




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
# ATTITUDES TOWARDS JEWS AND MUSLIMS IN NORWAY 2022

Population survey, minority survey and youth study

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THE NORWEGIAN CENTER  
FOR HOLOCAUST AND  
MINORITY STUDIES  
APRIL 2023



Published by:

**The Norwegian Center for Holocaust and Minority Studies**

Huk Aveny 56

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0318 Oslo

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Fax: +47 22 84 10 13

Design: Rayon Design

ISBN:

Print edition: 978-82-92988-75-6

Digital edition: 978-82-92988-76-3

# FOREWORD

This report presents the findings of three surveys on attitudes towards Jews and Muslims in Norway in 2022: a population survey, a minority survey and a youth survey. The survey of attitudes towards Jews was first conducted in 2011, while the survey of attitudes towards Muslims was first conducted in 2017. The minority survey was also conducted for the first time in 2017. Repeating the surveys every five years has made it possible to see trends in attitudes over time.

A new feature in the 2022 study is a separate survey of youth. This survey covers the same topics as the population survey but explores in more depth youth's views about what boundaries apply for acceptable actions and statements. In addition to the statistical surveys, group interviews were conducted with youth.

The Norwegian Center for Holocaust and Minority Studies was commissioned to undertake the surveys by the Ministry of Culture and Equality in response to a call for proposals announced in 2020. The survey was funded by the Ministry of Culture and Equality, the Ministry of Children and Families, the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, the Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development and the Ministry of Education and Research.

Data collection was conducted by Kantar Public between November 2021 and February 2022. The group interviews with youth were conducted between October 2021 and March 2022.

The Norwegian Center for Holocaust and Minority Studies is grateful for being awarded this important commission. We are pleased to submit a new and expanded report 10 years after the first one. Many thanks to the members of the project team, listed here in alphabetical order, who have performed their tasks under the challenging conditions of a pandemic: Professor Emeritus Werner Bergmann (Zentrum für Antisemitismusforschung, Technische Universität, Berlin), Research Professor Cora Alexa Døving (Norwegian Center for Holocaust and Minority Studies),

Research Fellow Birgitte P Haanshuus (Norwegian Center for Holocaust and Minority Studies), Professor Emeritus Ottar Hellevik (University of Oslo), Professor Christhard Hoffmann (Norwegian Center for Holocaust and Minority Studies/University of Bergen), Deputy Director Anders Ravik Jupskås (C-REX, University of Oslo), Research Professor Claudia Lenz (Norwegian Center for Holocaust and Minority Studies/MF Norwegian School of Theology, Religion and Society), Professor Emeritus Irene Levin (OsloMet), Senior Researcher Vibeke Moe (Norwegian Center for Holocaust and Minority Studies) and Senior Researcher Øyvind B Solheim (Institute for Social Research). Special thanks to Project Coordinator Birgitte P Haanshuus for her valuable contribution and to Senior Researcher Vibeke Moe for her efficient and skilful project management.

Guri Hjeltnes, Director  
Norwegian Center for Holocaust and Minority Studies,  
8 November 2022



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# SUMMARY

This report presents findings from three attitude surveys conducted by a research group at the Norwegian Center for Holocaust and Minority Studies: a population survey, a minority survey among Jews and Muslims, and a youth survey. Data collection was undertaken by Kantar Public between November 2021 and February 2022.

The population survey on antisemitism was first conducted in 2011 (HL-senteret, 2012) and was repeated in 2017 in an expanded version that also surveyed attitudes towards Muslims (Hoffmann & Moe, 2017). The minority survey of Jewish and Muslim respondents was first conducted in 2017 and examined the attitudes and experiences of the two minorities. The youth survey has been conducted for the first time, and includes a quantitative survey of attitudes and a qualitative interview study.

Many of the same questions were asked in all three surveys. However, the differences between the samples, including those related to the method of data collection, make any comparison of the results difficult. References to such differences are included in the analysis as part of the interpretation.

Other new elements include a set of questions measuring propensity to subscribe to conspiracy theories, referred to as conspiracy mentality, and new questions asking respondents for their views about the place of religion in society and about their media habits. Finally, more emphasis was placed on qualitative analyses in this study than in the two previous ones. These new elements help place the analysis of attitudes towards Jews and Muslims in a broader context.

Measuring the prevalence of attitudes is no easy task because there are many factors that influence how people respond to surveys like these. Beside the questionnaire design and question formulation, the broader context of the survey is another factor that plays a role. The political and social situation in Norway at the time of data collection, as well as various national and international crises, may have influenced

how respondents answered the questions. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is one example of a situation that may influence the results. The conflict was in a relatively calm period and not receiving much media coverage when data collection was being conducted. Nonetheless, factors such as perceived stagnation in the peace process may have had a bearing on the results. As with the previous surveys, this one contains a set of questions dealing with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This time we also added a survey experiment in which we explore in more depth how respondents' attitudes towards Jews are influenced by this topic.

The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic is another factor that must be taken into account when interpreting the results. Periods of political or economic unrest of the type we have seen in recent years, not least in connection with the pandemic, can reinforce social contradictions and stir up hostile attitudes towards minorities. A high degree of stability in the results between 2017 and 2022 may suggest that the pandemic in Norway has not had particular significance for the attitudes that were measured in this survey.

As in 2011 and 2017, we measured attitudes along three dimensions: a cognitive dimension (prejudices/stereotypes), an affective dimension (sympathy/dislike) and one that measures social distance.

## ATTITUDES TOWARDS JEWS

The results of the population survey show that negative attitudes towards Jews have become less prevalent in Norway in recent years. Since 2017, we have measured a significant decrease in social distance from and dislike of Jews, while the prevalence of prejudice (stereotypes) has remained stable. Social distance was measured by asking respondents how they would react to having a Jew as a neighbour or in their circle of friends. Overall, 3.9 per cent of the general population are negative

towards this kind of contact (5.9 per cent in 2017). The analysis of dislike of Jews also shows a decrease in prevalence; whereas 6.7 per cent of the general population expressed dislike of Jews in 2017, the corresponding proportion in 2022 is 4.7 per cent.

According to our measures, prejudice against Jews is more prevalent than social distance and dislike of Jews. The analysis shows a slight increase in prevalence of prejudice between 2017 and 2022 that is not significant; i.e. it may be due to random differences between the samples. However, it is worth noting that, unlike the other attitudinal dimensions, the incidence of antisemitic prejudice has not decreased. There are several possible explanations for this finding, one of which is that it reflects how antisemitic ideas are revived in periods of political, economic and social unrest.

Overall, 9.3 per cent of the Norwegian population displays what can be said to be marked prejudice against Jews (8.3 per cent in 2017). The stereotypes that remain relatively prevalent are those associated with Jewish international and economic power. For example, 14 per cent support the statement “World Jewry is working behind the scenes to promote Jewish interests” (13 per cent in 2017), a conspiracy theory that dates far back in the history of antisemitism. The statement “Jews have far too much influence on the global economy” is supported by 14 per cent (13 per cent in 2017), and 8 per cent believe that “Jews largely have themselves to blame for being persecuted” (unchanged from 2017). In all the three years in which the survey on antisemitism has been conducted (2011, 2017 and 2022), this statement has received least support in the general population.

The survey of Muslims with immigrant background and a minimum of five years residence in Norway also shows a decrease in the proportion wanting social distance from Jews. Whereas 9.9 per cent in 2017 were negative towards having social contact with Jews, this proportion in 2022 has dropped to 5.7 per cent. The index of dislike shows stable results for the same period:

4.9 per cent of the Muslim sample express dislike of Jews (4.7 per cent in 2017). A notably larger proportion (26.8 per cent) score high on prejudice against Jews. This figure is slightly lower than in 2017 (28.9 per cent). Similar to the population sample, the statement “Jews largely have themselves to blame for being persecuted” also receives least support in the Muslim sample (12 per cent, down from 17 per cent in 2017). Stereotypes of Jewish power and influence are more prevalent; for example, 30 per cent of the Muslim sample support the statement “World Jewry is working behind the scenes to promote Jewish interests” (28 per cent in 2017), while the related statement “Jews have far too much influence on the global economy” is supported by as much as 43 per cent in 2022 (42 per cent in 2017).

While the population sample and the Muslim sample score approximately the same for dislike of and social distance from Jews, high scores for prejudice against Jews remain notably more prevalent among Muslims. The discrepancy between the prevalence of stereotypes of Jews and attitudes towards Jews as neighbours or friends is evident in this sample, and indicates that antisemitism among Muslims in Norway relates primarily to an understanding of international conditions, and has little impact on interpersonal relations in the form of social distance. In 2022 we found that antisemitism in the Muslim sample is most prevalent among men and individuals with a low level of education. We found no differences related to age.

Negative attitudes towards Jews have low prevalence among youth in Norway. According to our analyses, 3 per cent of this sample have a dislike of Jews, and 5 per cent would dislike having Jews in their circle of friends.

## ATTITUDES TOWARDS MUSLIMS

Negative attitudes towards Muslims have also become less prevalent in the Norwegian population in the past



five years. The results show that 15.3 per cent of the population are negative towards social contact with Muslims (19.6 per cent in 2017) and 23.7 per cent express dislike (27.7 per cent in 2017).

Stereotypes of Muslims remain prevalent in the general population, but to a lesser extent than in 2017. In 2022, 30.7 per cent of respondents hold marked prejudices against Muslims (34.1 per cent in 2017). One of the statements which many support puts the blame for increasing anti-Muslim harassment on Muslims themselves (44 per cent compared with 47 per cent in 2017). One-third of the population sample (33 per cent) also supports the statements “Muslims pose a threat to Norwegian culture” and “Muslims do not fit into modern Western society” (39 per cent and 36 per cent respectively in 2017) and 26 per cent support the statement “Muslims are more violent than others”. The survey also shows that 10 per cent of the population sample supports the statement “Considering recent terrorist attacks, harassment and violence against Muslims are justifiable”. However, a solid majority (62 per cent) of the population sample supports the statement “Muslims are good Norwegian citizens”, which is far more than in 2017 (54 per cent). Support for this statement in the Jewish sample is even stronger; as much as 80 per cent of Jewish respondents consider this statement to fit “completely” or “rather well” with their own views.

Negative attitudes towards Muslims are less prevalent in the Jewish sample than in the population sample. This also applied in 2017, and can probably be attributed to the high level of education in the Jewish sample. Perceptions of shared minority experiences may also explain why negative attitudes are less prevalent. A large proportion (84 per cent) of the Jewish sample believes that Jews and Muslims share such experiences.

Overall, 11.2 per cent of Jewish respondents hold marked prejudices against Muslims. The statements that are most strongly supported are “Muslims do not

want to integrate into Norwegian society” (22 per cent) and “Muslims largely have themselves to blame for the increase in anti-Muslim harassment” (24 per cent). In the Jewish sample, 6 per cent of respondents do not wish to have social contact with Muslims and 11.9 per cent express dislike of Muslims. As in the population generally, all three dimensions of negative attitudes towards Muslims are less prevalent among respondents in the Jewish sample in 2022 than they were in 2017. In the youth sample, 6.7 per cent of respondents express dislike of Muslims, while 9 per cent would dislike having Muslims in their circle of friends.

One explanation for the decreased prevalence of negative attitudes towards Muslims may be the growing public attention given to the problems which anti-Muslim attitudes represent in Norwegian society. Furthermore, incidents such as the terrorist attack on the mosque in Bærum in 2019 and measures such as the action plan to combat discrimination and hatred towards Muslims (Ministry of Culture, 2020) may help reinforce the view that something ought to be done to combat anti-Muslim harassment (see below).

In the population sample, negative attitudes towards both Jews and Muslims are more prevalent among men, older people and people with a low level of education than they are among women, youth and people with a high level of education. In the Jewish sample, Islamophobic attitudes are slightly more prevalent among men, older people and people with a low level of education.

## SOCIAL CONTACT WITH ROMA, SOMALIS AND POLES

In addition to questions about social contact with Jews and Muslims, respondents were also asked about such contact with Roma, Somalis and Poles. The results show the same tendency as in the previous surveys, which is

that respondents are most sceptical of having contact with Roma. One-third (32 per cent) of the population does not want social contact with Roma. By comparison, 20 per cent do not want social contact with Somalis and 6 per cent do not want social contact with Poles. These results correspond with surveys conducted in other European countries that indicate a hierarchical pattern in populations' perceptions of minorities (see, for example, Jones & Unsworth, 2021; Sebban-Bécache et al., 2022).

### JEWS AND MUSLIMS IN NORWAY: EXPERIENCES OF DISCRIMINATION

The Jewish and Muslim respondents were asked about their experiences of discrimination. The results show an increase in negative experiences for both minorities.

Muslims tend to have more negative experiences than do Jews, but far more Jews than Muslims (71 per cent versus 33 per cent) sometimes avoid showing their religious affiliation out of fear of negative attitudes. Differences between the samples may also play a role here; while it can be more difficult for Muslims to hide their affiliation (for example, when it comes to wearing hijab), it can be easier for Jews to hide symbols such as the Star of David.

Of all the different types of experiences the respondents were asked about, most report being made to feel that they do not belong in Norway (43 per cent of Muslims and 31 per cent of Jews). Experiences of harassment are far less prevalent: 21 per cent of Muslim respondents and 11 per cent of Jewish respondents have experienced this.

The respondents were asked whether they had experienced discrimination by Norwegian public institutions. In both 2017 and 2022, far larger proportions of both samples answered "no" than answered "yes" to this question, but the proportion that has experienced

such treatment has increased. Muslims more commonly experience discrimination from public institutions than do Jews; 21 per cent of Muslims and 11 per cent of Jews answered affirmatively to this question in 2022. The increase in the number of respondents experiencing discrimination can be explained by the growing attention to and openness about such experiences. In the analysis we also related this finding to what in sociological research has been termed an integration paradox, where immigrants report more discrimination with increased integration. Part of the explanation for this trend is that integration can draw attention to outsidership and exclusion, as well as increase the propensity to interpret experiences as examples of discrimination (see, for example, Steinmann, 2019; Diehl, Liebau & Mühlau, 2021).

The Jewish and Muslim samples were also asked whether they thought it possible for them to cooperate in combating prejudice and discrimination. In both 2017 and 2022, a large majority of both samples believed this was possible, and more so in 2022 than in 2017. Eighty four per cent of respondents in the Jewish sample answered "yes" to this question in 2022, and 75 per cent of the Muslim sample did likewise. Moreover, the majority of both samples believe that Jews and Muslims have some shared experiences as minorities in Norway, which also represents an increase since 2017.

### THE PLACE OF RELIGION IN SOCIETY

We also asked the respondents for their views about the place of religion in society. The results show that a majority of respondents support the view that religious traditions ought to be adapted to the modern world, though support is stronger in the population sample and the Jewish sample (over 80 per cent) than in the Muslim sample (59 per cent). The statement "Religious freedom implies that religious communities should be

free to practice their traditions” receives less support in the population sample (58 per cent). It is supported by 77 per cent of the Jewish sample and by 70 per cent of the Muslim sample. The reason why large proportions of the minorities support this statement may be related to some important debates on Jewish and Islamic religious practices in recent years. This particularly applies to the heated debate over the circumcision of baby boys, in which prominent voices in the Jewish community have described the practice as very important for Jewish life in Norway. The debates have also engaged Muslim communities, and leaders from both minorities have come together and made joint statements. The fact that support for this statement is weaker in the general population may be because no corresponding need exists to defend practices in the majority society, for example in Protestant Christianity.

## ANTISEMITISM AND ISLAMOPHOBIA AS SOCIAL PROBLEMS

More respondents in the population sample and in the two minority samples in the 2022 survey believe that negative attitudes towards Jews are prevalent. This trend is particularly notable among respondents in the Jewish sample, of which 81 per cent now believe that negative attitudes towards Jews are prevalent (59 per cent in 2017). The corresponding figure in the population sample is 24 per cent (19 per cent in 2017). No respondents in the Jewish sample believe that such attitudes are “not prevalent at all”. A larger proportion (16 per cent) of the Muslim sample in 2022 also believes that antisemitism is prevalent than in 2017 (10 per cent).

Moreover, a larger proportion of Jews and Muslims in 2022 believe that negative attitudes towards Muslims are prevalent than in 2017. More respondents (86 per cent) in the Jewish sample believe this than in the Muslim sample (66 per cent). Three out of four respondents in

the population sample believe likewise (75 per cent), representing a decrease since 2017 (81 per cent).

The fact that more respondents believe that negative attitudes towards Jews and Muslims are prevalent stands in contrast to the measured decrease in such attitudes, but may reflect a general increase in awareness of discriminatory attitudes as a social problem. This impression may also be influenced by the spread of derogatory statements in digital media. Even though only a small proportion of the population make derogatory statements online, such statements can have wide reach. Greater awareness of these problems may also make minorities that are subjected to such attitudes more likely to report negative experiences.

A parallel trend is the increasing proportion of respondents in the population sample and the minority samples that consider it important to do something to combat harassment of Jews and Muslims. In the population sample, this proportion is 50 per cent regarding anti-Jewish harassment, which is the same as in the youth sample. In the Muslim sample, 41 per cent consider it necessary to combat anti-Jewish harassment, while almost all respondents (96 per cent) in the Jewish sample believe likewise.

A majority of respondents in the population sample and the youth sample consider it necessary to combat anti-Muslim harassment (59 per cent and 63 per cent, respectively). Nonetheless, the largest proportion of respondents that believe this is found in the Jewish sample (81 per cent). The corresponding proportion of the Muslim sample is 72 per cent. Respondents in the Jewish sample are thus more concerned with combating both antisemitism and Islamophobia than those in the other samples.

Overall, the results indicate that the respondents view harassment of Jews and Muslims as a serious problem and a threat to society that concerns us all. A large majority of the population sample (73 per cent) and almost everyone in the Jewish sample believe that

violence against and harassment of Muslims concern everyone and constitute an attack on our society. A majority of both samples also believe that such attacks show that hatred towards Muslims has become a serious problem in Europe (64 per cent of the population sample and 81 per cent of the Jewish sample).

Half of the population sample (52 per cent) and one-third of the Muslim sample (30 per cent) believe that harassment of and violence against Jews shows that antisemitism has become a serious problem in Europe. These results are similar to those from the 2017 survey. Moreover, 78 per cent of the general population believes that harassment of and violence against Jews concern everyone and constitute an attack on our society. This statement receives less support from the Muslim sample, though it has increased notably from 47 per cent in 2017 to 59 per cent in 2022.

The fact that Muslim respondents view antisemitism as a problem is also reflected in the stronger support shown in 2022 for the statement that Muslim leaders must do more to combat antisemitism in their local communities. In 2017 this statement was supported by 40 per cent, while in 2022 the corresponding figure is 45 per cent. In the population sample, 69 per cent support such increase in the efforts from Muslim leaders.

At the same time, many place responsibility for such acts with extremists. This applied to half of the population sample, regardless of whether the violence was directed at Jews or Muslims. 40 per cent of both minority samples express the same view regarding violence directed at the other group. Regarding violence against and harassment of Muslims, 28 per cent of the population sample and 21 per cent of the Jewish sample also believe it would be less of a problem if there were fewer asylum seekers.

In-depth qualitative analyses show that many respondents cited the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to explain negative attitudes towards Jews. Some responses mentioned how Israel/Israeli policies are

conflated with Jews generally, while other responses are themselves examples of such conflation. Negative attitudes towards Muslims are often explained by referring to group constructs and negative media representations of Muslims. Both antisemitism and Islamophobia are largely described as the result of prejudice and ignorance.

## HOLOCAUST

The survey contains a separate section dealing with attitudes towards Jews in relation to the Holocaust. The genocide of the European Jews was a major contributory factor to the emergence of an anti-antisemitic norm in Norway and the rest of Europe after World War II. References to the Holocaust also constitute a central element in contemporary antisemitism, such as in the form of Holocaust denial. The results from this survey show that, first of all, almost everyone in the general population and youth samples has heard about the Holocaust (96 per cent and 95 per cent, respectively). The corresponding proportion of the Muslim sample is smaller, though here, too, a clear majority answered “yes” to this question (78 per cent), and this proportion has increased notably since 2017. Moreover, a large majority of all the samples see the relevance of knowledge about the Holocaust. Almost all respondents (96 per cent) in the youth sample consider it important that all pupils learn about the Holocaust in school. Almost half of the youth also believe that Jews, on account of the Holocaust, have a right to their own state where they could seek protection from persecution. This statement is supported by an increasing, though much smaller, proportion of the population sample (37 per cent). One in three respondents in the Muslim sample believes likewise. The critical statement “Jews today exploit the memory of the Holocaust for their own benefit “ is supported by 18 per cent of the population

sample (22 per cent in 2017). In the Muslim sample the corresponding proportion is 36 per cent, which is larger than in 2017 (30 per cent). Almost no one in the Jewish sample supports it.

## ATTITUDES TOWARDS ISRAEL AND THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT

The results show clear differences between the population sample, the Jewish sample and the Muslim sample regarding views of Israel and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, while respondents in the youth sample respond more or less the same as the population sample. Larger proportions of the population sample and the youth sample express support for the Palestinians than for Israel; 31 per cent of the youth sample and 23 per cent of the population sample “mostly” or “solely” support the Palestinians, while 9 per cent of both samples support Israel. A clear majority (61 per cent) of Muslim respondents support the Palestinians, while a corresponding majority (63 per cent) of Jewish respondents support Israel. Attitudes in the general population towards the conflict have remained largely stable since 2011. In the Muslim sample, support for the Palestinians has increased since 2017 while support for Israel in the Jewish sample has slightly decreased.

A clear majority of all three samples support the idea that both the Israelis and the Palestinians are entitled to a state of their own, and the level of support is almost the same as in 2017: slightly less than 70 per cent of the population sample and the Muslim sample, and 78 per cent of the Jewish sample. The statement “Israel treats the Palestinians just as badly as the Jews were treated during World War II” is supported by a relatively large proportion of the population sample (33 per cent) and by far more in the Muslim sample (63 per cent). This implies a marked increase in support among Muslims since 2017 (from 51 per cent), while the level of support

in the general population has remained stable. There was no support for this statement among respondents in the Jewish sample. A European survey from 2018 showed that a clear majority of Jews in Europe found this statement antisemitic (FRA, 2018, p. 25). One reason why it can be said to be antisemitic is because it entails Holocaust relativisation and trivialisation. Reversal of the historical roles of victim and perpetrator from World War II is a well-known antisemitic trope. The statement is thus an example of how anti-Israel attitudes can have antisemitic expressions.

Another example from the survey is a statement asserting that violence against Jews could be justified considering how Israel treats the Palestinians. The introduction to the question contained a reference to Jews in Europe. Ten per cent of the population sample and 17 per cent of the Muslim sample support this statement. This represents a slight decrease since 2017, but must still be said to be high considering that the statement deals with justifying violence.

In line with the findings from 2017, antisemitic attitudes in 2022 are more prevalent among respondents who mostly support the Palestinians and hold anti-Israel attitudes. Islamophobia is more prevalent among those who mostly support Israel. This survey went more in depth to examine how the Israeli-Palestinian conflict influences views of Jews. The analysis shows that respondents who were reminded of the conflict before answering four questions about Jews gave slightly more negative answers or were more uncertain of how they should answer. Respondents in the Muslim sample were more influenced by the conflict than were respondents in the population sample. The differences between the results are generally small, however, which may be because the Middle East conflict already had a dominant place in the respondents’ frame of reference prior to answering the questionnaire.

A new statement directly raised the question of whether or not the respondents’ views of Jews had been

influenced by the conflict. The statement “Israeli polices have made me more negatively inclined towards Jews generally” is supported by one quarter (26 per cent) of the population sample and 43 per cent of the Muslim sample (36 per cent when they were not presented with the statements about the conflict prior to answering).

Overall, this survey shows that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has some bearing on attitudes towards Jews, both in the population generally and (to a larger extent) among Muslims.

## YOUTH SURVEY

As already seen, the results from the survey of attitudes among youth show some similarities with attitudes in the population in general, though with a tendency towards less prevalent negative views. In particular, we measured less prevalent dislike of Muslims among the youth. The questionnaire that was used in the youth survey was a modified version of the one used in the population survey. Instead of surveying support for stereotypes of Jews and Muslims, the survey examined respondents' reactions to a series of situations in youth environments where attitudes towards Jews and Muslims were expressed. Overall, the results show that a large proportion of the youth disapproved of the situations described, but also that a relatively large proportion interpreted them as jokes. Such an interpretation was particularly common among the boys. One example of such a situation given in the survey is: “When a Muslim pupil enters the classroom, their classmates call out ‘Allahu akbar’ and make machine gun noises”. 73 per cent of the youth answered that they would have found this unacceptable, and 19 per cent would have interpreted it as a joke. Another example is: “Someone calls out: ‘The last one is a Jew’ before running a race”. Slightly fewer respondents (63 per cent) would have found this unacceptable, while 27 per cent would have interpreted it as a joke.

Using qualitative group interviews, we explored a variety of interpretative patterns which the youth applied in their assessment of the situations. The youth generally disapproved of negative attitudes and were engaged in the topic. Furthermore, contextualisation played an important role in how the situations were assessed. However, the study also indicates that the youth view antisemitism and Islamophobia as problems in others, thereby revealing a certain lack of critical self-reflection. Antisemitism was primarily viewed as a historical phenomenon, and negative attitudes towards Muslims were understood as a contemporary problem, though particularly among older people. The same tendency was found in the quantitative part of this survey, where we analysed the youth's views about the causes of negative attitudes.

The group interviews showed that the youth were concerned with not being judgemental, but the discussions also indicated some uncertainty. This could partly be related to lack of knowledge and thereby to the ability to recognize the survey topics; for example, more abstract concepts such as conspiracy theories were not always grasped. A strong consensus against prejudice sometimes led to a narrowing of what initially was an open and honest exchange between the youth.

Thus, on the one hand, the survey reveals strong awareness and responsible speech among the youth. On the other hand, it demonstrates a need for more knowledge and for a willingness to challenge and be challenged by other people's views and attitudes.

## CONCLUSION

As shown, the prevalence of antisemitic and anti-Muslim attitudes has decreased in Norwegian society since 2017. However, it is even more apparent than in 2017 that the minorities themselves perceive the opposite to be the case. One explanation for this

discrepancy may be the growing public attention given to antisemitism and Islamophobia as social problems. This attention may lead the minorities to report negative experiences more often; in other words, these experiences may previously have been under-reported. However, other features of societal trends may explain this perception of a negative trend. Dissemination of hate speech has become easier through digital media. Group-based enmity can also serve as an explanatory model in times of crisis. Internationally, antisemitic representations in recent years have been based on the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic and a generally unsettled political and economic situation. This survey also shows how attitudes towards Jews and Muslims are related to other attitudes. A propensity to subscribe to conspiracy theories is associated with both antisemitic and Islamophobic attitudes in the general population. We also show that an important explanatory factor for negative attitudes may lie in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This conflict seems to have a negative influence on attitudes towards Jews among respondents in the Muslim sample in particular. Moreover, both antisemitism and (particularly) Islamophobia are closely associated with xenophobia among respondents in the population sample.

# RECOMMENDATIONS

## 1. Measures against Islamophobia and antiziganism

This survey shows that negative attitudes towards Muslims are still prevalent in Norwegian society. Many good measures have been implemented through the Action plan to combat discrimination and hatred towards Muslims (2020–2023). This action plan should be continued for three more years to ensure continuity in this important work. For 10 years, (2011, 2017 and 2022), the Norwegian Center for Holocaust and Minority Studies' attitude surveys have documented negative attitudes towards Roma. One-third of the Norwegian population does not wish to have social contact with this minority group. Social distance from Roma is more prevalent than from any of the other groups included in this survey. The attitude surveys should be continued to monitor trends in attitudes towards Jews, Muslims and Roma.

## 2. Research into conspiracy thinking and attitudes towards minorities

This study shows a clear link between antisemitic and Islamophobic attitudes and a propensity for conspiracy thinking. A negative economic and political situation can erode trust in society, fuel notions about hidden powers and lead to polarisation. More research is needed into how attitudes towards minorities are related to conspiracy theories. A fourth round of this survey should include a more in-depth analysis of milieus where conspiracy thinking is widespread.

## 3. Knowledge about the link between antisemitism and attitudes towards Israel

This survey conducted detailed analyses of the relationship between antisemitism and attitudes towards Israel. The results show a link between antisemitic attitudes and negative views of Israel in both the population sample and (particularly) the Muslim sample. Moreover, one-fourth of respondents in the population sample openly state that Israeli policies have made them more negatively inclined towards Jews in general. It is important that schools, editorial media and political organisations focus their efforts on raising awareness about the problem with this conflation, and specifically on how anti-Israel statements can be based on antisemitic expressions.

## 4. Freedom of expression and responsible speech among young people

The youth survey shows that young people have a strong awareness of prejudices and a clear desire to distance themselves from negative attitudes. This is an important condition for democratic citizenship and equal interaction. However, the study also reveals that young people are less equipped to argue against and challenge prejudiced statements they make themselves or that are made by others. Resources should be developed for use in schools, teacher education and youth organisations to boost young people's ability to balance freedom of speech and responsible speech in discussions of prejudiced language. Rather than set red lines that must not be crossed, the aim should be to develop a language for the criteria on which boundaries are set, what is problematic and why.



# BACKGROUND

## 1.1 THEMATIC INTRODUCTION

The surveys presented in this report cover a broad range of themes, the main one being attitudes towards Jews and Muslims. Other topics, such as attitudes towards the Middle East conflict, attitudes to immigration and refugees, and views of religiosity, help place these central themes in a broader context and, to some degree, explain such attitudes.

While attitudes in a population can have great significance for how people co-exist and, essentially, how society works, it is important to note that actions are not determined by attitudes at the individual level; negative attitudes do not necessarily imply that such attitudes will be put into practice in the form of speech or other actions.

The difference between attitudes and actions is also important when analysing the threat level associated with phenomena such as antisemitism and Islamophobia. For example, whereas radicalisation in certain communities and dissemination of hate speech in digital media can render hostile attitudes towards other groups more visible, the dissemination of such attitudes in the general population can nonetheless remain stable or even decrease. This increased visibility may also increase the frequency of negative experiences among minorities.

Both antisemitism and Islamophobia are concepts with definitions that are subject to debate. This applies not least to where the boundary line goes between (legitimate) criticism of Israel and (illegitimate) antisemitism, and between (legitimate) religious criticism and (illegitimate) Islamophobia. We hope that this survey can help elucidate these themes.

The following chapter provides a brief introduction to antisemitism and Islamophobia as concepts and phenomena in Europe today.<sup>1</sup>

## ANTISEMITISM

Antisemitism can be defined as negative attitudes towards and actions against Jews or what is perceived as Jewish, based on specific conceptions of Jews.<sup>2</sup> These stereotypes have a long history in Europe and cover a broad spectrum of ideas, some of them mutually contradictory. A common feature is the way in which they ascribe inherently (primarily) negative traits to Jews as a group. Some are recurring themes, such as the idea that Jews represent a foreign and hostile element in a community or that they pose a threat (internal or external) to society. Conspiracy theories about Jews claim that they represent a secret and dangerous global power. Antisemitic attitudes can imply support for such ideas or stereotypes of Jews or more complex theories in which Jews represent a central element in a worldview. Some examples of historically prevalent antisemitic stereotypes on which this and previous rounds of this survey were based are:

- Jews are powerful, and work behind the scenes to promote their own interests.
- Jews represent a threat to the established order of society.
- Jews are inferior.
- Jews are disloyal.
- Jews think they are better than others.
- Jews cannot be trusted.
- Jews represent a foreign element in society.
- Jews exploit the Holocaust to their own advantage/are behind the Holocaust/created the “myth” of the Holocaust.
- Jews are intransigent and vindictive.

