4 VIEWS ON HARASSMENT AND VIOLENCE AGAINST MUSLIMS

In light of recent events in Europe, the respondents were asked to express their opinion on five statements concerning harassment and violence against Muslims. This question is new in the 2017 survey, and was asked of the population sample and the Jewish sample.

Results, by sample, 2017

A clear majority in both samples supported the statements about how harassment and violence against Muslim concern everyone, represent an attack on our society, and show that hatred of Muslims has become a serious problem. At the same time, a large

majority in both samples (around half of the respondents) believed such acts were committed primarily by extremists and therefore said nothing about the general situation in Europe.

While a clear majority in both samples rejected the statement about how violence against Muslims were justified based on terrorist acts, one in 10 respondents supported the statement. Around one-third of both samples saw a connection between asylum seekers and violence against Muslims, and supported the statement “Harassment and violence against Muslims would not be a problem if there were fewer Muslim asylum seekers”. The statement concerns actions, but it is interesting if this result indicates that respondents think Muslims would have been more easily accepted had it not been for the

Table 16. Statements used in the index on prejudice against Muslims (Per cent. Population 2017)

Presented below is a series of statements that have already been made about Muslims. How well do these statements fit with your own opinions?	The statement fits:						
	Not at all	Rather well	Impossible to answer / NR	Rather well	Completely	Total	Rather well + Completely
<i>Muslims largely have themselves to blame for the increase in anti-Muslim harassment</i>	11	23	19	31	17	101	48
<i>Muslims consider themselves morally superior to others</i>	10	17	28	18	28	101	46
<i>Muslims pose a threat to Norwegian culture</i>	16	30	15	25	15	101	40
<i>Muslims do not fit into modern Western society</i>	14	32	17	23	13	99	36
<i>Muslims want to take over Europe</i>	20	23	27	17	14	101	31
<i>Muslims are more violent than others</i>	18	27	26	19	10	100	29

current situation of many asylum seekers. At the same time, the population sample expressed greater uncertainty over this issue (30.5 per cent answered “impossible to answer”, compared with 17.5 per cent of the Jewish population).

Both samples’ responses to all the statements show a similar pattern, though the Jewish respondents expressed more support than the population sample for the statement about how such actions concern everyone and represent an attack on society (87 per cent and 74 per cent respectively). More respondents in the population sample selected the response “impossible to answer” than in the Jewish

sample. Perhaps both of these differences can be attributed to Jews’ own experiences and awareness of being a vulnerable minority.

2.2.5 INDICES OF ISLAMOPHOBIA

Indices of negative attitudes towards Muslims were used in the 2017 survey, corresponding with those of negative attitudes towards Jews used in both the 2011 and the 2017 surveys. Obviously, the statements used to create the index of prejudice against Jews could not be used in the index of prejudice against Muslims.




Figure 18. Indices on prejudice against Muslims and prejudice against Jews (Per cent. Population 2017. The prejudices asked about differ between the two groups)

Consequently, the results are not directly comparable, even though two or three of the statements contain similar features (the first two statements and, to some extent, the fifth in Table 16). The questions used in the indices of social distance and dislike for Muslims correspond to those used in the indices for Jews. These indices are therefore comparable.

INDEX 1: PREJUDICE AGAINST MUSLIMS

After an analysis of consistency and meaning, six of the 10 statements used in the were selected to create the index (Table 16). All the statements express negative views of Muslims.²⁶

Since 1 point is assigned for the response “rather well” and 2 points for “completely”, the index scores range between 0 and 12. Distribution on the index is shown in Figure 18. Although, as already mentioned, the results are not directly comparable with Figure 6 showing the distribution of prejudice against Jews, the corresponding distribution of prejudice against Jews resulting from the 2017 population sample is shown below. Thirty-five per cent of the respondents supported none of the statements about Muslims. As much as 34.1 per cent scored high on the dichotomised index of prejudice, and 21 per cent were assigned scores on the upper half of the scale (7–12). The corresponding results for the index of prejudice against Jews in 2017 were 8.3 per cent and 3.5 per cent.

INDEX 2: SOCIAL DISTANCE FROM MUSLIMS

The results show that 72.2 per cent of the respondents express no reservations against having Muslims as neighbours or friends, while 8.4 per cent would dislike both. When the index is dichotomised, we obtain a high score for desired social distance from Muslims for 19.6 per cent of the respondents. The corresponding figure for social distance from Jews was 5.9 per cent.




Figure 19. Indices on social distance from Muslims and Jews (Per cent. Population 2017)

INDEX 3: DISLIKE OF MUSLIMS

In contrast to the situation for the affective dimension with regard to Jews, more respondents answered that the statement about having a dislike of Muslims fitted rather well or completely with their own opinion than did the statement about having sympathy for Muslims (31 per cent and 15 per cent respectively). The percentage of respondents also expressing sympathy was subtracted from the percentage expressing dislike, making the proportion with high scores 27.8 per cent. The corresponding proportion expressing dislike of Jews was 6.7 per cent in the 2017 survey.




Figure 20. Indices on dislike of Muslims and Jews (Per cent. Population 2017)

26 When no change over time is to be calculated, no decimals are used in the table.

INDEX 4: COMBINED INDEX OF ISLAMOPHOBIA

When the numbers of high scores are added together, the combined index shows that 59.2 per cent have no high scores on any of the three indices, whereas 13.6 per cent have high scores on all three. The figures for antisemitism are 86.7 per cent for low scores only and 2.1 per cent for high scores only.

When the combined index is dichotomised between scores of 1 and 2, the proportion of respondents scoring high for Islamophobia is 27 per cent. The proportion of respondents scoring high for antisemitism is 5.5 per cent. If the index had instead been dichotomised between scores of 0 and 1, the proportion of high scores for these two indices would have been 41 per cent and 13 per cent respectively.




Figure 21. Combined index on Islamophobia and antisemitism (Per cent. Population 2017)

VALIDATION OF THE COMBINED INDEX OF ISLAMOPHOBIA

Table 17 shows the relationship between index scores and views on various questions where one would expect attitudes towards Muslims to be strongly related to the distribution of responses. Such differences did emerge, though slightly smaller between the extreme categories of the index than in the corresponding table for the antisemitism index. This applies to, for example, the question about having

a Muslim prime minister in Norway. Even among respondents scoring 0 on the index of Islamophobia, 31 per cent responded not feeling comfortable with having a Muslim prime minister. The corresponding figure on the antisemitism index for the question about having a Jewish prime minister is 18 per cent. When 99 per cent and 100 per cent of respondents with an index score of 3 have negative attitudes, the difference between the groups at the extreme ends (high–low) of the index is 68 percentage points for the Islamophobia index and 82 percentage points for the antisemitism index.

However, even though the differences are slightly smaller, there is a steady increase in the proportion of negative responses on the index of Islamophobia when we move from scores 0 to 3 on the index. This gives reason to assume that the index captures what it was intended to measure; in other words, it is a valid measurement of Islamophobia.

Regarding where on the index the greatest differences in the distribution of responses lie, the picture is similar to that for the antisemitism index, namely between scores 0 and 1. This varies, however, and some of the differences are negligible. Dichotomising the scores into 0–1 versus 2–3 estimates a high level of Islamophobia at 27 per cent.

VIEWS OF MUSLIMS HELD BY JEWS AND NON-MUSLIM IMMIGRANTS (“OTHERS”)

Presented below is a comparison of the distributions on the indices of Islamophobia among respondents in the Jewish sample, the sample of non-Muslim immigrants (“Others”) and the population sample. The two minority samples are quite small, comprising 170 and 242 respondents respectively. Consequently, greater uncertainty is attached to the results from these two samples than from the population sample, which comprises 1,575 respondents. Nonetheless, the differences between the results for the Jewish sample and the population sample are too clear to

Table 17. Correlation between position on the combined index on Islamophobia and opinions on Muslims and their situation (Per cent. Population 2017)

	The statement fits:	Combined index of Islamophobia				% Difference
		0 Low	1	2	3 High	High-Low
<i>It would be fine by me if a Muslim were to become prime minister</i>	- Completely / Rather well	45	23	6	0	-45
	- Impossible to answer / NR	23	17	4	1	-22
	- Rather badly / Not at all	31	60	91	99	68
	Total	99	100	101	100	1
<i>Harassment and violence against Jews concern everyone and constitute an attack on our society</i>	- Completely / Rather well	83	71	61	46	-37
	- Impossible to answer / NR	13	17	18	19	6
	- Rather badly / Not at all	3	12	21	34	31
	Total	99	100	100	99	0
<i>Considering recent terror attacks, harassment and violence against Muslims are justifiable</i>	- Completely / Rather well	3	12	20	29	26
	- Impossible to answer / NR	14	22	23	19	5
	- Rather badly / Not at all	83	66	57	52	-31
	Total	100	100	100	100	0
<i>Harassment and violence against Muslims would not be a problem if there were fewer Muslim asylum seekers</i>	- Completely / Rather well	16	41	58	68	52
	- Impossible to answer / NR	33	34	25	24	-9
	- Rather badly / Not at all	51	25	17	8	-43
	Total	100	100	100	100	0
<i>Distribution on the index</i>		57.9	13.8	13.8	14.5	Sum 100

be attributed to chance. All differences between incidences of high scores on the three sub-indices and the combined index are statistically significant (three at the 5 per cent level and one at the 1 per cent level). The difference between the population sample and the “Others” sample is also significant (all at the 1 per cent level). Regarding difference between the two minority samples, the only statement for which the Jewish sample scores significantly higher than the “Others” sample is for social distance from Muslims (5 per cent level).

Prejudiced views of Muslims are less prevalent among Jews and “Others” than in the population sample, as shown in Table 18 and Figure 22. Between two-thirds and three quarters of the two minority samples did not respond in a way regarded as preju-

diced, while the corresponding figure for the population sample is slightly more than one-third. Here the proportion of respondents with a high value when the index is dichotomised is 34.1 per cent, compared with 14.7 per cent and 11.9 per cent among Jews and “Others” respectively.

Regarding the questions about social distance from Muslims, the differences between the samples are slightly smaller. The result for the index shows that 95 per cent of the “Others” sample would not dislike either form of contact, compared with 79 per cent of the Jewish sample and 72 per cent of the population sample. When the index is dichotomised, the proportion with a high value is 19.6 per cent for the population sample, 13.5 per cent for the Jewish sample and only 3.2 per cent for the “Others” sample.

Table 18. Statements used in the index on prejudice against Muslims (Per cent. Population 2017, samples comprising Jews and “Others”)

Presented below is a list of statements that have previously been made about Muslims. How well do these statements fit with your own opinions?								
	The statement fits:							
		Not at all	Rather well	Impossible to answer / NR	Rather well	Completely	TOTAL	Rather well + Completely
<i>Muslims largely have themselves to blame for the increase in anti-Muslim harassment</i>	Population 2017	10.8	22.6	19.1	30.9	16.5	100	47.4
	Jews	14.6	36.4	15.5	25.5	8.2	100	33.6
	Others	21.8	16.4	27.8	23.8	10.3	100	34.1
<i>Muslims consider themselves morally superior to others</i>	Population 2017	9.7	16.6	28.6	27.6	17.5	100	45.1
	Jews	10.0	26.4	28.2	26.4	9.1	100	35.5
	Others	18.6	17.1	27.8	25.9	10.7	100	35.6
<i>Muslims pose a threat to Norwegian culture</i>	Population 2017	15.8	30.0	14.8	24.6	14.8	100	39.4
	Jews	22.7	40.9	14.5	16.4	5.5	100	21.8
	Others	40.5	18.1	24.6	7.6	9.3	100	16.9
<i>Muslims do not fit into modern Western society</i>	Population 2017	14.4	31.8	17.4	23.2	13.2	100	36.4
	Jews	25.5	39.1	14.6	15.5	5.5	100	20.9
	Others	33.0	17.1	20.0	15.6	14.3	100	29.9
<i>Muslims want to take over Europe</i>	Population 2017	20.1	23.0	26.6	16.6	13.7	100	30.3
	Jews	30.0	30.9	18.2	12.7	8.2	100	20.9
	Others	43.5	14.6	26.3	9.4	6.3	100	15.6
<i>Muslims are more violent than others</i>	Population 2017	18.0	27.5	25.5	19.1	9.9	100	29.0
	Jews	20.0	31.8	22.7	18.2	7.3	100	25.5
	Others	34.6	17.5	27.0	12.0	8.8	100	20.8




Figure 22. Difference between the samples for index on prejudice against Muslims (Per cent. Population 2017, Jews and “Others”)




Figure 23. Difference between the samples for index on social distance from Muslims (Per cent. Population 2017, Jews and “Others”)

Table 19. Questions about social distance from Muslims (Per cent. Population 2017, Jews and “Others”)

To what extent would you like or dislike ...		Would like it	Wouldn't mind it	Don't know / NR	Would dislike it a little	Would dislike it a lot	TOTAL	Would dislike it a little + Would dislike it a lot
<i>having Muslims as neighbours?</i>	Population 2017	8.1	61.1	4.9	15.1	10.9	100.1	26.0
	Jews	13.5	62.4	4.1	12.4	7.7	100.0	20.0
	Others	15.4	61.7	14.0	4.6	4.3	100.0	8.9
<i>having Muslims in your circle of friends?</i>	Population 2017	13.4	59.8	5.9	11.6	9.4	100.0	21.0
	Jews	27.7	54.1	5.3	8.2	4.7	100.0	13.0
	Others	14.6	63.7	14.3	3.1	4.3	100.0	7.3




Figure 24. Difference between the samples for index on dislike of Muslims (Per cent. Population 2017, Jews and “Others”)

The Jewish sample – and to an even greater extent the “Others” sample – score lower than the population sample with regard to dislike of Muslims and higher with regard to sympathy towards Muslims. Consequently, the proportion with a high value in the two minority samples on the dichotomised index of dislike of Muslims are smaller, with 14.5 per cent for the Jewish sample and 6 per cent for the “Others” sample, compared with 27.8 per cent for the population sample (Figure 24).




Figure 25. Difference between the samples for combined index on Islamophobia (Per cent. Population 2017, Jews and “Others”)

The combined index of the three types of negative attitudes towards Muslims shows similarly clear differences between the three samples. When the index is dichotomised, the sample of non-Muslim immigrants scores lowest, with only 6.7 per cent with a high value, followed closely by Jews, with 7.7 per cent, while 27 per cent of the population sample has a high value. See chapter 3 for an analysis of what influences attitudes towards Muslims.

2.3 The prevalence of and need to combat anti-Jewish and anti-Muslim harassment

The respondents were asked their opinion on the prevalence of negative attitudes towards Jews and Muslims and on whether there was a need to combat anti-Jewish and anti-Muslim harassment. The respondents who considered negative attitudes were widespread were then asked to elaborate on what they believed were the reasons for such attitudes. The questions were asked of the respondents in all the samples, and were also asked in the 2011 survey.

2.3.1 OPINIONS ON THE PREVALENCE OF NEGATIVE ATTITUDES TOWARDS JEWS AND MUSLIMS

Changes from 2011 to 2017 (population sample)

In both the 2011 and 2017 surveys, far more respondents believed negative attitudes towards Muslims to be more widespread than were negative attitudes towards Jews. The clearest change is with regard to how many respondents believed negative views of Muslims to be widespread: from 86 per cent in 2011 to 81 per cent in 2017. In both surveys, the corresponding figures for opinion on the prevalence of antisemitism represented around one-fifth of the population sample (20 per cent in 2011 and 19 per

cent in 2017). There was also an increase in the proportion that believed negative attitudes towards Jews not to be widespread at all (from 7 per cent to 10 per cent). The result therefore shows that the population's perception coincides with the trend for the indices, all of which show a decrease in the prevalence of negative attitudes towards Jews.

Results, by sample, 2017

The proportion of Jewish respondents that believed negative attitudes towards Jews to be widespread was far larger (60 per cent) than that of the general population (19 per cent) and among Muslim respondents (10 per cent). The respondents' responses regarding the prevalence of negative attitudes towards Muslims were more evenly distributed: 80.5 per cent of Jewish respondents and 81 per cent of the general population believed such attitudes to be widespread. By comparison, 52 per cent of Muslims did so. In other words, respondents in the Muslim sample believed such attitudes to be less widespread than did the population sample; a quarter believed negative attitudes to not be very widespread or to not be widespread at all. However, many respondents in the Muslim sample found the questions

Table 20. Opinions on the prevalence of negative attitudes towards Jews (Per cent. Population 2011 and 2017, Muslims and Jews)

How widespread do you think negative attitudes towards Jews are in Norway today?	Very widespread	Fairly widespread	Impossible to answer	No response	Not very widespread	Not widespread at all	Total
Population 2011 (1,522)	1.7	18.7	12.7	0.0	60.1	6.7	100
Population 2017 (1,574)	2.4	16.9	11.8	0.0	58.8	10.1	100
Muslims (576)	1.7	8.0	37.1	0.4	34.3	18.6	100
Jews (20)*	15.0	45.0	0.0	10.0	30.0	0.0	100

**Due to an error, this question was only asked of 20 respondents in the Jewish sample.*

Table 21. Opinions on the prevalence of negative attitudes towards Muslims (Per cent. Population 2011 and 2017, Muslims and Jews)

How widespread do you think negative attitudes towards Muslims are in Norway today?	Very widespread	Fairly widespread	Impossible to answer	No response	Not very widespread	Not widespread at all	Total
Population 2011 (1,522)	20.7	65.7	3.2	0.0	10.1	0.3	100
Population 2017 (1,568)	16.5	64.3	4.7	0.0	14.0	0.5	100
Muslims (387)	18.1	34.2	19.0	3.1	20.5	5.2	100
Jews (103)	8.7	71.8	6.8	1.0	11.7	0.0	100

Table 22. Opinions on the trend in negative attitudes towards Jews over the past five years (Per cent. Jews)

Do you think that negative attitudes towards Jews have become more widespread or less widespread in Norway over the past five years?	More widespread	As widespread as before	No response	Less widespread	Total
Jews (124)	69.4	25.0	0.8	4.8	100

Table 23. Opinions on the trend in negative attitudes towards Muslims over the past five years (Per cent. Muslims)

Do you think that negative attitudes towards Muslims have become more widespread or less widespread in Norway over the past five years?	More widespread	As widespread as before	No response	Less widespread	Total
Muslims (586)	63.2	22.1	4.9	9.8	100

difficult to answer (22 per cent answered “impossible to answer” or refrained from answering). The results may be seen to indicate that not that many respondents have personally experienced negative attitudes (see pages 74–75), and perhaps to indicate a higher level of preparedness against such attitudes among Jewish respondents, associated with the long history of antisemitism. A correlation is found in the population sample between respondents’ opinions on the prevalence of negative attitudes and their own attitudes (see below).

HAVE NEGATIVE ATTITUDES BECOME MORE OR LESS PREVALENT OVER THE PAST FIVE YEARS?

Questions were also asked about how Muslims and

Jews perceived trends: “Do you think that negative attitudes towards Jews/Muslims have become more widespread or less widespread in Norway over the past five years?” In contrast to the trend shown in the attitudes of the population sample, the Jewish respondents consider the situation to have deteriorated; 69 per cent of respondents in the Jewish sample answered that such attitudes had become more widespread, and only 5 per cent answered that they had become less widespread. A quarter of the sample answered that such attitudes were as widespread as before.

Regarding the question of whether negative attitudes towards Muslims had become more or less widespread in Norway in the past five years, 63

per cent of the Muslim sample answered that such attitudes had become more widespread, 22 per cent that they were as widespread as before, and 10 per cent that they were less widespread (5 per cent did not respond).

THE GENERAL POPULATION: THE CORRELATION BETWEEN RESPONDENTS' OWN ATTITUDES AND THEIR OPINIONS ON THE PREVALENCE OF NEGATIVE ATTITUDES

The analyses of both the 2011 and the 2017 surveys revealed a correlation within the population sample between the respondents' own attitudes and their opinions on the prevalence of negative attitudes in others: high scores on the indices often imply a belief that such attitudes are widespread.

Seventeen per cent (2017) of respondents who scored 0 on the combined index for antisemitism believed such attitudes to be "very widespread" or "fairly widespread" (most answered "fairly widespread"). In the small group with a score of 3, however, 51 per cent believed negative attitudes towards Jews to be "very widespread" or "fairly widespread" (10 per cent answered with "very widespread"). In other words, the pattern shows that respondents who themselves are critical tend to think that others are, too (see Figure 26).

Similarly, the results for Islamophobic attitudes show that the more negative the attitudes of the respondents themselves, the more often they believed such attitudes to be widespread in the general population. In the 2017 survey, most of the respondents in the population sample believe negative attitudes towards Muslims to be very or fairly widespread, from 77 per cent of those who scored lowest on the combined index of Islamophobic attitudes to 93 per cent of those who scored highest. Figure 27 shows the proportion that answered "very widespread", representing an increase from 12 per cent to 39 per cent.

2.3.2 COMBATING ANTI-JEWISH AND ANTI-MUSLIM HARASSMENT IN NORWAY

The respondents were asked whether they saw a need to combat anti-Jewish and anti-Muslim harassment. This question was asked of all the respondents in all the samples, and was asked also in the 2011 survey.

Changes from 2011 to 2017 (population sample)

The proportion of respondents that saw a need to combat anti-Jewish harassment increased during this period, from 37.5 per cent in 2011 to 41 per cent in 2017. The proportion that saw a need to combat anti-Muslim harassment has fallen, however, from 59 per cent in 2011 to 56 per cent in 2017. The results also show the same trend that emerged in 2011: while a far larger proportion (twice as many respondents) considered it important to combat anti-Jewish harassment (41 per cent) than believed negative attitudes towards Jews to be widespread (19 per cent), the opposite applied for negative attitudes towards Muslims. In this case, a much larger proportion believed such negative attitudes to be widespread (81 per cent) than considered anti-Muslim harassment to be important to combat (56 per cent).