<sup>1</sup> See also the thematic introduction to the previous report (Hoffman & Moe, 2017, pp. 22–25).

<sup>2</sup> See, for example, Klug (2003). See also Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation, 2021, p. 12, though reference there is made to “hostile”, not “negative”, actions and attitudes, which is a narrower definition.

Support for such notions can form the basis for antipathetic feelings and dislike of social contact, which are two more dimensions of negative attitudes that we map in this study.

After the Holocaust, antisemitic ideology was discredited in Western society and partly disappeared from the public sphere. As a phenomenon, however, antisemitism did not disappear; today digital media provide a vital arena for disseminating antisemitic speech (see, for example, FRA, 2018).

Holocaust trivialisation and denial represent new elements in antisemitism after World War II. Holocaust denial is typically intended to sow doubt about the number of people murdered (almost six million Jews), the method used (the gas chambers) and the underlying intention (the extermination of Europe's Jews). Secondary antisemitism (Schönbach, 1961) originated in the European (and particularly German) guilt and sense of guilt after the genocide, and asserts, among other things, that the Jews exploit this guilt to their own advantage. This form of antisemitism manifests in, for example, opposition to the Holocaust memory culture.

As already implied, the State of Israel today accounts for another important frame of reference for antisemitism. Criticism of Israel must not be confused with antisemitism in itself nor be dismissed as such solely for being harsh or incorrect. However, criticism of Israel can be defined as antisemitic when it uses antisemitic stereotypes (such as references to traditional allegations of blood libel and child murder) or when negative views of Israel are phrased as opposition towards Jews collectively. Antisemitic attitudes may also underlie anti-Israel statements or actions, even though they are not openly expressed. In a time when antisemitism as an ideology has lost its credibility, criticism of Israel can constitute a new way of expressing antisemitic attitudes.

## ISLAMOPHOBIA

Islamophobia can be defined as widespread negative prejudices, actions and practices that attack, exclude or discriminate against people on the basis that they are, or are assumed to be, Muslim (see also Hoffmann & Moe, 2017, p. 25).<sup>3</sup> Negative conceptions of Islam and Muslims are rooted in different historical periods, such as the religiously inspired enemy images of the Middle Ages and the colonial representations of Muslims as an inferior race. But it was not until the Runnymede Trust in the UK published a report in 1997 that the phenomenon became the subject of broader research (Runnymede Trust, 1997). In Norway, the Norwegian Center for Holocaust and Minority Studies' attitude survey from 2017 constitutes a pioneer survey of Islamophobia.

We can talk about Islamophobia when Muslims are attributed inherent, negative traits solely by virtue of being Muslim. As in the 2017 study, the starting point for the analysis of attitudes towards Muslims in the current study was well-known tropes originating in Islamophobic ideas in Europe. Negative conceptions of Muslims that make up these ideas include:

- Muslims want to take over Europe and take advantage of European elites to promote their goals.
- Muslims are first and foremost loyal to Islamic laws and are therefore disloyal to Norwegian/European values.
- Muslims cannot be integrated because they don't really want to.
- Muslims despise democracy and represent a threat to Western culture.
- Muslims speak with two tongues.
- Muslims are guided by a hateful god.
- Muslims oppress women, and Muslim men are driven by a primitive form of sexuality.

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<sup>3</sup> A shorter version can be found in a report from the British think tank the Runnymede Trust: "Islamophobia is anti-Muslim racism" (Elahi & Khan, 2017, p. 7).

- Muslims are violent.
- Muslims are inferior.

These negative stereotypes build on a complex of ideas of culture, ethnicity and popular mindsets. At the same time, conceptions of “what Muslims are like” are often closely linked to conceptions of Islam. Consequently, Islam is represented as a religion that glorifies violence and is driven by a vision of global domination. The nuances of Islam disappear, and Muslims are seen as representatives of Islam understood as a threat. The far-reaching public debate on racism that came in the wake of the Black Lives Matter movement and incidents such as the terrorist attack on the mosque in Bærum, Norway in 2019 have raised awareness about Islamophobic attitudes as a social problem in Norway.

Several differences exist between antisemitism and Islamophobia in terms of the types of claims and historical explanations. Examples of such differences are antisemitism’s deep historical roots and its role in the persecutions that culminated in the genocide of the European Jews during World War II. The content of some prejudice constructs also differs markedly. Similarities are found in, among other things, fear of domination, where the minority is ascribed threatening political motives and hidden agendas. First and foremost, however, these two phenomena align in the way they ascribe individuals with collective, negative traits. One of the aims of the present survey was to map the ways in which antisemitism and Islamophobia are related in the Norwegian population.

## 1.2 PROJECT ORGANISATION AND IMPLEMENTATION

The attitude surveys on which this report is based were planned and implemented by an interdisciplinary research team comprising (in alphabetical order):

Werner Bergmann (Technische Universität, Berlin), Cora Alexa Døving (Norwegian Center for Holocaust and Minority Studies), Birgitte P. Haanshuus (Norwegian Center for Holocaust and Minority Studies), Ottar Hellevik (University of Oslo), Christhard Hoffmann (Norwegian Center for Holocaust and Minority Studies/ University of Bergen), Anders R. Jupskås (C-REX, University of Oslo), Claudia Lenz (Norwegian Center for Holocaust and Minority Studies/MF Norwegian School of Theology, Religion and Society), Irene Levin (OsloMet), Vibeke Moe (Norwegian Center for Holocaust and Minority Studies) and Øyvind B. Solheim (C-REX, University of Oslo).

The project manager was Vibeke Moe and the project coordinator was Birgitte P. Haanshuus. Claudia Lenz led the work on the qualitative youth survey.

Data collection for the quantitative surveys was conducted by Thomas Karterud and Ole Fr. Ugland from Kantar Public.

### THE REPORT AND ANALYSES

The entire project team contributed to preparing this report. The quantitative analyses were conducted by Øyvind B. Solheim, Ottar Hellevik, Thomas Karterud and Birgitte P. Haanshuus. The qualitative analyses were conducted by Vibeke Moe, Claudia Lenz and Cora Alexa Døving. Werner Bergmann wrote chapter 6 on the international comparison. Birgitte P. Haanshuus has edited and translated the Norwegian version of this chapter from English.

### NEW ELEMENTS IN THE PRESENT SURVEY

As well as elements from the two previous attitude surveys carried out by the Norwegian Center for Holocaust and Minority Studies in 2011 and 2017, the present study contains some new elements. The survey of attitudes towards Jews, towards other ethnic and religious minorities and towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict essentially repeats that of the previous surveys.

The analyses therefore show trends in these attitudes over a 10-year period. The expanded survey of attitudes towards Muslims was first conducted in 2017 and was repeated in 2022. A completely new element in the present study is the investigation of conspiracy mentality; that is, the propensity to subscribe to conspiracy theories. Some new questions regarding views about religion's place in society were added, as well as a survey experiment, the purpose of which was to gain a deeper understanding of the relationship between attitudes towards Israel and antisemitism.

The new study also includes a separate survey of attitudes among youth. While negative attitudes towards Jews and Muslims in the adult population were more prevalent among older people than among younger people in 2011 and 2017<sup>4</sup>, we have known less about what types of attitudes individuals aged under 18 have towards minority groups, particularly regarding prejudice against Jews and Muslims. Youth's attitudes towards issues such as homosexuality (Slåtten, 2016) and extremism (Vestel & Bakken, 2016; Haugstvedt & Bjørge, 2022) have previously been surveyed. The youth survey presented in the current report contains a slightly abbreviated version of the population survey and some elements that are new, where respondents were asked for their views about various incidents. Which questions were included in the quantitative youth survey is indicated in the tables in this report.

Attitudes among youth were also explored in a separate qualitative survey. Claudia Lenz and Vibeke Moe undertook seven group interviews with a total of 30 youth aged between 16 and 20. The interviews were conducted in Oslo and Viken, Bergen and Trøndelag. See chapter 7 for a more detailed description of the method used in the qualitative survey.

### 1.3 TARGET GROUPS AND SAMPLES

The quantitative surveys had four target groups and samples:

- A representative sample of the Norwegian population
- Jews in Norway
- Muslims with immigrant background from Muslim countries
- Youth aged between 15 and 20

The population survey was limited to individuals aged 18 or above. The survey among Jews was conducted among members of the Jewish Community of Oslo. The survey among Muslims was limited to Muslims aged between 18 and 75 with immigrant background (immigrants and Norwegian-born with immigrant parents) and a minimum of five years' residence in Norway from Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iraq, Iran, Kosovo, Morocco, Pakistan, Palestine, Somalia and Turkey. These are the most important countries of origin with respect to Norwegian Muslims with immigrant background and five years' residence in Norway. However, a significant proportion of those who were selected from these countries did not identify as Muslims. A selection of results from this group, called "Others" in the analysis, is also presented. Youth in the quantitative survey were defined as young people aged between 15 and 20 years.

### 1.4 DATA COLLECTION: METHOD AND IMPLEMENTATION

Data collection for the quantitative surveys was conducted between November 2021 and February 2022:

- Population sample:  
4 November 2021–8. December 2021

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4 HL-senteret (2012); Hoffmann & Moe (2017); Hellevik (2020).

- Jewish Community of Oslo:  
15 November 2021–27 January 2022
- Immigrant samples:  
18 November 2021–9 February 2022
- Youth sample:  
8 November 2021–8 February 2022

## POPULATION

The population survey was conducted electronically using GallupPanellet, Kantar's access panel for surveys, in the same manner as in 2017 and 2011, when respondents received email invitations and completed the survey online. The panel consists of around 55,000 individuals who regularly answer surveys. GallupPanellet is set up with representativeness in mind, the aim being to represent a miniature version of Norway that reflects the entire population.

To obtain an accurate nationally representative sample, the gross sample was pre-stratified and selected proportionally to the Norwegian population distribution by education, gender, age and geographical region. One reminder was issued during the field period.

## JEWS IN NORWAY

The survey among Jews was conducted in cooperation with the Jewish Community of Oslo. The survey was primarily carried out by issuing emails to congregation members (by the congregation itself) inviting them to complete the survey online. The survey was also distributed by letter post to members who were not listed with an email address in the membership register. Respondents who received the survey by letter post were issued a user name/password so that they too could complete the survey online. One reminder was sent to those who received the survey electronically. The same data collection method was used in 2017. Since some members of the Jewish sample may therefore have been interviewed in 2017 and 2022, this may have influenced the results in 2022. Such a panel effect may

have contributed to changes in views by generating more awareness about the matter raised in the question. However, it may also have led to stability if the respondents maintained the same view as the one they originally expressed. In other words, some uncertainty is attached to the interpretation of the results for the Jewish sample in 2022.

## MUSLIMS WITH IMMIGRANT BACKGROUND

The sample of Muslims with immigrant background was selected from the National Population Register. The final sample of Muslim respondents was identified by asking questions about religious affiliation (in the introduction to the survey). The National Population Register contains data about all citizens' immigration status and country background based on data about their country background and that of their parents. By using the National Population Register as a sample database, the survey could be addressed to specific immigrant groups with background from countries where Islam is the majority religion and thereby increase the likelihood of reaching Muslims. This approach means that the survey did not include Muslims without immigrant background, such as grandchildren of immigrants or converts to Islam. It is assumed, however, that such groups are currently relatively small.

When the previous survey was conducted (in 2017), this part of the data collection was conducted as a postal survey (where questionnaires are returned in prepaid envelopes) with the possibility to complete the survey online for those who wished to do so. In addition, a reminder was sent by text message. Since 2019, Kantar has been able to distribute surveys to email addresses obtained from the Common Contact Register for all surveys based on samples from the National Population Register. The 2022 survey among Muslims with immigrant background from Muslim countries was conducted as a combination of a postal survey (as in the previous survey) and an email survey, where half

of the sample received the survey by letter post and half by email. Both samples received reminders by email. The respondents also received reminders by text message, as in the previous survey. This design was chosen to make it possible to evaluate what a change of method (from postal to electronic) may mean for the final composition of the sample and the results from the survey.

**YOUTH**

The sample of youth aged between 15 and 20 was obtained from Kantar’s population database, which is a population database supplied by Data Factory. The youth sample was selected at random from everyone in the relevant age group who was listed with a mobile telephone number in the database. Recruitment was conducted by sending text messages containing a link to the online survey.

Table 1.1 Population sample

	Gross sample (distributed)	Net sample (responded)	Response rate	Sample distribution	Population distribution
<b>Male</b>	2 506	846	33.8%	51.2%	50.4%
<b>Female</b>	2 144	807	37.6%	48.8%	49.6%
<b>Aged below 30</b>	1 408	199	14.1%	12.0%	19.6%
<b>30-44 years</b>	1 052	313	29.8%	18.9%	25.7%
<b>45-59</b>	1 004	439	43.7%	26.6%	25.7%
<b>60 +</b>	1 186	702	59.2%	42.5%	29.0%
<b>Oslo and Akershus</b>	1 165	403	34.6%	24.4%	25.4%
<b>Rest of Eastern Norway</b>	1 174	429	36.5%	26.0%	25.7%
<b>Southern and Western Norway</b>	1 436	509	35.4%	30.8%	31.0%
<b>Trøndelag and Northern Norway</b>	875	312	35.7%	18.9%	17.9%
<b>Primary and lower secondary education (10-year compulsory education, 7-year elementary education or similar)</b>	599	132		8%	
<b>Upper secondary general education</b>	392	288		17%	
<b>Upper secondary vocational education</b>	946	371		22%	
<b>Tertiary vocational college, vocational programmes (1/2-2 years) based on upper secondary education</b>	720	255		15%	
<b>University/university college education, up to 4 years</b>	922	337		20%	
<b>University/university college education, more than 4 years</b>	966	270		16%	
<b>[Data on education missing]</b>	103				
<b>Low education</b>				63.3%	64.7%
<b>High education</b>				36.7%	35.3%
<b>Total</b>	4 650	1 653	36%		

## 1.5 RESPONSE RATES PER SAMPLE

### POPULATION

A total of 4,650 panel members received the invitation to complete the population survey. After one reminder had been sent, 36 per cent of these had responded. This resulted in a total of 1,653 respondents in the population sample. Table 1.1 shows the distribution by gender, age, geographical region and education for the gross sample, the net sample and the population sample, respectively.

In the final sample, older people aged 60 and above were overrepresented and younger people aged below 45 underrepresented. Apart from this, the table shows that the sample was approximately equivalent to the population in terms of distribution of gender, geographical region and educational level (high/low).

Kantar Public calculated weights to compensate for

the observed biases in the above-mentioned variables. The results from the survey can therefore be deemed representative of the population aged 18 years and above in terms of gender, age, geographical region and educational level.

### JEWS IN NORWAY

The survey among Jews was distributed to 470 members of the Jewish Community of Oslo, 20 of which received the survey by letter post. A total of 134 responses was registered, corresponding to a response rate of 28.5 per cent. A total of 129 respondents completed the survey online. Table 1.2 shows the Jewish sample's distribution by background characteristics. Compared with the population sample, the Jewish sample comprised considerably more respondents with high levels of education.

### MUSLIMS WITH IMMIGRANT BACKGROUND

The gross sample of Muslims was a pre-stratified sample that was selected according to expected response rate, based on historical figures from other surveys Kantar Public has conducted in recent years with the same target groups (immigrants with similar country backgrounds). The objective for this pre-stratification was to obtain a proportional net sample where the country backgrounds in question were correctly represented in relation to the immigrant population in Norway.

The response to the 2022 survey proved significantly weaker than in the previous survey conducted in 2017. This may be explained by a generally negative trend in society in responding to surveys. In addition, parts of the data collection were conducted in December, a month when response rates to surveys are lower than normal. To ensure a sufficient basis for analysis for the survey, invitations were selected and distributed by email to a supplementary sample during data collection. This supplementary sample was stratified according to

Table 1.2 Jewish sample

	Net sample (responses, n=134)
<b>Male</b>	44.8 %
<b>Female</b>	54.5 %
<b>Under 30</b>	14.2 %
<b>30-44</b>	17.9 %
<b>45-59</b>	20.9 %
<b>60+</b>	47.0 %
<b>Primary and lower secondary education (10-year compulsory education, 7-year elementary education or similar)</b>	3.7 %
<b>Upper secondary education (general study programme, vocational education or other)</b>	12.7 %
<b>Professional education/vocational education/craft certificate/upper secondary vocational education</b>	8.2 %
<b>University/university college education, up to 4 years</b>	26.1 %
<b>University/university college education, more than 4 years</b>	48.5 %
<b>Low education</b>	24.6 %
<b>High education</b>	74.6 %

the actual response by country background in the first distribution in order to help compensate for observed biases in the preliminary sample.

Initially, Kantar Public received two samples from the National Population Register, with 14,000 and 9,150 individuals respectively, totalling 23,150 individuals with immigrant background from the relevant countries with Muslim majorities. These samples were then cleaned against the Common Contact Register to add mobile telephone numbers (for sending reminders by text message). The letter post part of the survey was distributed to a random sample of 6,900 of the first sample that was provided. The remaining 7,100 received the survey by email. All 9,150 individuals in the supplementary sample received the survey by email.

In the first sample, an email reminder was sent to those who had not completed the survey (both those who received the survey by letter post and those who received it by email). Thereafter, a reminder text message was distributed containing a link to the survey. A total of 1,305 individuals with background from Muslim countries completed the survey, representing a response rate of 5.6 per cent. The survey was completed by 89 per cent electronically and by 11 per cent by letter post. A total of 821 of the 1,305 respondents, equivalent to a proportion of 63 per cent, reported Islam as their religious affiliation. The response rate in this survey was not abnormal for a web-based survey in the Norwegian immigrant population, and is in line with what Kantar Public recently achieved in surveys with similar samples in recent years for, among others, the City of Oslo (see Bangstad et al., 2022). Nonetheless, one could ask whether the low response rate would produce biases in the final sample and, in which case, which biases. It is a known fact that the level of response to this type of survey is higher among individuals with higher education. However, this is a general phenomenon rather than one that is particular to immigrant populations, and deficient data on educational level among immigrants in Norway

makes it more difficult to bring to light any biases in the sample regarding educational level. There may also be a propensity among individuals with a stronger sense of civic engagement to complete such surveys. To the extent that civic engagement is related to engagement against negative and undemocratic attitudes such as those surveyed in this study, the results may be slightly more positive - lower measured prevalence of negative attitudes - than what is actually the case in the population. Another potential effect of high education is that reporting of negative experiences may increase (Steinmann, 2019; Diehl, Liebau & Mühlau, 2021). See Hellevik (2015 and 2016) for a more detailed analysis of what low response rates may mean for survey results.

Table 1.3 shows the immigrant sample's distribution by country background and demography pre-distribution,

Table 1.3 Response rate, immigrant sample

	Gross sample (distributed)	Net sample (responded)	Response rate
<b>AFGHANISTAN</b>	2 517	97	3.9%
<b>BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA</b>	975	146	15.0%
<b>IRAQ</b>	3 357	163	4.9%
<b>IRAN</b>	2 102	148	7.0%
<b>KOSOVO</b>	1 469	100	6.8%
<b>MAROCCO</b>	1 039	53	5.1%
<b>PAKISTAN</b>	3 666	226	6.2%
<b>PALESTINE</b>	585	24	4.1%
<b>SOMALIA</b>	5 728	236	4.1%
<b>TURKEY</b>	1 712	112	6.5%
<b>Male</b>	12 644	710	5.6%
<b>Female</b>	10 506	568	5.4%
<b>Under 30</b>	5 723	326	5.7%
<b>30-44 years</b>	8 877	485	5.5%
<b>45-59 years</b>	6 159	331	5.4%
<b>60 years or older</b>	2 391	163	6.8%
<b>Total</b>	23 150	1305	5.6%



and the distribution of the same background variables post-distribution.

Response to the survey was lowest among immigrants with background from Afghanistan (4 per cent) and highest among individuals with background from Bosnia and Herzegovina (15 per cent). The low response rate among respondents from some country backgrounds was approximately as expected,

and pre-stratification, including stratification of the supplementary sample, helped to compensate for the relative biases this may have introduced to the net sample.

Table 1.4 Immigrant samples and representativeness

	Online questionnaire (n = 1,155)	Postal questionnaire (n= 150)	Muslims with immigrant background (n = 821)	Non-Muslims with immigrant background from Muslim countries (n = 484)	Total, net sample (responses, n = 1,305)	Population distribution (source: Statistics Norway)
<b>AFGHANISTAN</b>	7.6%	6.0%	8.4%	5.8%	7.4%	8.4%
<b>BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA</b>	9.8%	22.0%	5.6%	20.7%	11.2%	9.0%
<b>IRAQ</b>	13.1%	8.0%	11.6%	14.0%	12.5%	14.0%
<b>IRAN</b>	11.6%	9.3%	2.8%	25.8%	11.3%	10.8%
<b>KOSOVO</b>	7.4%	9.3%	5.8%	10.7%	7.7%	7.2%
<b>MAROCCO</b>	4.2%	3.3%	5.4%	1.9%	4.1%	4.8%
<b>PAKISTAN</b>	17.3%	17.3%	23.5%	6.8%	17.3%	18.5%
<b>PALESTINE</b>	1.9%	1.3%	2.4%	0.8%	1.8%	1.6%
<b>SOMALIA</b>	18.7%	13.3%	26.1%	4.5%	18.1%	16.7%
<b>TYRKEY</b>	8.4%	10.0%	8.4%	8.9%	8.6%	9.0%
<b>Male</b>	54.8%	54.2%	54.0%	56.0%	54.7%	53.4%
<b>Female</b>	43.6%	45.1%	44.6%	42.5%	43.8%	45.2%
<b>Aged below 30</b>	26.2%	15.3%	27.4%	20.9%	25.0%	24.9%
<b>30-44 years</b>	38.9%	24.0%	38.2%	35.3%	37.2%	38.6%
<b>45-59 years</b>	24.9%	28.7%	24.7%	26.4%	25.4%	24.7%
<b>60+ years</b>	10.0%	32.0%	9.6%	17.4%	12.5%	11.8%
<b>Primary and lower secondary education</b>	9.6%	15.4%	13.0%	5.6%	10.2%	
<b>Upper secondary education</b>	24.6%	20.3%	27.6%	18.3%	24.1%	
<b>Professional education/vocational education</b>	13.6%	12.6%	13.6%	13.3%	13.5%	
<b>University/university college education, up to 4 years</b>	27.1%	26.6%	26,3 %	28.2 %	27.0 %	
<b>University/university college education, up to 4 years</b>	23.0%	25.2%	17.4%	33.2 %	23.3 %	
<b>Low education</b>	47.8%	48.3%	54.2%	37.2 %	47.8%	
<b>High education</b>	50.1%	51.8%	43.7%	61.4 %	50.3%	

The representativeness of the immigrant sample combined (1,305) was assessed against Statistics Norway’s population statistics for the target group in question. In the two right-hand columns in Table 1.4, this sample is compared with the actual distribution by country background, gender and age of the immigrant population in question. The table also shows the distribution in the final Muslim sample. The table shows that, at a general level, there are relatively small differences between the sample and the population in terms of distribution by country background. The pre-stratification and correction that were performed when selecting the supplementary sample have therefore worked satisfactorily with regard to achieving a representative sample in terms of distribution by gender, age and country background for this target group. The sample biases we nonetheless could observe were further compensated for with weighting to ensure that the final results were representative of the population in terms of distribution by gender, age and country background.

Highly educated respondents are likely overrepresented in the immigrant sample. The proportion of the total immigrant sample reporting a high level of education is considerably higher than for the general population (50.3 per cent compared with 36.7 per cent). Note, however, that the proportion of respondents reporting a high level of education is somewhat lower among respondents reporting Islam as their religious affiliation (43.7 per cent) than it is among respondents reporting no religious affiliation with Islam (61.4 per cent).

The table also shows the sample distribution by demography, broken down by response method. Based on this, we can see that:

- Older respondents used (as expected) the postal questionnaire to a far greater extent than the younger age groups.
- Individuals with background from Bosnia and Herzegovina used the postal questionnaire to a far greater extent than individuals with country background from other countries. This may be related to the age composition among individuals with background from Bosnia and Herzegovina, which generally comprises more older individuals than most other countries.

**YOUTH**

The youth survey was conducted electronically only, with recruitment via text message and completion of the online questionnaire. In total, 11,994 individuals received the survey, distributed by 1,999 per age cohort (15–20 years), and 1,027 individuals in the target group responded, representing a response rate of 8.5 per cent.

The representativeness of the youth sample was assessed against Statistics Norway’s population statistics for the target group in question. Table 1.5 shows the target group distribution by gender and age and the population distribution for the same variables.

*Table 1.5 Youth sample, quantitative survey*

		Sample	Population
<b>Boys</b>	15 years	6.2%	8.4%
	16 years	8.3%	8.5%
	17 years	8.9%	8.5%
	18 years	6.9%	8.3%
	19 years	6.0%	8.6%
	20 years	6.1%	9.0%
<b>Girls</b>	15 years	7.0%	8.1%
	16 years	12.8%	8.1%
	17 years	11.8%	8.1%
	18 years	10.2%	8.0%
	19 years	8.6%	8.1%
	20 years	7.1%	8.4%

The table shows that boys in the age groups 15 years and 19–20 years are slightly underrepresented in the sample, and girls in the age group 16–18 years are slightly overrepresented. In the results these biases are compensated for using sample weighting, so the results can be deemed representative of the target group of youth aged between 15–20 years in terms of gender and age distribution.

## 1.6 THE QUESTIONNAIRE

The questionnaire contained questions on demography (age, gender, residence, sources of income, income and education); political orientation, media habits, life stance and religiosity; as well as questions about attitudes towards Jews and Muslims, social distance from other ethnic and religious minorities, attitudes towards immigration and refugees, and views about the Holocaust and the Middle East conflict. In addition, the questionnaire used in the minority survey maps experiences of discrimination among Jews and Muslims. As noted above, the youth survey was slightly shorter than the population survey. Among other things, statements measuring the cognitive dimension of attitudes (stereotypes) were not included in the questionnaire. Instead the respondents were asked about their views on various incidents.

The surveys are based on established survey methods for attitude surveys, and reflect how surveys on antisemitism and Islamophobia are conducted internationally. This also allows for comparison of the Norwegian results with international results (see chapter 6).

In addition to questions with checkboxes and fixed response options, the questionnaire had questions with open response options where respondents could write freely. Such open responses allow topics, views and experiences not dealt with elsewhere in the study to be

expressed, and are a valuable supplement to the fixed response questions. We believe that the combination of qualitative and quantitative methods is one of the strengths of this survey, and have attached more weight to qualitative analyses in the present survey than in the previous ones.

The questionnaire was developed by the project team at the Norwegian Center for Holocaust and Minority Studies and quality assured multiple times by Kantar Public. Quality assurance of the questionnaire for this survey (2022) included conducting cognitive in-depth interviews/tests with youth. In 2017 the minority survey was quality-assured through cognitive in-depth interviews with Jewish and Muslim informants. Using cognitive interviews, the respondents were interviewed about what it was like to complete the questionnaire. The primary purpose of the interviews was to obtain feedback on how the questionnaire worked and to ensure the validity of the survey. The interviews surveyed whether the questions were understood, which questions were difficult to answer, which questions were regarded as irrelevant, and whether the layout (structure) of the questionnaires worked, as well as the sequence of the questions and terminology. Fifteen cognitive interviews with youth were conducted in connection with the present survey.

The final version of the questionnaire can be downloaded here (Norwegian): <https://www.hlsenteret.no/forskning/jodisk-historie-og-antisemittisme/holdningsundersokelse-om-etniske-og-religiose-minoriteter/sporreskjema2022.pdf>. Please note that the questionnaire is a master version containing all the questions that were asked in the survey. The filter structure annotated in the questionnaire shows which questions were asked of all respondents (no annotation) and which questions were asked of respondents in the respective Jewish, Muslim and youth samples only (annotated accordingly).



# RESULTS

The following chapters present the results and analyses from the population survey, the minority surveys (attitudes and experiences among Jews and Muslims) and the youth study. First, the results for attitudes towards Jews and Muslims are presented in chapter 2. These results are then placed in context in chapter 3, where attitudes towards other national and religious minorities and towards the parties in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are presented, followed by analyses of the respondents' support for conspiracy thinking and views about the place of religion in society.

The respondents' views about the causes of negative attitudes provide interesting insights into their own attitudes and into their views about the causes of negative attitudes in others. These data were collected through the open response options in the questionnaire, and the responses are analysed in chapter 4. Chapter 5 presents the results for the Jewish and Muslim respondents' own experiences of negative attitudes.

Many surveys have been conducted on attitudes towards Jews and Muslims in Europe, and in chapter 6 the Norwegian results are placed in an international perspective. The final chapter presents the results for the qualitative youth study (group interviews). It is important to emphasise that - in addition to the differences in data collection methods - the large differences between (particularly) the Jewish and the Muslim samples regarding background make it difficult to directly compare the results. For the Jewish sample, the data collection method may have created a panel effect, among other things (see section 1.4). We will nonetheless report the results for both samples wherever the respondents answered the same questions.



## 2. ATTITUDES TOWARDS JEWS AND MUSLIMS

This chapter presents the results of the survey of attitudes towards Jews and Muslims. Like the surveys conducted in 2011 and 2017, we measured these attitudes along three dimensions: the affective dimension, measuring attitudes in the form of feelings, such as the prevalence of sympathy and antipathy or dislike; a dimension measuring attitudes in the form of social distance, such as willingness to accept members of a specific groups as neighbours<sup>5</sup> and, finally, the cognitive dimension, measuring the prevalence of ideas or mental images, such as support for stereotypes (see, for example, Breckler, 1984; Karakayali, 2009). While all three dimensions measure aspects of attitudes, they are to some extent independent of each other. This can be seen when, for example, stereotypes – the cognitive dimension – are more prevalent than antipathetic feelings in a population. In both 2011 and 2017, high scores on the cognitive dimension were more prevalent among respondents in the surveys than high scores on the other dimensions. This tendency is also found in the results for the present survey.

The tables show the results for the years in which each question was asked and of which sample.<sup>6</sup> The 2011 survey involved only a general population sample. Consequently, the tables show the trend in the population sample over a 10-year period and the trend in the minority samples from 2017 to 2022. The results were calculated with two decimal places before being rounded off to one.

### 2.1 ATTITUDES TOWARDS JEWS

The results of the survey of attitudes towards Jews are presented below. First we will look at the prevalence of sympathy/antipathy, social distance and prejudice (stereotypes). Then we will look at the results for a series of questions related to violence towards and harassment of Jews and at views of Jews in relation to the Holocaust.