Results, by sample, 2017

A larger proportion of the population sample (41 per cent) than the Muslim sample (28 per cent) considered it important to combat anti-Jewish harassment. The responses of these samples to the question of whether there was a need to combat anti-Muslim harassment were quite similar: 56 per cent of the population sample and 54 per cent of the Muslim sample responded positively. The corresponding figure for the Jewish respondents was 67 per cent. In other words, a larger proportion of respondents in the Jewish sample considered it important to combat

Table 24. Combating anti-Jewish harassment Population 2011 and 2017, Muslims and Jews)

Do you see a need to do something to combat anti-Jewish harassment in Norway?	Yes	No opinion	No response	No	Total
Population 2011 (1,522)	37.5	32.5	0.1	29.9	100
Population 2017 (1,575)	40.7	31.2	0.0	28.1	100
Muslims (586)	27.8	48.4	3.6	20.3	100
Jews (20)*	90.0	0.0	10.0	0.0	100

*Due to an error, this question was only asked of 20 respondents in the Jewish sample.

Table 25. Combating anti-Muslim harassment (Per cent. Population 2011 and 2017, Muslims and Jews)

Do you see a need to do something to combat anti-Muslim harassment in Norway?	Yes	No opinion	No response	No	Total
Population 2011 (1,522)	59.3	20.9	0.0	19.7	100
Population 2017 (1,568)	56.1	26.1	0.1	17.7	100
Muslims (387)	54.4	26.9	3.8	14.9	100
Jews (103)	67.0	24.3	1.0	7.8	100

anti-Muslim harassment than did respondents in the Muslim and population samples.

THE CORRELATION BETWEEN RESPONDENTS' OWN ATTITUDES AND THEIR VIEWS ON COMBATING NEGATIVE ATTITUDES

There is a very high correlation between the respondents' own attitudes and their assessment of the need for measures to combat anti-Jewish harassment in Norway: the more negative the attitudes of the respondents, the less need they saw to take measures. These are the same groups where the belief that anti-Jewish harassment is very or fairly widespread is most widespread (see Figure 26).




Figure 26. Score for the combined index on antisemitism and opinion on prevalence of negative attitudes towards Jews in Norway and the need to combat them (Per cent. Population 2011 and 2017 combined)

A similar correlation can be seen between the respondents' own attitudes and their assessment of the need for measures to combat anti-Muslim harassment in Norway: the more negative the attitudes of the respondents, the less need they saw to take measures to combat anti-Muslim harassment (Figure 27).




Figure 27. Score for the combined index on *Islamophobia* and opinion on prevalence of negative attitudes towards Muslims in Norway and the need to combat them (Per cent. Population 2017)

2.3.3 OPINIONS ON THE REASONS FOR NEGATIVE ATTITUDES TOWARDS JEWS AND MUSLIMS

The respondents who believed negative attitudes towards Jews and Muslims to be widespread were asked to say something about what they believed to be the reasons for these attitudes. These were open-ended questions to which respondents could answer freely, and were asked of the respondents in all three samples. The questions were worded in such a way as to allow respondents to express their views on attitudes in general or on the reasons for other people's negative attitudes. However, many responses

seemed to offer explanations for the respondents' own attitudes.

Open-ended questions provide an opportunity to gain a more complex and in-depth understanding of the respondents' views than is otherwise possible in a . The analysis is conducted primarily using qualitative methods, and the material is less suitable for quantification. The available material was coded into main categories which could nonetheless capture general tendencies. A clear pattern that emerged from the analyses conducted in 2011 was the way in which the responses could be divided into two main categories based on where the respondents placed responsibility for the attitudes: with the minorities themselves or with wider society (in, for example, media portrayals or prejudice within the majority population). This division was maintained in the analysis of the material from the 2017 survey.

RESPONSES FROM RESPONDENTS IN THE POPULATION SAMPLE

Because a far larger proportion of respondents believed negative attitudes towards Muslims to be widespread, a far larger proportion (around four times as many) also answered the question about reasons for negative attitudes towards Muslims (n= 1026) than answered the question about reasons for negative attitudes towards Jews (n= 247).

Changes from 2011 to 2017 (population sample)

In the 2011 survey approximately as many respondents attributed the reasons for negative attitudes towards Jews to external conditions as to the Jews themselves. In the present survey, by contrast, more respondents tended to point to reasons that lay outside the minority itself. In the 2011 survey, a small majority explained negative views of Muslims by pointing to factors within the minority itself, while in the present survey this was done by approximately one-third of the respondents. The two different

response categories are characterised by very different linguistic styles: whereas the language used by respondents attributing the reasons to the group is emotionally charged, the language used by respondents attributing the reasons to conditions outside the minority was more objective.

Similar to the results of the 2011 survey, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was most often cited as the reason for negative views of Jews. Many respondents mentioned how the conflation of “Israeli” with “Jew” could reinforce negative attitudes, while others cited the media’s coverage of the conflict as a key source. Some also described how the conflict influenced their own views of Jews: “Now I associate Jews with Israel, and I’m strongly opposed to the policies that are being pursued in that country!” Others mentioned the conflict without further explaining where their sympathies lay. In the latter case, it was impossible to categorise responses as “outside” or “inside” the group.

Many respondents referred to “old prejudices” and “history” in their explanations for negative attitudes towards Jews. These differed sharply from the explanations given for negative views of Muslims, which described them as a contemporary phenomenon and rarely contained any references to a longer history of prejudice. There was a tendency in both the 2011 and the 2017 surveys to refer to antisemitism as a prejudice that is almost automatically sustained as part of Norwegian culture. Some respondents linked the attitudes to World War II: “A remnant of the war.” Some expressed their own stereotypical views of Jews, even in answers where the respondent expressed sympathy for the Jews and demonstrated knowledge about the long history of antisemitism: “There has been a centuries-long dislike of Jews throughout history, possibly because they are talented business people and because many of them became affluent. They’ve been blamed for all kinds of things throughout the ages.” Other answers were

less explanatory but clearly referred to traditional antisemitic ideas nonetheless: “only interested in amassing wealth”; “conceited”; “greed”; and “business ethics”.

In 2011 the analyses revealed a tendency for negative attitudes towards Muslims to be explained as the result of specific problems and situations in Norwegian society, while negative views of Jews generally lacked similar references. Consequently, the descriptions of the reasons for negative views of Muslims were more rich in detail than those for negative attitudes towards Jews. This tendency was also clearly observed in the material from the 2017 survey, though there is greater variety in the respondents’ explanations of antisemitic attitudes. This is demonstrated primarily through more references to far-right extremism and Muslims/immigration. In the 2011 survey these categories were only marginally present in the material. Another issue that is given more prominence in the 2017 survey is politicians’ special treatment of Muslims. Some responses suggested that conflicts of interest over the use of resources gave rise to negative attitudes. One example is the following quotation, in which Muslims are singled out as the reason why the elderly are suffering: “[...] the way politicians squander money on them. It is the elderly in nursing homes here in NORWAY that are suffering.” Answers like these often contained a nationalist element, portraying the nation as threatened by the Muslims’ “undermining activities” or because “they have become too numerous”.

In research, antisemitic portrayals of Jews are often described as a combination of traditional images with deep historical roots and new elements that are adapted to contemporary situations. One example is accounts of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict which include conspiracy theories about Jewish power. The data from the 2017 survey gives an indication of how the conflict can also influence the

image of the Jew in the direction of more physical power or violence than what is usual in the traditional portrayals: “They are belligerent, hateful and show no respect for other people or religion”; “The Jews use power against the Palestinians’ terrorists”.

In both surveys, very few examples were found of respondents’ citing religion (Judaism) as the reason for negative attitudes towards Jews. Such a link is, however, prominent in the material dealing with negative views of Muslims. In such instances Islam is largely described as a foreign element in Norway, or as a threatening ideology: “They have an incomprehensible religion that doesn’t fit in here”; “They have a totally different religion, which prescribes revenge and hostilities”; “It’s a religion that puts fanatical religious orders before the society they live in. They live at least 500 years behind us.” These quotations mark a clear divide between Norwegian society and Islam.

Many respondents also mentioned cultural differences as crucial factors influencing attitudes towards Muslims. The responses in this category pointed in different directions, towards xenophobia in the Norwegian majority population and towards attitudes in the Muslim minority itself. Several mentioned the lack of will among Muslims to adapt to Norwegian conditions: “Don’t really want to become Norwegian”; “They don’t want to adapt to our culture, religion and the way we dress”; “Expect us to adapt to them instead of them having to adapt to Norwegian society”. Views on women in Islam or among Muslims were a recurring topic: “They bring a foreign culture with them, and their views on women are extremely bad”. Both “Muslims’ views on women”

and “culture” were in practice described by many respondents as the antitheses of their understanding of all things Norwegian.

Terrorism was the main factor to which most respondents referred to explain negative views of Muslims. It was a key topic in the 2011 survey, too, but in the present survey the trend is stronger. In both surveys these answers gave the impression that the core problem was generalisations from extremists/terrorists to the entire Muslim population: “The extremists give Muslims a bad reputation” and “They think Muslims are terrorists because terrorists are Muslims”. However, many responses lacked such nuances: “Acts of terror carried out by Muslims” and “They create the most unpleasantness in the world”. Many answers also essentialised Muslims into criminals and perpetrators of violence: “[...] they’re responsible for far too much violence, crime and lack of equality”; “Everyone except them is unclean and can be eliminated”; “Muslims’ hostile attitude – extremely demanding, provocative – criminals and fortune hunters, liars”. Many respondents also referred to the media as a source of negative attitudes: “The intense media coverage of terrorist acts and the populist policies that come in their wake” and “Unless they know some Muslims personally, they think all Muslims are like the few extremists portrayed on TV”. Criticism of the media’s portrayals is thus a common feature in the respondents’ explanations of negative attitudes towards both minorities. In general the explanations largely reflected the topics described in the introduction as widespread in antisemitic and Islamophobic ideas.

Presented below is a brief overview of the topics that were particularly prominent in the answers given by respondents in the population sample:

Typical topics mentioned to explain negative attitudes towards Jews (“inside” or “outside” the minority)

- Various negative traits in Jews themselves (“inside”)
- The Israeli-Palestinian conflict (both “inside” and “outside”)
- Media coverage of the conflict (“outside”)
- Old prejudices/“history” (both “inside” and “outside”)
- Ignorance (“outside”)
- Muslims/immigration from Muslim countries (“outside”)
- Far-right and far-left extremism (“outside”)
- Xenophobia (“outside”)

Typical topics mentioned to explain negative attitudes towards Muslims

- Terrorism/fear of terrorism (both “inside” and “outside”)
- Extremism/fear of extremism (both “inside” and “outside”)
- Negative portrayals in the media (“outside”)
- Xenophobia (“outside”)
- Lack of will or ability to integrate on the part of Muslims (“inside”)
- Violence/crime among Muslims (“inside”)
- Foreign/harmful culture/ displaces Norwegian culture (“inside”)
- Islam (“inside”)
- Views on women in Islam/among Muslims (“inside”)
- Lack of knowledge/ignorance in the majority population (“outside”)

RESPONSES FROM JEWISH AND MUSLIM RESPONDENTS (INCLUDING GROUP INTERVIEWS)

The following section presents the responses of the two minority samples regarding the reasons behind negative attitudes towards Jews and Muslims. Findings from the group interviews are drawn on to support the analyses and supplement the material. The participants in the studies are referred to as *respondents* and *minority samples* when reference is made to the quantitative study, and as *informants* when reference is made to the group interviews. See the introduction for a more detailed description of the method used for the group interviews.

The responses from both groups show some similarities with the responses from the population sample, but some differences too. Moreover, similarities and differences between the minorities are interesting to examine more closely.

As in the population sample, far more respondents in the minority samples believed negative attitudes towards Muslims to be widespread than negative attitudes towards Jews. Consequently, more respondents answered the question about the reasons for negative attitudes towards Muslims.²⁷

The responses from the minority samples can also be categorised according to whether the cited reason lies “outside” the group or “inside” it. In general, a larger proportion ascribed the reason to outside the group when explaining negative attitudes towards the minority to which they themselves belong. Among the Jewish respondents, none of the reasons mentioned in the responses can be placed “inside” the group when discussing reasons for antisemitism. However, the sample was very small in size, and the picture is modified in the group interviews, where some informants reflected on how

²⁷ For the Jewish sample, n = 64 and for the Muslim sample n = 302 on the question about the reasons for negative attitudes towards Muslims. For the question about the reasons for negative attitudes towards Jews, n = 13 for the Jewish sample and n = 120 for the Muslim sample. The informants in the group interviews come in addition.

Jewish traditions and the Jewish way of life can have an alienating effect. The informants also stressed how a lack of knowledge and understanding of the minority culture can reinforce negative attitudes, and thereby drew a more complex picture than what emerged in the brief comments made in the . Relatively many responses from the Muslim sample explained negative attitudes towards Muslims by referring to the minority itself. Lack of integration, failure to distance itself from terrorism, and religion generally were the most prominent categories in these responses. It is important to note that some respondents here stressed that they personally were not religious.

There were quite marked differences between how the groups explained negative attitudes towards the other group: a small majority of answers from the Jewish respondents ascribed the reasons to the Muslims themselves. The categories mentioned by the Jewish respondents were largely the same as those mentioned by the population sample, most notably terrorism, poor integration, oppression of women, and religion. Antisemitism among Muslims was also mentioned as an explanation for negative attitudes towards Muslims. Many of the Jewish respondents also believed that generalisations from isolated incidents (acts of terrorism) and negative portrayals in the media were reasons for Islamophobic attitudes.

Among the reasons for negative attitudes towards Jews cited by the Muslim respondents were ignorance, lack of contact, and xenophobia on the part of Norwegians, and historical prejudices. The findings indicate that Muslims see the same mechanisms of prejudice being used against Jews as are used against themselves. Some comments, on the other hand, asserted that Jews had no such problems in Norway.

Similar to the results of the population survey, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was the category

most often singled out to explain negative attitudes towards Jews. Mentions were often brief, such as "Israel" or "Israel-Palestine". Some respondents explicitly discussed the differences between the State of Israel, its policies, and Jews in general, such as in this example from a Muslim respondent: "Israel's power politics. Though has nothing to do with the individual level - but influences attitudes all the same." Some comments, however, conflate Israel and Jews. An example is provided in the following quotation, in which a parallel is also drawn between the Nazi persecution of the Jews and the treatment of the Palestinians:

The Jews who still talk about all the injustices committed against them in World War II with the Holocaust and the genocide of Jews. Israel, along with the US, uses the same methods against the Palestinians today as the Nazis used against the Jews. Because Jews are so wise, they should work for peace and reconciliation. Not more spreading of hate and occupation of Palestinian land.

The group interviews may provide added perspectives on this issue. The interviews with the Muslims bore witness to some ambivalence regarding the relationship between Israel and Jews, and here too, the choice of words revealed a generalisation of "Israel" to "Jews". Nonetheless, what did become clear - and also emerged in the quantitative study - was that some respondents have gained an awareness that a distinction *must* be drawn between the State of Israel and Jews. This awareness was present in all Muslim focus groups, and resulted both in situations where informants added nuances to others' comments and in (some) self-criticism on behalf of the Muslim minority.

Being made accountable for Israel's policies, and for what was perceived as a prevailing inability to distinguish between the State of Israel/Israeli poli-

ticians and Jews generally, were the most common examples of negative experiences given by the Jewish informants, as in the following quotation:

And so I sometimes think can I be allowed to be [respondent's name], not a Jew, and not a minority? And enjoy being at this café, like everyone else? But oh no. I have to answer on behalf of all the Jews in Norway. I have to answer, whether it's Rabin, who unfortunately was killed, or whoever's governing down there, or what I think about 9/11 and all kinds of things like that. This is my job. [J1, 22:01]

Furthermore, the Jewish informants in the group interviews clearly conveyed that negative experiences are not reserved to Muslims, but that they also are linked to what was perceived as widespread anti-Israel attitudes in the Norwegian majority population. The informants' responses concerning experiences are elaborated on below.

In the quantitative study, ignorance (lack of knowledge, lack of contact) was among the most-mentioned categories in respect of reasons that lie "outside the group" in both minority samples. This also applied in the population survey. With respect to negative attitudes towards Jews, this topic was often linked to history and to a long tradition of

prejudice, whereas the media's misleading portrayals were mentioned in a large number of comments dealing with negative attitudes towards Muslims.

To summarise, we see that the categories that emerge in the responses from the minority samples are not that different from those in the population sample, particularly when it comes to reasons for negative attitudes towards Muslims. An interesting finding, however, is that a clear majority of the Muslim respondents cite factors that lie outside the group (such as ignorance and media portrayals) as reasons for negative attitudes towards Jews. It is also worth mentioning that some comments from respondents in the Muslim sample contained personal statements that distanced these individuals from antisemitism.

The responses from the Muslim sample may indicate a difference between respondents who associate negative attitudes towards Jews primarily with the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and respondents who see the attitudes in the context of a long tradition of prejudice. The latter approach seems to have a nuancing effect on the respondent's own attitudes. The group interviews show that placing emphasis on the minorities' common experience of being vulnerable to prejudice may prove decisive for fostering an empathetic perspective and the capacity to identify with the other group as a minority in Norway (see below).

2.4 Jews and Muslims in Norway: relationships and experiences

In addition to the questions in the population survey, the minority samples were asked about the relationship between Jews and Muslims and about their experiences as minorities in Norway. All these questions are new in the 2017 survey.

2.4.1 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JEWS AND MUSLIMS IN NORWAY

The respondents were asked their opinion on the relationship between Jews and Muslims in Norway. The questions touched on topics such as cooperating on combating discrimination, common experiences, and the Norwegian authorities' treatment of the two minorities.

Table 26. Cooperation on combating prejudice and discrimination (Per cent. Muslims and Jews)

Do you think that Muslims and Jews / Jews and Muslims can cooperate on combating prejudice and discrimination?	Yes	Don't wish to answer / No response	Don't know	No	Total
Muslims (586)	69.5	6.8	19.6	4.1	100
Jews (162)	81.5	2.4	7.4	8.6	100

Table 27. Opinions on common experiences (Per cent. Muslims and Jews)

Do you think that Muslims and Jews / Jews and Muslims as minorities in Norway have any common experiences?	Yes	Don't wish to answer / No response	Don't know	No	Total
Muslims (586)	48.1	6.3	39.9	5.8	100
Jews (162)	74.7	3.1	4.9	17.3	100

Table 28. Opinions on Norwegian authorities' treatment of Jews and Muslims (Per cent. Muslims and Jews)

Do you think that Norwegian authorities treat Muslims and Jews / Jews and Muslims equally?	Yes	No response	Don't know	No, they treat Jews better	No, they treat Muslims better	Total
Muslims (586)	27.6	18.9	32.0	21.3	0.1	100
Jews (162)	22.2	7.4	46.3	7.4	16.7	100

Results, by sample, 2017

A clear majority in both samples believed that Jews and Muslims could cooperate on combating discrimination and prejudice. The Jewish respondents responded more positively than the Muslim respondents, yet a larger proportion of this sample answered “no”.

The same response pattern is observed in the question asking about common experiences: a clear majority responded positively, particularly among the Jewish respondents, even though these respondents also answered more often “no”. In other words, the views on these issues were more polarised within the Jewish sample (see also the findings from the group interviews presented below).

A large proportion of the Muslim sample answered both questions with “don’t know”, partic-

ularly to the question asking about common experiences (40 per cent).

A majority of respondents in the Muslim sample who expressed an opinion (28 per cent) believe that Norwegian authorities treat Jews and Muslims equally. The responses of the Jewish respondents were more evenly distributed: 22 per cent responded positively and 24 per cent responded negatively. Most of those who answered negatively in both samples believe that the other group is treated better than their own. Almost no-one in the Muslim sample believes that Muslims are treated best. However, many respondents in both samples were unsure: 32 per cent of Muslims and 43.5 per cent of Jews answered “don’t know”.

Table 29. Experiences of discrimination and exclusion (Per cent. Muslims and Jews)

Has anyone in the past 12 months made you feel that you do not belong in Norwegian society?	Often	Some-times	No response	Rarely	Never	Total
Muslims (586)	9.5	26.0	2.3	30.2	32.0	100
Jews (162)	4.9	22.8	0.0	30.9	41.4	100
Has anyone behaved negatively towards you in the past 12 months when they learned that you were Muslim / Jewish?	Often	Some-times	No response	Rarely	Never	Total
Muslims (586)	6.3	20.6	5.4	29.7	38.0	100
Jews (162)	3.1	15.4	3.7	29.6	48.1	100

Table 30. Experiences of discrimination and exclusion (Per cent. Muslims and Jews)

Do you feel that you have been unfairly treated by Norwegian public institutions (NAV, school, health service, police) because of your religious affiliation?	Yes	Not sure	No response	No	Total
Muslims (586)	14.6	16.9	2.4	66.1	100
Jews (162)	6.8	5.6	0	87.7	100

2.4.2 EXPERIENCES OF DISCRIMINATION AND EXCLUSION

The respondents in the Jewish and Muslim samples were also asked about their experiences of discrimination and exclusion.

Results, by sample, 2017

A clear majority in both samples reported rarely or never in the preceding 12 months being made to feel that they did not belong in Norwegian society. A majority also reported rarely or never in the same period to have experienced someone behaving negatively towards them because they were Jewish or Muslim. Most of the respondents answered both questions with the response option "never". This tendency was particularly strong among the Jewish respondents.

A larger proportion of Muslim respondents (35.5 per cent) than Jewish respondents (28 per cent) reported often or sometimes in the preceding year being made to feel that they did not belong in Norwegian society. More Muslim (27 per cent) than Jewish respondents (18.5) had experienced negative behaviour because of their religious identity.

The same tendency applied for the question about unfair treatment by public institutions in Norway: 15 per cent of Muslim respondents and 7 per cent of Jewish respondents reported having experienced unfair treatment. At the same time, a clear majority in both samples, and mostly among Jewish respondents (88 per cent compared with 66 per cent of Muslim respondents), did not feel they had been unfairly treated.