#### SYMPATHY AND ANTIPATHY

The respondents were asked for their views about the following two statements: “I have a particular sympathy for Jews” and “I have a certain dislike of Jews”. These questions were first asked in the population survey in 2011 and of the Muslim sample in 2017. They were also asked of the youth sample in 2022.

The population sample shows a slight increase in the proportion expressing sympathy, from 27 per cent in 2011 to 33 per cent in 2022. This increase has occurred in the past five years. The Muslim sample also shows an increase in the proportion expressing sympathy; 37 per cent now express sympathy with Jews (representing an increase of as much as 13 percentage points since 2017). Whereas the proportion expressing sympathy with Jews is slightly smaller among Muslims than in the population in general in 2017, the corresponding proportion in 2022 is slightly larger. Among non-Muslim immigrants (“Others”), the proportion expressing sympathy with Jews is 44 per cent (representing an increase of 16 percentage points since 2017). The youth sample has the largest proportion expressing sympathy for Jews; almost half of the respondents in this sample answered that they have “a particular sympathy for Jews” (46 per cent).

5 See especially Emory S Bogardus’ scale, developed in 1924. The scale consists of a list describing gradually increasing contact, from collegial contact, friendship and neighbourly relations to marriage with the family (Bogardus, 1925, pp. 216–226). See Mead Project Source Page: Social Distance and its Origin ([https://brocku.ca/MeadProject/Bogardus/Bogardus\\_1925b.html](https://brocku.ca/MeadProject/Bogardus/Bogardus_1925b.html), accessed 12 April 2022).

6 For the sake of simplicity, the data collected for the present survey are labelled “2022” in the tables though, as already mentioned, data collection was conducted in a period that covered both 2021 and 2022; see section 1.4 for more details.

Table 2.1 Sympathy for Jews (per cent)

How well does this statement fit with your own views: "I have a particular sympathy for Jews"?							
Sample	Not at all	Rather badly	Impossible to answer	No response	Rather well	Completely	Completely + Rather well
Population 2011	21.3	31.7	20.3	0.1	20.8	5.9	26.7
Population 2017	22.0	27.6	22.7	0.5	20.8	6.3	27.1
Population 2022	17.5	25.5	23.1	0.6	25.5	7.7	33.2
Change 2011-2022	-3.7	-6.1	2.8	0.6	4.7	1.8	6.5
Muslims 2017	17.7	12.0	41.8	4.1	15.2	9.1	24.4
Muslims 2022	17.1	11.1	32.3	2.5	22.8	14.3	37.1
Change 2017-2022	-0.6	-1.0	-9.5	-1.6	7.6	5.1	12.7
Others 2017	22.8	7.0	38.4	3.8	19.3	8.7	28.1
Others 2022	16.3	13.1	24.4	2.1	27.9	16.2	44.1
Change 2017-2022	-6.5	6.1	-14.0	-1.7	8.5	7.5	16.0
Youth 2022	15.3	12.9	24.7	0.7	31.6	14.8	46.4

In all the samples, far fewer respondents express dislike of Jews than express sympathy. The results for the population sample show a decrease in dislike, from 11 per cent in 2011 to 6 per cent in 2022. The change since 2017 is negligible. The results for the minority samples are almost the same for 2017 and 2022; 8 per cent of Muslims and 5 per cent of non-Muslim immigrants

express a dislike of Jews in 2022. In 2022, very few respondents in the youth sample (only 4 per cent) do likewise.

Table 2.2 Dislike of Jews (per cent)

How well does this statement fit with your own views: "I have a certain dislike of Jews"?							
Sample	Not at all	Rather badly	Impossible to answer	No response	Rather well	Completely	Completely + Rather well
Population 2011	43.4	33.9	11.4	0.1	9.5	1.7	11.2
Population 2017	48.5	32.7	10.8	0.5	5.9	1.6	7.5
Population 2022	55.0	27.7	9.6	1.3	5.1	1.2	6.3
Change 2011-2022	11.6	-6.2	-1.8	1.3	-4.4	-0.5	-4.9
Muslims 2017	35.7	13.4	36.1	5.7	6.9	2.2	9.1
Muslims 2022	46.4	14.7	26.1	4.5	6.3	1.9	8.3
Change 2017-2022	10.8	1.3	-10.0	-1.2	-0.6	-0.2	-0.8
Others 2017	50.7	10.8	23.4	9.3	4.4	1.4	5.8
Others 2022	60.3	16.0	14.1	4.5	3.3	1.9	5.1
Change 2017-2022	9.5	5.2	-9.3	-4.8	-1.1	0.5	-0.6
Youth 2022	71.2	11.7	10.6	2.2	2.8	1.4	4.3



### SOCIAL DISTANCE FROM JEWS

To measure social distance from Jews, the respondents were asked for their views about having Jews as neighbours or in their circle of friends. These questions were first asked in the population survey in 2011 and of Muslims in 2017. The question about friendship was also asked of the youth sample in 2022.

Table 2.3 Social distance from Jews: neighbours (per cent)

To what extent would you like or dislike having Jews as neighbours?								
Sample	Would like it	Wouldn't mind it	Don't know	No response	Would dislike it a little	Would dislike it a lot	Total	A little + A lot
Population 2011	13.6	73.0	2.9	0.0	7.4	3.2	100.0	10.6
Population 2017	13.6	75.4	3.8	0.2	5.3	1.7	100.0	7.0
Population 2022	16.5	73.7	3.4	0.6	4.6	1.2	100.0	5.8
Change 2011-2022	2.9	0.8	0.5	0.6	-2.8	-2.0	0.0	-4.8
Muslims 2017	22.0	62.7	5.2	1.7	3.5	5.0	100.0	8.5
Muslims 2022	28.7	60.0	4.9	0.9	3.0	2.5	100.0	5.5
Change 2017-2022	6.7	-2.7	-0.3	-0.8	-0.5	-2.5	0.0	-3.0
Others 2017	20.0	64.9	5.6	6.7	1.6	1.2	100.0	2.8
Others 2022	26.3	63.6	5.1	1.7	2.0	1.3	100.0	3.3
Change 2017-2022	6.3	-1.3	-0.5	-5.0	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.5

Table 2.4 Social distance from Jews: circle of friends (per cent)

To what extent would you like or dislike having Jews in your circle of friends?								
Sample	Would like it	Wouldn't mind it	Don't know	No response	Would dislike it a little	Would dislike it a lot	Total	A little + A lot
Population 2011	13.9	72.8	3.4	0.0	6.4	3.4	100.0	9.8
Population 2017	17.9	70.5	4.3	0.3	5.0	2.0	100.0	7.0
Population 2022	19.8	69.5	4.9	0.7	4.0	1.1	100.0	5.1
Change 2011-2022	5.9	-3.4	1.5	0.7	-2.4	-2.3	0.0	-4.7
Muslims 2017	23.6	55.8	7.8	1.6	5.3	5.9	100.0	11.2
Muslims 2022	30.0	54.5	7.2	1.9	3.4	3.1	100.0	6.4
Change 2017-2022	6.4	-1.3	-0.6	0.2	-1.9	-2.8	0.0	-4.7
Others 2017	21.9	60.4	6.0	6.7	3.8	1.2	100.0	5.1
Others 2022	32.1	55.8	5.7	3.4	1.6	1.4	100.0	3.0
Change 2017-2022	10.2	-4.6	-0.2	-3.3	-2.3	0.2	0.0	-2.1
Youth 2022	26.6	62.3	2.4	3.5	2.6	2.5	100.0	5.2

Compared with 2011, the results for the population sample show a decrease of 5 percentage points in the proportion of respondents expressing that they would “dislike it a little” or “dislike it a lot” to have Jews as neighbours to 6 per cent in 2022. Correspondingly, the proportion of respondents that would dislike having Jews in their circle of friends decreased by 5 percentage points, from 10 per cent in 2011 to 5 per cent in 2022.

A decrease in the proportion of respondents expressing a dislike for social contact with Jews was also measured in the Muslim sample; while 9 per cent would dislike having Jews as neighbours in 2017, the corresponding proportion in 2022 is 6 per cent. In 2017, 11 per cent of respondents in the Muslim sample were

negative towards having Jews in their circle of friends, while in 2022 we measured 6 per cent.

**PREJUDICE AGAINST JEWS**

The prevalence of prejudice against Jews (stereotypes) was surveyed by asking respondents in the population sample and the Muslim sample for their views about a series of statements. This method is widely used internationally for mapping antisemitism. The statements reproduced variations on notions about Jews that have been repeated throughout history. All the statements were expressions of generalised conceptions. The question was also asked of the population sample in 2011 and 2017 and of the Muslim sample in 2017.

Table 2.5 Prejudice against Jews (per cent)

How well do these statements fit with your own views?	Sample	Not at all	Rather badly	Impossible to answer	No response	Rather well	Completely	Total	Rather well + Completely
Jews are more intelligent than others	Population 2011	29.8	20.4	40.5	No	8.2	1.1	100.0	9.4
	Population 2017	32.1	23.1	36.1	0.2	7.2	1.3	100.0	8.5
	Population 2022	33.5	22.8	32.7	1.2	7.7	2.1	100.0	9.8
	Change 2011-2022	3.7	2.4	-7.7	1.0	-0.5	0.9	0.0	0.4
	Muslims 2017	27.2	10.4	38.5	4.8	14.3	4.8	100.0	19.1
	Muslims 2022	33.7	8.1	38.1	3.6	11.2	5.3	100.0	16.5
	Change 2017-2022	6.5	-2.3	-0.4	-1.2	-3.1	0.5	0.0	-2.6
Jews are artistically gifted	Population 2011	11.9	16.8	51.9	0.1	16.9	2.3	100.0	19.2
	Population 2017	12.3	18.3	55.3	0.1	12.1	1.9	100.0	14.0
	Population 2022	17.7	14.9	50.1	1.4	13.6	2.3	100.0	15.9
	Change 2011-2022	5.7	-1.8	-1.8	1.3	-3.3	-0.1	0.0	-3.4
	Muslims 2017	12.4	8.3	56.0	6.6	9.5	7.3	100.0	16.7
	Muslims 2022	13.7	6.9	60.1	3.8	10.6	4.9	100.0	15.5
	Change 2017-2022	1.3	-1.5	4.2	-2.8	1.1	-2.3	0.0	-1.2
Jews have always caused problems in the countries in which they live	Population 2011	27.2	30.3	27.7	0.2	11.2	3.4	100.0	14.6
	Population 2017	31.0	31.2	29.1	0.3	6.0	2.3	100.0	8.3
	Population 2022	37.9	27.3	24.3	0.9	7.5	2.1	100.0	9.6
	Change 2011-2022	10.7	-3.0	-3.4	0.7	-3.7	-1.3	0.0	-5.0
	Muslims 2017	23.4	15.5	39.6	5.9	9.7	5.9	100.0	15.6
	Muslims 2022	30.1	13.3	35.9	3.6	9.1	7.9	100.0	17.0
	Change 2017-2022	6.7	-2.1	-3.7	-2.2	-0.6	2.0	0.0	1.4

How well do these statements fit with your own views?	Sample	Not at all	Rather badly	Impossible to answer	No response	Rather well	Completely	Total	Rather well + Completely
Jews have far too much influence on US foreign policy	Population 2011	10.2	17.3	34.1	0.1	24.6	13.6	100.0	38.2
	Population 2017	13.2	17.8	40.3	0.3	21.8	6.7	100.0	28.5
	Population 2022	16.3	16.3	39.6	1.1	19.5	7.1	100.0	26.6
	Change 2011-2022	6.1	-1.0	5.5	1.0	-5.1	-6.5	0.0	-11.6
	Muslims 2017	3.0	3.9	39.1	5.4	21.0	27.5	100.0	48.6
	Muslims 2022	6.3	3.4	31.4	3.7	26.9	28.3	100.0	55.3
	Change 2017-2022	3.3	-0.5	-7.7	-1.8	5.9	0.8	0.0	6.7
Jews have far too much influence on the global economy	Population 2011	17.1	24.5	37.3	0.2	16.4	4.4	100.0	20.9
	Population 2017	19.8	26.0	41.1	0.3	9.7	3.1	100.0	12.8
	Population 2022	25.7	20.7	37.7	1.6	10.6	3.7	100.0	14.3
	Change 2011-2022	8.6	-3.8	0.4	1.4	-5.8	-0.8	0.0	-6.6
	Muslims 2017	4.4	4.7	42.0	6.5	21.1	21.1	100.0	42.3
	Muslims 2022	10.5	7.5	35.3	3.3	21.6	21.7	100.0	43.3
	Change 2017-2022	6.1	2.8	-6.7	-3.2	0.5	0.6	0.0	1.0
Jews have enriched themselves at the expense of others	Population 2011	22.2	28.1	34.9	0.2	11.8	2.8	100.0	14.6
	Population 2017	23.1	28.6	36.5	0.2	9.0	2.6	100.0	11.6
	Population 2022	28.7	24.6	33.5	1.2	8.5	3.5	100.0	11.9
	Change 2011-2022	6.5	-3.5	-1.3	1.0	-3.3	0.7	0.0	-2.7
	Muslims 2017	12.9	10.4	45.5	5.9	12.8	12.7	100.0	25.4
	Muslims 2022	17.7	12.1	39.8	4.3	13.5	12.6	100.0	26.0
	Change 2017-2022	4.8	1.8	-5.6	-1.6	0.7	-0.1	0.0	0.6
Jews have themselves to blame for being persecuted	Population 2011	38.6	27.1	21.7	No	10.3	2.3	100.0	12.6
	Population 2017	39.4	30.5	21.6	0.4	6.4	1.7	100.0	8.2
	Population 2022	44.5	25.4	20.9	1.2	6.1	1.9	100.0	8.0
	Change 2011-2022	5.9	-1.7	-0.8	0.8	-4.2	-0.4	0.0	-4.6
	Muslims 2017	25.7	11.7	39.9	6.1	9.4	7.2	100.0	16.6
	Muslims 2022	33.5	12.3	38.4	3.5	5.7	6.6	100.0	12.3
	Change 2017-2022	7.8	0.6	-1.5	-2.5	-3.7	-0.6	0.0	-4.3
Jews consider themselves to be better than others	Population 2011	15.8	21.6	36.1	0.2	19.9	6.4	100.0	26.3
	Population 2017	20.0	23.7	38.2	0.2	13.6	4.3	100.0	17.9
	Population 2022	22.8	24.0	34.3	1.2	13.2	4.6	100.0	17.8
	Change 2011-2022	7.0	2.4	-1.8	1.0	-6.7	-1.8	0.0	-8.6
	Muslims 2017	10.2	8.4	42.1	6.2	18.1	15.0	100.0	33.1
	Muslims 2022	13.9	7.2	42.0	4.2	16.8	15.8	100.0	32.6
	Change 2017-2022	3.7	-1.2	-0.2	-1.9	-1.3	0.8	0.0	-0.5

How well do these statements fit with your own views?	Sample	Not at all	Rather badly	Impossible to answer	No response	Rather well	Completely	Total	Rather well + Completely
World Jewry is working behind the scenes to promote Jewish interests	Population 2011	17.4	20.7	42.8	0.1	15.2	3.9	100.0	19.0
	Population 2017	20.9	21.2	44.6	0.2	9.6	3.5	100.0	13.1
	Population 2022	25.7	19.6	39.1	1.9	10.9	2.9	100.0	13.8
	Change 2011-2022	8.2	-1.1	-3.7	1.8	-4.3	-0.9	0.0	-5.2
	Muslims 2017	9.1	8.1	48.7	5.8	15.1	13.2	100.0	28.4
	Muslims 2022	13.0	8.3	43.6	5.1	14.0	16.0	100.0	30.0
	Change 2017-2022	3.9	0.3	-5.1	-0.7	-1.2	2.8	0.0	1.6

The results show a high level of stability in the support expressed for the statements in both samples between 2017 and 2022. Overall, the population sample shows a marked decrease in prevalence of stereotypes compared with 2011. However, support for certain statements remains relatively strong, and in some cases stronger than in 2017. The stereotypes that remain relatively prevalent are those associated with Jewish international and economic power. For example, 14 per cent of respondents in the population sample support the statement “World Jewry is working behind the scenes to promote Jewish interests” (13 per cent in 2017). This support is even more evident in the Muslim sample (30 per cent, compared with 28 per cent in 2017). The related statement, “Jews have far too much influence on the global economy”, is also supported by 14 per cent of the population sample, but clearly has more support among the Muslim respondents (43 per cent). Both of these statement express ideas that date far back in the history of antisemitism.

In all three surveys (2011, 2017 and 2022), the statement “Jews have themselves to blame for being persecuted” has had least support in the population sample (8 per cent in 2017 and 2022). This statement also has least support in the Muslim sample (12 per cent), and markedly less support than in 2017 (when 17 per cent of the Muslim sample supported it). 10 per cent of the population sample support the statement “Jews have always caused problems in the countries

in which they live” (8 per cent in 2017). Seventeen per cent of the Muslim sample support this statement in 2022 (16 per cent in 2017). The fact that, compared with the other statements, the Muslim sample shows relatively little support for statements that put the blame for antisemitism on the Jews may be interpreted as an expression of shared minority experiences and recognition of prejudice mechanisms which also affect Muslims. On the other hand, statements dealing with Jewish world power have relatively strong support in this sample. A similar tendency was also found in 2017 (Hoffmann & Moe, 2017, pp. 36–38). A reasonable interpretation of this result is that it shows how the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has significance for attitudes among Muslims (see also section 3.2).

As shown in the tables, a relatively large proportion of both the population sample and the Muslim sample either refrained from answering or selected “Impossible to answer”. This response pattern may indicate that the respondents found the question difficult to understand or form an opinion on. It may also be a way of conveying that the type of generalisations implied in the statements is not meaningful. Another interpretation of why respondents choose this response category is that they do not want to express views that break with social norms. This phenomenon makes up a key element in the theory of antisemitism’s “communication latency” (Bergmann & Erb, 1986; see also Hoffmann & Moe, 2020).

In Europe, antisemitism has historically served as an explanatory model in times of crisis and in step with political, economic and social unrest. The Jews have historically been blamed for numerous problems, including pandemics such as the Black Death. During the COVID-19 pandemic, notions positing that Jews were behind the pandemic were spread in social media and other public arenas worldwide.<sup>7</sup> The relatively stable results in the present survey indicate that such ideas have had little influence on attitudes in Norway. The fact that we also find no decrease in the population sample regarding prevalence of prejudice against Jews as we did for the other two attitude dimensions between 2017 and 2022 can perhaps be taken to suggest that the crisis has nonetheless had some effect on the cognitive dimension of attitudes.

#### VIEWS ABOUT HARASSMENT AND VIOLENCE AGAINST JEWS

The respondents were also asked for their views about antisemitic acts in the form of violence and harassment against Jews in Europe. The respondents were asked for their views about a series of statements. These questions were also asked of the population sample and the Muslim sample in 2017.

The introduction to the question was as follows: It has been reported in the news that Jews have been subjected to violence and harassment in Europe. How well do these statements fit with your own views?

Table 2.6 Views about harassment and violence against Jews (per cent)

	Sample	Not at all	Rather badly	Impossible to answer	No response	Rather well	Completely	Total	Completely + Rather well
Harassment and violence against Jews concern everyone and constitute an attack on our society	Population 2017	1.4	6.1	16.4	0.0	37.5	38.6	100.0	76.1
	Population 2022	1.8	4.8	13.8	2.2	36.0	41.5	100.0	77.5
	Change	0.4	-1.3	-2.7	2.2	-1.6	3.0	0.0	1.4
	Muslims 2017	7.9	6.1	33.4	5.3	17.9	29.3	100.0	47.3
	Muslims 2022	6.4	4.7	23.7	5.9	17.2	42.2	100.0	59.3
Change	-1.5	-1.4	-9.7	0.6	-0.8	12.9	0.0	12.1	
Harassment of and violence against Jews has become a serious problem in Europe	Population 2017	2.7	17.4	31.2	0.2	37.8	10.8	100.0	48.6
	Population 2022	2.9	12.8	30.9	2.0	38.1	13.4	100.0	51.5
	Change	0.2	-4.6	-0.2	1.7	0.4	2.6	0.0	2.9
	Muslims 2017	12.5	14.9	38.5	6.3	15.6	12.2	100.0	27.8
	Muslims 2022	11.2	14.4	36.8	7.4	17.6	12.8	100.0	30.4
Change	-1.4	-0.5	-1.7	1.1	2.0	0.6	0.0	2.6	

7 For a survey of antisemitism during the pandemic, see for example the overview published by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) in 2021: Antisemitism: Overview of Antisemitic Incidents in the European Union 2010-2020 [https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra\\_uploads/fra-2021-antisemitism-overview-2010-2020\\_en.pdf](https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2021-antisemitism-overview-2010-2020_en.pdf). A report from the European Commission in 2021 analyses the influence of the pandemic on antisemitic hate speech online in France and Germany. See: The Rise of Antisemitism Online During the Pandemic: A study of French and German Content <https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/the-rise-of-antisemitism-during-the-pandemic.pdf>

	Sample	Not at all	Rather badly	Impossible to answer	No response	Rather well	Completely	Total	Completely + Rather well
Considering how Israel treats the Palestinians, harassment and violence against Jews are justifiable	Population 2017	39.7	23.3	25.1	0.2	9.7	2.0	100.0	11.7
	Population 2022	41.4	22.4	24.2	2.1	7.5	2.4	100.0	9.9
	Change	1.7	-0.9	-0.9	1.9	-2.2	0.4	0.0	-1.8
	Muslims 2017	28.9	12.9	33.2	4.7	12.6	7.8	100.0	20.4
	Muslims 2022	38.8	13.1	25.4	5.7	8.7	8.3	100.0	17.0
	Change	9.9	0.2	-7.8	1.0	-3.9	0.5	0.0	-3.3
Violence against Jews is the act of extremists, and says nothing about the general situation in Europe	Population 2017	2.7	15.2	28.3	0.1	40.3	13.5	100.0	53.8
	Population 2022	4.4	17.5	27.9	1.8	36.5	11.9	100.0	48.4
	Change	1.7	2.3	-0.4	1.7	-3.8	-1.6	0.0	-5.4
	Muslims 2017	8.2	6.7	42.5	5.2	19.1	18.3	100.0	37.4
	Muslims 2022	7.6	7.3	38.0	6.6	21.6	18.9	100.0	40.6
Change	-0.6	0.6	-4.5	1.4	2.6	0.6	0.0	3.1	
Muslim leaders must do more to combat antisemitism in their local communities	Population 2017	1.2	3.4	25.9	0.1	38.4	31.0	100.0	69.4
	Population 2022	1.4	3.0	25.3	1.5	37.6	31.2	100.0	68.8
	Change	0.2	-0.4	-0.7	1.4	-0.8	0.2	0.0	-0.6
	Muslims 2017	10.1	9.0	35.3	5.4	19.5	20.8	100.0	40.3
	Muslims 2022	12.1	10.2	26.9	5.6	23.0	22.2	100.0	45.2
Change	2.0	1.2	-8.4	0.2	3.6	1.4	0.0	5.0	

The results show a high degree of stability in the respondents' views, especially in the population sample. The first statement, "Harassment and violence against Jews concern everyone and constitute an attack on our society", is supported by 78 per cent of the population sample. This is almost the same as in 2017 (76 per cent). The results for the Muslim sample show less support than in the population sample, but a marked increase nonetheless, from 47 per cent in 2017 to 59 per cent in 2022. Half of the population sample (52 per cent) and one-third of the Muslim sample (30 per cent) believe

that harassment of and violence against Jews has become a serious problem in Europe. These results are similar to those from the 2017 survey.

A link to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is implied in the statement "Considering how Israel treats the Palestinians, harassment and violence against Jews are justifiable". In 2017, 12 per cent of the population sample and 20 per cent of the Muslim sample supported this statement.

Table 2.7 Knowledge about the Holocaust (per cent)

	Sample	Yes	Not sure	No response	No	Total
Have you heard about the Holocaust?	Population 2017	95.7	1.9	0.3	2.2	100.0
	Population 2022	96.2	1.8	0.0	2.1	100.0
	Muslims 2017	63.7	8.3	2.5	25.6	100.0
	Muslims 2022	77.7	5.9	0.0	16.5	100.0
	Youth 2022	95.1	1.1	0.0	3.8	100.0

The results for 2022 show a slight decrease in both samples, to 10 per cent in the population sample and 17 per cent in the Muslim sample. The Muslim sample shows a marked increase (10 percentage points) in the proportion of respondents that reject such a link. Support for the statement in both samples can still be said to be relatively strong, given its content, which dealt with justifying the use of violence.

Approximately half of respondents in the population sample (48 per cent) believe that violence against Jews is largely the act of extremists and said nothing about the general situation in Europe (a decrease from 54 per cent in 2017). Forty-one per cent of the Muslim sample support this statement. The fact that Muslim respondents view such antisemitic acts as a more general problem (rather than the acts of extremists)

Table 2.8 Holocaust in relation to Jews (per cent)

How well do these statements about Jews and the Holocaust fit with your own views?	Sample	Not at all	Rather badly	Impossible to answer	No response	Rather well	Completely	Total	Completely + Rather well
Jews exploit Holocaust victimhood for their own purposes	Pop. 2011	13.2	31.8	30.3	0.4	18.8	5.5	100.0	24.3
	Pop. 2017	20.2	29.6	27.7	0.1	16.8	5.6	100.0	22.4
	Pop. 2022	28.2	27.9	25.1	0.8	12.5	5.4	100.0	18.0
	Jews 2017	73.8	16.5	4.3	2.4	2.4	0.6	100.0	3.0
	Jews 2022	74.6	17.2	3.7	0.7	3.7	0.0	100.0	3.7
	Muslims 2017	10.1	12.5	33.8	13.8	15.9	13.8	100.0	29.8
Knowledge about the Holocaust is important for preventing the oppression of minorities today <sup>8</sup>	Pop. 2017	0.7	2.5	8.9	0.1	31.4	56.4	100.0	87.8
	Pop. 2022	1.0	2.2	7.7	0.5	24.0	64.5	100.0	88.5
	Jews 2017	1.2	0.6	1.2	3.0	16.5	77.4	100.0	93.9
	Jews 2022	0.0	0.7	0.7	0.7	10.4	87.3	100.0	97.8
	Muslims 2017	3.6	4.0	21.9	13.9	19.8	36.7	100.0	56.5
	Muslims 2022	3.3	4.7	17.5	2.8	23.3	48.3	100.0	71.6
Because of the Holocaust, Jews today are entitled to their own state where they can seek protection from persecution	Pop. 2011	19.7	24.2	30.0	0.3	18.7	7.2	100.0	25.9
	Pop. 2017	13.2	17.9	35.5	0.1	22.9	10.4	100.0	33.3
	Pop. 2022	11.7	15.9	34.1	1.2	23.2	13.8	100.0	37.0
	Jews 2017	6.7	17.1	14.6	2.4	19.5	39.6	100.0	59.1
	Jews 2022	7.5	11.3	6.0	2.3	21.8	51.1	100.0	72.9
	Muslims 2017	11.9	10.9	33.7	13.5	16.3	13.6	100.0	30.0
It is important that all pupils learn about the Holocaust in school	Muslims 2022	18.5	11.5	36.9	2.7	16.7	13.8	100.0	30.5
	Youth 2022	9.8	12.7	28.6	1.6	28.0	19.3	100.0	47.3
Youth 2022	Youth 2022	0.8	1.0	1.0	1.0	11.7	84.5	100.0	96.2

8 This statement was introduced in the 2017 survey.

is also reflected in the stronger support shown for the statement “Muslim leaders must do more to combat antisemitism in their local communities” in 2022. This statement was supported by 40 per cent in 2017, while in 2022 it is supported by 45 per cent. Even more respondents in the population sample support such increased efforts from Muslim leaders; 69 per cent in both the 2017 and the 2022 surveys.

#### THE HOLOCAUST AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS JEWS

Respondents in the population sample, the youth sample and the Muslim sample were asked whether they had heard about the Holocaust. This question was also asked of the population sample and the Muslim sample in 2017. Respondents who either confirmed this or were unsure were also asked for their views about a series of statements dealing with three different aspects and possible interpretations of the historical significance of the Holocaust.

The statements shed light on the extent to which attitudes towards Jews are influenced by the historical experience of the genocide. The Jewish sample was also asked for their views about the list of statements. The youth sample was only asked the final question, which deals with the relevance of Holocaust education in schools.

The results (see Table 2.7) show that almost all respondents in the population and youth samples have heard about the Holocaust (96 per cent and 95 per cent, respectively). The corresponding proportion of the Muslim sample was smaller, though here, too, a clear majority answered “yes” to this question (78 per cent). There has also been a marked increase in the proportion of Muslim respondents that has heard about the Holocaust (from 64 per cent in 2017).

The statement that draws most support from all samples is: “Knowledge about the Holocaust is important for preventing the oppression of minorities today” (see Table 2.8). Between 72 per cent (Muslims)

and 98 per cent (Jews) of respondents support this statement. The related statement “It is important that all pupils learn about the Holocaust in school” is supported by 96 per cent of respondents in the youth sample. We can therefore say that a large majority of all the samples see the relevance of knowledge about the Holocaust.

Although support for the statement “Jews exploit Holocaust victimhood for their own purposes” is decreasing in the population sample, 18 per cent respond that the statement fits “completely” or “rather well”. This is on the same level as the average in other European countries but slightly higher than in countries such as Sweden, the United Kingdom and The Netherlands (see Kovács & Fischer, 2021). More Muslims support this statement in 2022 (36 per cent) than in 2017 (30 per cent). Almost no one in the Jewish sample agreed that Jews exploit the Holocaust.

A link is drawn between the Holocaust and Jews’ right to their own state in the final statement: “Because of the Holocaust, Jews are entitled to their own state where they can seek protection from persecution”. Almost three in four (73 per cent) of the Jewish sample support this statement, as does approximately half of the youth sample (47 per cent). Support for this statement is far weaker in the population and Muslim samples, at 37 per cent and 31 per cent, respectively. Support in the population sample has been increasing since 2011.

#### INDICES OF ANTISEMITISM

Determining the prevalence of negative attitudes in a population is complicated for several reasons. Attitudes are in themselves complex phenomena, and measuring them using a questionnaire is no easy task. The distribution of responses to different questions will depend not only on the subject matter but also on the wording and the response options provided. It is therefore expedient to use multiple questions with varied content and form, and to analyse the overall



pattern in the responses. In the same way as in 2011 and 2017, we therefore constructed indices of each of the three dimensions of attitudes being measured and then combined them in a combined index. The indices combined multiple questions with related content. Using multiple questions provides more reliable measurements because it reduces the significance of random errors. It also produces more valid measurements of complex features that cannot be captured in a single question.

Although some uncertainty will be attached to measuring the level of antisemitism in each year since this will depend on how the measuring instrument is designed, less uncertainty will be attached to measuring changes at this level given that the surveys are the same over time.