A clear majority (72 per cent) of Muslim respondents responded negatively when asked if they avoid showing their religious affiliation out of fear of negative attitudes. By contrast, a clear majority of Jewish respondents (64 per cent) confirmed that they had done this. At the same time, a clear majority in both samples reported rarely or never to have experienced harassment because of their religious affiliation (Jews: 89 per cent and Muslims: 83 per cent). This result can be seen as a manifestation of the minorities' different experiences, where Jews in Europe have often kept a low profile so as to avoid persecution. On the other hand, Muslims are more visible than Jews as a minority in Norway, both because the group comprises far more individuals and because Muslims more often wear distinctive

Table 31. Religious affiliation and negative attitudes (Per cent. Muslims and Jews)

Do you ever avoid showing your religious affiliation out of fear of negative attitudes?	Yes	No response	No	Total
Muslims (586)	26.0	2.1	71.8	100
Jews (162)	63.6	0.0	36.4	100

Table 32. Experiences of harassment based on religious affiliation (Per cent. Muslims and Jews)

Have you experienced harassment in Norway in the past 12 months because of your religious affiliation?	Often	Sometimes	No response	Rarely	Never	Total
Muslims (586)	2.7	11.5	2.7	22.8	60.3	100
Jews (162)	0.6	10.5	0.0	16.0	72.8	100

features such as specific clothing. The differences in size and historical experiences of the two minorities may explain why it seemed less relevant for Muslims to avoid showing their religious affiliation.

2.4.3 GROUP INTERVIEWS: MINORITY EXPERIENCES, AND JEWS' AND MUSLIMS' ATTITUDES TOWARDS EACH OTHER

The group interviews show some of the same tendencies as the quantitative material in respect of Jews and Muslims' common experiences. Some key examples mentioned by informants dealt with homogenising images of Norwegian culture and ignorance or prejudice. In two of the interviews (one Jewish and one Muslim group) parallels were also drawn between the interwar enemy images of Jews to today's harassment of Muslims. The Jewish informants showed signs of ambivalence: on the one hand they feared the growth of antisemitism among Muslims, and felt vulnerable to the aggression that could be directed at them. On the other hand, several Jewish informants conveyed that the presence of such a large minority helped promote acceptance of diversity in Norwegian society, as expressed in this quotation:²⁸

Norway has become a much much more multi-cultural society over the past ... let's say forty to fifty years. When I grew up in [district name] on the east side of Oslo, I was the only ... we were the only Jewish family. There were no Muslims, there were no Buddhists, there were no [...] I was the only one, absolutely the only one who was different. [...] Today it's so so different, [...]. It's like there's more acceptance for being different today than there was a few decades ago. [J1, 36:34]

Norwegianness, assimilation and integration

Considerable time in the group interviews was devoted to the subjects of assimilation, integration and belonging in Norwegian society. It seems as if the Muslims' presence in Norwegian society provides Jews with two conflicting positions: that of a minority which has, unlike the Muslims, managed to adapt or that of a minority which, like the Muslims, must reject demands to completely adapt in order to preserve its distinctive character. In this context it was interesting to hear how Norway's public sphere and representatives were discussed: while the royal family was praised for its recognition and inclusion efforts in the public debate, politicians and the media were criticised for their polarising effect.

In the interviews with the Jewish informants, belonging to Norwegian society was both discussed explicitly and expressed implicitly through the use of language. The category "Norwegians" was discussed in such a way as to both include and exclude Jews themselves. This is exemplified in the two extracts below, where informants first indicate their identification with a Norwegian "we" and subsequently refer to Norwegians as a group to which they do not necessarily belong:

²⁸ The same trend was found in a previous qualitative interview study among Jews in Norway; see Døving and Moe (2014).

1) Take Afghanistan or Iran or places like that. Then we'd be a minority. I mean, Norwegians would be a minority, and we would be treated with contempt for our views on women or equality. [J3 6:29]

2) A: Because I know that a lot of immigrants feel that Norwegians are extremely insular.

B: Norwegians are extremely insular.

A: They're impossible to get to know, aren't they? We're never invited to their cabins. They talk about their cabins all the time. We never get invited there. And I [laughs] ... I think Norwegians think they're very open, but in fact they're not. Not in terms of opening their own homes. And there I think that ... we have so much ... Norwegians have... Because we are quite hospitable and quite good at inviting people. [J3 16:44]

By comparison, the Muslim informants clearly positioned themselves as a minority in relation to a majority, with the exception of informants who had converted to Islam, in which cases identification tended to shift. For example, one of them described how donning a hijab had signified her no longer being regarded as truly Norwegian.

The group interviews gave an indication of how personal experiences of discrimination and stigmatisation can influence one minority's attitudes towards the other. As described in the section on methods, six photos were used to create a visual impulse in the group interviews. One of the photos depicted the "ring of peace" that was formed around a synagogue in Oslo at the initiative of Muslim youth after the attack on a synagogue in Copenhagen in February 2015. The reactions triggered by the photo within the groups varied widely. The informants in the group of young Muslims who positioned themselves as an

eloquent, new generation that sought to participate in Norwegian society showed pride in this act of solidarity:

So there you see it. A whole generation of young Norwegian Muslims standing together, hand in hand, as if protecting a synagogue. You won't find a better response than that. It's just so crystal clear, and it's just so perfect. It's acts like that one that make it possible to break down the stereotypes. [M2 43:50]

By way of contrast, one of the informants in the group of female Muslims mentioned the photo when expressing how vulnerable she felt to suspicion and stigma. She saw the demonstration as an expression of how unfairly Muslims are treated in that they are always expected to publicly distance themselves from negative acts:

I don't know, but as Muslims we do try really hard to show that we're not evil. I mean, how many times have people formed rings of peace around mosques? Do we really have to go public? It's almost expected of us. As if Muslims are always expected to publicly disapprove when something happens. But do all Americans do that? Did every Norwegian take to the streets and say 'We don't support ABB'?²⁹ Or did the Jews say: 'We're against Netanyahu's actions'? So I'm sure the intentions were good, but I wouldn't have taken part. Don't feel the need to go public and say that I don't kill Jews. I've nothing against Jews, so why should I make a public statement? [M3, 45:53]

The informant's question about the rings around mosques indicates that she sees an imbalance in the way Muslims are regarded solely as potential attack-

29 ABB: Anders Behring Breivik, the Norwegian terrorist who carried out the attacks in Norway on 22 July 2011.

ers, and are shown no solidarity or support when the hatred is turned on them.

Religion unites and divides

In the same way as in the population sample, religion was one of the topics most often mentioned by the minority samples when it came to reasons for negative attitudes towards Muslims. Some nuances were added to this picture in the group interviews by religion also being discussed as something that unites Jews and Muslims. Two of the discussions between the Muslim informants show how the fact that Judaism and Islam are Abrahamic religions provided justification for not allowing negative attitudes towards Jews on religious grounds. In the interviews with the Jewish groups, the informants discussed the challenge of keeping and defending religious traditions that can seem strange to the majority but that are important for the minority's identity. The discussion led to disagreement in

one group, when an informant claimed that Jews in Norway have, unlike the Muslims, undergone a process of adaptation during which they have broken away from unenlightened religious traditions in favour of modern, secular social ideals. This informant saw this "breaking away" from religion as an important identity marker that helped create distance from Muslims. Simultaneously she positioned herself as a member of the Norwegian majority.

To summarise, the group interviews draw a clear picture of how Jews and Muslims have certain common experiences as minorities in Norway, particularly with regard to standing out from a supposedly homogenous perceptions of Norwegianness. Moreover, as discussed above, the finding of shifting notions of being part of Norwegian society expressed in the interviews provides a basis for a more complex interpretation of what significance this has for mutual attitudes among minorities.

2.5 Social distance and attitudes towards immigration in general

The respondents were asked for their views on having contact with people of different nationalities and religions. They were also asked for their views on immigration and on what position Norway should take on refugees. The question about refugees is new in the 2017 survey. The other questions were also asked also in the 2011 survey. The questions were asked of the respondents in all three samples.

2.5.1 CONTACT WITH PEOPLE OF DIFFERENT NATIONALITIES AND RELIGIONS

The survey included questions about contact with people of seven different nationalities and religions: Muslims, Somalis, Poles, Roma, Jews, Catholics and Americans. The respondents were asked whether they would like or dislike having these people as neighbours or in their circle of friends. The answers to the questions about contact with Jews and Muslims have already been reviewed, but are presented again below to provide a fuller picture of the overall response pattern.

Changes from 2011 to 2017 (population sample)

The population displayed less social distance from almost all the groups in the present survey than in the 2011 survey. The decrease applies to both forms of contact, apart from the question about having Roma as neighbours, to which a larger percentage (from 55 per cent to 57 per cent) answered that they would dislike it. There was also an increase in the small percentage that would dislike having Americans as neighbours (from 4 per cent to 7 per

cent) or friends (from 3 per cent to 4 per cent).

The population sample ranked these groups in almost the same order in 2017 as in 2011. Only Americans and Catholics had switched places due to slightly greater social distance from Americans in 2017. Social distance was greatest from Roma, Somalis and Muslims, and least from Poles, Jews, Americans and Catholics.

In both the 2011 and 2017 surveys a smaller percentage of the population was sceptical about having different groups in their circle of friends than about having them as neighbours. This is interesting, and deviates from what is often assumed, namely that the closer the contact in question, the greater the social distance.³⁰ A possible explanation for this may be that friends, unlike neighbours, are a matter of choice, and that any social differences can thereby be minimised. One exception here is, as mentioned above, that the Muslim respondents were less sceptical about having Jews as neighbours than about having them in their circle of friends ([see page 31](#)).

Results, by sample, 2017

The three samples ranked the groups similarly, expressing most scepticism towards having contact with Roma, Somalis and Muslims and least scepticism towards having contact with Poles, Jews, Americans and Catholics.³¹ Moreover, the two minority samples showed less social distance from most groups than did the population sample. The Jewish and Muslim respondents in particular showed considerably less social distance from Roma and Somalis. As mentioned above, the Muslim respondents showed greater social distance from Jews than the general


³⁰ See, for example, the Bogardus Social Distance Scale, developed by Emory S. Bogardus in 1924.

³¹ The respondents in the Jewish and Muslim samples were not asked about their views on contact with their own groups.


When you think of..., what kind of contact would you feel comfortable with? To what extent would you like or dislike it if they became your neighbours?

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Roma (Gypsies)



Somalis



Americans




Poles



Catholics



Muslims



Jews



■ Would like it ■ Wouldn't mind it ■ Don't know ■ No response ■ Would dislike it a little ■ Would dislike it a lot

Figure 28. Social contact: neighbours (Per cent. Population 2011 and 2017, Muslims and Jews)

When you think of..., what kind of contact would you feel comfortable with? To what extent would you like or dislike it if they were brought into your circle of friends?




Figure 29. Social contact: circle of friends (Per cent. Population 2011 and 2017, Muslims and Jews)

population (9.9 per cent of Muslims scored high on the index, compared with 5.9 per cent of the population sample), while the Jewish respondents, on the other hand, showed less social distance from Muslims (13.5 per cent of the Jewish respondents scored high on the index, compared with 19.6 per cent of the population sample).

2.5.2 VIEWS ON THE CULTURAL AND ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF IMMIGRATION

The respondents were asked about their views on the economic and cultural impacts of immigration. The questions were presented in the form of a discussion between two people, A and B. The respondents were asked to indicate who they agreed with most: A or B. The questions were asked in the 2011 survey.³²

Changes from 2011 to 2017 (population sample)

A clear majority in both surveys believed that immigration had positive significance for Norwegian culture. Fifty-seven per cent supported A's statement: "Immigrants contribute to greater cultural diversity in Norway, introducing new and exciting food, music, art, etc." (Table 33). Slightly more respondents support this statement in 2017 than in 2011.

A clear majority of respondents in the 2017 survey who expressed an opinion (44 per cent) also agreed

with the statement "Immigrants are hard-working, diligent people who make a valuable contribution to the Norwegian economy and working life." (Table 34). This result also indicates an increase in the number of positive responses. This trend has contributed to minimising the differences between the results for these two questions, where previously far stronger support was expressed for the statement about immigrants' positive influence on culture than for the statement about their influence on the economy.

Results, by sample, 2017

A clear majority in the Jewish and Muslim samples also agreed with the statement "Immigrants contribute to greater cultural diversity in Norway, introducing new and exciting food, music, art, etc.". Moreover, both samples were more positive than the population sample (80.5 per cent of Muslim respondents and 67 per cent of Jewish respondents).

The same trend applies for the question on immigration and the economy: both minority samples responded more positively and in larger numbers than the population sample (74 per cent of Muslim respondents and 59 per cent of Jewish respondents). Only 6 per cent of Muslims agreed with A that immigrants exploit the welfare system. The Muslim respondents responded more positively to both questions than the other samples.

Table 33. Cultural impacts of immigration (Per cent. Population 2011 and 2017, Muslims and Jews)

Who do you agree with most: A or B?	Agree most with A	Impossible to choose	No response/Don't know	Agree most with B	Total
Population 2011 (1,522)	54.2	20.7	0.2	25.0	100
Population 2017 (1,575)	56.8	18.4	0.0	24.8	100
Muslims (586)	80.5	14.5	2.3	2.6	100
Jews (162)	66.7	21.6	0.0	11.7	100

³² The questions were obtained from Norsk Monitor and were previously used in analyses of trends in Norwegians' attitudes to immigrants; see Hellevik and Hellevik (2017). Norsk Monitor uses telephone interviews and postal s, whereas our survey was a web survey. Nonetheless, there is still a high level of correlation between the results of the two surveys.

Questions (pertaining to Table 33): Two people are discussing the possible effects of immigrants from other cultures arriving in Norway. Who do you agree with most: A or B?

A says: Immigrants contribute to greater cultural diversity in Norway, introducing new and exciting food, music, art, etc.

B says: Immigrants' ways of life don't fit into Norwegian society. Their foreign customs are problematic for those around them and could threaten Norwegian culture.

Questions (pertaining to Table 34): Two people are discussing. Whose view of immigrants do you agree with most: A or B?

A says: Immigrants want to exploit our welfare system and enjoy benefits which they played no part in creating.

B says: Immigrants are hard-working, diligent people who make a valuable contribution to the Norwegian economy and working life.

Table 34. Economic impacts of immigration (Per cent. Population 2011 and 2017, Muslims and Jews)

Whose view of immigrants do you agree with most: A or B?	Agree most with A	Impossible to choose	No response / Don't know	Agree most with B	Total
Population 2011 (1,522)	37.1	25.5	0.3	37.1	100
Population 2017 (1,575)	31.0	25.3	0.1	43.6	100
Muslims (586)	5.8	18.0	2.5	73.7	100
Jews (162)	17.9	22.2	0.6	59.3	100

2.5.3 VIEWS ON WHAT POSITION NORWAY SHOULD TAKE ON REFUGEES

The respondents were asked to express their opinion on three different positions regarding Norway's handling of refugees: should we do our utmost to ensure that Norway can receive more refugees; should they instead be helped in or near their home country; or can Norway not afford to help because of the many unresolved tasks here at home? The question was asked of all three samples, and the respondents could only select one option. The question is new in the 2017 survey but has been used in Norsk Monitor since 1993.

Results, by sample, 2017

Most respondents in the population sample (55 per cent) and in the Jewish sample (49 per cent) thought that Norway should help refugees in their own countries or somewhere close by. The Muslim respondents also supported this position to a large extent, though even more (45 per cent) answered that Norway should do its utmost to receive more refugees. The population sample showed less support for this position than the Muslim and Jewish respondents. The position that received least support in all three samples was the one stating that Norway could not afford to spend so much money on helping refugees because of the many unresolved tasks here at home.

Table 35. Views on what position Norway should take on refugees (Per cent. Population 2017, Muslims and Jews)

Which of the following statements about what position Norway should take on refugees do you agree with most?	We must do our utmost to ensure that Norway can receive more refugees	No response	Instead of receiving refugees in Norway, we should use resources to help them in their own countries or in countries close by	We can't afford to spend so much money on helping refugees as long as we have so many unresolved issues here in Norway	Total
Population 2017 (1,575)	32.7	0.4	54.6	12.2	100
Muslims (586)	44.8	6.3	41.7	7.2	100
Jews (162)	41.4	4.9	49.4	4.3	100

3 ANALYSES OF POSSIBLE REASONS FOR VARIATIONS IN ATTITUDES

It is difficult to draw causal conclusions based on interview data. What the data can show are statistical correlations, but these do not necessarily reflect causal influence. Correlation may be brought about by prior causal variables, something one can attempt to reveal through analyses where such variables are controlled for. However, one can never be absolutely sure that such a control will cover all the relevant variables. Another problem is causal direction, i.e. in which direction any influence between the variables works. For example, this can be difficult to know in the case of the relationship between negative attitudes towards Jews and views on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In many cases it is reasonable to assume that any influence will work both ways.

Which factors may influence peoples' attitudes towards Jews or Muslims? We will look at how attitudes vary between groups by gender, age, place of residence and education, and at the covariation between attitudes and religiosity, opinions on the

conflict in the Middle East, xenophobia, and immigrants in Norway.

Because the differences between the 2011 and 2017 surveys on attitudes towards Jews are minimal, the analyses of antisemitism will be performed on the two samples combined, thus providing a sounder basis for our calculations. The 2017 survey is the data source for attitudes towards Muslims, because many questions used in the indices were not part of the 2011 survey.

The purpose of the analyses is, first, to form a picture of what may have contributed to individuals in the Norwegian population developing negative attitudes towards Jews or Muslims, and, second, to examine whether the downward trend in antisemitism can be explained by changes in these explanatory variables. Separate indices were developed for views on the Middle East conflict, xenophobia, and attitudes towards immigrants.

3.1 Opinion on the Middle East conflict

As mentioned above, two to three times as many respondents in the population sample support the Palestinians in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as support Israel. However, more than half of the respondents refrained from expressing an opinion or did not respond. The results from the present survey show a

slight decrease since the 2011 survey in the proportion that support the Palestinians and an increase in the proportion that refrained from expressing an opinion. In the subsequent analysis, the two categories at either end of the spectrum were combined, as were the two categories in the middle expressing no

Table 36. People have conflicting views on the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. Which side do you support most? (Per cent. Population 2011 and 2017)

Year	Solely Israel	Mostly Israel	To some extent Israel	Neither	Impossible to answer / NA	To some extent Palestinians	Mostly Palestinians	Solely Palestinians	Total	Palestinians minus Israel
Population 2011	1.3	6.8	4.7	30.3	20.8	12.7	21.1	2.2	99.9	23.2
Population 2017	2.1	6.7	4.5	31.9	22.5	10.5	18.3	3.6	100.1	19.1
Change	0.8	-0.1	-0.2	1.6	1.7	-2.2	-2.8	1.4	0.2	-4.1

Table 37. Statements on the Middle East conflict (Per cent. Population 2011 and 2017)

How well do these statements about the Middle East conflict fit with your own opinions?		Not at all	Rather badly	Impossible to answer / No response	Rather well	Completely	Total	Rather well + Completely
<i>Israel's leaders genuinely want to find a solution to the conflict</i>	2011	12.9	32.1	34.2	16.6	4.2	100.0	20.8
	2017	10.0	31.2	37.0	17.8	4.1	100.1	21.9
	Change	-2.9	-0.9	2.8	1.2	-0.1	0.1	1.1
<i>Israel is at the forefront of the war on Islamic terrorism</i>	2011	12.4	20.4	46.9	15.9	4.5	100.1	20.4
	2017	8.0	20.9	51.9	14.7	4.5	100.0	19.2
	Change	-4.4	0.5	5.0	-1.2	0.0	-0.1	-1.2
<i>As long as the State of Israel exists there can be no peace</i>	2011	24.9	23.7	35.6	11.7	4.1	100.0	15.8
	2017	13.2	20.9	45.6	15.8	4.6	100.1	20.4
	Change	-11.7	-2.8	10.0	4.1	0.5	0.1	4.6
<i>Israel treats the Palestinians just as badly as the Jews were treated during World War II</i>	2011	11.5	21.0	29.4	29.1	9.0	100.0	38.1
	2017	9.9	20.5	37.4	25.4	6.9	100.1	32.3
	Change	-1.6	-0.5	8.0	-3.7	-2.1	0.1	-5.8
<i>Both the Israelis and the Palestinians are entitled to a state of their own</i>	2011	2.5	3.7	17.4	27.8	48.6	100.0	76.4
	2017	2.2	4.4	23.1	30.9	39.5	100.1	70.4
	Change	-0.3	0.7	5.7	3.1	-9.1	0.1	-6.0
<i>The Palestinian leaders genuinely want to find a solution to the conflict</i>	2011	6.1	21.8	34.4	31.6	6.2	100.1	37.8
	2017	7.3	19.2	40.4	28.2	5.0	100.1	33.2
	Change	1.2	-2.6	6.0	-3.4	-1.2	0.0	-4.6

support for either side, thereby reducing the number of values for the variable from eight to five.

As shown earlier, the statements expressing positive positions on Israel (the two first) received less support than those expressing positive positions on the Palestinians. The distribution of responses to the pro-Israel statements was quite similar in both surveys, while the pro-Palestinian statements received slightly less support in 2017

The response distribution for the two remaining statements with anti-Israel content (the third and fourth in the table) differed somewhat. Around one-third of the respondents answered "rather well" or "completely" to the statement "Israel treats the Palestinians just as badly as the Jews were treated

during World War II", but as shown, this proportion is slightly smaller in 2017 than in 2011. The statement "As long as the State of Israel exists there can be no peace" was supported by 20 per cent in 2017 and 16 per cent in 2011.

A factor analysis³³ of the six statements results in three dimensions, each with a pair of statements. When the responses for each statement are coded from 0 to 4, this creates three indices with scores ranging from 0 to 8, which we have named pro-Israel attitudes (statements 1 and 2), anti-Israel attitudes (statements 3 and 4), and pro-Palestinian attitudes (statements 5 and 6). The figures below show the distribution on the indices and how they are dichotomised. The division point is located above the

³³ Principal component analysis with varimax rotation. A similar analysis in 2011 with four statements in addition to these six produced the same dimension solution.