Compared with the 2011 survey, all three dimensions of attitudes in 2022 show a decrease in prevalence in the population sample. Moreover, the population sample shows significant decreases between 2017 and 2022 for the indices measuring social distance and dislike. The Muslim sample shows a significant decrease since 2017 in prevalence of social distance from Jews. According to the indices, prejudices (stereotypes) are more prevalent than social distance from and dislike of Jews. This is particularly evident in the results for the Muslim sample.

### INDEX OF PREJUDICE AGAINST JEWS

The index of prejudice against Jews (stereotypes) was constructed in such a way that 1 point was assigned for the response “Rather well” and 2 points for the response “Completely”. When the scores for the six statements were added up, it produced an index with scores ranging from 0 to 12 points. The threshold between “high” and “low” values when the index was dichotomised was set between 3 and 4 points.

The following six statements made up the index: “Jews consider themselves to be better than others”; “Jews have far too much influence on the global economy”; “World Jewry is working behind the scenes to promote Jewish interests”; “Jews have always caused problems in the countries in which they live”; “Jews have enriched themselves at the expense of others”; and “Jews largely have themselves to blame for being persecuted”. All the statements are variations on well-known antisemitic accusations with a long history in Europe.

The results show a high degree of stability between 2017 and 2022. As in the two previous surveys, the results in 2022 show large proportions for the lowest score (0). This indicates that most of the respondents consider none of the six statements to fit with their own views. As can be seen from Table 2.9, this applies to 55 per cent of the population sample in 2011 and to 69 per

Table 2.9 Index of prejudice against Jews (per cent)

Index of prejudice against Jews						
Sample	0 None	Low 1-3	4-6	7-9	10-12	High 4-12
Population 2011	55.0	32.9	7.4	3.3	1.3	12.1
Population 2017	69.2	22.5	5.0	1.9	1.4	8.3
Population 2022	69.2	21.6	5.7	2.2	1.3	9.3
Change 2011-2022	14.1	-11.3	-1.7	-1.1	0.0	-2.8
Muslims 2017	46.0	25.1	18.2	5.9	4.8	28.9
Muslims 2022	44.3	28.9	13.3	8.3	5.2	26.8
Change 2017-2022	-1.7	3.8	-4.9	2.5	0.4	-2.1
Others 2017	56.0	29.1	11.4	2.3	1.1	14.9
Others 2022	56.2	31.6	8.3	3.1	0.8	12.2
Change 2017-2022	0.1	2.5	-3.2	0.9	-0.4	-2.7

cent in 2017 and 2022, representing an increase of as much as 14 percentage points. Using this method of analysis, 9.3 per cent of the population sample is shown to have high scores and thus to hold marked prejudices against Jews in 2022 compared with 8.3 per cent in 2017 and 12.1 per cent in 2011. The slight increase is not significant (can be attributed to random differences between the samples).

The three indices of attitudes towards Jews were also used to analyse the results for antisemitic attitudes in the sample with Muslim and non-Muslim immigrants (“Others”). Prejudices are most prevalent in the Muslim samples in both 2017 and 2022. The index of prejudice shows quite stable results for the proportion with high scores in the Muslim sample. In 2022, 26.8 per cent of this sample show marked prejudices against Jews (28.9 per cent in 2017). The corresponding proportion for non-Muslim immigrants (“Others”) is 12.2 per cent (14.9 per cent in 2017).

**INDEX OF SOCIAL DISTANCE FROM JEWS**

The index of social distance was constructed using a scale from 0 to 4 points, in the same way as in 2011 and 2017. Both questions dealing with contact were assigned 1 point for “would dislike it a little” and 2 points for “would dislike it a lot”. The threshold for a high score was set

between 1 and 2 points, meaning that each respondent must at least dislike both types of relationship “a little” or one of them “a lot” in order to be assigned this score.

The analysis clearly shows that the largest proportions have the lowest score of 0. In 2022, the score for over 90 per cent of all the samples is 0.

By comparison, few respondents in 2022 score between 2 and 4 points and thereby score high on social distance. This applied to 3.9 per cent of the population sample, 5.7 of the Muslim sample and less than 3 per cent of the sample with “Others”. The corresponding results for the population sample were 5.9 per cent in 2017 and 8.5 per cent in 2011. In other words, there has been a steady decrease in prevalence of social distance from Jews during these years.

The index also shows a marked decrease in the Muslim sample in the past five years, from 9.9 in 2017. The result for social distance from Jews is thus the same for Muslims in 2022 and for the general population in 2017. If we compare the results from 2017 and 2022, only the change in social distance is significant for the Muslim sample.

**INDEX OF DISLIKE OF JEWS**

The index of dislike was constructed with a scale from 0 to 2 points where the statement on dislike formed the

Table 2.10 Index of social distance from Jews (per cent)

Index of social distance from Jews						
Sample	None 0	Low 1	2	3	High 4	High 2-4
Population 2011	88.0	3.5	5.0	0.6	2.9	8.5
Population 2017	91.6	2.5	4.0	0.3	1.6	5.9
Population 2022	92.9	3.2	2.5	0.5	0.9	3.9
Change 2011-2022	5.0	-0.3	-2.5	-0.1	-2.1	-4.6
Muslims 2017	87.9	2.2	5.2	0.7	3.9	9.9
Muslims 2022	92.3	2.0	3.6	0.4	1.7	5.7
Change 2017-2022	4.3	-0.2	-1.6	-0.3	-2.3	-4.1
Others 2017	97.3	1.2	0.8	0.0	0.7	1.5
Others 2022	95.4	2.1	1.8	0.0	0.8	2.6
Change 2017-2022	-1.9	0.9	0.9	0.0	0.1	1.1

Table 2.11 Index of dislike of Jews (per cent)

Index of dislike of Jews				
Sample	0 None	1 Low	2 High	High 1-2
Population 2011	90.2	8.4	1.5	9.8
Population 2017	93.3	5.2	1.5	6.7
Population 2022	95.3	3.9	0.8	4.7
Change 2011-2022	5.2	-4.5	-0.7	-5.2
Muslims 2017	95.3	3.9	0.8	4.7
Muslims 2022	95.1	3.7	1.2	4.9
Change 2017-2022	-0.2	-0.2	0.4	0.2
Others 2017	97.8	1.5	0.7	2.2
Others 2022	97.7	1.3	0.9	2.3
Change 2017-2022	0.0	-0.2	0.2	0.0
Youth 2022	96.8	1.9	1.2	3.2

starting point and the question on sympathy was used to adjust the score. The threshold for a high score was set between 0 and 1. Two points were assigned for the response “completely”, 1 point for “rather well” and 0 points for other responses (and, moreover, 0 points for all respondents expressing a particular sympathy for Jews).

We assigned 0 points to respondents who scored high on both dislike and sympathy, based on the assumption that this score might be due to a measurement error (that one of the questions was incorrectly registered). It is also possible that a high score on both sympathy and dislike was due to genuine emotional ambivalence on the part of the respondent. Our choice of coding means that only consistently negative response patterns were assigned high negative scores.

The index of dislike of Jews also shows a decrease in the proportion of respondents with high scores. While 9.8 per cent of the population sample had high scores in 2011, the corresponding proportion in the latest survey is 4.7 per cent. The index of dislike of Jews shows a high level of stability between 2017 and 2022 in the Muslim sample. In 2022, 4.9 per cent of the Muslim sample score high on dislike of Jews (4.7 per cent in 2017). The youth sample and the sample of “Others” have the smallest proportions with high scores.

There is a higher incidence of ambivalent responses in the Muslim sample than in the population sample; in other words, several respondents expressed having both “a particular sympathy for” and “a certain dislike of” Jews. In the same way as for the analysis of the results in the population sample, these were assigned a score of 0.

#### COMBINED INDEX OF THE THREE DIMENSIONS OF NEGATIVE ATTITUDES TOWARDS JEWS

We combined the three indices of prejudice, social distance and dislike in a separate combined index (for validation of the combined index for antisemitism, see Hoffmann & Moe, 2017, p. 44). The threshold for a high score when the combined index was dichotomised was set between 1 and 2, so that a respondent must have scored high on at least two of the three indices in order to be assigned a high score on the combined index. Consequently, respondents who only score high on one index, for example on the index of prejudice, are not counted among those with high scores on the combined index.

The analysis shows that most respondents rank low on all three indices (with a score of 0). In the population sample, this applies to all the three years in which the

Table 2.12 Combined index of the three dimensions of negative attitudes towards Jews (per cent)

Combined index of antisemitism					
Sample	0 None	1 Low	2	3 High	High 2-3
Population 2011	79.8	12.4	5.3	2.4	7.8
Population 2017	86.7	7.9	3.4	2.1	5.5
Population 2022	88.1	7.4	3.1	1.4	4.5
Change 2017-2022	8.3	-5.1	-2.2	-1.0	-3.3
Muslims 2017	65.5	27.6	4.9	2.0	6.9
Muslims 2022	70.8	23.0	4.3	1.9	6.2
Change 2017-2022	5.3	-4.6	-0.7	0.0	-0.7
Others 2017	84.0	13.5	2.6	0.0	2.6
Others 2022	86.8	9.9	3.0	0.4	3.4
Change 2017-2022	2.8	-3.6	0.4	0.4	0.8

surveys have been conducted, and in 2022 to 88 per cent of the respondents. A large proportion of Muslims (71 per cent) also score 0 on negative attitudes towards Jews in 2022.

Furthermore, the analysis shows that the incidence of antisemitic attitudes in the adult Norwegian population in 2022 is 4.5 per cent. The proportion with high scores in 2022 has decreased by 3.3 percentage points from 7.8 per cent in 2011. The decrease since 2017 is 1 percentage point.

The combined index shows a high level of stability between 2017 and 2022 for the Muslim sample in the proportion with high scores. In 2017, 6.9 per cent of this sample had high scores, while in 2022 the proportion is 6.2 per cent (no significant decrease).

In the sample with “Others”, 3.4 per cent score high on the combined index. The youth sample was not included in this analysis because the respondents did not respond to all the statements on which the combined index was based.

## 2.2 ATTITUDES TOWARDS MUSLIMS

The survey of attitudes towards Muslims followed the same model as the survey of attitudes towards Jews,

and included analyses of social distance, dislike and sympathy, and prevalence of stereotypes. The questions on social distance were already included in 2011, so it was possible to see the trend in the population’s attitudes over a 10-year period. The rest of the survey on attitudes towards Muslims was a repetition of the survey conducted in 2017.

As already mentioned, the relatively large changes in the results for the Jewish sample between 2017 and 2022 may be due to panel effect. Large fluctuations may also be attributed to the relatively small size of the sample.

### SYMPATHY AND ANTIPATHY

In the same way as for the survey of attitudes towards Jews, the respondents were asked about their views about two statements measuring sympathy and dislike: “I have a particular sympathy for Muslims” and “I have a certain dislike of Muslims”. The questions were asked of the population sample and the Jewish sample in 2017 and 2022, and of the youth sample in 2022.

Slightly more respondents in the population sample express sympathy with Muslims in 2022 than in 2017. The proportion supporting the statement “I have a particular sympathy for Muslims” increased from 14 per cent to 16 per cent during that period. Moreover, there are fewer respondents who do not support this

Table 2.13 Sympathy for Muslims (per cent)

How well does this statement fit with your own view: "I have a particular sympathy for Muslims"?							
Sample	Not at all	Rather badly	Impossible to answer	No response	Rather well	Completely	Rather well + Completely
Population 2017	32.3	32.9	20.1	0.3	11.8	2.6	14.4
Population 2022	30.8	32.7	17.9	2.9	13.5	2.2	15.7
Change 2017-2022	-1.5	-0.1	-2.3	2.6	1.7	-0.4	1.3
Jews 2017	22.7	28.2	25.5	0.9	19.1	3.6	22.7
Jews 2022	11.9	23.1	20.1	1.5	28.4	14.9	43.3
Change 2017-2022	-10.8	-5.0	-5.3	0.6	9.3	11.3	20.6
Youth 2022	19.5	14.5	24.2	1.6	28.7	11.5	40.2

Table 2.14 Dislike of Muslims (per cent)

How well does this statement fit with your own view: "I have a certain dislike of Muslims"?							
Sample	Not at all	Rather badly	Impossible to answer	No response	Rather well	Completely	Rather well + Completely
Population 2017	23.1	32.9	13.2	0.3	22.5	7.9	30.4
Population 2022	25.6	35.4	11.2	1.4	20.5	5.9	26.4
Change 2017-2022	2.5	2.5	-2.0	1.1	-2.0	-2.1	-4.0
Jews 2017	25.5	37.3	12.7	3.6	18.2	2.7	20.9
Jews 2022	32.3	41.4	8.3	2.3	12.0	3.8	15.8
Change 2017-2022	6.9	4.1	-4.5	-1.4	-6.2	1.0	-5.1
Youth 2022	56.5	19.4	12.8	1.9	7.1	2.3	9.4

statement in 2022. None of these changes is significant.

Markedly more respondents in the Jewish sample express sympathy in 2022 (43 per cent) than in 2017 (23 per cent). The result for the youth sample is approximately the same: 40 per cent express sympathy with Muslims.

The results show a marked decrease since 2017 in the proportion expressing dislike of Muslims. Whereas 30 per cent of the population sample supported the statement "I have a certain dislike of Muslims" in 2017, the corresponding figure for 2022 has dropped to 26 per cent. At the same time, the results show an increase of 5 percentage points in the proportion of respondents expressing that the statement does not fit with their views.

We measured a decrease in the proportion of respondents in the Jew sample expressing dislike of

Muslims, from 21 per cent in 2017 to 16 per cent in 2022.

Nine per cent of respondents in the youth sample express having a certain dislike of Muslims.

#### SOCIAL DISTANCE FROM MUSLIMS

To measure social distance from Muslims, the respondents were asked about the extent to which they would accept having Muslims as neighbours or in their circle of friends. This question was also asked of the population sample in 2011 and 2017 and of the Jewish sample in 2017. In the 2022 survey, respondents in the youth sample were asked for their views about friendships with Muslims.

The majority of all the samples respond that they would like or wouldn't mind having such contact with Muslims.

During the 10 years that have passed since 2011, the results for the population sample have shown a marked decrease in the proportion that would dislike having social contact with Muslims. This decrease is particularly noticeable in the past five years. The results follow the same pattern we have seen in the previous surveys, with a higher level of scepticism about being neighbours than about being friends. Perhaps this expresses an attitude of “my friends’ friends are my friends”, while having them as neighbours is perceived as being more random.

The proportion of the population sample that would dislike having a Muslim as a neighbour has dropped by 6

percentage points between 2011 and 2022. Nonetheless, just over one fifth (22 per cent) of the population sample remain sceptical. Between 2011 and 2022, the proportion that would dislike (a little or a lot) having Muslims brought into their circle of friends decreased by as much as 8 percentage points. In the Jewish sample, the proportion that is sceptical of having Muslims as neighbours decreased by 10 percentage points (from 20 to 10 per cent), while the proportion that is sceptical of having them as friends decreased by 7 percentage points (to 6 per cent). Nine per cent of the youth sample would dislike having Muslims brought into their circle of friends.

2.15 Social distance from Muslims: neighbours (per cent)

To what extent would you like or dislike having Muslims as neighbours?								
Sample	Would like it	Wouldn't mind it	Don't know	No response	Would dislike it a little	Would dislike it a lot	Total	A little + A lot
Population 2011	6.8	62.6	2.7	0.0	15.3	12.6	100.0	27.8
Population 2017	8.1	61.1	4.7	0.2	15.1	10.9	100.0	26.0
Population 2022	9.1	63.1	4.8	0.6	14.7	7.7	100.0	22.3
Change 2011-2022	2.3	0.6	2.1	0.6	-0.6	-4.9	0.0	-5.5
Jews 2017	13.5	62.4	4.1	0.0	12.4	7.6	100.0	20.0
Jews 2022	17.8	67.4	3.1	1.6	5.4	4.7	100.0	10.1
Change 2017-2022	4.3	5.1	-1.0	1.6	-6.9	-3.0	0.0	-9.9

2.16 Social distance from Muslims: circle of friends (per cent)

To what extent would you like or dislike having Muslims brought into your circle of friends?								
Sample	Would like it	Wouldn't mind it	Don't know	No response	Would dislike it a little	Would dislike it a lot	Total	A little + A lot
Population 2011	9.5	62.7	3.4	0.0	12.8	11.7	100.0	24.5
Population 2017	13.4	59.8	5.4	0.5	11.5	9.4	100.0	21.0
Population 2022	14.8	61.6	6.4	1.1	9.4	6.8	100.0	16.2
Change 2011-2017	5.4	-1.1	3.0	1.1	-3.4	-4.9	0.0	-8.3
Jews 2017	27.6	54.1	4.1	1.2	8.2	4.7	100.0	12.9
Jews 2022	30.2	60.5	2.3	0.8	2.3	3.9	100.0	6.2
Change 2017-2022	2.6	6.3	-1.8	0.4	-5.9	-0.8	0.0	-6.7
Youth 2022	26.8	59.3	1.5	3.3	5.6	3.5	100.0	9.1

The decrease in the proportion that is critical of having social contact with Muslims may reflect a trend where Norwegian Muslims are more visible in the public sphere, and such visibility may make for more nuanced impressions and less general, critical attitudes. The growing presence of immigrants in local communities in Norway also appears to have contributed to more positive attitudes (Hellevik & Hellevik, 2017).

**PREJUDICES AGAINST MUSLIMS**

We asked the respondents for their views about a series of statements dealing with Muslims. The statements reflect well-known Islamophobic stereotypes and ideas. The question was asked of the population sample and the Jewish sample in 2017 and 2022.

Table 2.17 Prejudice against Muslims (per cent)

How well do these statements fit with your own views?	Sample	Not at all	Rather badly	Impossible to answer	No response	Rather well	Completely	Total	Rather well + Completely
Muslims are good Norwegian citizens	Population 2017	6.3	14.8	25.0	0.2	41.7	11.9	100.0	53.6
	Population 2022	4.5	12.6	19.0	1.5	44.5	17.9	100.0	62.4
	Change	-1.9	-2.2	-6.0	1.4	2.8	5.9		8.7
	Jews 2017	2.7	8.2	15.5	1.8	57.3	14.5	100.0	71.8
	Jews 2022	0	7.5	11.9	0.7	45.5	34.3	100.0	79.9
	Change	-2.7	-0.7	-3.5	-1.1	-11.8	19.8		8.0
Muslims are more violent than others	Population 2017	18.0	27.5	25.3	0.3	19.1	9.9	100.0	28.9
	Population 2022	22.2	27.5	23.6	1.3	15.9	9.6	100.0	25.6
	Change	4.1	0.0	-1.7	1.0	-3.1	-0.3		-3.4
	Jews 2017	20.0	31.8	16.4	6.4	18.2	7.3	100.0	25.5
	Jews 2022	27.1	34.6	22.6	1.5	9.0	5.3	100.0	14.3
	Change	7.1	2.8	6.2	-4.9	-9.2	-2.0		-11.2
Muslims largely have themselves to blame for the increase in anti-Muslim harassment	Population 2017	10.8	22.6	19.0	0.2	30.9	16.5	100.0	47.4
	Population 2022	13.3	25.3	15.7	1.5	30.1	14.0	100.0	44.1
	Change	2.5	2.7	-3.3	1.4	-0.7	-2.5		-3.3
	Jews 2017	14.5	36.4	10.0	5.5	25.5	8.2	100.0	33.6
	Jews 2022	24.8	33.8	15.0	2.3	22.6	1.5	100.0	24.1
	Change	10.3	-2.5	5.0	-3.2	-2.9	-6.7		-9.6
Muslims do not fit into modern Western society	Population 2017	14.4	31.8	17.3	0.1	23.2	13.2	100.0	36.4
	Population 2022	18.3	31.5	15.7	1.5	22.8	10.2	100.0	33.0
	Change	3.9	-0.3	-1.6	1.4	-0.4	-3.0		-3.3
	Jews 2017	25.5	39.1	11.8	2.7	15.5	5.5	100.0	20.9
	Jews 2022	38.1	32.8	17.9	0.7	7.5	3.0	100.0	10.4
	Change	12.6	-6.3	6.1	-2.0	-8.0	-2.5		-10.5

How well do these statements fit with your own views?	Sample	Not at all	Rather badly	Impossible to answer	No response	Rather well	Completely	Total	Rather well + Completely
Muslims consider themselves morally superior to others	Population 2017	9.7	16.6	28.4	0.2	27.6	17.5	100.0	45.1
	Population 2022	11.5	20.4	29.9	1.6	21.7	15.0	100.0	36.6
	Change	1.8	3.8	1.5	1.4	-5.9	-2.6		-8.5
	Jews 2017	10.0	26.4	23.6	4.5	26.4	9.1	100.0	35.5
	Jews 2022	21.2	30.3	27.3	1.5	15.9	3.8	100.0	19.7
	Change	11.2	3.9	3.6	-3.0	-10.5	-5.3		-15.8
Muslims oppress women	Population 2017	2.1	13.6	15.2	0.1	41.2	27.9	100.0	69.1
	Population 2022	2.0	14.5	14.6	1.5	43.0	24.4	100.0	67.4
	Change	-0.1	0.9	-0.6	1.5	1.8	-3.5		-1.7
	Jews 2017	0.9	17.3	19.1	2.7	40.0	20.0	100.0	60.0
	Jews 2022	6.0	28.6	16.5	2.3	37.6	9.0	100.0	46.6
	Change	5.1	11.3	-2.5	-0.5	-2.4	-11.0		-13.4
Muslims pose a threat to Norwegian culture	Population 2017	15.8	30.0	14.7	0.1	24.5	14.8	100.0	39.4
	Population 2022	21.3	32.1	12.1	1.5	21.1	11.9	100.0	33.0
	Change	5.5	2.1	-2.6	1.4	-3.5	-2.9		-6.4
	Jews 2017	22.7	40.9	9.1	5.5	16.4	5.5	100.0	21.8
	Jews 2022	33.8	37.6	10.5	1.5	12.0	4.5	100.0	16.5
	Change	11.1	-3.3	1.4	-4.0	-4.3	-0.9		-5.3
Muslims do not want to integrate into Norwegian society	Population 2017	8.4	30.1	19.5	0.0	29.2	12.9	100.0	42.0
	Population 2022	9.5	34.0	15.5	1.4	29.9	9.8	100.0	39.7
	Change	1.1	4.0	-4.1	1.4	0.7	-3.1		-2.4
	Jews 2017	10.9	44.5	14.5	3.6	18.2	8.2	100.0	26.4
	Jews 2022	20.1	43.3	14.2	0.7	19.4	2.2	100.0	21.6
	Change	9.2	-1.3	-0.4	-2.9	1.2	-5.9		-4.7
Muslims want to take over Europe	Population 2017	20.1	23.0	26.4	0.1	16.6	13.7	100.0	30.3
	Population 2022	26.6	23.1	23.8	1.8	15.1	9.5	100.0	24.7
	Change	6.5	0.1	-2.7	1.7	-1.5	-4.2		-5.7
	Jews 2017	30.0	30.9	14.5	3.6	12.7	8.2	100.0	20.9
	Jews 2022	45.9	28.6	14.3	0.8	7.5	3.0	100.0	10.5
	Change	15.9	-2.3	-0.3	-2.9	-5.2	-5.2		-10.4

Overall, the results show less support for all the statements with the exception of the positively worded “Muslims are good Norwegian citizens” (which is supported by 62 per cent of the population sample and by 80 per cent of the Jewish sample, representing a marked increase in both samples). The largest decrease

in the population sample (9 percentage points) is found in the response to the statement “Muslims consider themselves superior to others”. This statement was supported by 45 per cent of the population sample in 2017 and by 37 per cent in 2022. Least support is expressed for the statements “Muslims want to take over



Europe” and “Muslims are more violent than others” (25 per cent and 26 per cent support in 2022, respectively). The proportion supporting the statement “Muslims want to take over Europe” shows a marked decrease (from 30 per cent in 2017). The proportion supporting the statement “Muslims are more violent than others” decreased by 3 percentage points (from 29 per cent in 2017). Nonetheless, a quarter of the population sample considers these statements to fit completely or rather well with their views. The proportion of the Jewish sample supporting the statements is markedly lower than that of the population in general.

The results also show that the statement “Muslims pose a threat to Norwegian culture” receives markedly less support in the population sample, from 39 per cent in 2017 to 33 per cent in 2022. Support for the statement “Muslims do not want to integrate into Norwegian society” in the population sample has decreased slightly, but 40 per cent still considers it to fit “completely” or “rather well” with their own views. Support for these statements in the Jewish sample is also clearly decreasing, and was markedly lower than in the population in general (17 per cent and 22 per cent, respectively).

Two-thirds (67 per cent) of the population sample still believe that Muslims oppress women. The corresponding proportion of the Jewish sample is smaller, though almost half (47 per cent) of the respondents support this statement.

The decrease in the proportion supporting stereotypes of Muslims corresponds with the decrease in the proportion wanting social distance or expressing a dislike of Muslims. This trend may reflect growing public attention in Norway to Islamophobic attitudes as a social problem. The decrease may be due to growing awareness and changing attitudes in the general population or to stronger social control of negative views as a result of such attention. The issue of Islamophobic attitudes has been discussed in the media, not least in the wake of terrorist attacks against Muslims. Statements in our survey reflect notions which, in the wake of such attacks, have become known as Islamophobic ideas. Another factor that may have influenced this trend is international movements such as Black Lives Matter, which has helped highlight racism as a social problem in Norway. A more diverse media industry may also have had a positive influence on attitudes in the population.

**VIEWS ABOUT HARASSMENT AND VIOLENCE AGAINST MUSLIMS**

The respondents were asked for their views about a number of statements dealing with harassment and violence against Muslims. The question was also asked of the population sample and the Jewish sample in 2017. The introduction to the question was as follows: *It has been reported in the news that Muslims have been subjected to violence and harassment in Europe. How well do these statements fit with your own views?*

Table 2.18 Views about harassment and violence against Muslims (per cent)

	Sample	Not at all	Rather badly	Impossible to answer	No response	Rather well	Completely	Completely + Rather well
Harassment and violence against Muslims concern everyone and constitute an attack on our society.	Population 2017	3.1	8.1	14.4	1.8	40.8	31.9	72.7
	Population 2022	3.2	8.5	13.1	2.3	35.8	37.1	72.8
	Change	0.2	0.4	-1.3	0.5	-5.0	5.2	0.2
	Jews 2017	0.6	3.5	2.9	37.6	21.8	33.5	55.3
	Jews 2022	1.5	0.8	3.7	2.2	26.1	65.7	91.8
	Change	0.9	-2.8	0.8	-35.4	4.4	32.1	36.5

	Sample	Not at all	Rather badly	Impossible to answer	No response	Rather well	Completely	Completely + Rather well
Harassment and violence against Muslims show that Islamophobia has become a serious problem in Europe	Population 2017	2.8	9.5	17.5	1.5	50.1	18.7	68.8
	Population 2022	3.4	11.8	19.0	2.3	45.8	17.6	63.5
	Change	0.7	2.3	1.5	0.9	-4.3	-1.1	-5.3
	Jews 2017	2.9	3.5	8.8	38.2	33.5	12.9	46.5
	Jews 2022	2.2	3.0	11.2	3.0	44.0	36.6	80.6
	Change	-0.7	-0.5	2.4	-35.2	10.5	23.6	34.1
Harassment and violence against Muslims are the acts of extremists and say nothing about the general situation in Europe	Population 2017	4.0	20.3	24.2	1.5	39.2	10.7	49.9
	Population 2022	3.7	19.6	25.7	3.0	37.6	10.4	48.1
	Change	-0.3	-0.7	1.4	1.5	-1.6	-0.3	-1.9
	Jews 2017	4.7	20.0	5.3	38.2	24.1	7.7	31.8
	Jews 2022	8.2	35.8	13.4	4.5	32.1	6.0	38.1
	Change	3.5	15.8	8.1	-33.8	8.0	-1.7	6.3
Considering recent terrorist attacks, harassment and violence against Muslims against Muslims are justifiable	Population 2017	46.5	25.7	16.4	1.4	7.3	2.8	10.1
	Population 2022	49.7	21.6	16.1	2.5	7.6	2.6	10.2
	Change	3.2	-4.1	-0.3	1.1	0.3	-0.2	0.1
	Jews 2017	41.8	10.0	4.7	37.6	4.7	1.2	5.9
	Jews 2022	74.6	11.2	6.0	2.2	5.2	0.8	6.0
	Change	32.9	1.2	1.3	-35.4	0.5	-0.4	0.1
Harassment and violence against Muslims would not be a problem if there were fewer Muslim asylum seekers	Population 2017	13.6	22.8	30.2	1.5	23.9	8.1	32.0
	Population 2022	16.5	23.8	29.2	3.0	20.3	7.3	27.6
	Change	2.9	1.0	-1.0	1.5	-3.6	-0.8	-4.4
	Jews 2017	15.9	15.9	10.6	38.2	14.7	4.7	19.4
	Jews 2022	41.0	20.9	14.9	2.2	17.2	3.7	20.9
	Change	25.2	5.0	4.3	-36.0	2.5	-1.0	1.5

The results for the population sample have changed little between 2017 and 2022. A large majority of the population sample (73 per cent) in 2022 believe that violence and harassment against Muslims concern everyone and constitute an attack on our society. This result was identical with that from 2017. The proportion of the Jewish sample is even larger, at 92 per cent in 2022.<sup>9</sup> A slightly smaller proportion of respondents in both samples believe that such attacks show that hate of Muslims has become a serious problem in

Europe, but this statement is also supported by a clear majority (64 per cent of the population sample and 81 per cent of the Jewish sample). At the same time, the results indicate that although the respondents believe the problem is serious, many regard harassment and violence as primarily a problem among people with extreme attitudes; around half of the respondents in the population sample believed in 2017 and in 2022 that such actions are primarily carried out by extremists and therefore say little about the general situation in

9 Due to an error, a large proportion of the Jewish sample was not asked this question in 2017. This is indicated in the column titled "No response" in the table. The results for the change are therefore difficult to interpret.

Europe. Four in 10 respondents (38 per cent) of the Jewish sample believe likewise in 2022.

A minority of respondents believe that violence and harassment against Muslims is justifiable considering recent terrorist attacks (10 per cent of the population sample and 6 per cent of the Jewish sample). This result is similar to that of the 2017 survey and, like the corresponding statement concerning violence against Jews, can be said to be relatively large considering the statement's content.

The final statement attributes harassment and violence against Muslims to large numbers of asylum seekers. The results for 2022 show that 28 per cent of the population sample and 21 per cent of the Jewish sample believe that such actions would not be a problem if there were fewer asylum seekers.

Overall, the results indicate that the respondents viewed anti-Muslim harassment as a serious problem and a threat to society, but that they often attribute this problem to certain groups, namely extremists or large numbers of asylum seekers.

### INDICES OF ISLAMOPHOBIA

The indices of Islamophobia were constructed to correspond with the antisemitism indices and in the same way as in 2017. The identical nature of the questions asked and the indices constructed for measuring social distance and antipathy allow comparison of the results for attitudes towards Jews and Muslims. The index of

prejudice, however, consists of different statements and is more difficult to compare directly.

### INDEX OF PREJUDICE AGAINST MUSLIMS

As for the index of prejudice against Jews, the index of prejudice (stereotypes) against Muslims was constructed with a scale from 0 to 12 points, where 1 point was assigned for the response "rather well" and 2 points was assigned for the response "completely" to the six statements included in the index. The threshold for a high score was set between 3 and 4 points.

We used the following six statements in the index: "Muslims largely have themselves to blame for the increase in anti-Muslim harassment"; "Muslims consider themselves morally superior to others"; "Muslims pose a threat to Norwegian culture"; "Muslims do not fit into modern Western society"; "Muslims want to take over Europe"; and "Muslims are more violent than others".

The analysis shows a decrease in prevalence of stereotypes in the population sample of 3.4 percentage points between 2017 and 2022. During the same period, the proportion that does not support any of the statements has increased by over 6 percentage points to 43.5 per cent. This makes 0 the most common score by far. According to this analysis, almost one-third (30.7 per cent) of the population sample holds marked prejudices against Muslims.

The Jewish sample also shows a decrease in high scores on the prejudice index, from 14.7 per cent in 2017

Table 2.19 Index of prejudice against Muslims (per cent)

Index of prejudice against Muslims						
Sample	0 None	Low 1-3	4-6	7-9	10-12	High 4-12
Population 2017	37.1	28.8	14.8	9.7	9.7	34.1
Population 2022	43.5	25.8	15.7	7.9	7.0	30.7
Change 2011-2022	6.4	-3.0	1.0	-1.7	-2.6	-3.4
Jews 2017	67.6	17.6	8.8	2.9	2.9	14.7
Jews 2022	63.4	25.4	6.7	2.2	2.2	11.2
Change 2017-2022	-4.2	7.7	-2.1	-0.7	-0.7	-3.5

to 11.2 per cent in 2022. The proportion of the Jewish sample that does not support any of the statements and therefore scores 0 shows a decrease (to 63.4 per cent in 2022).

**INDEX OF SOCIAL DISTANCE FROM MUSLIMS**

The index of social distance from Muslims was constructed in the same way as the index of social distance from Jews, with a scale from 0 to 4. Both questions dealing with contact were assigned 1 point for “would dislike it a little” and 2 points for “would dislike it a lot”. The threshold for a high score was set between 1 and 2. The proportion with a high score (2–4) for social distance from Muslims shows a decrease of just over 4 percentage points in the population sample since 2017, from 19.6 per cent to 15.3 per cent. A clear majority of respondents (76 per cent) have the lowest score on the index in 2022. The results also show a marked decrease

(to 6.0 per cent) in the proportion with high scores in the Jewish sample in 2022.

**INDEX OF DISLIKE OF MUSLIMS**

The index of dislike of Muslims was constructed with a scale from 0 to 2, where the threshold for a high score was set between 0 and 1. As with the index of dislike of Jews, we assigned 2 points for the response “completely”, 1 point for “rather well” and 0 points for other responses, including 0 points for the response “completely” or “rather well” to the question on sympathy.

We also assigned 0 points to respondents who scored high on both dislike and sympathy, based on an assumption that such scores might be due to a measurement error.

The results show a decrease in high scores for both the population sample and the Jewish sample. In 2022,

Table 2.20 Index of social distance from Muslims (per cent)

Index of social distance from Muslims						
Sample	None 0	Low 1	2	3	High 4	High 2-4
Population 2011	68.3	9.7	9.2	2.7	10.1	22.0
Population 2017	72.2	8.2	9.1	2.1	8.4	19.6
Population 2022	76.3	8.4	7.6	2.2	5.5	15.3
Change 2011-2022	7.9	-1.3	-1.6	-0.5	-4.6	-4.3
Jews 2017	78.8	7.6	7.1	2.4	4.1	13.5
Jews 2022	90.3	3.7	1.5	0.7	3.7	6.0
Change 2017-2022	11.5	-3.9	-5.6	-1.6	-0.4	-7.6

Table 2.21 Index of dislike of Muslims (per cent)

Index of dislike of Muslims				
Sample	0	1	2	High 1-2
Population 2017	72.3	20.4	7.3	27.7
Population 2022	76.3	18.2	5.5	23.7
Change 2017-2022	4.0	-2.2	-1.8	-4.0
Jews 2017	85.5	12.0	2.4	14.5
Jews 2022	88.1	9.0	3.0	11.9
Change 2017-2022	2.5	-3.1	0.6	-2.5
Youth 2022	93.3	4.8	1.8	6.7

23.7 per cent of the population sample score high on this index compared with 27.7 per cent in 2017. In the Jewish sample, 11.9 per cent score high on dislike of Muslims (14.5 per cent in 2017). The youth sample has the smallest proportion of high scores on the index of dislike (6.7 per cent).

#### COMBINED INDEX OF THE THREE DIMENSIONS OF ATTITUDES TOWARDS MUSLIMS

In the same way as for the analysis of attitudes towards Jews, we combined the three indices of prejudice against, social distance from and dislike of Muslims in a combined index (for validation of the combined index of Islamophobia, see Hoffmann & Moe, 2017, p. 58). The threshold for a high score when the combined index was dichotomised was set between 1 and 2 points, so that a respondent must have scored high on at least two of the three indices in order to be assigned a high score. Thus respondents who scored high on only one of the indices were not assigned a high score on the combined index.

Table 2.22 Combined index of three dimensions of negative attitudes towards Muslims (per cent)

Combined index of Islamophobia					
Sample	0 None	1 Low	2	3 High	High 2-3
Population 2017	59.2	13.8	13.4	13.6	27.0
Population 2022	64.5	15.2	14.2	6.2	20.3
Change 2017-2022	5.4	1.3	0.7	-7.4	-6.7
Jews 2017	74.1	18.2	5.9	1.8	7.6
Jews 2022	82.1	10.4	5.2	2.2	7.5
Change 2017-2022	8.0	-7.8	-0.7	0.5	-0.2

The combined index of negative attitudes towards Muslims shows that 20.3 per cent of the Norwegian population hold what can be described as Islamophobic attitudes, based on their high scores on at least two of the three indices of negative attitudes. This represents a decrease of 6.7 per cent from 2017. In the Jewish sample, 7.5 per cent score high on this index, which is similar to the score in 2017.

### 2.3 PERCEPTIONS OF THE PREVALANCE OF NEGATIVE ATTITUDES TOWARDS JEWS AND MUSLIMS AND THE NEED TO COMBAT THEM

How the scope of negative attitudes is assessed may be important in determining measures to combat these attitudes. In the three years in which this survey has been conducted, we have asked respondents in the population sample for their views about the prevalence of negative attitudes towards Jews and Muslims and whether they see a need to do something to combat such attitudes.

The general population's perception of the situation may also be of great importance for minorities' inclusion and sense of belonging. In 2017 and 2022, we therefore asked how the two minority samples perceived the prevalence of negative attitudes. Perceived changes in attitudes are also important; if a trend is perceived to be moving in the wrong direction, people are more likely

to support measures to combat that trend than if they viewed negative attitudes as something that largely belongs to the past.

#### PERCEPTIONS OF THE PREVALANCE OF NEGATIVE ATTITUDES TOWARDS JEWS

The population sample shows an increase in the proportion of respondents that believe that negative

attitudes towards Jews are prevalent. Whereas in 2017 this proportion was 19 per cent, in 2022 it is 24 per cent. At the same time, there is a decrease in the proportion that believes that the prevalence of such attitudes is low. This trend is more evident in the Jewish sample, which shows an increase in the proportion that believes that negative attitudes are “fairly” or “very” prevalent of as much as 22 percentage points since 2017 (from 59 per cent to 81 per cent) and a halving of the proportion that believes it is “not very prevalent” (from 30 per cent to 15 per cent). Again, the large fluctuations may partly be due to the panel effect or to the relatively small size of the Jewish sample (N = 134). Even relatively minor changes in responses in small samples will influence the combined results. No respondents in this sample believe that negative attitudes towards Jews “are not prevalent at all”. The Muslim sample also shows an increase in the proportion that believes that negative attitudes towards Jews are prevalent, from 10 per cent in 2017 to 16 per cent in 2022. The youth sample responded almost the same as the population sample to this question (23 per cent believe that negative attitudes are prevalent).

The changes may reflect a general increase in the awareness of discriminatory attitudes as a social problem. It may also reflect growing public attention to antisemitism in particular, for example related to antisemitic conspiracy theories in connection with the COVID-19 pandemic. The Norwegian results reflect a trend that has been measured in other European countries, but the difference between the general population in Norway and the Jewish sample was particularly large (see chapter 6 for an international comparison).

Table 2.23 Perceptions of the prevalence of negative attitudes towards Jews (per cent)

How prevalent do you think negative attitudes towards Jews are in Norway today?							
Sample	Very prevalent	Fairly prevalent	Not very prevalent	Not prevalent at all	Impossible to answer	No response	Very + Fairly
Population 2011	1.7	18.7	60.1	6.7	12.7	0.0	20.4
Population 2017	2.4	16.9	58.8	10.1	11.8	0.0	19.3
Population 2022	2.6	20.9	52.1	9.8	14.1	0.4	23.6
Change 2011-2022	0.9	2.2	-8.1	3.1	1.4	0.4	3.1
Jews 2017	11.1	48.1	29.6	0.0	0.0	11.1	59.3
Jews 2022	15.7	65.7	14.9	0.0	3.0	0.7	81.3
Change 2017-2022	4.6	17.5	-14.7	0.0	3.0	-10.4	22.1
Muslims 2017	1.7	8.0	34.3	18.6	37.1	0.4	9.6
Muslims 2022	3.7	11.8	31.7	19.0	32.2	1.6	15.5
Change 2017-2022	2.0	3.8	-2.6	0.4	-4.9	1.2	5.8
Youth 2022	4.9	18.4	56.5	10.1	9.5	0.6	23.3

### PERCEIVED PREVALANCE OF NEGATIVE ATTITUDES TOWARDS MUSLIMS

The general population's perceived prevalence of negative attitudes towards Muslims paints a different picture. The proportion that believes that such attitudes are prevalent shows a marked decrease, first from 2011 and 2017 and then from 2017 to 2022. At the same time, a larger proportion believes that such attitudes are "not very prevalent" or "not prevalent at all".

Nonetheless, far more respondents in the population sample (75 per cent in 2022) believe that negative attitudes towards Muslims are prevalent than believe that negative attitudes towards Jews are prevalent (24 per cent in 2022). In 2022, a larger proportion (86 per cent) of the Jewish sample believes that negative attitudes towards Muslims are prevalent than did in 2017 (79 per cent). Thus, it was in the Jewish sample that the largest proportion believes that negative attitudes towards the two minorities are prevalent.

"fairly" prevalent in 2017, 66 per cent believe the same in 2022. Selection of the response "very prevalent" has shown a particular increase (from 18 per cent in 2017 to 29 per cent in 2022). At the same time, a smaller proportion of respondents believes that negative attitudes are not prevalent and far fewer find it difficult to answer the question.

Again, the youth sample responses are similar to those of the population sample (75 per cent believe that negative attitudes are prevalent), though a slightly larger proportion believes they are "very prevalent" and fewer believe they are "fairly prevalent".

### PERCEIVED CHANGE IN PREVALANCE OF NEGATIVE ATTITUDES

We asked respondents in both minority samples to answer questions on whether or not any change had occurred in the prevalence of negative attitudes towards Jews and Muslims: "Do you think that negative attitudes

Table 2.24 Perceived prevalence of negative attitudes towards Muslims (per cent)

How prevalent do you think negative attitudes towards Muslims are in Norway today?							
Sample	Very prevalent	Fairly prevalent	Not very prevalent	Not prevalent at all	Impossible to answer	No response	Very + Fairly
Population 2011	20.7	65.7	10.1	0.3	3.2	0.0	86.4
Population 2017	16.5	64.3	14.0	0.5	4.7	0.0	80.8
Population 2022	13.3	61.9	17.9	1.1	5.5	0.3	75.2
Change 2011-2022	-7.4	-3.7	7.8	0.8	2.3	0.3	-11.2
Jews 2017	8.2	70.9	12.7	0.0	7.3	0.9	79.1
Jews 2022	20.9	64.9	10.4	0.7	2.2	0.7	85.8
Change 2017-2022	12.7	-6.0	-2.3	0.7	-5.0	-0.2	6.7
Muslims 2017	18.1	34.2	20.5	5.2	19.0	3.1	52.3
Muslims 2022	29.1	36.7	17.9	2.9	10.3	3.1	65.8
Change 2017-2022	11.1	2.5	-2.6	-2.3	-8.7	0.0	13.6
Youth 2022	18.4	56.8	18.1	1.6	4.5	0.7	75.1

Far more respondents in the Muslim sample in 2022 than in 2017 believe that negative attitudes towards Muslims are prevalent. Whereas 52 per cent of the Muslim sample believe such attitudes to be "very" or

towards Jews/Muslims have become more or less prevalent in Norway in the past five years?" The same question was asked of the minority samples in 2017.

The results show marked differences in perceptions depending on which sample was asked and whether they were asked about attitudes towards Jews or to Muslims. A majority among both Jews and Muslims perceive negative attitudes towards their group to have become more prevalent in the past five years (68 per cent of Jews and 57 per cent of Muslims). However, the corresponding figures for both samples are lower than in 2017 (when 69 per cent of Jews and 63 per cent of Muslims have the same perception).

In the population sample, 43 per cent believe that negative attitudes towards Muslims have become more prevalent while 27 per cent believe the same applies to attitudes towards Jews. On the other hand, almost

half (49 per cent) of the population sample believes that antisemitism is less prevalent, compared with only 3 per cent of the Jewish sample. By comparison, no respondents in the population sample believe that negative attitudes towards Muslims have become less prevalent in the past five years, while 15 per cent of Muslims do.

**PERCEIVED NEED TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT NEGATIVE ATTITUDES**

Respondents in all the samples were asked whether they saw a need to do something about harassment of Jews and Muslims (see Tables 2.26 and 2.27). This question was also asked of the population sample in 2011 and 2017 and of the Jewish and Muslim samples in 2017.

Table 2.25 Perceived change in prevalence in the past five years (per cent)

Do you think that negative attitudes towards Jews/Muslims have become more or less prevalent in Norway in the past five years?	Sample	More prevalent	As before	Less prevalent	No response	Total
<b>Negative attitudes towards Jews</b>	Jews 2017	69.4	25.0	4.8	0.8	100.0
	Jews 2022	67.9	26.9	3.0	2.2	100.0
<b>Negative attitudes towards Muslims</b>	Muslims 2017	63.2	22.1	9.8	4.9	100.0
	Muslims 2022	56.9	25.5	14.8	2.8	100.0

Table 2.26 Perceived need to combat anti-Jewish harassment (per cent)

Do you see a need to do something to combat anti-Jewish harassment?				
Sample	Yes	No	No opinion	No response
Population 2011	37.5	29.9	32.5	0.1
Population 2017	40.7	28.1	31.2	0.0
Population 2022	49.7	19.7	29.5	1.0
Change 2011-2022	12.2	-10.1	-3.0	0.9
Jews 2017 <sup>10</sup>	85.2	0.0	3.7	11.1
Jews 2022	96.3	0.0	3.0	0.7
Change 2017-2022	11.1	0.0	-0.7	-10.4
Muslims 2017	27.8	20.3	48.4	3.6
Muslims 2022	41.2	21.3	35.0	2.4
Change 2017-2022	13.5	1.0	-13.3	-1.2
Youth 2022	50.0	23.0	25.1	1.9

10 Due to an error, this question was asked of only 20 respondents in the Jewish sample in 2017.



Table 2.27 Perceived need to combat anti-Muslim harassment (per cent)

Do you see a need to do something to combat anti-Muslim harassment?				
Sample	Yes	No	No opinion	No response
Population 2011	59.3	19.7	20.9	0.0
Population 2017	56.1	17.7	26.1	0.1
Population 2022	58.7	16.5	23.9	0.9
Change 2011-2022	-0.6	-3.2	3.0	0.9
Jews 2017	67.3	8.2	23.6	0.9
Jews 2022	80.6	4.5	14.2	0.7
Change 2017-2022	13.3	-3.7	-9.5	-0.2
Muslims 2017	54.4	14.9	26.9	3.8
Muslims 2022	71.5	12.5	14.0	2.0
Change 2017-2022	17.1	-2.4	-13.0	-1.7
Youth 2022	63.3	17.7	17.8	1.3

The Jewish sample has the largest proportion that considers it necessary to combat both types of harassment. Both the population sample and the youth sample are more concerned with doing something about harassment of Muslims than of Jews, but the youth are somewhat more worried about harassment of Muslims than are respondents in the population sample. Fifty-nine per cent of the population sample and 63 per cent of the youth sample believe that something has to be done to combat anti-Muslim harassment, while 50 per cent of both of these samples believe that something has to be done to combat anti-Jewish harassment.



## 3. ATTITUDES IN CONTEXT

Which factors may have significance for the incidence of negative attitudes towards Jews or Muslims? In this chapter we present the results for the respondents' attitudes towards other national and religious groups, views about the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, propensity to subscribe to conspiracy theories, and views about the place of religion in society. When combined, these questions help place attitudes towards Jews and Muslims in a broader context and explain some key factors behind negative attitudes.

It is difficult to draw causal conclusions from interview data. What the data can show are statistical correlations, but these do not necessarily reflect causal influence. Another problematic area is causal direction; that is, the direction of any influence between the variables. For example, this can be difficult to know in the case of the relationship between negative attitudes towards Jews and views about the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. In many cases it is reasonable to assume that any influence will work both ways.

We will look at how the attitudes vary between groups by gender, age, geographical region and education, and at the covariation between negative attitudes and xenophobia, views about immigrants in Norway, views about religion and religiosity, conspiracy mentality and views about the Middle East conflict. Separate indices were created for views about the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, scepticism towards immigrants, conspiracy mentality and xenophobia.

### 3.1 SOCIAL DISTANCE FROM DIFFERENT GROUPS AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS IMMIGRATION

The respondents were asked about their views on contact with people from different countries and with different religious backgrounds. They were also asked for their views about immigration generally and on

refugees. The questions on immigration and social contact were asked in the 2011 and 2017 surveys, while the question on refugees was first asked in 2017.

#### CONTACT WITH PEOPLE OF DIFFERENT NATIONALITIES AND RELIGIONS

In addition to questions about their social contact with Jews and Muslims, respondents in the 2022 survey were also asked about such contact with Roma, Somalis and Poles. The results show the same tendency as in the previous surveys, which is that respondents are most sceptical of having contact with Roma. Social distance from Jews was found to be least prevalent. The results also correspond with surveys conducted in other European countries that indicate a pattern in populations' views of minorities and the existence of what is referred to as an “ethnic hierarchy” (see, for example, Jones & Unsworth, 2021; Sebban-Bécache et al., 2022).

Almost half (46 per cent) of the respondents in the population sample answered that they “would dislike it a little” or “would dislike it a lot” to have Roma as neighbours. Approximately one-third (30 per cent) would dislike having Roma in their circle of friends. As in 2011 and 2017, the respondents in the population sample are still more sceptical of having contact with Somalis than having contact with Muslims.

The respondents in the two minority samples are generally less sceptical of having either form of contact than respondents in the population sample.

Table 3.1 Social distance from different groups: neighbours (per cent)

When you think about [nationality], to what extent would you like or dislike having them as neighbours?								
Sample	Would like it	Wouldn't mind it	Don't know	No response	Would dislike it a little	Would dislike it a lot	Total	A little + A lot
<b>Jews</b>								
Population 2011	14	73	3	0	7	3	100	11
Population 2017	14	75	4	0	5	2	100	7
Population 2022	16	74	3	1	5	1	100	6
Muslims 2017	22	63	5	2	3	5	100	8
Muslims 2022	29	60	5	1	3	2	100	5
<b>Muslims</b>								
Population 2011	7	63	3	0	15	13	100	28
Population 2017	8	61	5	0	15	11	100	26
Population 2022	9	63	5	1	15	8	100	22
Jews 2017	14	62	4	0	12	8	100	20
Jews 2022	18	67	3	2	5	5	100	10
<b>Poles</b>								
Population 2011	11	70	3	0	13	4	100	17
Population 2017	10	74	3	0	10	2	100	12
Population 2022	12	73	3	0	9	2	100	11
Jews 2017	16	74	2	0	6	1	100	8
Jews 2022	14	81	1	1	3	0	100	3
Muslims 2017	21	62	4	1	6	6	100	12
Muslims 2022	24	64	6	1	4	2	100	6
<b>Roma</b>								
Population 2011	3	37	5	0	28	27	100	55
Population 2017	4	31	8	0	30	27	100	57
Population 2022	5	40	9	1	28	18	100	46
Jews 2017	9	36	10	0	32	13	100	45
Jews 2022	10	48	11	1	25	4	100	29
Muslims 2017	12	47	9	2	18	11	100	30
Muslims 2022	16	51	11	1	12	9	100	21
<b>Somalis</b>								
Population 2011	6	49	7	0	21	17	100	39
Population 2017	6	51	6	0	20	16	100	36
Population 2022	7	54	7	0	20	12	100	32
Jews 2017	12	54	8	0	16	9	100	26
Jews 2022	13	64	6	2	9	5	100	14
Muslims 2017	24	54	4	2	11	5	100	17
Muslims 2022	31	53	5	1	7	3	100	10

Table 3.2 Social distance from different groups: circle of friends (per cent)

When you think about [nationality], to what extent would you like or dislike having them brought into your circle of friends?								
Sample	Would like it	Wouldn't mind it	Don't know	No response	Would dislike it a little	Would dislike it a lot	Total	A little + A lot
<b>Jews</b>								
Population 2011	14	73	3	0	6	3	100	10
Population 2017	18	70	4	0	5	2	100	7
Population 2022	20	69	5	1	4	1	100	5
Muslims 2017	24	56	8	2	5	6	100	11
Muslims 2022	30	55	7	2	3	3	100	6
Youth 2022	27	62	2	4	3	3	100	5
<b>Muslims</b>								
Population 2011	9	63	3	0	13	12	100	24
Population 2017	13	60	5	0	12	9	100	21
Population 2022	15	62	6	1	9	7	100	16
Jews 2017	28	54	4	1	8	5	100	13
Jews 2022	30	60	2	1	2	4	100	6
Youth 2022	27	59	2	3	6	4	100	9
<b>Poles</b>								
Population 2011	13	70	3	0	11	3	100	13
Population 2017	16	71	4	0	6	2	100	8
Population 2022	17	71	4	1	5	1	100	6
Jews 2017	27	62	4	2	4	1	100	5
Jews 2022	25	67	3	2	3	0	100	3
Muslims 2017	22	56	6	3	6	7	100	12
Muslims 2022	28	59	7	2	2	2	100	4
Youth 2022	27	65	3	2	2	1	100	3
<b>Roma</b>								
Population 2011	4	49	4	0	23	20	100	43
Population 2017	8	40	10	1	22	20	100	42
Population 2022	8	48	13	1	17	12	100	30
Jews 2017	16	48	7	1	16	11	100	28
Jews 2022	20	57	8	2	10	4	100	14
Muslims 2017	13	45	12	2	13	14	100	27
Muslims 2022	18	50	14	3	9	7	100	15
Youth 2022	22	58	7	3	6	4	100	9
<b>Somalis</b>								
Population 2011	8	54	5	0	17	16	100	33
Population 2017	12	53	7	1	14	12	100	26
Population 2022	13	59	8	1	11	9	100	19

When you think about [nationality], to what extent would you like or dislike having them brought into your circle of friends?

Sample	Would like it	Wouldn't mind it	Don't know	No response	Would dislike it a little	Would dislike it a lot	Total	A little + A lot
<b>Somalis</b>								
Jews 2017	23	51	4	2	11	8	100	19
Jews 2022	23	61	4	3	5	5	100	9
Muslims 2017	25	52	7	2	7	6	100	13
Muslims 2022	35	49	7	2	4	3	100	6
Youth 2022	28	58	2	3	6	3	100	9

**INDEX OF XENOPHOBIA**

As explained previously, we constructed an index of social distance from Jews and Muslims by assigning 1 point for “would dislike it a little” and 2 points for “would dislike it a lot” regarding social contact. This produced a scale from 0 to 4, and we set the threshold for a high value between 1 and 2 points when the scale was dichotomised. We used the same method for analysing social distance from Roma, Poles and Somalis.

The population sample has the largest proportion of high scores for social distance from Roma (32 per cent). Twenty per cent score high on social distance from Somalis and 6 per cent from Poles.

The results show a marked decrease in the proportion with a high score on social distance from all three groups between 2011 and 2022.

While high scores on social distance from Jews and Muslims can be interpreted as aspects of antisemitism and Islamophobia, it can also be viewed as an expression of a more general scepticism towards foreigners; i.e. xenophobia.

An index of xenophobia could be created by viewing the combined results for social distance from Roma, Somalis and Poles. With three indicators scored from 0 to 4, this produced a scale from 0 to 12. We defined a high level of xenophobia as a score above the midpoint;

Table 3.3 Index of social distance from Poles, Roma and Somalis (per cent)

Index of social distance							
	Sample	None 0	Low 1	2	3	High 4	High 2-4
<b>Poles</b>	Population 2011	80.4	8.3	8.0	0.8	2.4	11.3
	Population 2017	87.1	5.1	5.6	0.6	1.5	7.8
	Population 2022	87.8	6.3	4.2	0.6	0.9	5.8
	Change 2011-2022	7.4	-2.0	-3.8	-0.2	-1.5	-5.5
<b>Roma</b>	Population 2011	36.8	19.7	19.3	10.5	13.7	43.6
	Population 2017	41.7	13.9	19.6	5.4	19.4	44.3
	Population 2022	53.4	14.3	16.9	4.2	11.2	32.3
	Change 2011-2022	16.6	-5.3	-2.4	-6.4	-2.5	-11.3
<b>Somalis</b>	Population 2011	51.9	16.2	16.1	6.6	9.2	31.8
	Population 2017	62.2	11.1	12.4	2.8	11.6	26.7
	Population 2022	66.5	13.2	10.0	2.6	7.6	20.2
	Change 2011-2022	14.6	-3.0	-6.1	-3.9	-1.6	-11.6




Figure 3.1 Index of xenophobia (per cent)

in other words, we set the threshold for a high score between 6 and 7 points. As illustrated in the figure, high levels of xenophobia show a marked decrease in the population sample since 2011, particularly in the past five years.

In 2022, we measured high scores on the index of xenophobia for 8.3 per cent of the population sample. This represents a decrease from 13.4 per cent in 2017 and from 14.7 per cent in 2011.

**VIEWS ABOUT THE IMPACTS OF IMMIGRATION**

Two questions dealt with the potential impacts of having immigrants from other cultures come to Norway. One of the questions dealt with cultural impacts, the other with economic impacts. The questions were asked of the population sample in 2011, 2017 and 2022 and of the Jewish and Muslim samples in 2017 and 2022. The questions have also been used in Norsk Monitor since 1993.

The results show a gradual increase in the proportion that believes that immigration has positive cultural and economic impacts, and a decrease in the proportion that believes it represents an economic burden.

**CULTURAL IMPACTS**

The respondents were asked to decide which of two statements dealing with the cultural impacts of immigration fit best with their own views. This question was also asked of the youth sample.

Table 3.4 Cultural impacts of immigration (per cent)

Two people are discussing the impacts of having immigrants from other cultures come to Norway.

A says: "Immigrants contribute to greater cultural diversity in Norway".

B says: "Immigrants' ways of life don't fit into Norwegian society. Their foreign customs are problematic for those around them and could threaten Norwegian culture".

Who do you agree with most: A or B?

Sample	Agree most with A	Agree most with B	Impossible to choose	No response
Population 2011	54.2	25.0	20.7	0.2
Population 2017	56.8	24.8	18.4	0.0
Population 2022	61.0	24.6	13.7	0.7
Change 2011-2017	6.9	-0.3	-7.0	0.4
Jews 2017	65.9	11.8	21.2	1.2
Jews 2022	76.1	10.4	11.9	1.5
Change 2017-2022	10.2	-1.3	-9.2	0.3
Muslims 2017	80.5	2.6	14.5	2.3
Muslims 2022	83.4	3.1	12.5	1.0
Change 2017-2022	2.9	0.5	-2.0	-1.4
Youth 2022	75.6	14.1	10.0	0.2

In all the years this survey has been conducted, a majority of the respondents have believed that immigration has positive cultural impacts in Norway. In 2022, 61 per cent of the population sample supports A's statement: "Immigrants contribute to greater cultural diversity in Norway". However, a quarter (25 per cent) of respondents agree more with B's statement that immigrants' ways of life does not fit into Norwegian society and that immigration represents a threat to Norwegian culture. The proportion that is sceptical about the cultural impact of immigration has remained stable for the entire period, so the change is related to a decrease in the proportion that is unsure. As we have seen, however, there has been a decrease in the past five years in the proportion believing that Muslims pose a threat to Norwegian culture (from 39 per cent to 33 per cent; see section 2.2).

*ECONOMIC IMPACTS*

The respondents were also asked which of two statements dealing with the economic impacts of immigration fit best with their own views. Whereas in 2011 the proportion of respondents in the population sample that believed immigration had a positive impact on the Norwegian economy was the same as the proportion that believed it had a negative impact, in 2022 the proportion of respondents that believe that immigration has a positive impact is twice that of those who believe it has a negative impact. More than half of the respondents in the population sample (53 per cent) now believe that "Immigrants are hard-working, diligent people who make a valuable contribution to the Norwegian economy and working life" while 24 per cent support the statement "Immigrants want to exploit our welfare system and enjoy benefits which they play no part in creating". A decrease in the proportion that believes that immigrants exploit welfare benefits could also be seen in the answers to the open response



options (see chapter 4). Contrary to what was the case regarding views about the cultural impacts of immigration, the increase in the proportion that believes that immigration has positive economic impacts is primarily related to a decrease in negative views. The proportion that is unsure has remained quite stable throughout the period.

response, 1 point for not expressing an opinion, and 2 points for a negative response. When scores of 3 or 4 on the index are regarded as high values, 29 per cent of the sample was classified as sceptical of immigrants in 2017 and 24 per cent in 2022, representing a decrease of 5 percentage points.

Table 3.5 Economic impacts of immigration (per cent)

Two people are discussing the impacts of having immigrants from other cultures come to Norway.				
A says: "Immigrants want to exploit our welfare system and enjoy benefits which they play no part in creating".				
B says: "Immigrants are hard-working, diligent people who make a valuable contribution to the Norwegian economy and working life".				
Whose view on immigrants do you agree with most: A or B?				
Sample	Agree most with A	Agree most with B	Impossible to choose	No response
Population 2011	37.1	37.1	25.5	0.0
Population 2017	31.0	43.6	25.3	0.1
Population 2022	24.4	52.7	22.4	0.6
Change 2011-2022	-12.7	15.6	-3.1	0.6
Jews 2017	18.2	58.2	22.4	1.2
Jews 2022	14.2	58.2	26.1	1.5
Change 2017-2022	-4.1	0.0	3.8	0.3
Muslims 2017	5.8	73.7	18.0	2.5
Muslims 2022	5.7	78.7	14.3	1.3
Change 2017-2022	-0.1	5.0	-3.7	-1.2

Table 3.6 Index of scepticism towards immigrants (per cent)

Index of scepticism towards immigrants				
Sample	0 None	Weak 1	Medium 2	High 3-4
Population 2017	38.2	14.8	18.1	28.8
Population 2022	45.6	14.4	15.9	24.1
Change	7.4	-0.4	-2.2	-4.7

The results for the population sample's perceptions of immigrants' significance for Norwegian culture and the Norwegian economy (presented in Tables 3.4 and 3.5) were used to create an index of scepticism towards immigrants. The index of scepticism towards immigrants was created by assigning 0 points for a positive

**VIEWS ABOUT HOW NORWAY OUGHT TO RESPOND TO REFUGEES**

The respondents were asked to evaluate three different points of view on Norway’s treatment of refugees: should we do our utmost to ensure that Norway can receive more refugees; should they instead be helped in or near their home country; or can Norway not afford to help because of the many unresolved issues here in Norway? The question was asked of all the samples. It was also asked in 2017 and has been used in Norsk Monitor since 1993.