Figure 30. Index on pro-Israel attitudes (Per cent. Population 2011 and 2017)




Figure 31. Index on anti-Israel attitudes (Per cent. Population 2011 and 2017)




Figure 32. Index on pro-Palestinian attitudes (Per cent. Population 2011 and 2017)

midpoint on the scale so that scores of 5 to 8 yield high values on the index. The percentage with a high value remained stable at around 20 for the pro-Israel index (Figure 30). Around 40 per cent is positioned on the mid-range of the index, and a similar proportion is distributed on the negative half. Around a quarter of the population sample has a high value on the index for anti-Israel attitudes towards the Middle East conflict, with an increase from 25 per cent in 2011 to 27 per cent in 2017 (Figure 31). In the middle of the scale (score 4) we find 34 per cent (2011) and 39 per cent (2017) of the sample. The proportion of respondents on the lower part of the scale (scores 0-3), representing those who rejected the anti-Israel

statements, has decreased from 42 per cent to 34 per cent.

Most of the responses to the pro-Palestinian statements are located above the midpoint on the scale, with 66 per cent in 2011 and 60.5 per cent in 2017 (Figure 32). Around a quarter are located around the midpoint and show a slight increase in 2017, while around 10 per cent reject the pro-Palestinian statements.

In addition to being dichotomised in multivariate analyses, the indices are trichotomised in tables. Low values will thus denote scores 0-2, medium values 3-5 and high values 6-8.

3.2 Xenophobia

Earlier we presented the population's attitudes towards social contact with Jews and Muslims, defined by whether respondents would like or dislike having them as neighbours or friends. The index of social distance was developed by assigning 1 point for the response "would dislike it a little" and 2 points for "would dislike it a lot" for each of the two types of

contact. Table 38 shows the distribution on the index of social distance from Roma, Somalis and Poles. The first two groups particularly stand out with respect to the level of scepticism in the population sample. The proportion with high scores (2-4) in the present survey is 44 per cent for Roma, 27 per cent for Somalis and 8 per cent for Poles. For the purpose of

Table 38. Scepticism about having social contact with Roma, Somalis and Poles as neighbours or friends (Per cent. Population 2011 and 2017)

Degree of scepticism about being neighbours / friends		Low				High	Total	High (2-4)
		0	1	2	3	4		
<i>With Roma (Gypsies)</i>	Population 2011	36.8	19.7	19.3	10.5	13.7	100.0	43.5
	Population 2017	41.7	13.9	19.6	5.4	19.4	100.0	44.4
	Change	4.9	-5.8	0.3	-5.1	5.7	0.0	0.9
<i>With Somalis</i>	Population 2011	52.0	16.2	16.1	6.6	9.2	100.1	31.9
	Population 2017	62.2	11.1	12.4	2.8	11.6	100.1	26.8
	Change	10.2	-5.1	-3.7	-3.8	2.4	0.0	-5.1
<i>With Poles</i>	Population 2011	80.4	8.3	8.0	0.8	2.4	99.9	11.2
	Population 2017	87.1	5.2	5.6	0.6	1.5	100.0	7.7
	Change	6.7	-3.1	-2.4	-0.2	-0.9	0.1	-3.5



Figure 33. Distribution on index on xenophobia, based on opinions on having Roma, Somalis and Poles as neighbours/in circle of friends (Per cent. Population 2011 and 2017)

comparison, the corresponding result for Muslims is 21 per cent, Jews 6 per cent, Americans 4 per cent, and for Catholics 3 per cent.

The table shows stability in attitudes about having contact with Roma and less scepticism towards having contact with Somalis and Poles.³⁴

Could reluctance to have contact with Jews or Muslims be part of a more general scepticism

towards foreigners, or xenophobia? To measure xenophobia, we used an index of the total scores for the three groups in Table 38. With three indicators with scores between 0 and 4, this produces an index ranging from 0 to 12. If a high level of xenophobia is defined as a score above the midpoint on the scale (7-12), we find this in 15 per cent and 13 per cent of respondents in 2011 and 2017 respectively.

3.3 Scepticism towards immigrants

Earlier we presented the results of the general population's views on the significance of immigrants for Norwegian culture and the Norwegian economy

(presented again in Tables 39 and 40 below). These were used to create an index of scepticism towards immigrants.

Table 39. Views on the significance of immigrants for Norwegian culture (Per cent. Population 2011 and 2017)

	A Diversity	Impossible to choose	No response	B Threat	Total	A minus B
Population 2011	54.2	20.7	0.2	25.0	100.1	29.2
Population 2017	56.8	18.4	0.0	24.8	100.0	32.0
Change	2.6	-2.3	-0.2	-0.2	-0.1	2.8

³⁴ A minor change was made to the wording of the question. In 2011 the wording used was "When you think about xx, what type of contact do you think you would feel comfortable with? To what extent would you like or dislike ...?" In 2017: "We will now ask you some questions about contact with people of different nationalities and religions. To what extent would you like or dislike ...?"

Table 40. Views on the significance of immigrants for Norwegian economy (Per cent. Population 2011 and 2017)

	A Exploit	Impossible to choose	No response	B Contribute	Total	B minus A
Population 2011	37.1	25.5	0.4	37.1	100.1	0.0
Population 2017	31.0	25.3	0.1	43.6	100.0	12.6
Change	-6.1	-0.2	-0.3	6.5	-0.1	12.6

The index of scepticism towards immigrants was created by assigning 0 point for a positive response, 1 point for not expressing an opinion, and 2 points for a negative response. Given that scores of 3 or 4 on the index are regarded as high values, 31 per cent of the sample is classified as being sceptical towards immigrants in 2011 and 29 per cent in 2017; in other words, these attitudes have remained stable. On the other hand, the proportion expressing two positive attitudes (score of 0) increased from 31 per cent in 2011 to 38 per cent in 2017.




Figure 34. Index on scepticism towards immigrants (Per cent. Population 2011 and 2017)

3.4 Religiosity

It is possible that attitudes towards Jews or Muslims are influenced by personal religiosity. The questions about religiosity asked in the 2011 survey were changed in the 2017 survey. In 2017 the respondents were asked: “Do you believe in God?” and “How important is your religion to you?”

The distribution of the population sample’s responses to the first question was 34 per cent “yes”, 25 per cent “not sure” and 41 per cent “no”. When asked about the importance of religion, 12 per cent of respondents answered “very important”, 28 per cent “fairly important”, 36 per cent “neither important nor

unimportant”, 18 per cent “not very important” and 7 per cent “not important at all”.

The proportion of respondents that answered “yes” when asked if they believe in God is larger in the minority samples: among non-Muslim immigrants (“Others”) 38 per cent; Jewish respondents 48 per cent; and Muslim respondents as much as 94 per cent. Forty per cent of the population sample answered that religion was very or fairly important to them. The same applied for the “Others” sample, while the corresponding figures for the Jewish sample was 64 per cent and for the Muslim sample 77 per cent.

3.5 Possible explanations for negative attitudes towards Jews and Muslims

When the respondents are grouped by social characteristics or opinions measured by the indices discussed above, variations in the incidence of antisemitism or Islamophobia between the groups may provide clues as to what stimulates development of such attitudes. They are measured using the dichotomised combined indices, where high values denote scores of 2 or 3, indicating that the respondent has high values on at least two of the three sub-indices. Table 41 shows how the proportion of respondents displaying high levels of antisemitism or high levels of Islamophobia, when defined in this manner, varies between different groups in the population.

The incidence of both antisemitic and Islamophobic attitudes is higher among men than among women, among older people, and among people with lower levels of education. Regarding region, Trøndelag and Northern Norway stand out with slightly lower incidence of antisemitism and higher incidence of Islamophobia than other regions in the country.

Belief in God and regarding religion as important in one's life show no clear correlations with antisemitism or Islamophobia in the general population, though the proportion displaying high levels of Islamophobia among those who answered "yes" to the question about belief in God is slightly larger than for those who answered "no".

Which side the respondents support in the Middle East conflict and what opinions they hold on the conflict clearly correlate with antisemitism and Islamophobia in the direction expected. The exceptions are that the correlation between pro-Palestinian attitudes and antisemitism is weak, and that strong

anti-Israel attitudes correlate with Islamophobia. The first finding may indicate that support for the Palestinians only to a little degree is a result of antisemitism. The second finding may indicate that negative attitudes towards foreigners and towards immigrants can stimulate both antisemitism and Islamophobia. Both attitudes have clear correlations with antisemitism and, in particular, Islamophobia. In terms of incidence of high levels of Islamophobia, the difference between the groups at either end of the indices of xenophobia and scepticism towards immigrants is almost 80 percentage points. One might ask whether scepticism towards foreigners or immigrants on the one hand and antisemitism or Islamophobia on the other should be regarded as separate phenomena that may influence each other, as we have done here, or whether they should instead be considered as different aspects of the same phenomenon, a syndrome that has been called group-focused enmity.³⁵

Several of the variables in Table 41 are intercorrelated. For example, individuals displaying high levels of xenophobia will often also hold negative attitudes towards immigrants. In order to see what a characteristic in itself means, the groups to be compared must be made equal through an analysis in which the other variables are included. This can be achieved by performing a multivariate regression analysis (Table 42). As a result of an analysis of Table 41, the importance of religion – which had no clear correlation with antisemitism or Islamophobia – was omitted.

To ease comparison of the importance of different characteristics, we used the explanatory variables dichotomised in the multivariate analysis,

³⁵ Zick et al. (2011).

Table 41. Variation in antisemitism and Islamophobia between different groups (Percentage with high scores on the combined indices) (Per cent. Population 2017)

Variable	Values (index scores)	High antisemitism	High Islamophobia	Proportion of sample	N (not weighted)
Gender	Female	3	20	50	805
	Male	8	34	50	770
Age	-29 years	2	11	18	239
	30-44 years	5	27	28	410
	45-59 years	7	30	27	463
	60+ years	6	34	28	463
Place of residence	Oslo and Akershus	5	22	25	381
	Rest of Eastern Norway	5	27	26	404
	Southern and Western Norway	7	28	31	601
	Trøndelag and Northern Norway	3	34	18	189
Education	University level	3	18	32	414
	Lower	7	31	68	1161
Belief in God	Yes	6	31	34	550
	Not sure	4	28	25	394
	No	6	23	41	631
Importance of religion	Very important	4	31	12	109
	Fairly important	5	29	28	242
	Neither	6	32	36	317
	Not very important	4	38	18	149
	Not important at all	7	32	7	59
Support for parties in Middle East conflict	Solely / mostly Palestinians	12	13	22	325
	To some extent Palestinians	6	18	11	172
	No opinion	3	28	54	865
	To some extent Israel	5	47	5	68
	Solely / mostly Israel	2	60	9	145
Pro-Israel attitudes	Strong (6-8)	3	52	10	176
	Medium (3-5)	4	24	63	1025
	Weak (0-2)	11	26	23	374
Anti-Israel attitudes	Strong (6-8)	22	36	15	241
	Medium (3-5)	3	23	66	982
	Weak (0-2)	2	34	24	352
Pro-Palestinian attitudes	Strong (6-8)	7	20	41	652
	Medium (3-5)	4	31	53	844
	Weak (0-2)	9	45	5	79
Xenophobia	None (0)	2	5	38	584
	Weak (1-2)	2	15	25	379
	Some degree (3-4)	7	36	15	250
	Medium (5-6)	8	55	9	142
	Strong (7-12)	19	83	13	220
Scepticism towards immigrants	None (0)	3	3	38	572
	Weak (1)	4	12	15	236
	Medium (2)	4	29	18	296
	Quite strong (3)	4	42	11	168
	Strong (4)	13	80	18	303
All		5	27	100	1575

Table 42. Bivariate and multivariate regression analysis with dichotomised combined indices as dependent variable (Population 2017). *Coefficients in brackets: not significant at the 5 per cent level.

Variable	High values (index scores)	Antisemitism			Islamophobia		
		Bivariate	Multivariate		Bivariate	Multivariate	
Gender	Female	-4.9	-4.8	-4.4	-14.2	-14.0	-5.1
Age	-44 years	-2.4	(-2.2)	(-0.6)	-11.5	-9.9	-5.1
Region (two dummy variables. Reference group: Eastern Norway)	Southern and Western Norway	2.6	(1.8)	(1.7)	(1.9)	(2.8)	(1.1)
	Trøndelag and Northern Norway	-3.1	(-2.6)	(-2.9)	6.6	7.3	(2.5)
Education	University / university college	-3.5	-2.9	(-1.6)	-12.7	-10.2	(-0.8)
Belief in God	Yes	(0.5)	(0.1)	(1.7)	6.1	4.8	(2.6)
Middle East conflict (two dummy variables. Reference group: No opinion)	Support Israel	(-2.6)		(-1.6)	33.0		14.0
	Support Palestinians	6.6		5.3	-18.7		-7.8
Pro-Israel attitudes	Strong (5-8)	(-2.6)		(-1.9)	12.7		(0.5)
Anti-Israel attitudes	Strong (5-8)	12.6		10.3	5.0		5.4
Pro-Palestinian attitudes	Strong (5-8)	(0.3)		(-1.5)	-11.1		(-0.3)
Xenophobia	Strong (7-12)	15.9		14.8	64.1		40.0
Scepticism towards immigrants	Strong (3-4)	6.2		(1.1)	54.4		36.3
Explained variance (adjusted R squared)			0.019	0.134		0.058	0.419

except for which side the respondents supported in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and region. The dichotomised indices of negative attitudes towards Jews and Muslims were coded 0 for low value and 1 for high value. The regression coefficients thus reflect proportion differences, and when multiplied by 100 as shown in the table, can be interpreted as percentage differences. The bivariate association between gender and antisemitism in Table 42 (-4.9) corresponds to, for example, the difference in percentage points between women and men in Table 41 (3-8 = -5).

The variables in the table were divided into two categories. The first category contains the social background variables and belief in God, the second contains opinion on the Middle East conflict, xenophobia and scepticism towards immigrants. The latter variables lie closer to antisemitism and Islamophobia

in the causal chain, and can be considered as intermediate variables between the first group of variables and negative attitudes towards Jews and Muslims. They constitute potential mechanisms that may explain the correlation between them. It could also be possible that the influence works in the opposite direction; for example, that Islamophobia leads to scepticism towards immigrants, or that it works both ways, meaning that these phenomena stimulate each other. This is impossible to determine with the available data. Regardless of causal direction, it would be interesting to identify the extent to which these characteristics co-occur among the respondents.

The multivariate analysis is performed in two stages. In the first, the social background variables and belief in God are included. Changes in the bivariate correlation for a variable show how much of this

correlation can be explained by the other variables in the group. For some, such as gender and age, these will be indirect effects. For others it may also be a case of spurious (non-causal) correlation. In the second stage, all the variables are included, and the remaining correlation constitutes the direct effect of the relevant variable, given the variables that are included in the analysis.

Table 42 shows that when we remove differences between women and men with regard to the other variables, the gender difference for antisemitism is reduced, but only marginally (from -4.9 to -4.4 percentage points). For Islamophobia, however, the correlation with gender is radically reduced when controlled for all other variables (from -14.2 to -5.1). This can largely be ascribed to the clear gender differences with regard to xenophobia and scepticism towards immigrants (Table 43). The fact that these correlations are negative indicates that women – who are assigned high value on the gender variable – show lower incidences of such attitudes than men. Table 42 shows that both xenophobia and scepticism towards immigrants have a strong effect on the like-

lihood of scoring high on Islamophobia, and thereby transmit a negative indirect effect between gender and Islamophobia.

In other words, a key part of the explanation for the lower incidence of Islamophobia among women is that high levels of xenophobia and scepticism towards immigrants are far rarer among women than among men (negative correlations with gender, where women are assigned high value, in Table 43).

The results of the multivariate analysis (Table 42) show that xenophobia has greatest significance for whether a person scores high on the antisemitism index, followed by anti-Israel attitudes and support of the Palestinians in the Middle East conflict. Being a woman and supporting Israel help reduce the likelihood of a high score.

Xenophobia has the greatest effect on high levels of Islamophobia, closely followed by scepticism towards immigrants, which had little effect on the incidence of antisemitism. Supporting Israel in the Middle East conflict helps to increase the chance of high levels of Islamophobia. Education has a clear bivariate correlation, which shows little change when

Table 43. Correlation matrix for independent variables (Person's r. Population 2011 and 2017 combined)

	Gender Female	Age < 45 years	Educ. univ/univ coll	Xenophobia	Scep. towards Immigrants	Support Israel	Support Palestinians	Pro-Israel attitudes	Anti-Israel attitudes	Pro-Palestinian attitudes
Gender (Female)	1	-0.04	0.06	-0.09	-0.15	-0.15	-0.01	-0.06	0.04	-0.03
Age (young: <45 years)	-0.04	1	0.05	-0.06	-0.01	-0.08	-0.07	-0.08	-0.12	-0.14
Educ. (univ/univ coll)	0.06	0.05	1	-0.11	-0.17	-0.03	0.11	-0.04	-0.07	0.03
Xenophobia	-0.09	-0.06	-0.11	1	0.41	0.09	-0.12	0.06	0.05	-0.12
Scep. towards immigrants	-0.15	-0.01	-0.17	0.41	1	0.16	-0.20	0.07	0.03	-0.16
Support Israel	-0.15	-0.08	-0.03	0.09	0.16	1	-0.28	0.40	-0.18	-0.17
Support Palestinians	-0.01	-0.07	0.11	-0.12	-0.20	-0.28	1	-0.19	0.27	0.31
Pro-Israel attitudes	-0.06	-0.08	-0.04	0.06	0.07	0.40	-0.19	1	-0.07	0.03
Anti-Israel attitudes	0.04	-0.12	-0.07	0.05	0.03	-0.18	0.27	-0.07	1	0.14
Pro-Palestinian attitudes	-0.03	-0.14	0.03	-0.12	-0.16	-0.17	0.31	0.03	0.14	1

Table 44. Percentage high antisemitism (Per cent. Population 2011 and 2017 combined)

Xenophobia	Support for parties in Middle East conflict					Difference
	Mostly Israel	To some extent Israel	Both / None	To some extent Palestinians	Mostly Palestinians	Pal.-Isr.
Very high	5.9	11.8	19.6	33.2	52.0	46.1
High	2.0	3.8	6.9	5.0	20.6	18.6
Medium	0.0	2.4	2.1	7.7	22.1	22.1
Low	1.5	0.0	1.5	7.4	7.5	6.0
Very low	0.0	0.0	1.1	0.7	4.7	4.7
Difference	5.9	11.6	18.5	32.5	47.3	41.4

Table 45. Percentage high Islamophobia (Per cent. Population 2017)

Xenophobia	Support for parties in Middle East conflict					Difference
	Mostly Israel	To some extent Israel	Both / None	To some extent Palestinians	Mostly Palestinians	Pal.-Isr.
Very high	90.9	92.5	83.7	72.6	66.7	24.2
High	87.4	56.5	49.3	40.2	57.2	30.2
Medium	67.7	44.4	34.5	33.3	20.3	47.4
Low	42.1	14.1	15.4	7.1	6.3	35.8
Very low	17.3	22.1	5.8	1.2	1.9	15.4
Difference:	73.6	70.4	77.9	71.4	64.8	8.8

controlled for other social background variables but which disappears when controlled for attitude variables. Education is therefore not a direct but rather an indirect effect, primarily via xenophobia and scepticism towards immigrants. Such attitudes are less common among people with university or university college education (Table 43).

An intuitive and perhaps more easily understandable way of demonstrating the effect of these characteristics on antisemitism or Islamophobia is by using tables. However, a limit must be set on how many characteristics are examined simultaneously in order to avoid having too few respondents in the cells in the table. Tables 44 and 45 use two of the variables shown by the analysis to have the greatest effect on antisemitism and Islamophobia, namely xenophobia and opinion on the parties in the Middle East conflict. Limiting the number of variables to two

allows using five values for each variable in the table instead of the crude dichotomy used in the regression analysis.

Variables with five categories provide wide variation in the proportion with high levels of antisemitism, from 0 per cent in the bottom left-hand corner for respondents with no xenophobia who support Israel, to 52 per cent in the upper right-hand corner for respondents with high levels of xenophobia who support the Palestinians. Between these extremes the proportion with high levels of antisemitism gradually increases in a pattern that follows the main diagonal.

Table 45 for Islamophobia is set up in the same way as Table 44. Since the correlation with opinion on the parties in the Middle East conflict shows the opposite trend here, the proportions increase from the bottom right-hand corner to the upper left-hand

corner, from 2 per cent among respondents with no xenophobia who support the Palestinians to 91 per cent among respondents with very high levels of xenophobia who support Israel.

In Table 44 for antisemitism the distance between the groups at either end of the spectrum is slightly

greater for xenophobia (columns) than for opinion on the Middle East conflict (rows). This applies even more so for Islamophobia (Table 45). This indicates a strong effect of xenophobia – a general scepticism towards foreigners – on the development of negative attitudes towards Jews and Muslims.

3.6 Possible reasons for the decrease in antisemitism

As shown above, the proportion of the general population that scored high on the dichotomised combined index for antisemitism decreased by 2.3 percentage points between 2011 and 2017, from 7.8 per cent to 5.5 per cent. Could the independent variables in the analysis from the preceding section explain this decrease? If so, it must be variables which both have an effect on antisemitism and have changed in the “right” direction in this time period (i.e. show lower incidence of the value that increases the likelihood of antisemitism or a higher incidence of the value that reduces that likelihood).

The criterion of change in incidence excludes variables such as gender and age, where the composition of the population will not have changed significantly during the time period in question. It also excludes variables with negligible direct effect

on antisemitism in the multivariate analysis in Table 42. This leaves us with the variables in Table 46.

A variable’s contribution to changes in the incidence of high levels of antisemitism is equivalent to the product of how much it has changed multiplied by the effect it has on antisemitism. The changes in incidence in particular prove to be so negligible that this contribution amounts to only a few tenths of one percent. In fact, the result for the greatest contribution – for anti-Israel attitudes – is directly misleading; the trend towards a slightly higher incidence of such attitudes should have contributed to more, not less, antisemitism. The result, when effects for all the variables are added up, is -0.2 percentage points. Considering the actual decline of 2.3 per cent, we conclude that the variables in Table 46 cannot explain the decline in incidence of antisemitism in

Table 46. Independent variables’ contribution to decrease in antisemitism (Per cent. Population 2011 and 2017)

Variable	High values (index scores)	Incidence			Direct effect on antisemitism	Change x direct effect
		2011	2017	Change		
Education	University	28.4	32.1	3.7	-1.6	-0.06
Middle East conflict	Support Palestinians	36.0	32.4	-3.6	5.3	-0.19
Anti-Israel attitudes	Strong (5-8)	24.8	27.2	2.4	10.3	0.25
Xenophobia	Strong (7-12)	14.7	13.4	-1.3	14.8	-0.19
Scepticism towards immigrants	Strong (3-4)	30.6	28.8	-1.8	1.1	-0.02
Antisemitism	High (1-3)	7.8	5.5	-2.3	Sum:	-0.21

Norway between 2011 and 2017. In order to understand the background for this development, we must look for trends or events during this period that were not captured by these variables. One possibility

might be increased media and political attention to antisemitism as a social issue during this period, generated by terrorist attacks against Jews in Europe, among other things.