A majority of respondents in the population sample (51 per cent) believe that Norway should primarily help refugees in or near their own country. Forty-three per cent of the Jewish sample and 37 per cent of the Muslim sample believe likewise in 2022. This proportion has decreased in all samples since 2017. The responses from the youth sample (48 per cent) are similar to those from the population sample in 2022.

A large proportion of the minority samples believe Norway should do its utmost to receive more refugees: this view is held by approximately half of both the Jewish and the Muslim samples in 2022, and represented an increase since 2017 for both samples. Thirty-three per cent of the population sample believes Norway should receive more refugees, which is the same result as in 2017. This view is held by 39 per cent of the youth sample.

The point of view that received by far the least support in both 2017 and 2022 was that Norway could not afford to spend so much money on helping refugees because there are so many unresolved issues here in Norway. In 2022 this view is held by 14 per cent of the population sample, 6 per cent of the Jewish sample and 7 per cent of the Muslim sample. Again, the responses from the youth sample are similar to those of the population sample (10 per cent).

Table 3.7 Norway and refugees (per cent)

Which of the following points of view about how Norway should respond to refugees fits best with your own views?				
Sample	We must do our utmost to ensure that Norway can receive more refugees.	Instead of receiving refugees in Norway, we should use resources to help them in their own countries or in countries close by.	We can't afford to spend so much money on helping refugees as long as we have so many unresolved issues here in Norway.	No response
Population 2017	32.7	54.6	12.2	0.4
Population 2022	32.9	50.6	14.4	2.1
Change 2017-2022	0.2	-4.0	2.2	1.7
Jews 2017	41.8	49.4	4.1	4.7
Jews 2022	47.8	42.5	6.0	3.7
Change 2017-2022	6.0	-6.9	1.9	-1.0
Muslims 2017	44.8	41.7	7.2	6.3
Muslims 2022	50.2	36.9	6.9	6.1
Change 2017-2022	5.4	-4.9	-0.4	-0.2
Others 2017	40.9	40.6	8.6	9.9
Others 2022	46.7	38.5	9.9	4.9
Change 2017-2022	5.8	-2.1	1.2	-4.9
Youth 2022	39.4	47.6	10.4	2.6

### 3.2 ISRAEL AND THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT

As discussed in the introduction, the relationship between attitudes towards Israel and attitudes towards Jews is important in many discussions today about anti-Jewish attitudes. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been part of the discussion about antisemitism for many years. The issue under debate is to what degree and in what ways can critical views of Israel and Israeli policy towards the Palestinians be linked to antisemitic attitudes. Where is the line drawn between criticism of Israel and antisemitism? Which anti-Israel expressions are simultaneously antisemitic? Since 2011 the Norwegian Center for Holocaust and Minority Studies' survey has included a question mapping respondents' support for the parties in the conflict. Another question asks respondents to evaluate different statements dealing with Israel and the conflict.

#### SUPPORT FOR THE PARTIES IN THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT

The respondents in all samples were asked about their support for the parties in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The question was first asked of the population sample in 2011 and of the minority samples in 2017. The youth sample was asked the same question in 2022.

The results show clear differences between the population sample, the Jewish sample and the Muslim sample regarding views of Israel and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, while respondents in the youth sample respond more or less the same as the population sample. Larger proportions of the population sample and the youth sample express support for the Palestinians; 31 per cent of the youth sample and 23 per cent of the population sample support the Palestinians "solely" or "mostly", while 9 per cent of both samples support Israel. The distribution of support is otherwise as might be expected: a clear majority of the Muslim sample (61 per cent) primarily supports the Palestinians while a similar majority of the Jewish sample (63 per cent) supports Israel.

Table 3.8 Support for the parties in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (per cent)

People have conflicting views about the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. Who do you support most?										
Sample	Solely/ mostly Israel	Solely Israel	Mostly Israel	To some extent Israel	Neither	Impossible to answer/ No response	To some extent Palestin- ians	Mostly Palestin- ians	Solely Palestin- ians	Solely/ mostly Palestin- ians
Population 2011	8.1	1.3	6.8	4.7	30.3	20.8	12.7	21.1	2.2	23.3
Population 2017	8.8	2.1	6.7	4.5	31.9	22.3	10.5	18.3	3.6	21.9
Population 2022	9.3	2.0	7.3	4.6	30.9	20.0	12.1	19.4	3.8	23.1
Change 2011-2022	1.2	0.7	0.5	-0.1	0.6	-0.8	-0.6	-1.7	1.6	-0.1
Jews 2017	65.9	14.7	51.2	13.5	5.3	14.1	1.2	0.0	0.0	0.0
Jews 2022	62.7	11.9	50.8	12.7	7.5	14.9	0.0	2.2	0.0	2.2
Change	-3.2	-2.8	-0.4	-0.8	2.2	0.8	-1.2	2.2	0.0	2.2
Muslims 2017	2.9	1.8	1.1	0.4	17.3	20.0	7.2	30.4	21.7	52.0
Muslims 2022	2.4	1.1	1.2	0.7	13.5	15.1	6.9	28.6	32.8	61.4
Change	-0.6	-0.7	0.1	0.3	-3.8	-4.9	-0.3	-1.8	11.1	9.3
Youth 2022	8.9	3.2	5.7	2.4	23.9	26.2	7.2	20.3	11.1	31.4

Attitudes in the population have largely remained stable since 2011. In the Muslim sample, support for the Palestinians has increased since 2017 while support for Israel in the Jewish sample has slightly decreased. Moreover, the level of uncertainty in the Muslim sample has decreased since 2017: in 2022 fewer respondents answered that they support neither side in the conflict or selected the option “Impossible to answer”.

#### IEWS OF ISRAEL AND THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT

The outcome of any analysis of the prevalence of antisemitism will be influenced by the understanding of the phenomenon on which it is based. As we have seen, our analysis is based on three different indices which, when combined, capture different forms of negative attitudes towards Jews. The list of stereotypes reflected how antisemitism is no static phenomenon but rather one that reflects problems in contemporary society. The question of whether critical statements about Israel are simultaneously antisemitic is relatively easy to determine when they contain references to traditional anti-Jewish ideas. But if antisemitism is to be understood as a flexible phenomenon, as we argue, this also implies that the repertoire gradually takes on new forms of expression that call for interpretation and new borderlines.<sup>11</sup>

The Norwegian Center for Holocaust and Minority Studies’ surveys have included statements about Israel that straddle such a borderline. One example that often prompts debate on the demarcation line between antisemitism and criticism of Israel is the claim that Israel treats the Palestinians just as badly as the Jews were treated during World War II. This statement expresses strong criticism of Israel and implies a reversal of the historical roles of victim and perpetrator,

a well-known antisemitic trope with roots that reach back long before the State of Israel was formed (Holz, 2012). A survey conducted by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) has shown that a large majority of Jews in Europe interpret this trope as antisemitic (FRA, 2018, p. 25). One reason why it can be said to be antisemitic is because it entails Holocaust relativisation and trivialisation. The results show that this statement was evaluated very differently in the population and Muslim samples compared with the Jewish sample. Whereas it receives no support in the Jewish sample, a relatively large proportion of the population sample (33 per cent in 2022) and an even larger proportion of the Muslim sample (63 per cent in 2022) expresses support. Moreover, the Muslim sample shows a marked increase in support between 2017 and 2022 (from 51 per cent in 2017).

Other comparative European studies that included this statement in some cases show large differences in the level of support in various population samples. However, the results from one study conducted in 16 European countries in 2021 indicate that the level of support in Norway is slightly above average. Whereas one-third of the population in Norway supports this statement, the average for countries included in the European study was 26 per cent (Kovács & Fischer, 2021, p. 51).<sup>12</sup>

11 See Bergmann (2021) for a review of how antisemitism and attitudes towards Israel overlap. The report presents an overview of international surveys on this topic.

12 The countries included in the survey were: France, Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Romania, Poland, United Kingdom,

Table 3.9 Views of Israel and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (per cent)

How well do these statements about the Middle East conflict fit with your own views?	Sample	Not at all	Rather badly	Impossible to answer	No response	Rather well	Completely	Rather well + Completely
As long as the State of Israel exists, there can be no peace	Population 2011	24.9	23.7	35.1	0.5	11.7	4.1	15.8
	Population 2017	13.2	20.9	45.5	0.1	15.8	4.6	20.4
	Population 2022	14.5	19.1	40.4	2.0	16.8	7.1	24.0
	Change 2011-2022	-10.4	-4.6	5.3	1.5	5.2	3.0	8.2
	Jews 2017	77.6	11.2	5.9	1.8	2.4	1.2	3.5
	Jews 2022	73.1	9.7	8.2	2.2	5.2	1.5	6.7
	Change 2017-2022	-4.5	-1.5	2.3	0.5	2.9	0.3	3.2
	Muslims 2017	20.2	14.1	34.6	6.2	11.2	13.8	25.0
	Muslims 2022	17.8	15.3	33.8	3.9	10.5	18.7	29.2
	Change 2017-2022	-2.4	1.2	-0.8	-2.2	-0.7	4.9	4.2
Both the Israelis and the Palestinians are entitled to a state of their own	Population 2011	2.5	3.7	17.0	0.5	27.8	48.6	76.4
	Population 2017	2.2	4.4	23.0	0.0	30.9	39.5	70.3
	Population 2022	2.1	4.1	22.1	1.7	31.0	38.9	69.9
	Change 2011-2022	-0.3	0.4	5.1	1.2	3.2	-9.7	-6.5
	Jews 2017	7.6	4.1	6.5	1.8	36.5	43.5	80.0
	Jews 2022	1.5	10.4	9.0	1.5	33.6	44.0	77.6
	Change 2017-2022	-6.2	6.3	2.5	-0.3	-2.9	0.5	-2.4
	Muslims 2017	4.1	2.1	19.6	4.2	14.9	55.1	70.0
	Muslims 2022	6.6	4.9	17.7	3.3	15.8	51.7	67.5
	Change 2017-2022	2.5	2.8	-1.9	-0.9	0.9	-3.4	-2.5
Israeli leaders genuinely want to find a solution to the conflict	Population 2011	12.9	32.1	33.7	0.4	16.6	4.2	20.9
	Population 2017	10.0	31.2	36.8	0.2	17.8	4.1	21.9
	Population 2022	10.4	29.5	36.6	2.2	16.5	4.7	21.3
	Change 2011-2022	-2.5	-2.6	2.8	1.8	-0.1	0.5	0.4
	Jews 2017	4.1	20.6	11.2	0.6	37.6	25.9	63.5
	Jews 2022	1.5	21.1	14.3	0.8	45.1	17.3	62.4
	Change 2017-2022	-2.6	0.5	3.1	0.2	7.5	-8.6	-1.1
	Muslims 2017	29.3	21.1	34.8	5.3	5.5	4.0	9.4
	Muslims 2022	40.2	18.2	29.3	4.1	4.8	3.3	8.1
Change 2017-2022	10.9	-2.9	-5.5	-1.1	-0.6	-0.7	-1.3	

How well do these statements about the Middle East conflict fit with your own views?	Sample	Not at all	Rather badly	Impossible to answer	No response	Rather well	Completely	Rather well + Completely
Palestinian leaders genuinely want to find a solution to the conflict	Population 2011	6.1	21.8	34.2	0.2	31.6	6.2	37.7
	Population 2017	7.2	19.2	40.3	0.1	28.1	5.0	33.1
	Population 2022	6.8	19.1	40.2	1.5	25.9	6.6	32.4
	Change 2011-2022	0.7	-2.7	6.0	1.3	-5.7	0.4	-5.3
	Jews 2017	31.2	41.2	14.1	1.2	10.6	1.8	12.4
	Jews 2022	26.9	50.7	13.4	2.2	6.7	0.0	6.7
	Change 2017-2022	-4.3	9.6	-0.7	1.1	-3.9	-1.8	-5.6
	Muslims 2017	4.1	10.5	37.3	5.0	25.5	17.6	43.1
	Muslims 2022	5.1	10.5	34.5	4.8	23.1	22.0	45.2
	Change 2017-2022	1.0	0.0	-2.8	-0.2	-2.3	4.4	2.1
Israel treats the Palestinians just as badly as the Jews were treated during World War II	Population 2011	11.5	21.0	29.2	0.2	29.1	9.0	38.1
	Population 2017	9.9	20.5	37.0	0.3	25.4	6.9	32.2
	Population 2022	12.6	19.8	33.2	1.6	24.9	7.9	32.8
	Change 2011-2022	1.1	-1.2	3.9	1.4	-4.2	-1.0	-5.3
	Jews 2017	77.6	15.3	4.7	1.8	0.6	0.0	0.6
	Jews 2022	81.3	14.2	3.0	0.7	0.7	0.0	0.7
	Change 2017-2022	3.7	-1.1	-1.7	-1.0	0.2	0.0	0.2
	Muslims 2017	6.0	7.1	30.6	5.6	23.4	27.3	50.7
	Muslims 2022	4.4	6.2	23.4	2.7	22.9	40.4	63.3
	Change 2017-2022	-1.6	-0.9	-7.2	-2.9	-0.5	13.1	12.6
Israel is at the forefront of the war against Islamic extremism.	Population 2011	12.4	20.4	46.4	0.5	15.9	4.4	20.3
	Population 2017	8.0	20.9	51.8	0.1	14.7	4.5	19.2
	Population 2022	7.4	18.1	50.4	2.3	16.1	5.7	21.8
	Change 2011-2022	-5.0	-2.3	4.0	1.8	0.2	1.3	1.5
	Jews 2017	4.7	12.9	17.6	2.4	29.4	32.9	62.4
	Jews 2022	7.5	14.9	18.7	2.2	31.3	25.4	56.7
	Change 2017-2022	2.8	2.0	1.0	-0.1	1.9	-7.6	-5.6
	Muslims 2017	22.5	11.7	43.1	6.0	7.8	8.8	16.7
	Muslims 2022	28.3	14.7	37.2	4.7	7.6	7.6	15.2
	Change 2017-2022	5.8	3.0	-5.9	-1.4	-0.3	-1.2	-1.5

Responses to the statement expressing strong criticism of Israel (“As long as the State of Israel exists, there can be no peace”) show a tendency towards growing support in all three samples. More respondents in the population sample (24 per cent) and the Muslim sample (29 per cent) and fewer respondents in the Jewish sample (7 per cent) express support for this statement. While the wording did not clearly define which area(s) are affected by the threat against peace, more specific references were made in variations of the statement used in other studies. The more general statement (“As long as the State of Israel exists, there can be no peace”) was used in the Norwegian survey in 2011, when 16 per cent of the population sample supported this statement. By comparison, the statement “As long as Israel exists, we will not have peace in the world” used in a Swedish population survey was supported by 7 per cent (Bachner & Bevelander, 2020, p. 11), while an Austrian survey that referred to the Middle East and was therefore more specific, was supported by 10 per cent (IFES, 2020, p. 10).

A clear majority of all three samples support the idea that both the Israelis and the Palestinians are entitled to a state of their own, and the level of support is almost the same as in 2017: slightly less than 70 per cent of the population sample and the Muslim sample, and 78 per cent of the Jewish sample. The level of support for this statement in the population sample has decreased since 2011.

On the other hand, the responses to the statements dealing with Israeli and Palestinian leaders’ genuine desire to find a solution to the conflict vary widely between the samples. Whereas a majority (62 per cent) of the Jewish sample believes that Israeli leaders want peace, support for this statement is markedly lower in the population sample (21 per cent) and the Muslim sample (only 8 per cent). The case is almost the complete opposite when it comes to evaluating the

Palestinian leaders’ intentions, with high support shown by the Muslim sample (45 per cent), partial support by the population sample (32 per cent) and markedly low support by the Jewish sample (7 per cent). Confidence in the Palestinian leaders has steadily decreased in the population sample since 2011 (from 38 per cent).

Support for the final statement (“Israel is at the forefront of the war on Islamic terrorism”) has remained stable in the population sample, at approximately one-fifth in all three surveys (22 per cent in 2022). Support in the Muslim sample is lower (15 per cent in 2022), though this figure has also remained stable since 2017. Support in the Jewish sample is highest (57 per cent), though this figure is lower than it was in 2017 (62 per cent).

#### **INDICES OF VIEWS ABOUT THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT**

As in the previous surveys, we used three indices for views about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict based on the six statements presented in Table 3.9. As shown, the statements expressing a positive view towards Israel (“Israeli leaders genuinely want to find a solution to the conflict” and “Israel is at the forefront of the war against Islamic extremism”) receive less support in the population sample than do the statements expressing a positive view towards the Palestinians. The distribution of responses to the pro-Israel statements is quite similar in 2011, 2017 and 2022, while the pro-Palestinian statements receive less support.

In the population sample, the distribution of responses to the two anti-Israel statements (“Israel treats the Palestinians just as badly as the Jews were the Jews were treated during World War II” and “As long as the State of Israel exists, there can be no peace”) remain stable for the former statement and shows increased support for the latter, from 20 per cent in 2017 to 24 per cent in 2022.

A factor analysis of the six statements resulted in three dimensions, each with its own pair of statements.<sup>13</sup> When the responses for each statement were coded 0-4, this produced three indices with scores of 0-8: pro-Israel, anti-Israel and pro-Palestine.

*PRO-ISRAEL:*

*Israeli leaders genuinely want to find a solution to the conflict.*

*Israel is at the forefront of the war against Islamic extremism.*

*ANTI-ISRAEL:*

*Israel treats the Palestinians just as badly as the Jews were treated during World War II.*

*As long as the State of Israel exists, there can be no peace.*

*PRO-PALESTINE:*

*Both the Israelis and the Palestinians are entitled to a state of their own.*

*Palestinian leaders genuinely want to find a solution to the conflict.*

In Table 3.10 this scale was divided into three, from low to high values. Low values will thus denote scores 0-2, medium values 3-5 and high values 6-8. The table shows how antisemitism and Islamophobia vary in the population sample in 2017 and 2022 in accordance with the different scores on each index. The respective scores in the index show how the population sample's views about antisemitism and Islamophobia vary in 2017 and in 2022. The link between the scores on these indices and antisemitism and Islamophobia are discussed in section 3.5.

Table 3.10 Indices of views about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (per cent)

Index	Sample	Values (index scores)	Antisemitism, high	Islamophobia, high	Proportion of sample	Number (not weighted)
Pro-Israel	Population 2017	Weak (0-2)	11.0	25.6	24.0	374
		Medium (3-5)	3.7	23.7	65.7	1025
		Strong (6-8)	3.5	51.9	10.3	176
Pro-Israel	Population 2022	Weak (0-2)	8.5	18.3	20.4	338
		Medium (3-5)	3.3	18.1	68.1	1115
		Strong (6-8)	4.4	37.0	11.5	200
Pro-Palestine	Population 2017	Weak (0-2)	8.7	45.3	5.4	79
		Medium (3-5)	4.2	30.8	53.3	844
		Strong (6-8)	6.7	19.8	41.3	652
Pro-Palestine	Population 2022	Weak (0-2)	11.6	48.0	4.9	79
		Medium (3-5)	3.0	21.2	55.7	883
		Strong (6-8)	5.7	15.6	39.4	691
Anti-Israel	Population 2017	Weak (0-2)	1.9	33.4	22.8	352
		Medium (3-5)	2.9	22.5	62.5	982
		Strong (6-8)	21.9	36.4	14.7	241
Anti-Israel	Population 2022	Weak (0-2)	2.3	28.1	23.8	405
		Medium (3-5)	3.1	14.7	59.5	962
		Strong (6-8)	12.6	29.4	16.7	286

13 Principal component analysis with a varimax rotation in 2017. A similar analysis in 2011 with four statements in addition to these six produced the same dimensional solution.



**SURVEY EXPERIMENT: HOW ARE THE RESULTS INFLUENCED BY THE RESPONDENTS BEING REMINDED OF THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT?**

We wanted to investigate how attitudes towards Jews are influenced by respondents being reminded of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. We did this by inviting a subsample of respondents to answer four questions about Jews after they had expressed their views about the statements dealing with Israel and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (primed). Another subsample responded to the statements about the conflict later on in the interview (unprimed). The respondents in the subsamples (from the general population and Muslim sample) were selected at random.<sup>14</sup>

The statements used for priming were the same as those in Table 3.9:

1. As long as the State of Israel exists, there can be no peace.
2. Both the Israelis and the Palestinians are entitled to a state of their own.
3. Israeli leaders genuinely want to find a solution to the conflict.
4. Palestinian leaders genuinely want to find a solution to the conflict
5. Israel treats the Palestinians just as badly as the Jews were treated during World War II.
6. Israel is at the forefront of the war on Islamic terrorism.

The following statements/questions were used to measure the effect of the priming:

Table 3.11 Survey experiment (per cent)

To what extent would you like or dislike having a Jew as a son-in-law/daughter-in-law?		Would like it	Wouldn't mind it	Would dislike it a little	Would dislike it a lot	Don't know	No response
Population 2022	Unprimed	12.0	62.5	8.1	3.8	12.4	1.2
	Primed	10.0	59.4	8.5	4.9	15.6	1.7
	Diff. primed vs unprimed	-2.0	-3.1	0.4	1.1	<b>3.2</b>	0.5
"It would be fine by me if a Jew were to become prime minister of Norway". How well does this fit with your own views?		Completely	Rather well	Rather badly	Not at all	Impossible to answer	No response
Population 2022	Unprimed	31.9	24.9	12.1	6.9	17.1	7.1
	Primed	30.4	26.5	12.2	9.3	20.4	1.3
	Diff. primed vs unprimed	-1.5	1.6	0.1	<b>2.4</b>	<b>3.3</b>	<b>-5.8</b>
"Norway should do more to promote Jewish culture". How well does this fit with your own views?		Completely	Rather well	Rather badly	Not at all	Impossible to answer	No response
Population 2022	Unprimed	8.5	19.1	26.2	13.1	31.1	2.1
	Primed	4.7	16.6	28.9	12.8	34.8	2.2
	Diff. primed vs unprimed	<b>-3.8</b>	-2.5	2.7	-0.3	3.7	0.1
"Israeli policies have made me more negatively inclined towards Jews in general". How well does this fit with your own views?		Not at all	Rather badly	Rather well	Completely	Impossible to answer	No response
Population 2022	Unprimed	20.8	25.8	21.0	4.7	25.6	2.1
	Primed	22.8	23.8	20.3	5.8	25.9	1.3
	Diff. primed vs unprimed	2.0	-2.0	-0.7	1.1	0.3	-0.8

14 The size of the subsamples for the population: primed 821-825 and unprimed 826-828; for Muslims: primed 362 and unprimed 439-446 (there was a slight variation in the number of responses to the questions).

7. To what extent would you like or dislike having a Jew as a son-in-law/daughter-in-law?
8. "It would be fine by me if a Jew were to become prime minister of Norway". How well does this fit with your own views?
9. "Norway should do more to promote Jewish culture". How well does this fit with your own views?
10. "Israeli policies have made me more negatively inclined towards Jews in general". How well does this fit with your own views?

The results for the four questions used in the experiment are presented in Tables 3.11 and 3.12. The difference between the samples with and without priming were calculated and tested for significance with a significance level of 5 per cent. The tables were designed to make it easy to obtain a picture of any tendencies from the pattern in the table. The response options are arranged

to show positive attitudes towards Jews on the left and negative views on the right. The colour yellow indicates that priming increases the incidence of the response in question while blue indicates that priming reduces it. Significant results appear in bold font and strong colours.

Many of the differences in the results for the population sample are so small that they may be random, and even most of those that are significant are relatively small. The impression is that priming creates a small reduction in the proportion of positive responses and a small increase in the proportion of negative responses and no responses.

In the Muslim sample the three biggest effects of priming are an increase in the proportions that respond "don't know". Two of the questions show a significant increase in the proportion of highly negative responses. Otherwise the increase in the proportion of responses

Table 3.12 Survey experiment (per cent)

To what extent would you like or dislike having a Jew as a son-in-law/daughter-in-law?		Would like it	Wouldn't mind it	Would dislike it a little	Would dislike it a lot	Don't know	No response
Muslims 2022	Unprimed	12.7	35.6	10.6	20.9	19.2	1.0
	Primed	7.6	33.8	6.2	14.8	33.3	4.4
	Diff. primed vs unprimed	<b>-5.1</b>	<b>-1.8</b>	<b>-4.4</b>	<b>-6.1</b>	<b>14.1</b>	<b>3.4</b>
"It would be fine by me if a Jew were to become prime minister of Norway". How well does this fit with your own views?		Completely	Rather well	Rather badly	Not at all	Impossible to answer	No response
Muslims 2022	Unprimed	38.0	23.2	7.7	7.0	17.8	6.3
	Primed	36.6	13.7	4.7	11.5	31.2	2.3
	Diff. primed vs unprimed	-1.4	<b>-9.5</b>	<b>-3.0</b>	<b>4.5</b>	<b>13.4</b>	<b>-4.0</b>
"Norway should do more to promote Jewish culture". How well does this fit with your own views?		Completely	Rather well	Rather badly	Not at all	Impossible to answer	No response
Muslims 2022	Unprimed	10.5	20.4	10.0	18.7	34.1	6.3
	Primed	7.4	15.1	12.5	13.0	47.0	5.1
	Diff. primed vs unprimed	-3.1	<b>-5.3</b>	2.5	<b>-5.7</b>	<b>12.9</b>	-1.2
"Israeli policies have made me more negatively inclined towards Jews in general". How well does this fit with your own views?		Not at all	Rather badly	Rather well	Completely	Impossible to answer	No response
Muslims 2022	Unprimed	20.7	10.8	18.8	17.4	27.6	4.8
	Primed	17.9	10.5	19.8	23.2	23.2	5.4
	Diff. primed vs unprimed	-2.8	-0.3	1.0	<b>5.8</b>	-4.4	0.6

of “don’t know” or “impossible to answer” has largely been at the expense of all the other response options.

However, the differences between the results for the two subsamples are generally small. From a survey methodology perspective, this can be taken as a sign that potential response order effects are minimal. This may be because the Middle East conflict already held a prominent place in the respondents’ frame of reference before the interview was conducted.

**XENOPHOBIA, SUPPORT FOR THE PARTIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT, AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS JEWS AND MUSLIMS**

In 2017, the analyses showed that xenophobia and support for the parties in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict were two of the variables that most strongly correlated with antisemitism and Islamophobia (Hoffmann & Moe, 2017, pp. 97–98). We repeated the analysis below, this time with data for 2017 and 2022 combined in both tables to provide us with more respondents and more

reliable results. Like last time, the variables support for the parties and xenophobia were grouped into five categories. The numbers in the tables show the proportion of respondents with the relevant combination of values of the two independent variables that scored high on the indices of antisemitism or Islamophobia.

With five values on each of the two variables, we found wide variation in the proportion showing high levels of antisemitism (Table 3.13), from 0 per cent in the bottom left-hand corner for respondents with no xenophobia and who support Israel to 57 per cent in the upper right-hand corner, where respondents show strong xenophobia and mostly support the Palestinians. Between these extremes, the proportion with high levels of antisemitism gradually increases in a pattern that largely follows the main diagonal.

Table 3.14 for Islamophobia was set up in the same way as the table for antisemitism. Since the correlation with support of the parties in the Middle East conflict shows the opposite trend here, the proportions increase

Table 3.13 Percentage with high levels of antisemitism (per cent, population 2017 and 2022 combined)

Xenophobia	Support mostly in the Middle East conflict					Difference
	Mostly Israel	To some extent Israel	Neither side	To some extent Palestinians	Mostly Palestinians	Pal-Isr
Strong	3.9	11.7	18.1	18.4	56.9	52.9
Medium	1.9	0.0	11.2	6.9	17.8	15.9
Some	0.0	4.0	0.8	7.0	24.3	24.3
Weak	2.9	0.0	0.8	5.5	6.9	4.0
None	0.0	0.0	0.8	0.8	3.3	3.3
<b>Difference</b>	3.9	11.7	17.3	17.6	53.5	49.6

Table 3.14 Percentage with high levels of Islamophobia (per cent, population 2017 and 2022 combined).

Xenophobia	Support mostly in the Middle East conflict					Difference
	Mostly Israel	To some extent Israel	Neither side	To some extent Palestinians	Mostly Palestinians	Isr-Pal
Strong	87.1	89.1	80.1	62.4	73.2	13.9
Medium	78.2	58.4	46.3	42.5	47.2	31.0
Some	58.9	32.5	34.3	24.7	25.5	33.4
Weak	41.9	34.5	15.5	7.6	8.2	33.7
None	15.2	13.3	5.0	2.2	2.1	13.2
<b>Difference</b>	71.8	75.8	75.1	60.1	71.1	0.7

from the bottom right-hand corner to the upper left-hand corner, from 2 per cent of respondents with no xenophobia and who support the Palestinians to 87 per cent of respondents with very high levels of xenophobia and who mostly support Israel.

In Table 3.13 for antisemitism, the distance between the outer groups is almost the same for xenophobia (columns) and views about the conflict (rows). For Islamophobia, the differences are much greater with regard to xenophobia, and views about the Middle East conflict make little difference here (Table 3.14). The analysis illustrates how xenophobia and attitudes towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict may affect the development of negative attitudes towards Jews and Muslims.

### 3.3 CONSPIRACY THINKING

Groups and individuals that promote conspiracy theories in the public sphere have become increasingly visible in recent years. The COVID-19 crisis has stimulated the spread of such theories even beyond more extreme groups (see, for example, Allington et al., 2020; Gruzd & Mai, 2020). This trend is particularly noticeable in online fora. Conspiracy theories about hidden forces being behind large-scale social changes and about how society as we know it is about to disappear are disseminated through social media. Dissemination of such notions is a sign of distrust in society and may pose a democratic problem.