3.7 The link between antisemitism and Islamophobia

Are antisemitism and Islamophobia related phenomena or attitudinal opposites? Is it a matter of both-and or either-or when it comes to such attitudes? The former is conceivable if xenophobia is a dominant reason. The latter might be a consequence if the Israeli–Palestinian conflict plays a decisive role in attitude formation and if a person develops positive attitudes towards the party he sympathises with and negative attitudes towards its opponent. We have already seen that both of these factors play a role, but that xenophobia seems to be most important. This is confirmed by the results below.

That antisemitism and Islamophobia often go together can be shown by estimating the correlation between these two indices. The coefficient (Pearson's r) is positive in the population sample in 2017, whether we use the combined index scored 0-3 (0.24) or the dichotomised version (0.15). These are clear though not very strong correlations.

Tables can offer a better picture of the correlation. The left half of Table 47 shows that the likelihood of scoring high on Islamophobia is far greater for people with high levels of antisemitism than for people with low. The difference is as much as 30

Table 47. Link between Islamophobia and antisemitism (Per cent. Population 2017)

Islamophobia	Antisemitism		
	Low	High	Difference
Low	75	45	30
High	25	55	-30
Total	100	100	0

Islamophobia	Antisemitism		
	Low	High	Total
Low	97	3	100
High	89	11	100
Difference	-8	8	0

Table 48. Incidence of the different combinations of antisemitism and Islamophobia (Percentage of grand total. Population 2017)

Islamophobia	Antisemitism				Total	Antisemitism		
	0 Low	1	2	3 High		Low	High	Total
0 Low	55.4	2.2	1.0	0.6	59.2	70.5	2.5	73.0
1	11.4	1.6	0.6	0.3	13.8			
2	10.3	2.1	0.9	0.2	13.4	24.0	3.0	27.0
3 High	9.6	2.1	0.9	1.0	13.6			
Total	86.7	7.9	3.4	2.1	100.0	94.5	5.5	100.0

percentage points. Correspondingly, the right half of the table shows that scoring high on Islamophobia increases the likelihood of having antisemitic attitudes rather than decreases it. The difference is 8 percentage points.

The pattern in Table 47 means that the combinations high-high and low-low antisemitism-Islamophobia will occur more frequently than chance would predict. This is shown in Table 48, where the general population is distributed across the different value combinations on the two overall indices. On the left, indices scored 0-3 are used; on the right, the dichotomised indices.

The table containing dichotomised indices (on the right) shows that 70.5 per cent of respondents score low on both indices while 3 per cent score high on both. Antisemitism alone is found in 2.5 per cent of the sample, while Islamophobia alone is found in 24 per cent.

If we envision that the responses were distributed in the cells in the table by drawing lots, in other words totally by random, and in such a way that we maintained the marginal distribution for the two indices (94.5-5.5 and 73-27), the proportion that fell in the high-high or the low-low cells would be 1.5 percentage points lower in each cell (4.5 per cent in the high-high cell, for example). Correspondingly, the proportion in each of the two cells with low values on one index and high on the other would be 1.5 percentage points higher. This shows that antisemitism and Islamophobia tend to co-occur in people. They are, in other words, related attitudes rather than opposites. It is clear, however, that they often occur alone, particularly in the case of Islamophobia, given that these negative attitudes are far more widespread in Norway than antisemitism according to our measurements.

Table 41 showed how the proportion of either high levels of antisemitism or high levels of Islamophobia varies between groups with different social characteristics or attitudes. Table 49 shows corresponding results for different combinations of the two types of negative attitudes for the dichotomised indices: low values on both, low values on Islamophobia and high values on antisemitism and vice versa and, finally, high values on both.

High values for antisemitism only vary relatively little between the groups in the table, with the exception of opinion on the parties in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and on the conflict itself. High values for Islamophobia only varies far more with regard to opinion on the Middle East conflict, xenophobia and scepticism towards immigrants. High values on both indices are especially common among respondents with high levels of xenophobia and scepticism towards immigrants.

An absence of both types of negative attitudes is far more common among women than men (a difference of 15 percentage points), among young respondents (24 percentage points), and among respondents with university or university college education (14 percentage points).

Opinions on the parties in the Middle East conflict have considerable effect. The proportion of low values on both indices for respondents who support the Palestinians is 39 percentage points higher than for respondents who support Israel. The pattern of opinions on the conflict is similar, but on two of the three indices those who hold a neutral position have the highest proportions. The greatest distance between the extreme groups is found for xenophobia (79 percentage points) and for scepticism towards immigrants (75 percentage points).

Table 49. Variations in incidence of different combinations of antisemitism and Islamophobia (Per cent. Population 2017)

Variable	Values (index scores where relevant)	Combination antisemitism - Islamophobia			
		L-L	H-L	L-H	H-H
Gender	Female	78	2	19	1
	Male	63	3	29	5
Age	-29 years	87	2	10	0
	30-44 years	71	2	24	3
	45-59 years	67	3	26	4
	60+ years	63	3	31	3
	Oslo and Akershus	76	3	19	3
Place of residence	Rest of Eastern Norway	71	2	24	3
	Southern and Western Norway	69	3	24	4
	Trøndelag and Northern Norway	66	1	31	2
	University level	80	2	17	1
Education	Lower	66	3	27	4
	Yes	66	3	28	3
Belief in God	Not sure	70	2	26	2
	No	75	2	19	4
	Very important	67	2	29	2
Importance of religion	Fairly important	69	2	26	3
	Neither	65	3	30	2
	Not very important	61	1	35	3
	Not important at all	68	0	25	7

Variable	Values (index scores where relevant)	Combination antisemitism - Islamophobia			
		L-L	H-L	L-H	H-H
Support for parties in Middle East conflict	Solely/mostly Palestinians	79	8	9	4
	To some extent Palestinians	79	3	15	3
	No opinion	72	1	25	3
	To some extent Israel	52	1	44	4
	Solely/mostly Israel	40	0	57	2
	Pro-Israel attitudes	Strong (6-8)	47	1	49
Medium (3-5)		75	2	22	2
Weak (0-2)		69	5	20	6
Anti-Israel attitudes	Strong (6-8)	53	11	25	11
	Medium (3-5)	76	1	21	5
	Weak (0-2)	66	1	32	1
Pro-Palestinian attitudes	Strong (6-8)	76	4	17	2
	Medium (3-5)	68	1	28	3
	Weak (0-2)	55	0	37	9
Xenophobia	None (0)	94	2	5	0
	Weak (1-2)	83	2	14	1
	Some degree (3-4)	58	6	35	1
	Medium (5-6)	42	3	50	5
	Strong (7-12)	15	2	66	17
Scepticism towards immigrants	None (0)	94	3	3	0
	Weak (1)	86	3	11	1
	Medium (2)	69	2	26	3
	Quite strong (3)	56	2	40	2
	Strong (4)	19	1	68	13
All		70.5	2.5	24	3

3.8 The parties' voter groups: attitudes towards Jews, Muslims and immigrants

The differences between the parties' voter groups are not particularly wide with regard to the four indices for attitudes towards Jews. Progress Party voters have the largest proportions of high values on all indices (13 per cent on the combined index when two to three high scores for the sub-indices are regarded as high values), while those for voters of the Liberal Party, the Christian Democratic Party and the Socialist Left Party are markedly small (with 1 to 3 per cent scoring high).

Similar calculations for the indices of negative attitudes towards Muslims show greater differences between the parties' voter groups. The percentage of Progress Party voters that scored high on the combined index (62 per cent) is far greater than for the other parties' voters, with the Conservative Party closest though still considerably smaller (37 per cent). Socialist Left Party and Liberal Party voters have the smallest proportion, with 5 per cent showing high levels of Islamophobia according to

our measurements. Figure 35 shows the combinations for the proportion with high scores on the two indices within the parties' voter groups. According to our measurements, in 2017 more people in the population as a whole hold negative attitudes towards Muslims than to Jews (27 per cent compared with 5.5 per cent). Greater differences between the proportion for Islamophobia and antisemitism are found in the voter groups for the Progress Party and the Conservative Party. The two proportions are quite similar for the Liberal Party, Socialist Left Party and the Green Party, and in fact slightly larger for antisemitism than for Islamophobia in the latter's voter group. However, the number of respondents in some voter groups is small and the results correspondingly uncertain. This applies to the small parties with regard to Islamophobia, where the results of the 2017 constitute the only available data, and to the Green Party and the Red Party with regard to antisemitism.

Table 50. Attitudes towards Jews in political parties' voting bases (Percentage high values on the dichotomised indices. Population 2011 and 2017 combined)

Voted at the last election*	Indices on attitudes towards Jews (% high score)			
	Prejudice	Dislike	Distance	Combined
Progress Party (FrP)	14.9	14.2	15.7	13.3
Green Party (MDG)	12.9	5.8	6.9	10.3
Conservative Party (H)	11.5	9.0	7.3	7.0
Don't wish to disclose	10.2	5.1	8.6	7.0
Red Party (R)	11.6	9.8	7.8	6.2
Centre Party (SP)	9.5	9.4	8.1	6.0
Labour Party (AP)	10.2	8.4	4.6	5.7
Socialist Left Party (SV)	5.2	6.2	1.4	3.4
Christian Democratic Party (KrF)	2.9	4.0	2.1	2.1
Liberal Party (V)	3.3	4.7	0.7	0.7
All	10.2	8.2	7.2	6.6

*The last election refers here to the 2013 general election. The questionnaire was distributed prior to the 2017 general election

Table 51. Differences in attitudes towards Muslims, by political party (Percentage high values on the dichotomised indices. Population 2017)

Voted at the last election*	Indices on attitudes towards Muslims (% high score)			
	Prejudice	Dislike	Distance	Combined
Progress Party (FrP)	73.5	59.4	49.6	63.2
Conservative Party (H)	44.1	41.8	23.3	38.0
Don't wish to disclose	34.5	25.2	19.9	23.0
Centre Party (SP)	33.9	21.4	17.7	21.0
Labour Party (AP)	21.3	14.7	13.0	16.1
Christian Democratic Party (KrF)	27.4	17.1	6.7	14.7
Green Party (MDG)	18.4	9.0	4.2	9.0
Red Party (R)	6.9	6.9	0.0	6.9
Socialist Left Party (SV)	8.6	7.2	2.1	5.0
Liberal Party (V)	8.4	12.0	2.7	4.5
All	34.1	27.7	19.6	27.0

*The last election refers here to the 2013 general election. The questionnaire was distributed prior to the 2017 general election




Figure 35. Position of the parties' voter groups based on proportion with high value on indices for antisemitism (2011 + 2017) and Islamophobia (2017) (Per cent. Population 2011 and 2017 combined)

Table 52. Political parties' voter groups in the population sample (Population 2011 and 2017)

Voted	Population		
	2011	2017	Total
AP	380	370	750
FrP	133	189	322
H	368	376	744
KrF	56	40	96
MDG	0	33	33
R	22	25	47
SP	58	69	127
SV	69	60	129
V	82	45	127

3.9 The Muslim sample and possible explanations for attitudes towards Jews

Table 53 shows variations in the incidence of antisemitism between different groups within the Muslim sample. The table also shows the compositions of the population sample and the Muslim sample, showing marked differences in some characteristics. This particularly applies to religiosity (far more Muslim respondents believe in God and consider religion to be important), which side the respondents support in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (more Muslim respondents support the Palestinians), and to xenophobia and scepticism towards immigrants (far lower incidence among the Muslim respondents).

The pattern of prevalence of antisemitism resembles that already seen for the population sample. But although the variation in the percentage with high scores on the combined index for antisemitism in the two samples is quite similar for many characteristics, there are some differences. One of them is the markedly large proportion showing antisemitism among older Muslims. Another is the low prevalence of antisemitism among those respondents most sceptical about immigrants, but we find almost no Muslims there. Many groups in the Muslim sample are so small that the minor differences that exist between them are not statistically significant; in other words they may be the result of random sampling error.

Table 54 shows variation in antisemitism for characteristics that are relevant for immigrants but not for the rest of the population. One distinction is time of immigration, where those who have lived

longest in Norway and those who were born here (second-generation immigrants) show a slightly larger proportion for antisemitism than more recent immigrants. But again, the differences are so small in relation to the number of respondents that only the difference in time of immigration is significant. Furthermore, the proportion of high antisemitism among respondents who received their education outside Norway and among respondents who use media from their country background as their primary news source are slightly larger. The respondents who consider compliance with religious rules to be not important at all show the smallest proportion of antisemitism. However, all these differences are too small to be significant.

It could also be interesting to examine whether country background has any effect on the incidence of antisemitism (Table 55). Among the Muslim immigrants, the respondents from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Pakistan showed the highest levels of antisemitism, while among the non-Muslim immigrants the respondents from Turkey showed the highest levels of antisemitism. But the small number of respondents in these groups makes these figures uncertain. If we compare, for example, these three results with the corresponding results for immigrants from Iraq, only the difference from Muslims from Bosnia and Herzegovina is significant (at the 5 per cent level).

**Table 53. Variation in antisemitism between different groups
(Percentage with high scores on the combined index. (Per cent. Population and Muslims 2017))**

Variable	Values (with index scores where relevant)	% high antisemitism		% of sample		N (not weighted)	
		Popul.	Musl.	Popul.	Musl.	Popul.	Musl.
<i>Gender</i>	Female	3	5	50	49	805	259
	Male	8	8	50	51	770	322
<i>Age</i>	-29 years	2	5	18	31	239	178
	30-44 years	5	5	28	37	410	214
	45-59 years	7	6	27	22	463	141
	60+ years	6	25	28	10	463	50
<i>Education</i>	University level	3	6	32	31	414	177
	Lower	7	8	68	69	1161	377
<i>Belief in God</i>	Yes	6	6	34	94	550	546
	Not sure	4	14	25	4	394	24
	No	6	14	41	2	631	15
<i>Importance of religion</i>	Very important	4	7	12	47	109	276
	Fairly important	5	7	28	29	242	163
	Neither	6	7	36	13	317	73
	Not very important	4	8	18	6	149	38
	Not important at all	7	4	7	4	59	31
<i>Support for parties in Middle East conflict</i>	Solely / mostly Palestinians	12	11	22	52	325	287
	To some extent Palestinians	6	7	11	7	172	43
	No opinion	3	2	54	37	865	238
	To some extent Israel	5	0	5	0	68	3
	Solely / mostly Israel	2	0	9	3	145	15
<i>Pro-Israel attitudes</i>	Strong (6-8)	3	3	10	6	176	39
	Medium (3-5)	4	6	63	59	1025	339
	Weak (0-2)	11	9	23	35	374	208
<i>Anti-Israel attitudes</i>	Strong (6-8)	22	17	15	26	241	141
	Medium (3-5)	3	4	66	61	982	358
	Weak (0-2)	2	0	24	13	352	87
<i>Pro-Palestinian attitudes</i>	Strong (6-8)	7	7	41	55	652	314
	Medium (3-5)	4	7	53	42	844	251
	Weak (0-2)	9	11	5	3	79	21
<i>Xenophobia</i>	None (0)	2	1	38	60	584	355
	Weak (1-2)	2	12	25	17	379	95
	Some degree (3-4)	7	16	15	11	250	62
	Medium (5-6)	8	18	9	7	142	40
	Strong (7-12)	19	18	13	6	220	34
<i>Scepticism towards im- migrants</i>	None (0)	3	7	38	66	572	384
	Weak (1)	4	7	15	18	236	107
	Medium (2)	4	6	18	15	296	83
	Quite strong (3)	4	0	11	1	168	6
	Strong (4)	13	0	18	1	303	6
<i>All</i>		6	7	100	100	1575	586

Table 54. Difference in incidence of antisemitism between Muslim groups (Per cent. Muslims)

Variable	Values	% high antisemitism	% of sample	N (not weighted)
<i>Time of immigration</i>	Before 2000	9	32	192
	2000 or later	5	52	326
	Born in Norway (second generation)	9	15	68
<i>Where education was completed</i>	In Norway	6	54	318
	Outside Norway / No response	8	46	268
<i>News media usually used</i>	From country of origin	9	43	243
	Not from country of origin	6	57	340
<i>How important to comply with religious rules</i>	Very important	8	32	187
	Fairly important	6	33	188
	Neither	8	16	91
	Not very important	7	11	65
	Not important at all	2	7	50

Table 55. Country background and antisemitism for Muslim and non-Muslim immigrants (Percentage with high antisemitism. Muslims and "Others")

	Antisemitism			Bases (N)		
	Muslims	"Others"	Total	Muslims	"Others"	Total
Afghanistan	1.0	0.0	0.8	72	15	87
Bosnia and Herzegovina	21.6	2.3	12.1	38	37	75
Iraq	5.3	2.3	4.3	90	46	136
Iran	0.0	3.1	2.2	34	87	121
Kosovo	0.0	0.0	0.0	25	8	33
Morocco	2.4	0.0	2.2	36	2	38
Pakistan	11.8	0.0	10.6	93	11	104
Palestine	5.9	0.0	5.3	10	2	12
Somalia	4.5	0.0	3.9	135	17	152
Turkey	7.7	10.3	8.3	53	17	70
Total	6.9	2.6	5.7	586	242	828

4 THE NORWEGIAN RESULTS FROM AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

To better assess the results from the present studies, it is useful to compare them with the results from similar surveys conducted in other European countries. While relevant empirical studies of attitudes towards Jews are available in several European countries, the same does not apply for attitudes towards Muslims. So far questions about attitudes towards Muslims have only been included in surveys on hostile attitudes towards minority groups, while the few specific studies on this issue that are conducted are primarily in the field of sociology

of religion. Inclusion of Jewish experiences of discrimination and antisemitism in surveys is also rare, though a large-scale study was carried out in 2013 in the EU.³⁶ The Muslim population's experiences have been examined in two large surveys conducted in the EU, thus providing relevant background for the present survey.³⁷ However, differences in empirical data make it impossible to compare all the aspects covered by the CHM survey with similar surveys conducted in other countries.

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4.1 Antisemitic prejudice

The studies which the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) in the United States has regularly conducted for some years now represent a relevant international comparison. However, the sample in the ADL studies, which can often number as few as 500 respondents, is quite small and therefore fails to satisfy representativeness requirements. Moreover, little information is provided on the methodology for data collection and the translation of questions and statements into different languages. The findings from the ADL studies should therefore be treated with caution. However, the findings in the studies for the different countries have proven stable over time, and the trends match the findings in available studies for the respective countries. The ADL studies may therefore still provide valuable indications of the distribution of antisemitic ideas in different countries.

To map antisemitic attitudes, the ADL studies used an index of 11 antisemitic statements (see table 56). These statements capture aspects that are almost exclusively associated with traditional antisemitism (power in international financial mar-

kets, politics and the media, lack of loyalty and strong self-interest) while secondary antisemitism (see the introduction) is covered in only one statement (“Jews still talk too much about what happened to them in the Holocaust”), and there are no statements at all concerning Israel-related antisemitism. Moreover, the index measures the aspect “international influence” is covered by as many as five statements. Assuming that the notion that “Jews have too much influence” will apply in different spheres such as business, media, politics etc., all five of these statements essentially measure the same thing.

The respondents in these studies are classified as antisemitic if they regard at least six of the statements as “probably true”. The percentage value therefore relates to the proportion of respondents that supported more than half of the antisemitic statements. The findings of the ADL study from 2014 for various countries are presented below.³⁸ The average for countries in Northern, Western and Southern Europe was 24 per cent, while the average for Eastern European countries was considerably

36 FRA (2013).

37 FRA (2009) and FRA (2017).

38 The *ADL Global 100* study examines antisemitism in 100 countries, and was conducted between July 2013 and February 2014 (so before the latest Gaza conflict). 53,100 people were asked, and the sample size was n = 500 in most of the countries. ADL (2015).

Table 56. Antisemitic attitudes in 11 European countries (Per cent. 2014)

Item	Norway	Sweden	Finland	Denmark	Germany	France	UK	Italy	Spain	Netherlands	Greece	Average
<i>Jews are more loyal to Israel than to...</i>	40	27	38	39	55	31	27	51	65	33	60	42
<i>Jews have too much power in the business world</i>	14	9	20	11	33	51	11	31	53	17	85	30
<i>Jews still talk too much about what happened to them in the Holocaust</i>	31	10	23	15	33	48	12	32	50	14	82	33
<i>Jews have too much power in international financial markets</i>	19	14	23	26	52	44	10	45	48	20	60	33
<i>Jews don't care about what happens to anyone but their own kind</i>	21	10	18	12	28	31	8	28	26	16	53	23
<i>People hate Jews because the way Jews behave</i>	23	7	16	11	25	46	11	30	34	9	74	26
<i>Jews have too much power over global affairs</i>	13	12	22	26	31	42	19	26	39	16	69	29
<i>Jews have too much control over the US Government</i>	27	9	21	15	29	33	9	23	22	10	42	22
<i>Jews think they are better than other people</i>	21	5	16	7	23	44	14	18	31	8	68	23
<i>Jews have too much power over the global media</i>	12	2	7	5	13	18	6	9	12	5	38	11
<i>Jews are responsible for most of the world's wars</i>	6	12	18	17	33	26	7	17	17	11	47	19
<i>Antisemitism score</i>	15	4	15	9	27	37	8	20	29	5	69	22

Antisemitische Einstellungen in Nord-, West- und Südeuropa




Figure 36 Source: ADL, Global 100 (Per cent. 2014)

Antisemitic attitudes in Northern, Western and Southern Europe.

larger, at 34 per cent. In the Islamic countries of the Middle East and North Africa it is as high as 74 per cent. Combined, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, the UK and the Netherlands are the European countries where antisemitic views are relatively less widespread – even though the findings for Norway are slightly poorer than for the other countries.³⁹

We find the decrease in prevalence of antisemitic prejudice shown in the present survey conducted by CHM in other European countries, too. The ADL studies measured a reduction from 2014 to 2015 in Germany, where values dropped from 27 per cent to 16 per cent; in Belgium where they dropped from 27 per cent to 21 per cent; in Denmark, where they dropped from 9 per cent to 8 per cent; and in France, where they dropped from as much as 37 per cent to 17 per cent. The scores for other countries either remained stable or showed trends in the opposite direction: in the Netherlands from 5 per cent to 11 per cent; in the UK from 8 per cent to 12 per cent; and in Italy from 20 per cent to 29 per cent. The ADL study for 2015 showed an overall decrease for Western Europe from 23 per cent to 21 per cent. The relative large differences between the results for 2014 and 2015 (partially upward, partially downward) suggests problems in measurement.⁴⁰ Nonetheless, the trend in antisemitic attitudes in many European countries can be seen to be declining – or at least

not rising. This stands in sharp contrast with the perception held by Jews in many of these countries and which also emerges in the CHM survey, namely that the situation has deteriorated. The cause of this concern must originate in other circumstances, such as terrorism, online antisemitism or experiences of everyday discrimination.

A long-term study conducted in Germany between 2002 and 2016 shows a clear decrease in support for antisemitic statements. A similar decrease was also observed in Norway (ADL 2012 and 2014). The statement “Jews are more loyal to Israel than to Norway” was regarded as “probably true” by 58 per cent in 2012 (compared with 40 per cent in 2014). The statement concerning Jews’ economic influence, “Jews have too much power in the business world”, was supported by 21 per cent in 2012 and by 14 per cent in 2014. The decrease in support for the statement “Jews have too much power in international financial markets” was relatively small, from 23 per cent in 2012 to 19 per cent two years later.

The only statement that showed an increase in negative attitudes concerned secondary antisemitism: “Jews still talk too much about what happened to them in the Holocaust”.⁴¹ Twenty-five per cent supported this statement in 2012 and 31 per cent in 2014. Regarding the statement concerning the

Table 57. Trend in antisemitic attitudes over time, Germany 2002–2016. Source: Heitmeyer, 2002–2011, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) 2012–2016 – Scale based on two statements: Jews have too much influence in Germany / Jews themselves are partly to blame that they were persecuted

	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2009	2010	2011	2012	2014	2016
Antisemitism scale	12.7	14.6	14.6	12.6	8.4	9.1	9.8	9.9	8.1	8.6	8.5	5.8

39 A similar pattern in the prevalence of antisemitic attitudes emerged in the 2008 study *Intolerance, Prejudice and Discrimination*. Prevalence was least in the UK and the Netherlands, closely followed by Germany, France and Italy. Among the West European countries that participated in the survey, Portugal had the highest level of antisemitic attitudes, but the figures for the East European countries Poland and Hungary were even higher. Zick et al. (2011), p. 56–59.

40 ADL (2015).

41 By “secondary antisemitism” is meant a type of antisemitism that emerged after the Holocaust. The term includes not only denial or relativisation by setting off other genocides against the Holocaust, but also charges that Jews or the State of Israel is today trying to take advantage of their victimhood for moral, economic or political ends. See also the introductory chapter of this report.

old idea of the Jews being the “chosen people”, the response to the statement “Jews think they are better than other people” in the ADL survey showing 21 per cent for Norway in 2014 is close to the result for the statement in the CHM survey “Jews consider themselves to be better than others”, which was supported by 26 per cent in 2011 (“rather well”/“completely”). Support for this statement dropped to 18 per cent in 2017.⁴²

A similar relationship also emerges with regard to the statements concerning Jewish influence on US politics: in the ADL survey from 2014, 27 per cent of Norwegian respondents supported the statement “Jews have too much control over the United States Government”. In the CHM survey for 2017, 29 per cent support the corresponding statement “Jews have too much influence on US foreign policy”. This marks a clear downward trend from 2011, when support was measured at 38 per cent. One attitude that is closely linked with the charge that Jews consider themselves to be better than others is the idea that Jews only care about their own group. In the ADL survey from 2014, 21 per cent of Norwegian respondents agreed with the statement “Jews don’t care about what happens to anyone but their own kind”. This figure is just under the average for Western and Southern Europe.⁴³ Similarly, 19 per cent in 2011 supported the statement in the CHM survey that “World Jewry is working behind the scenes to promote Jewish interests”. Support for this statement in 2017 shows a clear decrease to 13 per cent. Among Muslims in Norway, this statement was supported by 28 per cent, which is significantly stronger.

Regarding statements dealing with secondary antisemitism, the only comparable figures available are for Germany and, to some extent, France. In 2017 the statement “Jews largely have themselves to blame for being persecuted” was supported by 8 per cent of the Norwegian population sample, representing a drop of 4 percentage points from 2011 (12 per cent). Support for this statement among Muslims in Norway is considerably stronger, at 17 per cent. In Germany too, only 7 per cent of respondents in the FES study (2016) agreed that “Jews are responsible for their own persecution by the way they behave”.⁴⁴

A similar pattern emerges in connection with another statement dealing with secondary antisemitism: “Jews exploit Holocaust victimhood for their own purposes”.⁴⁵ Support for this statement in Norway barely showed any decrease between 2011 and 2017 (from 24 per cent to 22 per cent). This figure is at the same level as for Germany, where 26 per cent supported this statement in 2016. The figure for the UK in 2017 was considerably lower: 10 per cent supported the statement “Jews exploit the Holocaust victimhood for their own purposes”. If “Jew” is “replaced by “Israel”, support increases to 13 per cent.⁴⁶

In a French survey from 2014, as much as 35 per cent of the population agreed with the statement “The Jews use today their status of victimhood of the Nazi genocide during the Second World War for their own interest”. Support among the Muslim section of the population was even stronger, at 56 per cent.⁴⁷ In a survey from 2013 in which Jewish respondents in eight EU countries were asked whether they had

42 In 2017, 13 per cent of the population of Great Britain agreed with the statement: “Jews think they are better than other people.” Daniel Staetsky (2017), Figure 5, p. 22.

43 In the French Ipsos survey of 2015, 91% of the respondents fully or partially agreed with a similar statement: “Les Juifs sont très soudés entre eux “ (Jews are very close-knit). The Muslims in France agreed to the same extent (90%). Ipsos (2015), p.28

44 Zick, Küpper and Krause (2016), pp.44-45.

45 Zick, Küpper and Krause (2016), pp.44-45. In Germany 25.6 per cent of the respondents fully agreed or tended to agree.

46 Staetsky (2017), Figure 5, p. 22 and Figure 11, p. 29.

47 Unlike the German and Norwegian surveys, only two response options were provided: “agree” or “disagree” without any further differentiation. (Domenique Reynié, *L’antisémitisme dans l’opinion publique française: Nouveaux éclairages*, Paris: Fondapol, 2014). Quoted from Jikeli (2015), p. 8.

heard or read about anyone making the statement “Jews exploit Holocaust victimhood for their own purposes”, 37 per cent confirmed having done so. The figures distributed by country were as follows: Belgium 48 per cent, Italy 37 per cent, France 44 per cent, Sweden 35 per cent, Germany 42 per cent, Hungary 57 per cent, UK 35 per cent and Latvia 33 per cent.⁴⁸ These findings indicate that respondents in many countries (perhaps as a result of today’s global teaching about the Holocaust) accuse Jewish organisations or the State of Israel for exploiting the “moral capital” associated with Jewish victimhood. The findings from a previous survey conducted in the EU also suggest this. The respondents were asked to express their opinion on the statement “Jews try to take advantage of having been victims during the Nazi era”. The proportions that agreed with this statement in the respective countries was: Netherlands 17.2 per cent, UK 21.8 per cent, France 32.3 per cent, Italy 40.2 per cent, Germany 48.9 per cent, Portugal 52.2 per cent, Hungary 68.1 per cent and Poland 72.2 per cent (the overall average for all these countries was 41.2 per cent).⁴⁹

A basis for comparison with a Germany survey is also available for the statement “Israel treats the Palestinians just as badly as the Jews were treated during World War II”. A decrease from 38 per cent in 2011 to 32 per cent in the present survey was indeed

measured, but the proportion supporting the statement remains quite large, and is far larger than the corresponding figure of 25 per cent in the Germany survey from 2016.⁵⁰ In two surveys conducted by the Bertelsmann Foundation, the proportion of Germans that agreed with the statement was, nonetheless, considerably larger, and increased from 30 per cent in 2007 to 41 per cent in 2013 (“Fully agree”/“tend to agree”).⁵¹ The study conducted by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) in 2013 showed that 48 per cent of Jews in the eight EU countries included had heard or seen someone make the statement “Israel treats the Palestinians just as badly as the Jews were treated during World War II”.⁵² The statement can be related to both secondary antisemitism and Israel-derived antisemitism. As many as 51 per cent of Muslim respondents in the present survey conducted by CHM supported this statement. It is reasonable to interpret this result primarily as an expression of condemnation of Israeli policy, as it cannot be expressing defence against historical guilt among these respondents. Jikeli has pointed out that support for different forms of secondary antisemitism among European Muslims may also be characterised by contemporary discursive patterns, where antisemitic attitudes are finding new, more acceptable forms of expression.⁵³

48 FRA (2013), Table 4, p. 24.

49 Zick et al. (2011), p. 57.

50 Zick, Küpper and Krause (2016), pp.44-45.

51 See: Hagemann and Nathanson (2015), p. 39.

52 FRA (2013), p. 24. The figures for the individual countries were: Belgium 61 per cent, Italy 59 per cent, France 56 per cent, Sweden 51 per cent, Germany 49 per cent, Hungary 49 per cent, UK 25 per cent and Latvia only 14 per cent.

53 Jikeli (2015), chapter 9.

4.2 Islamophobia

Surveys on attitudes towards Muslims are far rarer than surveys on attitudes towards Jews.⁵⁴ The fact that 34.1 per cent of the respondents asked in the CHM survey displayed Islamophobic prejudice while the corresponding figure for antisemitic prejudice was 8.3 provides a general basis on which to say something about prevalence.⁵⁵ However, a direct comparison is impossible because the statements used in the two indices are different.

Whereas some statements are now used internationally and identically for mapping antisemitic attitudes, the same does not apply for measuring Islamophobic attitudes. Only a few statements are suitable for comparison with the CHM study.

In Norway, as in other European countries, the statement claiming that Islam and Muslims discriminate against or are oppressive towards women receives most support. In a survey of six European countries conducted in 2010, around 80 per cent of respondents associated the word “Islam” with “unfair treatment of women”. The corresponding figure for Denmark was 86 per cent, western Germany 82.0 per cent, eastern Germany 81.2 per cent, Netherlands 80.2 per cent, France 68.2 per cent, and Portugal 59.7 per cent.⁵⁶

In the comparative study conducted by Zick, Küpper and Hövermann in 2008, between 72 per cent and 82 per cent also supported the statement “Muslims’ attitudes towards women contradict our

values”.⁵⁷ Aspects relating to social distance, namely that Muslims represent a threat to the respective countries’ cultures (39 per cent support in Norway) or that Muslims do not fit into modern Western society (36 per cent support in Norway) are also found in other European countries and in similar wording. The statement in the abovementioned study was positively worded “The Muslim culture fits well into [country]”. Support for this statement varied widely: 16.6 per cent of Germans agreed, while the corresponding figure for Portugal was 50.1 per cent and for the other countries was distributed between these two extremes.⁵⁸ In other words, half or even the majority of respondents in these countries considered the Muslim culture to be incompatible with their own.⁵⁹ In the study by Detlef Pollack, approximately 40 per cent of respondents in (western) Germany, Denmark, France and the Netherlands regarded their respective countries’ cultures to be threatened by foreign cultures. These findings largely correlated with the findings for Norway.⁶⁰

In the German “Group-focused Enmity” survey conducted in 2008, respondents were asked two questions concerning cultural distance which can to a large extent be compared with the Norwegian questions: 44.6 per cent of Germans strongly agreed or agreed more than disagreed with the statement “Islamist and West European values are incompatible” (whereas in the present study from CHM

54 SETA, Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research (2016). The country reports include one on Norway: Bangstad, *Islamophobia in Norway. National Report 2015*. A new edition of European Islamophobia Reports for 2016: Enes Bayrakli/Farid Hafez, *The State of Islamophobia in Europe* (www.islamophobiaeurope.com).

55 The figures for the individual countries were: Germany 76.1 per cent, UK 81.5 per cent, France 78.8 per cent, Netherlands 78.2 per cent, Italy 82.8 per cent, Portugal 71.1 per cent, Poland 72.1 per cent and Hungary 76.8 per cent; see Zick et al. (2011), pp. 65–72. In Germany 18.3 per cent of Germans were in 2016 classified as Islamophobic, 5.8 per cent as antisemitic; see Zick et al. (2016).

56 Pollack et al. (2010).

57 Zick et al. (2011)

58 UK 39.0 per cent, France 49.8 per cent, Netherlands 38.7 per cent, Italy 27.4 per cent, Poland 19.0 per cent and Hungary 30.2 per cent; see Zick et al. (2011).

59 Zick et al. (2011), p. 70.

60 Pollack et al. (2010), p. 5.

Table 58. “Do you have a positive or negative impression of the following groups?” (Answers: fairly/very negative – (fairly/very positive)) Source: Roma gypsies most negatively perceived European minority group, survey findings, YouGov Survey Results 2015

	Jews	Muslims	Black people	Gay people	Roma / Gypsies
Norway	10 (35)	37 (18)	11 (37)	11 (45)	40 (12)
Finland	10 (34)	45 (13)	20 (30)	15 (40)	53 (11)
Denmark	8 (41)	45 (21)	11 (41)	6 (46)	72 (6)
Sweden	6 (43)	36 (25)	8 (43)	7 (52)	45 (17)
Germany	9 (31)	36 (17)	10 (34)	12 (36)	42 (11)
Great Britain	7 (41)	40 (22)	8 (44)	9 (46)	58 (10)
France	10 (36)	40 (17)	14 (31)	14 (33)	55 (9)

36.4 per cent supported the statement “Muslims do not fit into modern Western society”). Another question was used to measure the sense of being threatened. 78.1 per cent of Germans strongly agreed or agreed more than disagreed with the statement “The Muslims living here threaten our freedoms and rights” (whereas the statement “Muslims pose a threat to Norwegian culture” was supported by 39 per cent in the present study).⁶¹ In other words, in a European context Norwegians show a relatively low level of cultural distance from Muslims.

Islamophobic ideas commonly accuse Muslims of being unable or unwilling to integrate, and of keeping themselves to themselves (see also the introductory chapter of this report). The dissemination of this idea was measured in the present study using

the statement “Muslims do not want to integrate into Norwegian society”, which was supported by 42 per cent. In 2016 the Pew Research Center tried to determine respondents’ views on Muslims’ desire to integrate using the question “Do you think most Muslims in our country today want to adopt our country’s customs and way of life or do you think they want to be distinct from the larger society?” An average of 58 per cent of respondents in 11 European countries answered “want to be distinct” and 32 per cent with “want to adopt”. The remaining respondents answered “both equally”.⁶² This indicates a general scepticism in Europe about Muslims’ desire to integrate. In Norway, however, the level of scepticism seems to be lower than average.

4.3 Dislike and social distance

As described early on in this report, surveys measure multiple dimensions of attitudes. In addition to the cognitive dimension, the affective dimension (sympathy/antipathy) and degree of social distance are measured. The emotional rejection of Jews (“I

have a certain dislike of Jews”) is supported by 6.7 per cent in the present survey, which is equivalent to the result of a survey conducted by the polling institute YouGov in November 2015.⁶³ The question “Do you have a positive or a negative impression of

61 Leibold et al. (2012), pp. 177–198.

62 The figures for the individual countries (want to be distinct/want to adopt), by percentage: Greece 78/11, Hungary 76/15, Spain 68/24, Italy 61/27, Germany 61/32, UK 54/31, Netherlands 53/42, France 52/43, Sweden 50/33 and Poland 45/32. Pew Global (2016).

63 The survey covered seven countries, including four Nordics, France, UK and Germany. YouGov (2015). While the other countries had samples of a thousand or more respondents, the sample for Norway numbered 544 respondents, which increases the margin of error in this case. The result here was that 10 per cent selected response options “fairly negative” or “very negative”.

the following groups?” was asked in these countries with reference to Jews, Muslims, black people, gay people and Roma.

The findings of a survey conducted by Pew Research Center, also in 2015, were similar to those of the YouGov survey. In the Pew survey 7 per cent of respondents in France and the UK and 9 per cent in Germany held negative views of Jews. Other countries, such as Spain (17 per cent), Italy (21 per cent) and Poland (29 per cent), displayed even larger proportions of negative views.⁶⁴ In 2016 Pew Research Center carried out a similar survey on the prevalence of negative views of Muslims in 10 European countries. The survey showed a high level of negative opinions about Muslims, primarily in Eastern European countries (Hungary 72 per cent, Italy 69 per cent, Poland 66 per cent, Greece 65 per cent, Spain 50 per cent, Netherlands and Sweden 35 per cent, France and Germany 29 per cent, and UK 28 per cent).⁶⁵ Two more recent studies in the UK (2017) and Germany (2016) asked questions about attitudes towards Jews, Muslims and a sample of other religious groups. Both countries showed the same ethnic-religious hierarchy: the smallest proportion of unfavourable opinions was for Christians (in the UK 10 per cent, in Germany 6 per cent). The proportion of unfavourable opinions of Hindus and Jews were at the same level (in the UK 13 per cent for both groups, in Germany 11 per cent and 12 per cent respectively). In both countries, however, negative views of Muslims were the most prevalent: 34 per cent in the UK and 33 per cent in Germany.⁶⁶

In the CMH survey from 2017, 30 per cent of respondents support the statement “I have a certain dislike of Muslims”. At 22 per cent, the level of nega-

tive attitudes towards Muslims is clearly lower in the Jewish sample than in the general population.

As in the YouGov survey, antipathy towards Muslims was clearly more prevalent than towards Jews. Surveys conducted in connection with Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes and Trends showed varying degrees of more markedly negative views of Muslims than Jews in several European countries between 2004 and 2008. Nonetheless, correlation between these two attitudes is very high. Negative attitudes towards both groups were more common among the older, less educated and among people who placed themselves on the right of the political spectrum.⁶⁷

Regarding positive attitudes towards Jews, the difference between the general population and the Muslim sample is relatively small (27 per cent compared with 24 per cent). In the YouGov survey from 2015, as many as 35 per cent of Norwegians answered that they had a “fairly positive” or “very positive” impression of Jews. Fifteen percent of the Norwegian population expressed having “a particular sympathy for Muslims” (in the YouGov survey from 2015 the proportion was 18 per cent). The corresponding figure among Jews was 23 per cent. Again, the results showed that the Jewish sample held more positive attitude towards Muslims than did the population in general.

In the seven European countries in the YouGov survey (see Table 58) we find – with some variations – almost structurally identical “ethnic hierarchies”.⁶⁸ The Roma ranked clearly lowest, followed by Muslims (disliked by more than one-third of the general population) and black people (disliked by around 10 per cent). In all these countries, Jews ranked highest in

64 Pew (2015).

65 Pew (2016). Compared with Pew Research Center’s 2015 survey, therefore, the negative view of Muslims has increased in 2016. In 2015 the values were as follows: UK 19 per cent, France 24 per cent, Germany 24 per cent, Spain 42 per cent, Poland 56 per cent and Italy 61 per cent. Pew (2015).

66 Staetsky (2017), s. 16. The negative values are much lower in the UK survey if the response option “neither favourable nor unfavourable» is included (Figure 1). Antidiskriminierungsstelle des Bundes (2016), *Akzeptanz religiöser und weltanschaulicher Vielfalt*, p. 3.

67 Pew Global (2008).

68 See, for example, Hagedoorn (1995), Hagedoorn and Pepels (2003) or Jäckle (2008) for more detailed information.

the ethnic hierarchy. A German study from 2013 on attitudes towards Sinti and Roma showed the same hierarchical structure. The prevalence of antipathy expressed towards the different groups was: Jews (6 per cent), black people (7 per cent), Muslims (23 per cent) and Sinti and Roma (33 per cent). The survey also included other respondent groups: Eastern Europeans (18 per cent), Italians (4 per cent) and asylum seekers (20 per cent).⁶⁹

If the respondents are asked about social distance, such as having different groups as neighbours, the same hierarchy emerges in Norway. As shown, this applies not only in the Norwegian population sample, but also among the Jewish and Muslim respondents (although the two minority samples showed far less social distance towards other groups than the population in general). The index of social distance for the Norwegian population in 2017 produces the following hierarchy (from greatest to least distance): Roma (44 per cent), Somalis (27 per cent), Muslims (22 per cent), Poles (8 per cent) Jews (6 per cent) and Americans (4 per cent).⁷⁰ The same ranking emerges from the Jewish and Muslim samples, only with far less social distance. The German surveys on social distance also produce the same ranking. In response to the question “How comfortable or uncomfortable would you find it to have someone from the following groups as your neighbour...?”⁷¹ the results from the German respondents produced the following hierarchy (from lowest to highest): Sinti and Roma (31 per cent), asylum seekers (29 per cent) Muslims (21 per cent), Eastern Europeans (14 per cent), Jews (5 per cent), black people (4 per cent) and Italians (3 per cent).⁷²

In CHM’s 2011 survey, 10 per cent of the population

would not like having Jews as neighbours (“To what extent would you like or dislike it if they became your neighbours?”). As shown, the corresponding figure in the 2017 survey dropped to 7 per cent. Unlike the considerably higher level of antisemitic prejudice among the Muslim respondents, the overall response of the Muslim sample in Norway (9.9 per cent) barely differed from that of the general population on the question of social distance from Jews.

On the other hand, the general population in Norway (as in Germany) showed far greater social distance from Muslims. In the 2011 survey the proportion was 28 per cent, and dropped only moderately to 26 per cent in the 2017 survey. The Jewish respondents indeed showed less social distance (19 per cent) from Muslims than did the general population, though considerably more than Muslims expressed towards them. As well as the abovementioned cognitive prejudices, social differences may also play a role in social distance, particularly because neighbourhoods in towns and cities tend to be homogeneous.