We wanted to survey respondents' propensity for conspiracy thinking, referred to as conspiracy mentality, and degree of political distrust. The respondents were asked for their views about four statements, three of which expressed belief in hidden connections and the

Table 3.15 Support for conspiracy thinking (per cent)

To what extent do the following statements fit with your own views?	Sample	The statement fits:						
		Not at all	Rather badly	Impossible to answer/No response	Rather well	Completely	Total	Completely + Rather well
Norwegian authorities closely monitor all citizens	Population	21.5	38.7	19.1	17.6	3.2	100.0	20.8
	Jews	38.1	36.6	14.2	10.4	0.7	100.0	11.1
	Muslims	14.9	19.3	42.7	14.4	8.7	100.0	23.1
	Youth	22.9	36.9	23.1	14.3	2.8	100.0	17.1
Incidents which apparently have nothing to do with each other are often the result of secret activities	Population	20.1	16.8	47.8	12.2	3.0	100.0	15.2
	Jews	35.8	22.4	33.5	8.2	0.0	100.0	8.2
	Muslims	9.0	7.8	66.6	10.3	6.3	100.0	16.6
	Youth	23.5	15.6	52.8	6.8	1.4	100.0	8.2
Secret organisations exist that have strong influence on political decisions made in Norway	Population	19.7	20.8	37.9	17.3	4.4	100.0	21.7
	Jews	36.1	24.8	28.6	8.3	2.3	100.0	10.6
	Muslims	12.2	10.0	57.7	12.3	7.8	100.0	20.1
	Youth	26.2	22.0	37.7	11.3	2.8	100.0	14.1
Politicians in Norway act in the best interests of society	Population	3.9	12.7	9.1	51.8	22.4	100.0	74.2
	Jews	0.0	8.2	6.7	63.4	21.6	100.0	85.0
	Muslims	4.7	11.6	18.8	36.1	28.9	100.0	65.0
	Youth	4.0	16.6	10.7	51.0	17.7	100.0	68.7

fourth of which expressed confidence in Norwegian politicians to act in the best interests of society. The question was introduced with the following sentence: "Views differ on who influences political decisions in society. To what extent do the following statements fit with your own views?" This is the first time this question has been asked in this survey, but the list of statements was a modified version of one that has previously been used in other surveys (see Dyrendal, 2020; Bruder et al., 2013). The question was asked of the population sample, the two minority samples and the youth sample.

The results show that the vast majority of respondents in all the samples believe that the three statements dealing with conspiracy thinking largely do not fit with their own views. At the same time, a majority of all the samples believe that Norwegian politicians act in the best interests of society. The respondents in the youth sample generally have lower propensity than respondents in the general population to consider the first three statements to fit with their own views, but a slightly larger proportion of them find that the final statement does not.

In the population sample, approximately as many respondents support the statements "Norwegian authorities closely monitor all citizens" and "Secret organisations exist that have strong influence over

political decisions made in Norway" (both just over 20 per cent). Slightly fewer (15 per cent) share the view that "Incidents which apparently have nothing to do with each other are often the result of secret activities". The results for the Muslim sample are close to those for the population sample, while support for the statements in the Jewish sample is only half of that in the population sample.

As already mentioned, the list of statements was a modified version of a list that has previously been used for surveying conspiracy mentality. By referring to Norwegian conditions, our statements have more concrete implications than the original versions. More general statements would likely have received more support because respondents would more likely have related them to international contexts.

#### INDEX OF CONSPIRACY MENTALITY

We constructed an index of conspiracy mentality with scores of 0-2 for each statement. For statements no. 1 to 3, 2 points were assigned for "completely" and 1 point for "rather well". Other responses were assigned 0 points. For statement no. 4, 2 points were assigned for "not at all", 1 point for "rather badly" and 0 points for other responses.

Table 3.16 Index of conspiracy mentality (per cent)

Sample	Value	Proportion of sample	Number (not weighted)
Population (1653)	Low 0	58.4	969
	Medium 1-2	29.3	487
	<b>High 3-8</b>	<b>12.3</b>	<b>197</b>
Jews (134)	Low 0	73.1	98
	Medium 1-2	24.6	33
	<b>High 3-8</b>	<b>2.2</b>	<b>3</b>
Muslims (821)	Low 0	55.1	457
	Medium 1-2	30.8	249
	<b>High 3-8</b>	<b>14.1</b>	<b>115</b>
Youth (1027)	Low 0	62.2	645
	Medium 1-2	29.5	304
	<b>High 3-8</b>	<b>8.3</b>	<b>78</b>

This created a scale from 0 to 8. We set the threshold for high values between scores 2 and 3 so that a “high value” for the dichotomised index corresponded to scores between 3 and 8. This means that, for example, respondents who selected “rather well” three times would be assigned a “high score”. The same would apply to respondents who selected “completely” once and “rather well” once.

The result (see Table 3.16) shows that most respondents score 0 and therefore have no propensity for conspiracy mentality. High scores (3–8) are seen more often in the population sample (12 per cent) and the Muslim sample (14 per cent). In the youth sample, 8 per cent were assigned high scores. The smallest proportion with high scores is found among the Jewish respondents (2 per cent). This may be because these respondents more easily recognise the conspiratorial element in the statements based on their similarity with familiar antisemitic ideas. Another contributory factor might be the respondents’ high level of education.

### CONSPIRACY MENTALITY AND POLITICAL AFFILIATION

We analysed the correlation between propensity for conspiracy mentality and political views in the population sample.

The analysis shows that the largest proportions with high scores on the index of conspiracy mentality can be found among respondents who vote for the Progress Party and “Others” (24 per cent and 34 per cent respectively). Thereafter come voters for the Centre Party, Christian Democratic Party, Red Party and the Conservative Party with proportions of between 20 per cent and 10 per cent. The proportions among respondents who vote for the Socialist Left Party, Labour Party, Liberal Party and the Green Party are less than 10 per cent.

### CONSPIRACY MENTALITY AND ANTISEMITISM

We wanted to investigate whether there were any correlations between conspiracy mentality and attitudes towards Jews. By comparing distribution on the antisemitism index of respondents with different scores on the conspiracy index, we gain an impression of the importance of conspiracy mentality for the incidence of antisemitism.

Table 3.17 Conspiracy mentality and political affiliation (per cent, population 2022)

Party voted for at the last election	Index for conspiracy mentality			Number (not weighted)
	Low (0)	Medium (1-2)	High (3-8)	
Red Party (R)	56.3	31.0	12.7	117
Socialist Left Party (SV)	74.2	18.7	7.1	146
Labour Party (Ap)	62.4	32.0	5.6	321
Centre Party (Sp)	53.2	29.9	16.9	161
Green Party (MDG)	79.0	19.4	1.6	54
Liberal Party (V)	77.8	17.5	4.8	56
Christian Democratic Party (KrF)	66.7	19.6	13.7	47
Conservative Party (H)	58.7	30.5	10.8	284
Progress Party (FrP)	32.1	44.0	23.9	151
Other parties/lists	26.2	40.0	33.8	63
Don't wish to disclose	56.7	30.2	12.9	113

Table 3.18 Correlation between conspiracy mentality and antisemitism (per cent, population 2022)

Index of conspiracy thinking	Combined index of antisemitism					
	0	1	2	3	High 2-3	Total
Low (score 0)	94.2	3.9	1.2	0.8	1.9	100.0
Medium (score 1-2)	85.9	9.2	3.7	1.2	4.9	100.0
High (score 3-8)	64.4	19.8	10.8	5.0	15.8	100.0
Difference	29.8	-15.9	-9.6	-4.2	-13.9	

We find a clear correlation between attitudes in both the population sample and the Muslim sample: those who show propensity for conspiracy thinking more often have high scores on the antisemitism index.

Table 3.19 Correlation between conspiracy mentality and antisemitism (per cent, Muslims 2022)

Index of conspiracy thinking	Combined index of antisemitism					
	0	1	2	3	High 2-3	Total
Low (score 0)	83.7	12.9	2.2	1.2	3.4	100.0
Medium (score 1-2)	66.4	27.1	5.5	1.0	6.5	100.0
High (score 3-8)	30.2	53.2	9.7	6.9	16.6	100.0
Difference	53.5	-40.3	-7.5	-5.7	-13.2	

### CONSPIRACY MENTALITY AND ISLAMOPHOBIA

We also analysed the correlation between conspiracy mentality and attitudes towards Muslims.

Table 3.20 Correlation between conspiracy mentality and Islamophobia (per cent, population 2022)

Index of conspiracy thinking	Combined index of Islamophobia					
	0	1	2	3	High 2-3	Total
Low (score 0)	75.9	10.6	10.8	2.7	13.5	100.0
Medium (score 1-2)	54.6	19.1	17.0	9.3	26.3	100.0
High (score 3-8)	34.2	27.5	23.1	15.2	38.3	100.0
Difference	41.7	-17.0	-12.2	-12.6	-24.8	

The correlation with conspiracy mentality is even stronger for Islamophobia in the population sample. Among respondents who score high on conspiracy thinking, 38 per cent also score high on Islamophobic attitudes.

The Jewish sample is relatively small, and few of them score high on Islamophobia. Since very few respondents in this sample support statements dealing with conspiracy thinking, the group that scores high on

both indices was very small and the results have not been included in this presentation.

The connection revealed in the analyses between propensity for conspiracy thinking and antisemitic or Islamophobic attitudes is as expected (see also Dyrendal, 2020). Both antisemitic and Islamophobic ideas contain elements of conspiratorial ideas. Correlation does not imply causation. It is also conceivable that the influence works in the opposite direction, from antisemitic/

Islamophobic attitudes to conspiracy thinking. This cannot be ascertained using our interview data.

### 3.4 VIEWS ABOUT THE PLACE OF RELIGION IN SOCIETY

We asked respondents in all the adult samples about their views about the place of religion in society. This question was asked for the first time in the 2022 survey. The respondents were asked for their views about two statements: “Religious traditions should be adapted to the modern world to make them compatible with important principles such as equality” and “Religious freedom implies that religious communities should be free to practice their traditions”. Various rights and considerations related to questions about equality and religious freedom sometimes conflict with each other. While there is no contradiction implied between the statements in our study, the response distribution gives an indication of what most respondents consider to be most important.

and the Jewish sample (83 per cent in both) than among Muslims and non-Muslim immigrants (59 per cent and 74 per cent, respectively). There is also more uncertainty among Muslim respondents, 18 per cent of whom selected the option “impossible to answer”.

With the exception of the Muslim sample, the statement that religious communities should be free to practice their own traditions receives less support than the statement that religious traditions should be adapted to the modern world. The statement that religious communities should be free to practice their own traditions receives more support (70 per cent) among Muslim respondents, though the strongest support for this statement comes from the Jewish sample (77 per cent). The reason why large proportions of the minorities support this statement may be related to some central debates over Jewish and Islamic religious practices in recent years. The circumcision of baby boys has been the subject of heated debate, even at political level. Jews in Norway hold different views about circumcision, but prominent voices in the Jewish community have described the practice as an existential

Table 3.21 The place of religion in society (per cent)

Statement	Sample	Not at all	Rather badly	Impossible to answer	No response	Rather well	Completely	Completely + Rather well
Religious traditions should be adapted to the modern world to make them compatible with important principles such as equality.	Population 2022	2.2	5.7	7.6	1.5	34.3	48.7	83.0
	Jews 2022	0.8	3.7	5.2	7.5	44.0	38.8	82.8
	Muslims 2022	7.8	7.7	17.9	8.1	29.8	28.7	58.5
	Others 2022	5.1	4.9	10.9	4.9	23.8	50.4	74.2
Religious freedom implies that religious communities should be free to practice their traditions	Population 2022	8.5	21.2	11.1	1.0	45.8	12.5	58.3
	Jews 2022	3.7	6.0	6.0	7.5	50.8	26.1	76.9
	Muslims 2022	4.5	6.0	12.7	6.9	29.7	40.3	69.9
	Others 2022	10.6	15.3	14.8	5.5	33.9	20.0	53.9

Regarding the statement that religious traditions should be adapted to the modern world, the results show that a large majority of respondents support it. However, this support is more evident in the population sample

question. The debates have also engaged Muslim communities, and leaders from both minorities have united in making joint statements. The fact that support for the statement on religious practice is weaker in the



population sample may be because no corresponding need exists to defend practices in the majority society, for example in Protestant Christianity.

### 3.5 VARIATIONS IN INCIDENCE OF ANTISEMITISM AND ISLAMOPHOBIA

We analysed variations in the incidence of antisemitism and Islamophobia by social characteristics and views among the respondents. This analysis may provide clues as to what stimulates development of such attitudes. This is measured using the dichotomised combined indices of antisemitism and Islamophobia,

where a high value denotes a score of 2 or 3, indicating that the respondent has high values on at least two of the three subindices. Table 3.22 shows how, when defined in this manner, the proportion of respondents displaying high levels of antisemitism or high levels of Islamophobia varies between different groups in the population sample. Some of the results have already been presented above. We now summarise them along with the results for background variables such as age and gender and the significance of religion/religiosity for attitudes towards Jews and Muslims.

Table 3.22 Variation in antisemitism and Islamophobia between different groups: percentage with high scores on the combined indices (per cent, population 2022).

Variables	Values (index scores)	High antisemitism	High Islamophobia	Proportion of sample	Number (not weighted)
Gender	Male	6.1	25.1	50.4	846
	Female	2.9	15.5	49.6	807
Age	-29 years	3.9	14.7	19.6	199
	30-44 years	3.9	17.6	25.7	313
	45-59 years	3.0	24.3	25.7	439
	60+ years	6.8	23.1	29.0	702
Geographical region	Oslo and surrounding areas	3.5	16.2	25.4	403
	Rest of Eastern Norway	6.3	24.3	25.7	429
	Southern/Western Norway	4.8	19.8	31.0	509
	Trøndelag/Northern Norway	2.8	21.4	17.9	312
Education	Lower	5.5	26.1	59.8	1046
	University level	3.0	11.8	40.2	607
Belief in God	Yes	6.2	22.9	28.8	497
	No	3.9	18.9	45.5	713
	Not sure	3.7	19.9	25.7	443
Place of religion in own life	Very important	2.7	20.3	13.5	107
	Fairly important	5.6	26.3	23.3	200
	Neither important nor unimportant	5.9	24.0	39.4	353
	Not very important	2.5	19.9	16.2	141
	Not important at all	10.2	22.5	7.6	66

Variables	Values (index scores)	High antisemitism	High Islamophobia	Proportion of sample	Number (not weighted)
Support in Middle East conflict	Mostly Israel	1.0	48.1	9.3	163
	To some extent Israel	0.9	36.3	4.6	78
	Neither side	4.0	20.1	50.9	824
	To some extent Palestinians	3.6	11.3	12.1	201
	Mostly Palestinians	8.3	11.2	23.1	387
Pro-Israel	Weak (0-2)	8.5	18.3	20.4	338
	Medium (3-5)	3.3	18.1	68.1	1115
	Strong (6-8)	4.4	37.0	11.5	200
Pro-Palestine	Weak (0-2)	11.6	48.0	4.9	79
	Medium (3-5)	3.0	21.2	55.7	883
	Strong (6-8)	5.7	15.6	39.4	691
Anti-Israel	Weak (0-2)	2.3	28.1	23.8	405
	Medium (3-5)	3.1	14.7	59.5	962
	Strong (6-8)	12.6	29.4	16.7	286
Xenophobia	None	1.3	4.2	47.6	767
	Weak	3.5	16.7	22.2	378
	Some	5.1	33.9	14.5	233
	Medium	10.8	46.7	7.4	126
	Strong	18.9	75.7	8.3	149
Scepticism towards immigrants	None (0)	1.7	2.5	45.6	734
	Weak (1)	2.2	9.2	14.4	238
	Medium (2)	6.0	21.6	15.9	264
	Quite strong (3)	1.8	38.3	7.2	123
	Strong (4)	13.9	69.2	16.9	294
Conspiracy mentality	Low 0	1.9	13.5	58.4	969
	Medium 1-2	4.9	26.3	29.3	487
	High 3-8	15.8	38.3	12.3	197
All	Population 2017	5.5	27.0	100.0	1575
	Population 2022	4.5	20.3	100.0	1653

Table 3.23 Variation in antisemitism and Islamophobia between different groups (percentage with high scores on the combined indices) (per cent, population 2022).

Variables	Values (index scores)	High antisemitism	High Islamophobia	Proportion of sample	Number
Religious traditions should be adapted to the modern world	Does not fit	7.9	36.1	2.2	34
	Rather badly	9.9	33.6	5.8	88
	Rather well	3.2	18.9	34.8	590
	Completely	5.0	19.8	49.4	788
	Impossible to answer	2.2	17.0	7.8	128
Religious freedom implies that religious communities should be free to practice their traditions	Does not fit	7.8	38.6	8.6	134
	Rather badly	7.3	25.7	21.4	355
	Rather well	3.1	15.4	46.2	758
	Completely	6.0	16.0	12.7	193
	Impossible to answer	1.1	22.8	11.2	195

The results show that both antisemitism and Islamophobia are more common among men than among women, among people with low education than among people with high education, and among older people than among younger people. Regarding age distribution, antisemitism is most common in the older age group (60+) and Islamophobia among people aged above 45. It is unclear how religiosity influences attitudes, but antisemitism is least prevalent among respondents who report that religion is very important for them and Islamophobia is most prevalent among respondents who believe in God.

Moreover, antisemitism is most common among respondents with anti-Israel attitudes, and Islamophobia is most common among respondents who score high on the Pro-Israel index. Both antisemitism and Islamophobia are most common among respondents who score lowest on the pro-Palestine index. Both antisemitism and Islamophobia are also most common among respondents who score high on the indices of scepticism towards immigrants and xenophobia.

Table 3.23 shows how respondents' views about the place of religion in society correlate with attitudes towards Jews and Muslims. The results show that both antisemitism and Islamophobia are most prevalent among respondents who disagree that religious

communities should be free to practice their traditions. At the same time, these attitudes are also more prevalent among respondents who disagree that religious traditions should be adapted to the modern world, though the number of respondents is small. A possible explanation for this might be that these respondents are critical of religion generally or hold conservative views and therefore see no point in adapting traditions to the modern world. A critical view on religiosity may relate to negative attitudes towards Jews and Muslims as religious minorities.

Regarding attitudes among the minorities, we find that antisemitism in the Muslim sample is most prevalent among men and respondents with low education. We found no differences related to age. In the Jewish sample, Islamophobic attitudes are slightly more prevalent among men, older people and people with low education.

We also looked at how antisemitism and Islamophobia vary in different voter groups.

Table 3.24 Variation in antisemitism and Islamophobia between different voter groups (percentage with high scores on the combined indices). (Percentage of population 2017 and 2022 combined. Not weighted).

Parties	Antisemitism, high	Islamophobia, high	Number
Socialist Left Party (SV)	2.4	4.9	206
Red Party (R)	4.2	6.3	142
Green Party (MDG)	3.4	6.9	87
Liberal Party (V)	3.0	9.9	101
Christian Democratic Party (KrF)	1.1	14.9	87
Labour Party (Ap)	6.1	16.6	691
Not stated	4.7	23.8	684
Centre Party (SP)	5.7	27.0	230
Conservative Party (H)	5.9	32.9	660
Progress Party (FrP)	10.3	58.2	340




Figure 3.2 Variation in antisemitism and Islamophobia in different voter groups (Population 2022)

Progress Party voters score by far the highest on antisemitism and Islamophobia. The scores for voters of the Christian Democratic Party, Liberal Party and Socialist Left Party are at the opposite end of the scale.

Table 3.25 shows how attitudes towards Jews and Muslims correlate with media habits. Few clear

patterns emerge regarding antisemitism. However, high scores seem more common among those who follow alternative online newspapers Steigan.no and Resett.no and among those who do not follow NRK (Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation).

Table 3.25 Media habits and variation i antisemitism and Islamophobia (percentage with high scores on the combined indices). 0 means non-user (per cent). Population 2022.

Which news media do you follow?	Values (index scores)	High antisemitism	High Islamophobia	Proportion of sample	Number
0		5.0	18.1	37.9	663
VG		4.2	21.7	62.1	990
0		4.8	22.0	73.6	1219
Aftenposten		3.8	15.7	26.4	434
0		7.2	27.0	22.8	336
NRK		3.7	18.4	77.2	1317
0		4.9	17.7	51.4	815
TV2		4.1	23.1	48.6	838
0		4.4	17.9	81.9	1353
Nettavisen		5.1	31.1	18.1	300
0		4.5	20.8	93.4	1533
Klassekampen		4.3	13.1	6.6	120
0		4.4	18.9	96.7	1594
Resett		8.3	63.4	3.3	59
0		4.5	20.0	98.5	1628
Steigan.no		6.8	40.7	1.5	25
0		4.8	18.0	46.5	701
Local newspaper(s)		4.2	22.4	53.5	952
0		4.6	21.0	87.3	1459
International media		3.9	15.9	12.7	194

Respondents who follow the alternative news media Resett.no and Steigan.no score high on Islamophobia far more often than those who do not follow these media. Islamophobia is also more prevalent among respondents who follow local newspapers and Nettavisen and among those who follow TV2 than among those who do not. Islamophobia is also more prevalent among respondents who do not read Aftenposten or Klassekampen and among those who do not follow NRK.

The differences for antisemitism are small and may be random, while most of the differences for Islamophobia are marked and significant. Either way, it is important to point out that the results may be due to other differences between users and non-users of the various media such as education and political orientation and therefore not necessarily say anything

about the influence of media content on users' attitudes towards Jews and Muslims.



## 4. RESPONDENTS' VIEWS ABOUT THE CAUSE OF NEGATIVE ATTITUDES TOWARDS JEWS AND MUSLIMS

Respondents in all samples were asked an open-ended question about what they consider to be the cause of negative attitudes towards Jews and Muslims. This question was also asked in the two previous surveys in 2011 and 2017, but only of respondents who believed that such attitudes were prevalent. The data material used in the new survey is therefore considerably larger than in the previous ones. A total of 2,630 respondents answered the question “What do you think causes negative attitudes towards Jews?” and 2,954 answered the question “What do you think causes negative attitudes towards Muslims?”

*Table 4.1 Response distribution for open-ended questions on the cause of negative attitudes (N)*

Sample	Q53_O “What do you think is the cause of negative attitudes towards Jews?”	Q55_O “What do you think is the cause of negative attitudes towards Muslims?”
Population 2022	1141	1241
Jews 2022	110	103
Muslims 2022	436	525
Others 2022	287	337
Youth 2022	656	748
<b>Total</b>	<b>2630</b>	<b>2954</b>

The material has value as a supplement to the questionnaire’s pre-set response options by allowing for respondents’ own views and, potentially, for topics not covered in the questionnaire. Both antisemitism and Islamophobia are evolving phenomena, and open response options can help bring to light any trends. The material was analysed in two ways: first, a semantic analysis aimed at finding patterns followed by word searches in each of the respondent categories to identify the most prevalent or typical topics. The responses do not necessarily describe actual causes of negative attitudes, but rather the respondents’ views about what

underlies antisemitic and Islamophobic attitudes.

The responses to both questions can be grouped into two main categories according to where they place the cause of negative attitudes. The one category explains negative attitudes by pointing at the minorities themselves; their behaviour, traditions or general traits. The other category points at features of society around them, such as xenophobia in the population, negative media representations and group constructs. This general categorisation was also performed in the analyses from 2011 and 2017.<sup>15</sup> Explanations that placed the cause of attitudes with the minorities themselves often reflected negative views of Jews and Muslims among respondents, but could also contain nuances and reservations. As emerges in some of the examples presented below, responses recounting respondents’ thoughts about other people’s views were more ambivalent about what the respondents themselves thought.

There were wide variations in how much respondents wrote; some only jotted down a single word or sentence, while others wrote long paragraphs containing complex accounts of possible causes. Although the brief responses provide less basis for in-depth analysis, they are still interesting because they say something about an immediate association a respondent makes. Some responses also expressed finding the questions difficult, that there were multiple possible responses or that it was unclear why some people harbour negative attitudes.

15 See also HL-senteret (2012); Moe et al., (2016); Hoffmann & Moe (2017); Moe (2020) and Døving (2020).

#### 4.1 EXPLANATIONS FOR NEGATIVE ATTITUDES TOWARDS JEWS

The open-ended questions about the causes of negative attitudes towards Jews cover many of the same topics that were central in the two previous surveys (see Moe et al., 2016; Moe, 2020). At the same time, some new elements are highlighted, and perhaps particularly, a new emphasis that gives some indication of discursive trends associated with antisemitism as a topic and with broader public debates. Which topics this applied to will be discussed in the following sections.

##### A LINK TO ISRAEL

As in 2011 and 2017, the most widespread explanation for negative attitudes towards Jews was that they were related to Israel and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, the frequency with which such references were made varied between the samples. A clear majority of Jewish respondents who answered the question pointed to the conflict/Israel (78 of 110 responses). The same response was also widespread in the Muslim sample and in the population sample, but less so in the youth sample (72 of 656 responses).

How respondents conceived this link between Israel/the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and antisemitism also varied widely. Many respondents in the population sample believed that conflating Jews with Israel might partly explain negative attitudes. The material contains many responses indicating that the respondents' views of Jews were characterised by a negative impression of Israel and could therefore be seen as expressions of such links: "Their behaviour towards neighbouring countries and others who disagree with their policies", "Perhaps because of what they're doing in Palestine", "Their behaviour and outright bullying of the Palestinians", and "They use violence against Palestinian settlements" are some examples from the population sample. Some responses were very brief and therefore

provided little basis for interpretation, even though the references themselves were clear enough ("Israel" and "Occupation"). An association between Jews and the Middle East conflict is also the likely basis for this brief but concise response from a respondent in the population sample: "BELLIGERENT".

An unwarranted conflation of Israel with Jews was also a recurring topic in the Muslim sample. One informant emphasised the importance of precision when interpreting criticism: "It's important to distinguish between criticism of the State of Israel and people who are Jewish. If I criticise the State of Israel for its attitude towards the non-Jewish population of Israel and its aggressive relationship with its neighbours, that would not mean that I'm criticising Jews". Some examples from the Muslim sample also imply how Israeli policy towards the Palestinians is understood as a Jewish responsibility: "What are they doing in Palestine? How are they treating the Palestinians?", "That they use force on vulnerable groups, and occupation of other people's land" and "The world's biggest open prison is in Palestine; you have to be deaf and blind to not see how the Jews are treating the Palestinians".

Many respondents in the Jewish sample pointed to a conflation of Israel, Israeli policies and Jews where negative attitudes towards Israel manifest in antisemitism. Many of the responses specified what they considered to be the source of this influence by, for example, pointing to media bias or to attitudes in certain communities such as the political left wing or student groups or among Muslims. For example, one informant wrote: "They confuse what Israel does with what Norwegian Jews stand for. This is driven by the media, in my opinion, and by the left wing in Norwegian politics. They've set a different standard for Israel (Jews) than for other states (people)". This response alludes to the problems of generalising/conflating Israel with Jews (in Norway) and to a perception that expectations of Israel differ from those of other countries. The perceived



link between attitudes towards Israel and antisemitism is expressed by how the respondent adds “Jews” in brackets after “Israel”.

The fact that negative attention to Israel could in itself create negative attitudes is the topic of several responses from respondents in the Jewish sample: “Strong focus on Israel’s policies”, “A lot of negative statements in the media and the negative attitude towards the State of Israel” and “Israel’s policies, occupation of the West Bank, the way the media cover what goes on in Israel” are some examples.

#### THE HISTORY OF ANTISEMITISM

A connection that is often made across respondent categories is that between historical persecution of Jews, particularly during World War II, and negative attitudes towards Jews today. Some responses direct accusations against the Israelis, citing references to the Holocaust and Jewish persecution during World War II, while others point out that whatever sympathy the Jews had after the Holocaust was now lost. Accordingly, one respondent commented: “First they [the Jews] got loads of sympathy, but after a lot of brutal behaviour, people are losing this sympathy” (Muslim sample). Some responses also imply that Jews abuse the sympathy they received after World War II: “Maybe living to some extent on the bad conscience of the West after the war” (population sample). “Some may use World War II to get sympathy” is an example from the youth sample. Some mention that Jews still expect sympathy for something that is a closed chapter: “They still expect my sympathy for what happened in WW2. I wasn’t even born then,” wrote another respondent in the population sample. This comment implies that the respondent in question feels that they are held accountable for the injustice that was committed against the Jews and that this is unreasonable because the respondent has no personal blame for what happened. The Jews’ exploitation of the history of the Holocaust for their own benefit became

a well-known antisemitic trope after World War II. This view still has some support in the Norwegian population today. As we have seen, the statement “Jews exploit the memory of the Holocaust for their own benefit” was supported by 18 per cent of the population sample (see section 2.1).

Another form of historical reference found in the material is the claim that historical persecutions may be the source of negative attitudes towards Jews. For example, one respondent wrote: “Too much focus on World War II”. This brief response could be interpreted to mean that negative attitudes arose from excessive focus; that negative attitudes towards Jews are fuelled by the majority’s wish to put past injustices behind them. It could also be understood to mean that currents of thought – such as antisemitic propaganda – are kept alive by sustained attention. Both views were reflected several places in the material and, each in their own way, identify trends in antisemitism after the Holocaust.

References to World War II or Nazism are particularly prominent among respondents in the youth sample (171 responses). Some of the responses are quite lengthy, describing how respondents believe this history has influenced attitudes. They often mention continuity, where prejudices and attitudes have “survived” in, for example, neo-Nazi and right-wing extremist groups. Many respondents in the youth sample also point to “old attitudes” or “conservative views”, thereby implying that such ideas belong to the past, to old people and to ingrained attitudes: “Old people who maybe still hold the same views as during the war or neo-Nazis” is a typical example of such a response. Some responses seem to assert that the Holocaust and the Nazi persecution of the Jews created optimal conditions for negative attitudes rather than (just) being the result of such attitudes: “Because of the mark of WWII” and “The result of Nazism, old wisdom is passed down” are two examples of such responses from the youth sample. Other responses are very brief: “WWII”,

“Nazism” and “Hitler”. The many references to the war and “the past” in this sample may reflect the fact that education in schools relates primarily to antisemitism when teaching about World War II and that anti-Jewish attitudes are more seldom presented as a contemporary phenomenon. One respondent in the youth sample suggested that knowledge is limited, particularly about Judaism, and that attitudes are influenced by a one-sided focus on the Holocaust: “Insufficient knowledge about the religion. Most people only know about the Holocaust from World War II”.

#### THE POWER OF LANGUAGE

The responses from the youth sample indicate a conscious view of language, and that many have reflected on the effects which different statements can have, whether in the form of jokes or terms of abuse (use of the word “Jew” as a term of abuse was often mentioned). Several respondents described how something might be meant to be “humorous” but have an unintended effect and thereby help to spread negative views. “Many people joke about Jews” wrote one respondent; “Generalisations resulting from tasteless humour” wrote another. The idea that use of the word “Jew” as a term of abuse could be perceived as a joke was also a topic in the first attitude survey (HL-senteret, 2012, p. 27). When asked how they would interpret such language use, 20 per cent of respondents in the population sample stated that they would interpret it as “a joke”. The extent to which statements and actions are interpreted in such a way was also investigated in the youth survey in 2022 (see chapter 7 of the present report). One respondent in the youth sample pointed out that statements can have a meaning which the person expressing it is unaware of, and that they could be understood in many ways: “That the attitudes often operate in grey areas, where one can say that something was just a joke, but can also have a deeper meaning. Even if the person saying it is unaware of it”. As well as reflecting how attitudes are complex

and perhaps not fully considered by individuals, this comment bears witness to how unconscious statements contribute to antisemitic ideas being passed on culturally, even in societies with widespread anti-antisemitic norms. A more detailed account from the youth sample drew lines between different generations, statements and media channels:

*Jokes in primary school, like ‘Are you gay or what?’ or ‘Are you Jewish or what?’ Many YouTube videos and TikTok posts contain childish and racist comments, both in the comment fields and on other social media platforms. If you have racist grandparents or friends, this has a negative influence on you and you begin to behave like them.*

References to language as a cause of negative attitudes were not as prominent in the responses in the other three samples. The increased significance attached to this topic in 2022 is related to the fact that the youth sample is new in this survey. However, the assertion that it is primarily among youth that such language is used was made by respondents in other samples.