In a survey conducted by FRA in 15 European countries in 2008, an average of 20 per cent of Europeans would feel uncomfortable having Muslims as neighbours.⁷³ The questions are not identical because the Norwegian version contains two negative response options and a more moderately worded version (“would dislike it a little”). This can partly explain the relatively large proportion in Norway expressing dislike compared to the European average and to the results for Denmark (13 per cent) and Sweden (16 per cent). The 2017 survey conducted by the Bertelsmann Foundation in five European countries also examined the readiness of respondents to accept different groups as neighbours. As

69 Zentrum für Antisemitismusforschung (2014).

70 Since Catholics do not constitute an ethnic group, they were excluded here.

71 Selection of a negative scale value from “more uncomfortable than comfortable” to “uncomfortable” (5-7) on a seven-point scale. Because of other scaling of the responses, the tilslutningsverdier are not comparable. This does not however change the very similar structure of the ethnic hierarchy in Norway and Germany.

72 Zentrum für Antisemitismusforschung (2014).

73 FRA (2017).

in Norway, negative attitudes towards Muslims in these countries were more prevalent than towards Jews: in Austria 28 per cent (compared with 8 per cent); in the UK 21 per cent (compared with 4 per cent); in Germany 19 per cent (compared with 5 per

cent); in Switzerland 17 per cent (compared with 7 per cent); and in France 13 per cent (compared with 3 per cent).⁷⁴ The corresponding figure for Norway (26 per cent) is higher than for four of the West European countries covered in the survey.

4.4 Discrimination against Jews and Muslims

It is only in recent years that researchers and human rights agencies have begun asking minorities questions about their experiences of discrimination.⁷⁵ Jewish experiences have been examined in the FRA

survey from 2013 as well in in studies conducted in France by Ipsos in 2015,⁷⁶ in Germany in 2016,⁷⁷ and now also in Norway in 2017. Comparative studies of Muslim's experience of discrimination were con-




Figure 37. Perceptions on changes in the level of antisemitism in the country over the past five years, by EU Member State (%) (Source: FRA (Per cent. 2013))

74 Halm and Sauer (2017). Figure 3, p. 9. The surveys were conducted at the end of 2016.

75 FRA (2013).

76 Ipsos (2015).

77 Zick et al. (2017).

ducted in 2008 and 2016, mainly by the European Agency for Fundamental Rights, and some surveys of individual countries have also been carried out.⁷⁸

Regarding the question of whether the level of antisemitism has increased over the past five years, the average figures for the eight EU countries covered by the FRA survey show that 75 per cent of the Jewish population see a strong or moderate increase, 18 per cent say it has stayed the same, and only 5 per cent see a strong or moderate decrease. A survey of Jews in Germany in 2016 shows similar results. The results for the French study conducted in 2015 were even more negative. As much as 92 per cent of the Jewish respondents believed that the level of antisemitism had increased over the preceding five years (moderate: 25 per cent or strong: 67 per cent), 6 per cent believed it to be constant, and only 2 per cent believed it had decreased.⁷⁹ The responses of the Jewish sample in CHM's 2017 survey differ only slightly from those in the EU countries: 69 per cent believe negative attitudes have become more widespread; 25 per cent see no change, and only 5 per cent believe negative attitudes have become less widespread in the past five years.

The Muslim respondents have a similar, though not quite as negative, view of the situation: 63 per cent believe that negative attitudes towards Muslims in Norway have become more prevalent; 22 per cent believe such attitudes have remained constant; and 10 per cent believe negative attitudes towards Muslims have become less prevalent.

The CHM survey also examines Jews' (and Muslims') experiences of discrimination: "Have you experienced harassment in the past 12 months because of your religious affiliation?" Twelve per

cent of Jewish respondents reported having experienced this often (1 per cent) or sometimes (11 per cent); 16 per cent rarely; and 73 per cent never in the preceding 12 months. However, Jewish respondents in Norway reported that, in the preceding 12 months, they had often experienced people behaving negatively towards them when they learned that they were Jews. Forty-five per cent reported such experiences (3 per cent often, 15 per cent sometimes, and 30 per cent rarely). Only 48 per cent had not experienced it. In France 23 per cent of Jewish respondents reported being subjected to antisemitic comments many times. Twenty-two per cent reported experience it once, and only 55 per cent reported never having experienced it. Regarding physical attacks, 89 per cent of the Jewish respondents in France had not experienced such attacks, 8 per cent had experienced it once, and 3 per cent more often.⁸⁰

Muslims feel more often discriminated against in Norway than do Jews. Only 60 per cent report never having experienced it, while 3 per cent report having experienced it often. A further 12 per cent answered "sometimes" and 23 per cent answered "rarely".⁸¹ In the preceding 12 months, the Muslim respondents in Norway had experienced more often than Jews that people behaved negatively towards them when they learned of their religious affiliation. Fifty-seven per cent reported having experienced it often (6 per cent), sometimes (21 per cent) and rarely (30 per cent). Only 38 per cent had not experienced it. In the FRA survey from 2017 an average of 27 per cent of the Muslim respondents in 15 European countries reported encountering discrimination based on ethnic origin or immigrant background in the preceding 12 months. However, experiences differed

78 FRA (2009); FRA (2017); Pollack et al. (2016).

79 Ipsos (2015). Ninety-one per cent of the Jewish respondents believed the Muslims to be the cause, while 48 per cent believed it was the Catholics in France.

80 Ipsos (2015).

81 In Germany, Muslims of Turkish descent were asked about how they experienced discrimination and lack of recognition. Twenty-four per cent of respondents considered themselves to belong to an ethnic group that was discriminated against in Germany. However, the respondents were not asked about the personal experiences of discrimination, but rather about their impressions of such experiences for the group as a whole. Pollack et al. (2016), p. 7.

widely between different (European) countries and between respondents of different backgrounds. If asked about experiences in the preceding five years, as many as 39 per cent of the Muslim respondents report incidents of discrimination.⁸²

The survey conducted by the Bertelsmann Foundation in 2017 also asked Muslims about their experiences of discrimination in the preceding 12 months. A particularly large proportion in Austria (68 per cent) reported experiences of discrimination. In France the corresponding figure was 28 per cent, in the UK 42 per cent, in Germany 37 per cent and in Switzerland 35 per cent. The country-specific differences may be related to the degree of interreligious relations, which 87 per cent of the Muslims in Switzerland regarded as extremely high. The proportions of Muslims that reported this in other countries were: UK 68 per cent, Germany and France 78 per cent, and Austria only 62 per cent.⁸³

The FRA survey from 2017 asked more differentiated questions about whether skin colour, religion or ethnic origin/immigrant background were the main reasons for the discrimination experienced by the Muslim respondents over the preceding five years. On average, 27 per cent in the individual countries cited ethnic origin/migration background as the main reasons, 17 cited religion, and 9 per cent skin colour. The figures for Denmark (25 per cent, 21 per cent and 12 per cent) and Sweden (24 per cent, 16 per cent and 17 per cent) differed little from the average.⁸⁴ It is interesting that 17 per cent of the respondents in 2016 cited religion as the reason while in 2010 only 10 per cent did likewise. This means that discrimination is often perceived to be related to Islam. Second-generation Muslims feel more often discriminated

against on religious grounds than do first-generation Muslims.⁸⁵

The FRA survey from 2013 asked a similar question about whether Jews had been subjected to verbal insults, harassment or physical attacks in the preceding 12 months. Across the eight EU countries, an average of 21 per cent of the respondents had experienced such incidents.⁸⁶ A direct comparison with the Norwegian results is impossible in this case, due to the different response options.

The Jewish respondents in Norway reported slightly fewer incidents of unfair treatment by public institutions based on their religious affiliation (7 per cent; a further 6 per cent answered they were not sure), while 88 per cent had never experienced it. In Germany the respondents in 2016 reported more often being treated unfairly by public offices and authorities (sometimes, often, very often: 13 per cent) and by educational institutions (sometimes, often, very often: 20 per cent) because they were Jewish.⁸⁷ Here again, however, differences in question wording and response options make direct comparison impossible.

Fear of being discriminated against can result in people hiding their religious affiliation. In Norway, Muslims and Jews hold very different views on this issue (“Do you ever avoid showing your religious affiliation out of fear of negative attitudes?”). Although Jews reported being discriminated against more seldom than did Muslims, 64 per cent reported that they avoided showing their religious affiliation. The corresponding proportion among the Muslim respondents was 26 per cent.

In the FRA survey from 2013, the Jewish respondents in the eight EU countries responded similarly

82 FRA (2017), Figure 22, p. 43; Figure 9.

83 Halm and Sauer (2017), p. 6 and pp. 11–15.

84 FRA (2009), Figures 6 and 7, pp. 26–27.

85 FRA (2009), p. 24.

86 FRA (2013), Figure 8, p. 30.

87 Zick et al. (2017), p. 30.

to those in Norway: 32 per cent reported that they never avoided showing their religious affiliation, while 68 per cent reported that they did (20 per cent always, 18 per cent often, and 30 per cent sometimes).⁸⁸ However, there were marked differences between the eight countries. Similar to Norway (34 per cent), the proportions of respondents that did not avoid showing their religious affiliation in the respective countries were as follows: Germany (37 per cent), Italy (34 per cent) and UK (41 per cent), while the figures for Sweden (22 per cent), France (25 per cent), Belgium (26 per cent) and Hungary (28 per cent) show that Jews in these countries more often hid their religious affiliation. Only in Latvia did a majority of respondents (75 per cent) report not avoiding to do it. Such avoidance is clearly – though not always – linked to specific experiences. In the FRA survey, Jewish respondents in Germany (24 per cent) accounted for the largest proportion that felt discriminated against on the basis of their religion or belief, while the corresponding proportion in Sweden was only 16 per cent. These country-specific differences and similarities are difficult to explain. They are clearly not directly linked to the prevalence of antisemitic attitudes in the population, since this is smaller in Sweden than in Hungary or Germany.

Overall, the differences between the eight EU countries in the FRA survey (average 19 per cent) regarding this question (discrimination on the basis of religion) were negligible (except for Latvia, where only 5 per cent reported being discriminated against on this basis).⁸⁹ In a survey of Jews in Germany conducted in 2016, only 37 per cent reported not once being discriminated against for religious reasons in the preceding 12 months. Twenty per cent reported

being discriminated against rarely, 24 per cent sometimes, and 17 per cent often or very often.⁹⁰ The survey among Jews in Germany conducted in 2016 showed that a larger proportion avoided wearing recognisable Jewish symbols. Eleven per cent reported never avoiding it, 19 per cent answered that the question did not apply to them, while the remaining 70 per cent reported that they avoided displaying religious symbols (11 per cent rarely, 18 per cent sometimes, 15 per cent often and 26 per cent very often).⁹¹

In addition to experiences of blatant discrimination or harassment, data was also collected on whether Jews and Muslims receive signals from the Norwegian majority that they do not belong in Norwegian society (“Has anyone in the past 12 months made you feel that you do not belong in Norwegian society?”). Only 41 per cent of Jewish respondents and 32 per cent of Muslim respondents in Norway reported not having had such experiences in the preceding 12 months, though only 5 per cent of Jewish respondents and 10 per cent of Muslim respondents reported having experienced it often. Nonetheless, almost two-thirds of Jewish respondents (59 per cent) and two-thirds of Muslim respondents (66 per cent) have experienced it at some time. In response to the same question (“How often have you experienced the following situation in Germany: Non-Jewish people make me feel that I don’t belong in German society?”), 33 per cent of Jewish respondents (a smaller proportion than in Norway) answered “never”, while 13 per cent answered “often” or “very often” (24 per cent “sometimes” and 28 per cent “rarely”).⁹²

The worst form of discrimination is physical attack. CHM’s survey asked respondents whether

88 FRA (2013), Figure 15, p. 39.

89 FRA (2013), Table 8, p. 58.

90 Zick et al. (2017), p. 17.

91 Zick et al., p. 32. It is possible that the strong division of the responses that also include those who rarely avoid it have a bearing on the high figures.

92 Zick et al. (2017), p. 19. No comparable figures for Muslim populations in other countries are available. In a 2016 survey of Muslims of Turkish descent in Germany (*Integration und Religion aus der Sicht von Türkischstämmigen in Deutschland*), 53 per cent reported that they were not recognised as members of German society, no matter how much they tried. See: Pollack et al. (2016), p. 7.

violence against Jews or Muslims could be justified under certain circumstances. In the case of the Jewish respondents, the reason for the use of violence referred to Israel's treatment of the Palestinians, and in the case of the Muslim respondents it referred to the Islamist terror attacks in Europe. Regarding the question about violence against Jews, 12 per cent of the population sample and as much as 20 per cent of the Muslim sample saw violence as justifiable. Regarding the corresponding question about violence against Muslims, 10 per cent of the population sample and 9 per cent of the Jewish sample saw violence as justifiable. In 2017 a survey conducted in the UK asked a similar, though not fully comparable, question. In that survey 4 per cent of the population sample considered violence against Jews to be

"often" or "sometimes" justifiable in order to defend their political or religious beliefs and values. A larger proportion considered violence against Muslims to be justifiable; 7.5 per cent considered such violence "often" or "sometimes" justifiable. Around the same proportion considered violence against immigrants in general to be justifiable, as well as against banks or big business (7 per cent), while 10 per cent of respondents selected the more moderate form of consent, "rarely justified". However, justification of violence against Islamist extremists received most support (27 per cent).⁹³

In 2016, 2 per cent of the Muslim populations of 15 European countries reported having been physically attacked in the preceding 12 months because of their ethnic or immigrant background.⁹⁴

4.5 Antisemitic attitudes among Muslim immigrants

Considering the prevalence of antisemitic attitudes in many of the countries of origin of migrants and refugees in Europe, it must be asked to what extent

such attitudes also apply to the Muslim population in Europe.⁹⁵ Few studies have so far been conducted on antisemitism which - in addition to studying a

Table 59. Views of Jews. Source: Pew Global Attitudes Project (Per cent. 2006)

Unfavorable View of Jews	France general population	France Muslims	Germany general population	Germany Muslims	UK general population	UK Muslims	Spain general population	Spain Muslims
Very	3	9	5	31	3	33	14	37
Somewhat	10	19	17	13	4	14	25	23
Total	13	28	22	44	7	47	39	60

Source: Pew Global Attitudes Project (2006)
The margin of error due to the sample size is between 4 and 6 percent depending on the country.

93 Staetsky (2017), p. 4 and p. 39 ff. ("Thinking about Britain today, to what extent do you feel that using violence against any of the following groups or institutions would be justified in order to defend your political and religious beliefs and values?")

94 FRA (2009), p. 41.

95 Cf. the data for the Middle East and North Africa in ADL, Global 100 (2014/15).

Table 60. “Jews cannot be trusted.” (Per cent agreeing; Six Country Immigrant Integration Comparative Survey) Ersanilli and Koopmans (2013). Turks and Moroccans are not representative of all Muslims in the countries mentioned. However, they account for a large proportion of the Muslim population.

	Austria	Belgium	France	Germany	Netherlands	Sweden
Self-identified Christians (70% of the native sample)	10.7	7.6	7.1	10.5	8.4	8.6
Self-identified Muslims (97% of the interviewees of Turkish or Moroccan origin)	64.1	56.7	43.4	28.0	40.4	36.8

country’s general population – also include a sufficiently large sample of the Muslim population living there. The results for Norway show that Muslims express antisemitic prejudices significantly more often than the majority population (29 per cent compared with 8.3 per cent), while their level of social distance from Jews is closer to that of the general population (9.9 per cent compared with 5.9 per cent). With regard to the affective dimension, the Muslim respondents express a lesser degree of dislike of Jews (5 per cent) than does the general population (7 per cent). In the surveys available in Europe, data collection has focused exclusively on antisemitism’s cognitive dimension. Günther Jikeli’s meta study from 2015 shows that in several European countries, as in Norway, there is stronger support for antisemitic statements among Muslims than among the general populations.⁹⁶ These findings are confirmed in the most recent survey conducted in the UK in 2017.⁹⁷

The first ever internationally comparable, representative study was conducted in connection with the Pew Global Attitudes Project in April 2006. However, only one question was asked regarding attitudes towards Jews, namely whether the respondents held a favourable or unfavourable (very unfavourable or somewhat unfavourable) opinion of Jews. In the Muslim sections of the populations, the

negative attitudes towards Jews in all the four EU countries covered by the study were clearly more prevalent than in the general populations (see Table 59).

A study from 2008 conducted by Ruud Koopmans and colleagues on religious fundamentalism and hostility towards out-groups confirms this finding, although only Turkish and Moroccan immigrants were included in this study.⁹⁸

The study shows that there were differences between Sunni Muslims in Turkey and Morocco; in other words that the respondents’ country of origin played a role. Moreover, far more religiously devout and fundamentalist Muslims more often supported the statement “You just cannot trust Jews” (70 per cent) than did devout Muslims who were not fundamentalists (fewer than 30 per cent).

To measure the prevalence of antisemitic attitudes among the adult Muslim populations in Germany, Belgium, France, Italy, Spain and the UK, the ADL in 2015 asked more Muslims than represented the proportions of those populations (oversampling) so as to obtain a sufficiently large sample to be able to make reliable statements about these population groups.⁹⁹ When measured using the ADL index as presented above, antisemitism is clearly more prevalent in the Muslim section of the populations in the countries included in the survey

96 Jikeli (2015).

97 Staetsky (2017), p. 48.

98 Koopmans (2015), pp. 33–57.

99 ADL Global 100 (2014/15).




Figure 38. Antisemitism among Muslims in Western Europe compared to total population (Per cent. ADL 2014/2015)

than in their general populations. The average index score among Muslims accounted for 55 per cent in all six countries for this sample (general population: 21 per cent). ADL explained this as primarily an effect of religion, but the study itself shows that the respondents' backgrounds likely had a more decisive effect. A survey conducted in Germany confirms this finding: Muslim migrants from Arab and North African countries and their descendants more often display antisemitic tendencies than do migrants from the Balkans, Afghanistan and Pakistan.¹⁰⁰

The findings of the survey conducted by CHM, however, show the opposite: Muslim immigrants from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Pakistan more often display antisemitic tendencies than do immigrants from Iraq and Morocco. The findings are somewhat uncertain, however, due to the small number of respondents. The present survey from the CHM, however, also shows that there are clear differences between Muslim and non-Muslim respondents from the same country of origin. A Danish study conducted in 2004 also found that antisemitic attitudes among Muslim respondents from Turkey, Pakistan,

Somalia, Palestine and the former Yugoslavia were more prevalent than among Christian migrants from these countries. However, the study concluded that there were differences between Muslims from the different countries of origin. For example, antisemitic attitudes were most prevalent among Palestinians.¹⁰¹ Other studies, such as that from Pew Research Center in 2008, have shown that Christian populations in Arab states, such as Lebanon, display negative attitudes towards Jews almost as often (95 per cent) as Sunni and Shia Muslim populations (99 per cent).¹⁰²

However, the Muslim population in the countries studied – with the exception of the UK, where the Muslim population consists primarily of immigrants from Asia¹⁰³ – come predominantly from countries in the Middle East and from countries west of the Nile and north of the Sahara. According to the ADL Global 100 study, antisemitic attitudes are extremely prevalent in this group, currently over 70 per cent. The ADL study from 2015 compared data on Muslims in Europe with data from the countries of origin and found that the former group consistently agreed less with the antisemitic statements on the index,

¹⁰⁰ Furthermore, differences can be proved to exist between Muslims of different denominations. See: Frindte et al. (2011).

¹⁰¹ Nannestad (2009), pp. 43–61.

¹⁰² Pew (2008).

¹⁰³ However, the proportion of Muslim respondents in the UK was also large (54 per cent), just as in Germany, where Turkish immigrants make up the largest proportion of Muslims.

sometimes by narrow margins, sometimes by very wide ones. Combined, these surveys show that both religious affiliation and country of origin can have a bearing on antisemitic attitudes. However, more research is needed to fully explain the background for these attitudes, including the significance of factors such as religiosity, religion and country background.

The Ipsos study from 2015, where respondents were presented with eight stereotypical statements about Jews, found that 36 per cent of the French population agreed with five to eight of the statements. The corresponding proportion of the Muslim respondents accounted for 51 per cent.¹⁰⁴ A study conducted in France in 2014 showed a similar result. In this study respondents were presented with six antisemitic statements. Fifty-three per cent of the French respondents and 17 per cent of the Muslim respondents disagreed with some of the statements. Fifteen percent and 46 per cent respectively

expressed strong support by agreeing with four to six of the statements. Among “believing and practicing Muslims” the proportion was as much as 60 per cent.¹⁰⁵ In 2017, 3.5 per cent of the UK’s total population and 13 per cent of its Muslim population held “strong antisemitic attitudes”, defined as agreement with between five and eight of the eight statements. Thirty per cent of the general population and 56 per cent of the Muslim population agreed with at least one statement. The level of agreement among religious Muslims was higher than for less religious and non-religious Muslims.¹⁰⁶

A similar picture for Norway emerges from the CHM survey, which partly uses other statements. The index of prejudice against Jews shows marked prejudice among 8 per cent of the Norwegian population and 29 per cent of the Muslim respondents. The distance between the two groups is therefore less than in most other European countries.

104 Ipsos (2015).

105 Reynié, *L'antisémitisme dans l'opinion publique française* (2014) – quoted from Jikeli (2015), p.11 (Table 4).

106 Staetsky (2017), p. 64 and Figure 33, p. 54.

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6 APPENDIX: QUESTIONNAIRE

UTVALG:

Single coded

Utvalgskilde/ versjon [IKKE SYNLIG FOR RESPONDENTENE]

Normal

- 1 Panel (befolkning)
- 2 DMT (jøder)
- 3 Folkeregisteret (innvandrere fra muslimske land)

B001: Bakgrunn

Begin block

Ask only if UTVALG,2,3

Q1:

Single coded

Answer not required

Er du mann eller kvinne?

Normal

- 1 Mann
- 2 Kvinne

Ask only if UTVALG,2,3

Q2:

Numeric

Answer not required | Min = 18 | Max = 99

Hva er din alder?

Vennligst notér

Ask only if UTVALG,2,3

Q6:

Single coded

Answer not required

Hva er din høyeste fullførte utdanning?

Normal

- 1 Grunnskoleutdanning (10-årig grunnskole, 7-årig folkeskole eller lignende)
- 2 Videregående utdanning (Allmennfag, yrkesskole eller annet)
- 3 Fagutdanning/yrkesutdanning/fagbrev/videregående yrkesfaglig utdanning
- 4 Universitets-/høgskoleutdanning med inntil 4 års varighet
- 5 Universitets-/høgskoleutdanning med mer enn 4 års varighet

Ask only if UTVALG,3

Q6_O:

Single coded

Answer not required

Hvor fullførte du utdannelsen din?

Normal

- 1 i Norge
 - 2 i et annet europeisk land
 - 3 i et land utenfor Europa
- 9997 Annet, noter... *Open *Position fixed

Ask only if UTVALG,3 and Q6_O,2,3,9997

Q6_O2:

Single coded

Answer not required

Fullførte du denne utdannelsen i familien din sitt opprinnelsesland, eller i et annet land?

Normal

- 1 I familiens opprinnelsesland
- 2 I et annet land

Ask only if UTVALG,2,3

Q14:

Single coded

Answer not required

Hva er din hovedkilde til livsopphold?

Normal

- 1 Inntektsgivende arbeid heltid
- 2 Inntektsgivende arbeid deltid
- 3 Selvstendig næringsdrivende
- 4 Alderspensjonist
- 5 For tiden arbeidsledig/arbeidstrygd
- 6 Annen type trygd
- 7 Elev, student
- 8 Hjemmeværende/husarbeid i hjemmet
- 9 Annet

Ask only if UTVALG,3

Q7:

Multi coded

Answer not required

Hvilke språk snakker du hjemme?

Flere svar mulig

Normal

- 1 Norsk
- 2 Mine foreldres morsmål
- 3 Andre språk

Ask only if UTVALG,3

Q5:

Single coded

Answer not required

Føler du deg mest knyttet til...

Normal

- 1 Familiens opprinnelsesland
 - 2 Norge
 - 3 Begge landene
- 9999 Vet ikke *Position fixed *Exclusive

Ask only if UTVALG,3

Q9:

Multi coded

Answer not required

Hvilke nyhetsmedier (aviser, TV, nettsider etc.) benytter du vanligvis?

Flere svar mulig

Normal

- 1 Norske medier
- 2 Medier fra din families opprinnelsesland
- 3 Annet

Q8:

Single coded

Answer not required

Er du norsk statsborger?

Normal

- 1 Ja
- 2 Nei
- 3 Har dobbelt statsborgerskap (norsk + annet)

Ask only if Q8,1,3

Q8_O:

Single coded

Answer not required

Stemte du ved forrige stortingsvalg, i 2013?

Normal

1 Ja

2 Nei

9999 Husker ikke *Position fixed *Exclusive

Ask only if Q8_O,1

Q66:

Single coded

Answer not required

Hvilket parti stemte du på?

Normal

1 Det norske Arbeiderparti (DNA)

2 Fremskrittspartiet (Frp)

3 Høyre (H)

4 Kristelig Folkeparti (KrF)

16 Kystpartiet

17 Miljøpartiet De Grønne (MDG)

15 Rødt (RV, AKP, RU)

6 Senterpartiet (SP)

7 Sosialistisk Venstreparti (SV)

8 Venstre (V)

9 Andre partier og lister

14 Vet ikke

12 Vil ikke oppgi parti

B001: Bakgrunn

End block

B002: Livsyn og religiøsitet

Begin block

Q68:

Single coded

Answer not required

Hvilket livssyn/religiøs tilhørighet har du?

Normal

- 1 Protestantisk kristen
- 2 Katolsk kristen
- 3 Annet kristent trossamfunn utenfor statskirken
- 4 Jødedom
- 5 Islam
- 6 Humanetiker
- 7 Tilhører annet trossamfunn *Position fixed
- 8 Har ingen spesiell livssynstilhørighet *Position fixed
- 9 Ønsker ikke å svare *Position fixed

Ask only if Q68,4

132

Q68_OJ:

Single coded

Answer not required

Hvilken retning innenfor jødedommen har du tilknytning til?

Normal

- 1 Jødedom, ortodoks
- 3 Jødedom, sekulær
- 4 Annet
- 5 Ønsker ikke å svare *Position fixed

Ask only if Q68,5

Q68_OM:

Single coded

Answer not required

Hvilken islamsk retning har du tilknytning til?

Normal

- 1 Sjia
- 2 Sunni
- 3 Annen retning
- 4 Ønsker ikke å svare

Q69:

Single coded

Answer not required

Tror du på Gud?

Normal

- 1 Ja
- 2 Nei
- 3 Usikker

Ask only if Q68,1,2,3,4,5,7

Q67:

Single coded

Answer not required

Hvor viktig er religionen din for deg?

Normal

- 1 Svært viktig
- 2 Ganske viktig
- 3 Hverken viktig eller uviktig
- 4 Lite viktig
- 5 Ikke viktig i det hele tatt

Ask only if Q68,4,5

Q67_O:

Single coded

Answer not required

Hvor viktig eller lite viktig er det for deg å følge de religiøse reglene innenfor din religion?

Normal

- 1 Svært viktig
- 2 Ganske viktig
- 3 Hverken viktig eller uviktig
- 4 Lite viktig
- 5 Ikke viktig i det hele tatt

Ask only if Q68,4,5

Q18:

Single coded

Answer not required

Bærer du synlige tegn på din religiøse tilhørighet?

Normal

- 1 Ja
- 2 Nei

134

Ask only if Q68,4

Q17_J:

Matrix

Answer not required | Number of rows: 2 | Number of columns: 4

Har du i løpet av de siste 12 månedene opplevd at personer...

Normal

Rendered as Dynamic Grid

	Ofte	Noen ganger	Sjelden	Aldri
...gir deg en følelse av ikke å høre til i det norske samfunnet?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
..oppfører seg avvisende mot deg når de får vite at du er jøde?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Ask only if Q68,5

Q17_M:

Matrix

Answer not required | Number of rows: 2 | Number of columns: 4

Har du i løpet av de siste 12 månedene opplevd at personer...

Normal

Rendered as Dynamic Grid

	Ofte	Noen ganger	Sjelden	Aldri
...gir deg en følelse av ikke å høre til i det norske samfunnet?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
..oppfører seg avvisende mot deg når de får vite at du er muslim?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

B002: Livsyn og religiøsitet

End block

135

B003: Opplevd diskriminering og negative hendelser

Begin block

Ask only if Q68,4,5

Q22:

Single coded

Answer not required

Hender det at du unngår å vise din religiøse tilhørighet fordi du er redd for negative holdninger?

Normal

- 1 Ja
- 2 Nei

Ask only if Q68,4,5

Q19:

Single coded

Answer not required

Har du de siste 12 månedene opplevd å bli trakassert i Norge på bakgrunn av din religiøse tilhørighet?

Normal

- 1 Ofte
- 2 Noen ganger
- 3 Sjelden
- 4 Aldri

Ask only if Q68,4,5

Q20:

Single coded

Answer not required

Føler du at du har blitt urettferdig behandlet av norske offentlige institusjoner (Nav, skole, helsevesen, politi) på bakgrunn av din religiøse tilhørighet?

Normal

- 1 Ja
- 2 Nei
- 3 Usikker

Ask only if Q68,4

Q16_J:

Single coded

Answer not required

Tror du at negative holdninger til jøder er blitt mer eller mindre utbredt i Norge de siste fem år?

Normal

- 1 Mer utbredt
- 2 Like utbredt som før
- 3 Mindre utbredt

Ask only if Q68,5

Q16_M:

Single coded

Answer not required

Tror du at negative holdninger til muslimer er blitt mer eller mindre utbredt i Norge de siste fem år?

Normal

- 1 Mer utbredt
- 2 Like utbredt som før
- 3 Mindre utbredt

B003: Opplevd diskriminering og negative hendelser

End block

B004: Generelt om fremmedfrykt og sosial avstand

Begin block

Q12_intro:

Text

Nå følger noen spørsmål om virkninger av innvandring fra andre kulturer til Norge. (gå videre til neste side)

Q12:

Single coded

Answer not required

To personer diskuterer hvilke virkninger det kan få at det er kommet innvandrere fra andre kulturer til Norge.

A sier: Innvandrerne bidrar til at vi får et større kulturelt mangfold i Norge, med spennende ny mat, musikk, kunst, osv.

B sier: Innvandrernes levemåte passer ikke inn i Norge. De fremmede skikkene er til ulempe for omgivelsene og kan bli en trussel mot norsk kultur.

Hvem er du mest enig med, A eller B?

Normal

- 1 Mest enig med A
- 2 Mest enig med B
- 3 Umulig å velge

Q13:

Single coded

Answer not required

A sier: Innvandrere ønsker å utnytte våre velferdsordninger og få del i goder de ikke selv har vært med å skape.

B sier: Innvandrere er dyktige og arbeidsomme mennesker som yter et verdifullt bidrag til norsk økonomi og arbeidsliv.

Hvem er du mest enig med når det gjelder synet på innvandrere, A eller B?

Normal

- 1 Mest enig med A
- 2 Mest enig med B
- 3 Umulig å velge

Q15:

Single coded

Answer not required

Hvilket av standpunktene nedenfor stemmer best med ditt syn på hvordan Norge bør stille seg til flyktninger?

Random

- 1 Vi må strekke oss så langt som mulig for å ta imot flere flyktninger i Norge
- 2 I stedet for å ta imot flyktninger i Norge bør vi bruke midler til å hjelpe dem i sitt eget land eller land som ligger nær deres eget.
- 3 Vi har ikke råd til å bruke så mye penger på å hjelpe flyktninger så lenge vi har så mange uløste oppgaver her i Norge.

Q028:

Text

Nå vil vi stille deg noen spørsmål om kontakt med mennesker med ulike nasjonaliteter og religioner. (gå videre til neste side)

Q11_list:

Single coded

[139](#)

Answer not required

List of items for Q11

Random

- 1 rom ("sigøynere")
- 2 somaliere
- 3 amerikanere
- 4 polakker
- 5 katolikker
- 6 muslimer
- 7 jøder

Q11:

Matrix

Answer not required | Number of rows: 2 | Number of columns: 5

I hvilken grad ville du like eller mislike at...

Normal

Rendered as Dynamic Grid

	Like det	Ikke ha noe spesielt i mot det	Mislike det litt	Mislike det sterkt	Vet ikke
[LOOP AND PIPE IN FROM Q11_list] ble naboene dine?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
[LOOP AND PIPE IN FROM Q11_list] ble bragt inn i vennekretsen din?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Researcher notes: IF Q68 = 4 (Jødedom) THEN HIDE/ DO NOT PIPE IN alternative 7 (Jøder)
IF Q68 = 5 (Islam) THEN HIDE/ DO NOT PIPE IN alternative 6 (Muslimer)

Ask only if UTVALG,1

Q10:

Matrix

Answer not required | Number of rows: 2 | Number of columns: 5

Hvor godt eller dårlig stemmer denne påstanden for deg?

Normal

Rendered as Dynamic Grid

	Stemmer ikke i det hele tatt	Stemmer nokså dårlig	Stemmer nokså godt	Stemmer helt	Umulig å svare
Det er greit for meg om en muslim ble statsminister i Norge	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Det er greit for meg om en jøde ble statsminister i Norge	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Scripter notes: Kun en av de to påstandene (statements) skal presenteres for hver person. Hvilken påstand som presenteres skal randomiseres. Kun befolkning/ panel får dette spørsmålet.

B004: Generelt om fremmedfrykt og sosial avstand

End block

B005: Spørsmål om muslimer

Begin block

Ask only if Q68,1,2,3,4,6,7,8,9

Q27:

Matrix

Answer not required | Number of rows: 2 | Number of columns: 5

Hvor godt eller dårlig stemmer påstandene for deg?

Normal

Rendered as Dynamic Grid

	Stemmer ikke i det hele tatt	Stemmer nokså dårlig	Stemmer nokså godt	Stemmer helt	Umulig å svare
Jeg føler en egen sympati for muslimer	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Jeg føler en viss motvilje mot muslimer	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

142

Q55:

Single coded

Answer not required

Hvor utbredt tror du negative holdninger til muslimer er i Norge i dag?

Normal

- 1 Veldig utbredt
- 2 Ganske utbredt
- 3 Lite utbredt
- 4 Ikke utbredt i det hele tatt
- 5 Umulig å svare

Ask only if Q55,1,2

Q55_O:

Open

Answer not required

Hva tror du er årsaken til negative holdninger til muslimer?

Vennligst notér

Q59:

Single coded

Answer not required

Mener du det er nødvendig å gjøre noe for å bekjempe muslimhets i Norge?

Normal

- 1 Ja
- 2 Nei
- 3 Ingen mening

Ask only if Q68,1,2,3,4,6,7,8,9

Q58_info:

Text

Nå følger en rekke påstander som tidligere har vært satt fram om muslimer. (bla videre til neste side).

Ask only if Q68,1,2,3,4,6,7,8,9

Q58:

Matrix

Answer not required | Number of rows: 10 | Number of columns: 5

Hvor godt eller dårlig stemmer disse påstandene for deg?

Random

Rendered as Dynamic Grid

	Stemmer ikke i det hele tatt	Stemmer nokså dårlig	Stemmer nokså godt	Stemmer helt	Umulig å svare
Muslimer passer ikke inn i et moderne vestlig samfunn	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Muslimer er gode norske borgere	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Muslimer ser på seg selv som moralsk overlegne andre	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Muslimer utgjør en trussel mot norsk kultur	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Muslimer undertrykker kvinner	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Muslimer vil ikke integreres i det norske samfunnet	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Muslimer ønsker å ta over Europa	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Muslimer har selv mye av skylden for økende muslimhets	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Muslimer er familiekjære	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Muslimer er mer voldelige enn andre	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Ask only if Q68,1,2,3,4,6,7,8,9

Q31_2_info:

Text

I nyhetene har det blitt rapportert om at muslimer har blitt utsatt for vold og trakassering i Europa. (bla videre til neste side)

Ask only if Q68,1,2,3,4,6,7,8,9

Q31_2:

Matrix

Answer not required | Number of rows: 5 | Number of columns: 5

Hvor godt eller dårlig stemmer disse påstandene for deg?

Random

Rendered as Dynamic Grid

	Stemmer ikke i det hele tatt	Stemmer nokså dårlig	Stemmer nokså godt	Stemmer helt	Umulig å svare
Trakassering og vold rettet mot muslimer angår alle og er et angrep på samfunnet vårt	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Trakassering og vold rettet mot muslimer viser at hat mot muslimer har blitt et alvorlig problem i Europa	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Trakassering og vold rettet mot muslimer er ekstremisters handlinger, og sier ikke noe om den generelle situasjonen i Europa	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Med tanke på nylige terrorangrep, kan trakassering og vold rettet mot muslimer forsvares	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Trakassering og vold rettet mot muslimer hadde ikke vært et problem med færre muslimske asylsøkere	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

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B005: Spørsmål om muslimer

End block

B006: Spørsmål om jøder

Begin block

Ask only if Q68,1,2,3,5,6,7,8,9

Q23:

Matrix

Answer not required | Number of rows: 2 | Number of columns: 5

Hvor godt eller dårlig stemmer påstandene for deg?

Normal

Rendered as Dynamic Grid

	Stemmer ikke i det hele tatt	Stemmer nokså dårlig	Stemmer nokså godt	Stemmer helt	Umulig å svare
Jeg føler en egen sympati for jøder	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Jeg føler en viss motvilje mot jøder	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

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Q53:

Single coded

Answer not required

Hvor utbredt tror du negative holdninger til jøder er i Norge i dag?

Normal

- 1 Veldig utbredt
- 2 Ganske utbredt
- 3 Lite utbredt
- 4 Ikke utbredt i det hele tatt
- 5 Umulig å svare

Ask only if Q53,1,2

Q53_O:

Open

Answer not required

Hva tror du er årsaken til negative holdninger til jøder?

Vennligst notér

Q57:

Single coded

Answer not required

Mener du det er nødvendig å gjøre noe for å bekjempe jødehets i Norge?

Normal

- 1 Ja
- 2 Nei
- 3 Ingen mening

Ask only if Q68,1,2,3,5,6,7,8,9

Q21_info:

Text

Nå følger en rekke påstander som tidligere har vært satt fram om jøder. (bla videre til neste side)

Ask only if Q68,1,2,3,5,6,7,8,9

Q21:

Matrix

Answer not required | Number of rows: 10 | Number of columns: 5

Hvor godt eller dårlig stemmer disse påstandene for deg?

Random

Rendered as Dynamic Grid

	Stemmer ikke i det hele tatt	Stemmer nokså dårlig	Stemmer nokså godt	Stemmer helt	Umulig å svare
Jøder er mer intelligente enn andre folkeslag	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Jøder ser på seg selv som bedre enn andre	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Verdens jøder arbeider i det skjulte for å fremme jødiske interesser	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Jøder har blitt rike på andres bekostning	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Jøder er spesielt kunstnerisk begavete	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Jøder har alt for stor innflytelse over internasjonal økonomi	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Jøder har alt for stor innflytelse over amerikansk utenrikspolitikk	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Jøder har selv mye av skylden for at de er blitt forfulgt	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Jøder har alltid skapt problemer i landet der de bor	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Jøder er familiekjære	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Ask only if Q68,1,2,3,5,6,7,8,9

Q31_1_info:

Text

I nyhetene har det blitt rapportert om at jøder har blitt utsatt for vold og trakassering i Europa. (bla videre til neste side)

Ask only if Q68,1,2,3,5,6,7,8,9

Q31_1:

Matrix

Answer not required | Number of rows: 5 | Number of columns: 5

Hvor godt eller dårlig stemmer disse påstandene for deg?

Random

Rendered as Dynamic Grid

	Stemmer ikke i det hele tatt	Stemmer nokså dårlig	Stemmer nokså godt	Stemmer helt	Umulig å svare
Trakassering og vold rettet mot jøder angår alle og er et angrep på samfunnet vårt	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Trakassering og vold rettet mot jøder viser at jødehat har blitt et alvorlig problem i Europa	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Når en tenker på hvordan Israel behandler palestinerne, kan trakassering og vold rettet mot jøder forsvares	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Vold mot jøder er ekstremisters handlinger, og sier ikke noe om den generelle situasjonen i Europa	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Muslimske ledere må gjøre mer for å bekjempe jødehat i sitt lokalmiljø	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

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B006: Spørsmål om jøder

End block

Ask only if Q68,4,5

B007: Forholdet mellom Jøder og Muslimer

Begin block

Q25:

Single coded

Answer not required

Tror du at jøder og muslimer kan samarbeide mot fordommer og diskriminering?

Normal

- 1 Ja
- 2 Nei
- 3 Vet ikke
- 4 Ønsker ikke å svare

Q24:

Single coded

Answer not required

Mener du at jøder og muslimer som minoriteter i Norge har noen felles erfaringer?

Normal

- 1 Ja
- 2 Nei
- 3 Vet ikke
- 4 Ønsker ikke å svare

Q26:

Single coded

Answer not required

Synes du at norske myndigheter likebehandler jøder og muslimer i Norge?

Normal

- 1 Ja
- 2 Nei, behandler jøder best
- 3 Nei, behandler muslimer best
- 9999 Vet ikke *Position fixed *Exclusive

B007: Forholdet mellom Jøder og Muslimer

End block

Ask only if UTVALG,1,3

Q33_HC:

Single coded

Answer not required

Har du hørt om Holocaust?

Normal

- 1 Ja
- 2 Nei
- 3 Usikker

Ask only if Q33_HC,1,3 or Q68,4

Q33:

Matrix

Answer not required | Number of rows: 3 | Number of columns: 5

Hvor godt eller dårlig stemmer disse påstandene om jødene og Holocaust for deg?

Random

Rendered as Dynamic Grid

	Stemmer ikke i det hele tatt	Stemmer nokså dårlig	Stemmer nokså godt	Stemmer helt	Umulig å svare
Jøder i dag utnytter minnet om Holocaust til sin egen fordel.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
På grunn av Holocaust har jødene i dag rett til en egen stat der de kan søke beskyttelse når de blir forfulgt.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Kunnskap om Holocaust er viktig for å forebygge undertrykkelse av minoriteter i dag.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q45:

Single coded

Answer not required

Folk har ulike oppfatninger av konflikten mellom Israel og palestinerne. Hvem holder du mest med?

Normal

- 1 Bare med Israel
- 2 Mest med Israel
- 3 Litt med Israel
- 4 Ingen av sidene
- 5 Litt med palestinerne
- 6 Mest med palestinerne
- 7 Bare med palestinerne
- 8 Umulig å svare

Q46_info:

Text

Nå følger noen påstander som tidligere har blitt satt fram om midtøstenkonflikten. (bla videre til neste side)

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Q46:

Matrix

Answer not required | Number of rows: 6 | Number of columns: 5

Hvor godt eller dårlig stemmer disse påstandene om midtøstenkonflikten for deg?

Random

Rendered as Dynamic Grid

	Stemmer ikke i det hele tatt	Stemmer nokså dårlig	Stemmer nokså godt	Stemmer helt	Umulig å svare
Så lenge staten Israel finnes, kan det ikke bli fred	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Både israelerne og palestinerne har rett til en egen stat	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Israelske ledere ønsker oppriktig å få til en løsning på konflikten	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Palestinske ledere ønsker oppriktig å få til en løsning på konflikten	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Israel behandler palestinerne like ille som jødene ble behandlet under 2. verdenskrig	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Israel står i første rekke i kampen mot islamistisk terrorisme	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

B008: Holocaust og midt-østen

End block

KOM:

Open

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Answer not required


Har du noen synspunkter eller kommentarer til undersøkelsen du nå har besvart?


Vennligst notér

OUTRO:

Text

Takk for at du tok deg tid til å svare på spørsmålene våre! Klikk på "Neste"/ pil mot høyre for å avslutte undersøkelsen.





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