#### CONSPIRACY THEORIES

Conspiracy theories and misinformation are more prominent as explanations for negative attitudes in this material than they were in the previous attitude surveys. This may be because milieus supporting conspiracy theories and the threat such milieus pose to democracy have received wide attention in recent years, perhaps particularly through political unrest in the United States. The spread of conspiracy theories in connection with the COVID-19 pandemic has also received wide attention, and has partly been related to antisemitism. Nonetheless, these are still far less common than responses that refer to Israel and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Overall, just under 100 (of 2,630) responses contain words such as

“conspiracy” and “conspiracy theories” or mention that Jews have hidden, or an especially/disproportionately large amount of, power.

The material from this survey contains both responses expressing respondents’ own support for such ideas and responses identifying conspiracy theories as a problem and something which others believe in. The following response from a respondent in the population sample seems to express support for the idea that Jews are working behind the scenes: “New World Order, the Bilderberg Group, control the press, the central banks and take long steps to avoid wearing out their shoes”.

The responses that mention conspiracy theories tend to place such ideas in a historical context. Negative attitudes towards Jews are then described as a continuation of elements from Nazi ideology or from even further back in time. “Good old-fashioned racism plus old Nazi conspiracy theories” is one example from the population sample. “Old conservative ideas and conspiracy theories from 40-50-year-old arrogant people on Facebook” is one example from the youth sample of how conspiracy theories are placed both in the past and in (slightly) older people. Antisemitism’s characteristic mix of old ideas and new adaptations is alluded to in this response, again from the population sample: “Increasing fascism and right-wing extremism. Old prejudices about Jews and new conspiracy theories about Jews (e.g. ‘globalists’ and ‘reptiles’)”. One respondent from the Muslim sample reflects on how social distance can help keep ideas like these alive: “Lack of knowledge about and personal relationships with Jews. Some conspiracy theories that have abounded over time. Without Jews in one’s circle of friends, maybe those theories are not confronted often enough”.

#### TRADITIONAL STEREOTYPES AND ANTI-JUDAISM

The material from all the respondent categories contains several examples of traditional stereotypes of Jews, such as references to Jews being stingy, obsessed with money and caring only about themselves. The descriptions of Judaism sometimes reflect ancient topics, for example that Judaism is very strict or that Jews represent a closed group in society by virtue of their religion or more specific notions of traits or behaviour. One respondent in the population sample wrote: “Think it’s because they have a very strict religion and they can often isolate themselves from modern society and then they appear very alien to most people”. Another wrote: “Because they crucified Jesus, among other things”. The following responses also reflect conceptions of Jews and Judaism that used to be widespread (both examples taken from the youth sample): “They think they’re God’s people, and therefore say that they are better than everyone else, in a way” and “Their religion is very brutal, and they are slaves to their god”.

Some respondents also mentioned Judaism as a religion without expressing such traditional ideas. Several respondents link negative attitudes to a “foreign” religion. The responses indicate that antisemitism is interpreted in a broader context that also encompasses views about other religious minorities, as illustrated by these two examples from the youth sample: “Unfamiliar religion in Norway” and “Generally negative attitudes towards both foreign ethnicities and religions”. One respondent in the population sample alluded to an alienation from religion in general: “Have a general dislike of religious people, Jews, Christians, Muslims, etc.” The 2022 survey showed a large increase in the proportion of responses that refer to Judaism, religion and religiosity compared with those of 2011 and 2017.<sup>16</sup> It is not easy to know the reason for this change. It may reflect the fact

16 The keywords “relig\*”, “Judaism” and “Jesus\*” gave 145 hits in 2022 and 14 hits in 2011 and 2017 combined (n= 633 in 2011/2017 combined).

that the 2022 survey asked more questions about views about religious traditions or it may speak to the wider public attention given to religiosity and issues dealing with religious freedom and attitudes towards religious minorities. In this sense the responses are characterised by a public debate which otherwise largely refers to Islam and attitudes towards Muslims. In addition to a “foreign religion”, some respondents cited xenophobia as the background for negative attitudes towards Jews. However, this was a far more common response to the question about the cause of negative attitudes towards Muslims (see below).

Envy is another recurring topic in the material, across respondent categories. The reason for the connection drawn to negative attitudes is that Jews are seen as clever, and provoke dislike motivated by envy. Positive stereotypes of Jews as smart, clever and highly successful in many arenas have also underlain portrayals of Jews as a threat to society. Such ideas serve as a premise for conspiratorial ideas of Jewish power and intrigue. One impression of Jews as an elite group was expressed by a respondent in the Muslim sample, who simultaneously argued that Jews have made important contributions to the development of mankind: “Elite minority. Without their innovations in nuclear physics, Google, Facebook, Hollywood and financial institutions, we would still be living in the Middle Ages ...”. One respondent in the population sample expressed irritation at what they saw as particularly high self-esteem among Jews: “Have yet to meet a Jew who doesn’t make a big deal about being Jewish. OMG Becky, we don’t care”. The response is not very specific, but can perhaps be viewed in connection with accusations that Jews exploit their history of victimhood and sympathy from outsiders, as referred to above.

#### RELATIONS BETWEEN JEWS AND MUSLIMS

A total of 118 responses contain references to Muslims. Some of them describe Muslims as carriers of antisemitic

attitudes, which partly makes antisemitism appear as an “imported problem”. This was also found in 2017, when references to attitudes among Muslims were more prominent than they had been in the material from 2011. Some examples from the population sample in the 2022 survey are: “Conflict between Jews and Muslims”, “It probably comes mostly from Muslims, many are taught to hate Jews according to TV” and “Think it occurs mostly in Muslim communities”. The response “A bit unsure, don’t think the Muslims are the reason” both hints at what the respondent immediately consider to be the cause and expresses distance from this explanation. The response “They took land from the Muslims”, which was also written by a respondent in the population sample, can be interpreted as an assertion about where such attitudes primarily can be found (namely among Muslims) but also as a picture of how the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is often framed as a conflict between Jews and Muslims – “they” in the quote refers to the Jews – and that this negatively influences attitudes towards Jews.

One respondent in the youth sample described the situation at their old school and simultaneously referred to a broader picture that included Muslims and orthodox Christians: “Muslims and orthodox (Poles, Balkan, Serbia, etc.) hold a grudge against them and use ‘Jew’ as an everyday term of abuse at my former school where 90 per cent of the pupils had foreign backgrounds”. One respondent from the Muslim sample wrote a rather long answer in which they touched on both the impact of the conflict on attitudes towards Jews and the potential for fellowship between Jews and Muslims:

*I think there are many Jews who suffer as a direct consequence of the State of Israel, unfortunately. People don’t distinguish between state and religion. Israel’s warfare, infringements and continuing violations of human rights and international law have negative consequences*

*for the Jews, unfortunately. The Jews themselves, many of them, don't even support what the state does. It's regrettable to see that the Jews suffer as a result of the occupying force Israel. Muslims and Jews will manage to coexist without any problems. We have a lot in common in our religions: circumcision, kosher/halal, belief in God.*

One respondent in the Muslim sample suggested there was a difference in what lay behind antisemitic attitudes in different parts of the population: "It stems from Christianity for Norwegians, and the Zionist policy for Muslims", and "Old people who are conservative and don't want to accept customs and ways of living other than the Christian ones. And Muslims who blame Israel for the conflict" are two examples of this view.

Various national histories emerged in some of the responses. For example, one respondent from Albania expressed pride over the country's efforts for the Jewish minority during World War II: "Racism is still alive among Europeans. I come from Albania, the only country in Europe that hid Jews from Nazism. I have been taught to respect Jews. You become what you learn".

Another pattern emerged in the way in which respondents compare attitudes towards Jews and to Muslims or referred to their previous answers to the question about the causes of negative attitudes towards Muslims ("same as above") to indicate that the causes of negative attitudes are the same whether they are towards Jews or Muslims. However, one respondent in the Muslim sample saw a difference in how Jews and Muslims were treated: "Find that Jews are discussed sensitively, a lot of sympathy for their story without realising that the same story is playing out right now against the Muslims". The comparison between the Jews' and the Muslims' stories of victimhood that are made in this quotation pits these stories against each other in a way that resembles the statement we discussed

above, where Israel's treatment of the Palestinians is equated with the Nazi's treatment of the Jews during World War II. At the same time, the quotation implies a perception of differences in the treatment of Jews and Muslims today. This perception is also reflected in other parts of the survey. As we will see, 36 per cent of the Muslim respondents believe that Norwegian authorities treat Jews better than they treat Muslims (see chapter 5).

#### **OPPOSITION TO ANTISEMITISM**

While many respondents distanced themselves from negative attitudes by describing them as expressions of prejudice or ignorance, some took the opportunity to argue explicitly against negative attitudes. Some answers are brief and primarily express the view that negative attitudes towards Jews are difficult to understand: "It's a mystery to me!". Others give more detailed explanations for why they believe that negative attitudes are wrong. For example, one respondent in the Muslim sample wrote: "It's difficult to say but we're all humans and we must respect each other. We must be careful not to say [something] negative about religion or colour. Jews, Islam, Christianity, Hinduism, etc., all of them. Respect is important". This answer indicates that the respondent sees common features between different negative attitudes and maybe has had personal experience as a member of a religious minority that formed a frame of reference for the explanation for antisemitism.

\*

To sum up, the analysis shows many of the same tendencies we found in 2011 and 2017, though with some shifts when it came to topics that were more common in 2022, such as references to conspiracy theories and religion. In this way, the responses reflect current topics in the wider public debate. A tendency to point to "the others" as carriers of negative attitudes emerges in the material, for example when respondents from the youth sample assert that negative attitudes are primarily

historical or the reserve of “old people” or when adult respondents underline the language used by young people. At the same time, the material contains many examples of critical reflection; for example, respondents refer to problematic attitudes among “we Norwegians” or “we Muslims”. There are also close similarities between the samples with regard to topics; differences in the explanations are more typically found between respondents within the same sample rather than between respondent groups.

#### 4.2 EXPLANATIONS FOR NEGATIVE ATTITUDES TOWARDS MUSLIMS

One-sided representations of Islam and Muslims in the media, Islamic terrorism and general prejudice in the population serve as the most common explanations for negative attitudes towards Muslims. In other words, a substantial majority of the 2,954 respondents attribute the causes of negative attitudes to wider society and not to “Muslims’ behaviour”. Still, some differences emerge between the respondent categories. The population sample stands out with its larger proportion of responses attributing the cause of negative attitudes to Muslim traits, while the youth and Muslim samples in particular attribute it to media slants and prejudices. We will now take a closer look at the topics that characterise the responses across the respondent categories and highlight some examples of how the topics are assessed and expressed in the respective respondent categories.

##### PREJUDICE AND XENOPHOBIA

References to prejudice, xenophobia and lack of knowledge in the population sample account for just over 1,000 responses. Several of the brief responses contain only a few words, such as “prejudice” or “lack of knowledge”, but most of them tend towards generalising mechanisms like this one: “Prejudice,

myths and people’s lack of ability to see the difference between religious extremism and ‘ordinary’ Muslims” and: “Xenophobia and little willingness/ability to accept other customs and cultures”.

In the Muslim sample, words such as “misinformation” and “disinformation” are used repeatedly to explain prejudices: “People simply have zero knowledge about the religion”. Expressions such as “pigeonholing everyone” and “tar everyone with the same brush” recurred in several responses. If we include words such as “exclusion” and “isolation”, around 100 of the 525 responses from Muslims make explicit references to conditions within Norwegian society or to Norwegians’ behaviour. Religion accounts for another dimension in responses that point to Norwegian society: “Generally a negative attitude towards religion. That there’s no place for it in a modern society and Muslims are maybe the most visible religious group”. The cause cited here is that Muslims represent religiosity in a society that rejects religion. However, the most common reference to religion dealt with how Islam is misunderstood: “[...] Islam is often projected as a strict religion with no freedom and looks down on women and all that; it’s not like that at all”.

The youth sample stands out by having the largest proportion of responses highlighting xenophobia, prejudice, stereotypes and racism: 250 of 748 responses. Several responses contain only one word, such as “prejudice” or “xenophobia” while others give more detailed explanations: “Most Norwegians know way too little about other religions and life stances. We have prejudices and are afraid of encountering new views”, and “I think far too many Norwegians hold prejudices against people who are not like us or who don’t believe in the same things as we do”. The word “racism” is not used as often as “prejudice” and “xenophobia”, though it occurs in 38 of the responses, which is more frequent than in the other respondent categories: “Racism and discriminatory treatment” and “racist family members

and friends”, and “underlying racism” are examples of this. The responses in the youth sample often criticise Norwegians’ behaviour: “People like to feel they’re better than others and therefore have a need to bad-mouth people who can’t help where they come from”. The criticism mentions older peoples’ attitudes relatively often, as in these responses: “Old conservative people who get all their news from Facebook” and “[...] general racism from the old days, and old people and people from small villages who never see diversity”. A form of moral distance from negative attitudes is easy to discern in this category of responses from youth.

As many as 40 out of 103 responses in the Jewish sample mention prejudice. Prejudice is clearly linked to lack of knowledge and, more Jewish respondents than the other categories explain this with a lack of understanding of religion and religious customs in Norway: “Prejudice and that fact that people with secular backgrounds find it difficult to understand and accept religious customs”, and “Xenophobia. Lack of knowledge about Muslims, which can give rise to prejudices and stereotypes”. Although lack of knowledge is the most common explanation for prejudice, “racism” is also used in some of the responses, such as this one: “That people are racists and are unable to see others as humans”. The words “Norwegian” and “Norway” are mentioned in 19 responses in this sample. Several mention how Norwegians are preoccupied with homogeneity, fear the unknown and have “[too] little knowledge about the value of ‘the other’s’ point of view”: “Norwegians’ need to find reassurance through all of us having to be so alike”. The subject of a secular Norway is also brought up: “In addition, I think that Norway’s secular culture, where the Christian cultural heritage is often underplayed, means that people have less understanding of traditions, cultures and customs of religious groups than they used to”. It is reasonable to interpret the frequent references to Norwegian cultural heritage and things Norwegian as a result of the fact that the responses come from a

group of respondents that have personal experience as a minority. Identification between Jews and Muslims by virtue of being exposed to false ideas is also mentioned, as in this response:

*Xenophobia, Norwegian centricity, incorrect content in the school curriculum for religion and in the media. Some examples: the false notions of Muslims as terrorists and of Jews and Muslims being (and having to be) enemies, and that all Muslims are Arabs and that all Arabs are Muslims...*

#### THE MEDIA

The reference that occurs most frequently across the samples is to “the media”. The responses dealing with the media in the population sample often mention generalisations made in the wake of recent news stories. Two typical examples from the population sample are: “If you have no knowledge about people with different religious views, the voice of the media becomes so loud that people think terrorism and all that is something all Muslims live by and believe in” and “[...] with the media’s sensationalist take on the crime rate in Oslo, people in more rural areas don’t have any opportunities to challenge their prejudice in practice”. Some of the responses to questions dealing with the media also mention the political far right and alternative media in this landscape: “Media, Progress Party, SIAN, Resett, Hege Storhaug”. Most of the population sample’s responses to media questions bring up the tendency to focus excessively on negative aspects of Muslims: “[...] you don’t often see dancing liberal Muslims on TV” and “The media, they only focus on the few who do something wrong. More should be told about ‘ordinary’ people”.

The media are the most frequently cited explanation in the Muslim sample. A keyword search for “media” gave 303 hits in the 525 responses. If we add words such as “news”, “press” and “TV”, approximately 60 per cent of

the responses cite the media as a key cause. Examples of brief responses in this category are: “MEDIA, MEDIA AND MEDIA” and “Media that put Muslims in a bad light”. More than half of the responses that mention the media associate them with other causes, such as prejudice and xenophobia more generally. As in the population sample, some of the responses here also regard the media as a cause because they provide a platform for politicians with negative views of Muslims. These types of responses often mention organisations such as SIAN [Stop Islamisation of Norway] and Human Rights Service (HRS). Still, the majority of the responses blame the media’s demand for attention. Several responses also ask why good Muslims are not given more coverage in the media. Here are two typical examples: “It’s because the media focus on extremists and their views. Because the media want to sell news stories. Muslims who work and pay their tax and live their lives in peace and harmony don’t sell newspapers” and “[There are] many Muslims who do a really good job in Norway [...] But if it’s a Muslim that does something wrong, it makes the headlines [...]”.

After the terrorist attacks in Norway on 22 July 2011, Norwegian media houses changed what was up until then the standard practice of disclosing religious or ethnic identity. Despite that, several responses assert that “every time someone does something wrong, the media write ‘the man was Muslim’ or ‘a Muslim man’” and “There have been many cases where a white perpetrator was declared mentally ill for the same offence as a non-white person. When it comes to immigrants, it’s always Islam that’s blamed – even in the case of mentally ill people” and “If someone has committed a crime and that person is a Muslim or has foreign roots, that is emphasised in the case”. With regard to the above-mentioned change in press ethics, it is reasonable to assume that the explanation lies in the circulation of news stories; when a perpetrator’s identity is not mentioned in an initial news story, the name or identity

will often crop when the news story is circulated online.

Seventy-eight out of 749 respondents in the youth sample cited media coverage as a cause. The media landscape is blamed for prejudice: “The media and the internet spread false messages about Muslims, and people hear bad things about Muslims from other people and believe them”. The view that the media “spread” and “lead to” generalisations is explicit in the responses.

The media make up an important part of the explanations for negative attitudes towards Muslims in the Jewish sample, too. “The press’ excessive focus on lineage”. The media are accused of presenting a biased image that impacts Muslims in Norway: “Confusing rhetoric in the media, that racists are given airtime with no critical questions asked”.

#### **TERRORISM AND CONFLICTS OUTSIDE NORWAY**

The most typical reference in the population sample is to “terrorism”, and it is found both in responses attributing the cause to Muslims (“Muslims are terrorists”) and in responses attributing the cause to generalisations in the population: “Some believe that terrorists and Muslims are one and the same”. The generalisation mechanism is often elaborated in responses citing terrorism: “[...] the negative reputation which a small group of Muslims create for this religion. Terrorism, strict sharia laws”. Some responses are more neutral: “You see terrorism on the news and get scared”. Wars in other countries, the Middle East and the global situation are often mentioned in connection with terrorism. A relatively large number of responses thus attribute the causes of negative attitudes to incidents that took place outside Norway.

Incidents in other countries are also cited as explanations by the Muslim sample: war, corruption, fundamentalism and poor leadership in Muslim-dominated countries such as Saudi Arabia and Iran are cited as specific examples, in the same way as terrorist



organisations in other countries are: “All the wars in the Middle East. All the wars in the Muslim countries + IS’ barbaric acts”. The cause of negative attitudes is thus implicitly attributed to the generalisation mechanism which the respondent believes to be at play. One such mechanism explicitly emerges in the responses that directly cite terrorism as the source. The word “terrorism” occurs in 62 responses, but if we add “IS”, “Taliban” and “Al-Qaida”, close to a hundred responses (out of a total of 525) claim that terrorist incidents and organisations have led to negative attitudes towards Muslims: “Because of the terrorists who represent Islam ... they’re not really, they exploit Islam for their own interests” and “stupid people who use religion for terrorism”. The terrorist attacks that took place on 11 September 2001 are mentioned in 12 of the responses, and despite the fact that it is now 20 years ago, the date still serves as a reference to the source of an ongoing negative focus. One interesting feature of the responses referring to terrorism is that expressions of regret are often added, such as “unfortunately, Muslims are ...” or explanations of how terrorism and violence are forbidden in Islam.

Terrorism is also emphasised as a cause in 174 of the 748 responses in the youth sample. Terrorism is mentioned first and foremost in responses dealing with prejudice: “Stereotypes. Many think they are terrorists” or “Terrorist organisations destroy their reputation because this is widely covered in the media”. Like the responses from the Muslim respondents, the respondents in the youth sample also point out that prejudice based on terrorism is wrong; in other words, they rectify an image they believe to be widespread.

In the Jewish sample, prejudice is often explained by referring to terrorism as the original cause (in 30 of the 103 responses). “[...] generalisations based on the picture of terrorism the West has formed”. The Jewish respondents highlight incidents in other countries relatively often, and when they do so they make

references to the media. “Generalisations based on negative media coverage. The unfavourable examples provided by radicalised violent Muslims. Violent episodes in the Middle East”.

#### **RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM, CONSPIRACY THEORIES AND RACISM**

We find the word “racism” in 25 of the 1,241 responses in the population sample. There are very few references to right-wing extremism but, combined with references to groups like SIAN and to politics in general, we find approximately 40 responses citing ideology as a cause, such as: “Xenophobia and right-wing extremist propaganda that has spread inside conservative circles and are rife on Facebook and elsewhere online” and “Enemy images, racism and prejudices are polarised against Muslims in large parts of society and are supported by the authorities”.

A slightly larger percentage of the responses in the Muslim sample cite ideological position as a cause. The word “racism” occurs in responses 11 times, “Islamophobia” five times and “right-wing extremism” seven times. If we add references to Islam and organisations that criticise Muslims (such as SIAN and HRS), references to ideological positions are included as a cause of negative attitudes in approximately 50 of the 525 responses; for example: “[...] groups like SIAN that spread fear propaganda against Muslims (and foreigners generally)”, “Conspiracy theories such as ‘Eurabia’ are legitimised when people who promote them receive public funding, such as Hege Storhaug and HRS”, “The growth of right-wing populism and right-wing extremism in recent years, and the acts carried out by Islamists”, and “Eurabia and many other conspiracy theories”.

As already mentioned, racist attitudes are cited as the cause in the youth sample, but these are ascribed to older generations rather than to an expressed ideological position. The responses in the Jewish sample also contain few references to right-wing movements.

**CAUSES PLACED INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE GROUP**

A combination of explanations is found largely in the responses from the youth sample, where some deal with Islam or the behaviour of Muslims and some with attitudes among Norwegian: “Extremism, things that are written in the Koran, terrorism and general racism”, and “Prejudice, and that many ‘Muslims’ use religion in the wrong way/do bad things”. More than half of the 138 responses (of 748) that refer to the minority itself exemplify this combination of explanations. Such responses from the youth sample are often modified, as in these examples: “Their religion takes a slightly more traditional, conservative view on a few things” and “These views don’t always fit with modern Norwegian culture” or give explanations such as:

“Muslims in Norway generally come here as refugees. They bring with them a sense of insecurity from their own countries that leads to more thefts and crime. They’re also often in poorer communities that lead them to crime”. In other words, these responses explain why some become criminals rather than saying that they are criminals.

Twenty-nine of the 103 responses from Jewish respondents mention challenging aspects of Islam or Muslims, but one-third of these are part of combined explanations. For example, a single response could contain the words “xenophobia” and “Islamophobia” while simultaneously pointing out that “Muslims’ values conflict with ‘Western values’ like equality, freedom of religion and freedom of speech”. Another example is a response that highlights face coverings and honour killings yet simultaneously singles out Islamophobia as a cause.

**“MUSLIMS ARE ...”: WHEN THE CAUSE LIES SOLELY WITH THE MUSLIMS**

Compared with the other respondent groups, the population sample has a larger proportion of responses that attribute the cause of negative attitudes to the minority itself; 467 out of 1,241 responses made assertions about “Muslims’ behaviour” to explain the cause. The wording in the responses give reason to interpret them as the respondents’ personal views. Responses in this category typically list traits of so-called Muslim culture and lifestyle or of Islam: “A completely different culture that clashes with the cultural and religious values on which our democracy is built. Sometimes little willingness to adapt to Norwegian society, laws and traditions. Can in certain situations seem extremely demanding”. Islam is presented as old-fashioned or fanatical: “Because it’s a religion that is stuck in the Middle Ages”. Islam is sometimes described as an agent that refuses to adapt to liberty and democracy. Islam is also described as the direct reason why Muslims do not fit in: “[...] religious rites that prevent integration”. The fact that they are different seems to justify negative attitudes: “Many Muslims are very religious and don’t understand Norwegian culture. Maybe they shouldn’t have come to Europe”.

The view that “they” neither could nor would be integrated also recurs in responses in the population sample: “THEY can’t adapt to Norwegian society” or “That very many will not adapt to Norwegian culture and way of life”. In this response we see how Muslims are ascribed a motive for not wanting to integrate: “Unwillingness to adapt to Norwegian culture and Norwegian conditions in society”. “Their views about women”, as one respondent asserts, is a recurring expression, and one that is often linked to crime: “Terrorism. Oppression of women. Criminal sons. Forced marriage. Circumcision. Inbreeding” or “The religion’s views about equality, culturally conditioned barbaric acts also called circumcision, covering of women,

difficult for women to freely choose a partner [...]”. In general, it seems that “Muslims’ views about women” in particular trigger a litany of negative traits.

“Violent Muslims” is another trope in this category of responses found in the population sample: “A lot of violence among them and they work each other up” or “Muslims are behind much of the violence in society”. The religion of Islam is often cited as the cause of this violence: “Islam is a dangerous religion”. But Muslims’ mentality is itself another explanation: “Bring a lot of crime and violence with them, because they have a totally different set of values from that of Western Europe” and “Killing in God’s name, revenge, defence of the family’s honour [...]”. Several responses refer to Muslims’ lack of respect for Norwegian law or that they are overrepresented in crime statistics. Muslim culture is described as barbaric and fanatical in these responses, a tendency that can be related to the fact that 26 per cent of the population sample state that Muslims are more violent than others (see section 2.2).

Around one-tenth of the 748 responses in the youth sample lack some nuance which otherwise characterises the material in this sample. Such responses consist of statements about Muslims which can be read as expressions of prejudiced attitudes among the respondents themselves: “They’re terrorists and oppress women and have attitudes and customs that don’t fit in in Norway” and “Many highly religious individuals who criticize/press onto non-believers and Christians. Often associated with gang violence”. Crime and violence seem to be the most frequent references in this category of responses from the youth sample: “They think Norway is criminal and have to act tough. This doesn’t apply to everyone, of course. And not to be rude, but after immigrants crime has also risen a bit” and “Many are criminals and violent”. Some responses mention the lack of willingness to integrate and the different culture, but references to culture are less prominent compared with those in the population

sample. For example, Muslims’ views about women, which is one of the most common explanations given in the responses from the population sample, is much less prominent in responses in the youth sample (occurred in 18 responses in total).

In the Jewish sample, 29 out of 103 responses mention traits pertaining to “the Muslims” as explanations but, like the youth sample, the majority of these responses are more nuanced in that they divide the cause between prejudice in the population and Muslim culture. According to 18 of the responses, however, the cause is due solely to traits in Muslims: “Overrepresentation in statistics for crime, benefit recipients and poor integration” or “Muslims demand special treatment. Muslims use the word ‘offended’ at every opportunity”. Only one of the responses in this category refers to Muslims as a threat to Jews: “[...] For Jews it’s probably because they know that many Muslims hate Jews and that the Muslims pray five times a day for the Jews to die”.

Prejudice and xenophobia are the most commonly cited causes in all respondent categories except the Muslims, where the media are identified as the main cause. In other words, the discourses on Muslims are considered to be the cause of negative attitudes. Furthermore, it emerges that the population sample has the most responses attributing the cause to the minority itself.

One feature of the responses in the youth sample that distinguishes it from the others is that they demonstrate some caution in the form of expressions such as “I think it may be due to ...”. When the responses highlight aspects of Islam or Muslims, they too are often nuanced with wording such as “many think that Muslims are ...”. It is reasonable to assume that contemporary society’s established debates on attitudes towards minorities in general have created a high level of awareness among youth.

The presence of the word “racism” alongside references to right-wing extremism and conspiracy theories in explanations of causes, which occurs in all the respondent groups, can be seen as the result of recent years’ focus on racism in the Norwegian and international public spheres. The establishment of action plans by the Norwegian authorities in which Islamophobia is related to racism, the public discourse in connection with the tenth anniversary of the 22 July terrorist attacks in which extremism and conspiracy theories were raised in many channels, and last but not least, the strong focus on racism following the revival of the Black Lives Matter movement in the spring of 2020; all reasonable explanations for why the causes of negative attitudes towards Muslims are being placed in a wider context.

In other words, negative discourses stand out in all the respondent groups as a cause of Islamophobia but most prominently in the Muslim sample. It is interesting that keyword searches for institutions, such as “police\*”, “health service\*” and “school\*” result in hits in only one or two responses. Thus, attitudes and practices within public institutions do not emerge as a central source of negative attitudes towards Muslims (for example, as a result of what one learns at school or what the police say about Muslims).

The Jewish sample stands out in the way in which critical distance is applied to use of the words “Norwegian” and “Norway”. Relatively speaking, a large number of responses contain negative features of a form of Norwegian ethnocentrism, and we see a minority identity in this type of response. We also find a similarly critical view on Norwegian society in the youth sample. As already shown, distinctive features of the youth’s responses are their explicit rejection of prejudice and their demonstration of a moral position. To them, being young and having better attitudes than the generation before them seems to be part of the respondents’ self-awareness.

Considering that 25 per cent of the population sample in the quantitative survey supports the statement that Muslims want to take over Europe, few responses in this material refer to Muslims wanting to take over society. Only around 10 responses in the population sample attribute the cause of negative attitudes to the belief that Muslims will or are about to take over the country. The term “Islamisation by stealth” occurs only once in the entire material (in a response from a Muslim respondent). It is also worth noting that an insignificant number of respondents assert that Muslims economically exploit the country, which is a well-known stereotype.

Hate towards and harassment of Muslims are common in social media (Nadim, 2022). In light of this, it is worth pointing out that a clearly readable and emotional hatred of Muslims as a threat (readable in the form of block letters, references to violence and dehumanising expressions) does not characterise the responses that attribute the cause to Muslims (this occurred frequently in the material from 2017). The hateful responses urge for Muslims to be removed from the country because we cannot “know who’s walking around like ticking bombs” or reel off a list of words, such as: “Sharia, covering, views about women, beheading, halal, paedophilia, child marriage, polygamy, what’s the point of praying five times a day?, view on Western population, foreign element”. Although such statements do not characterise the material, they are part of it, first and foremost in the population sample. In the youth’s responses, we find only three that explicitly singled out Muslims as a threat to Norwegian culture.

## 5. JEWS AND MUSLIMS IN NORWAY: RELATIONS AND EXPERIENCES

The respondents in the two minority samples (the Jewish and the Muslim respondents) were asked about their experiences of negative attitudes, exclusion and discrimination. They were also asked whether there were occasions when they avoided showing their religious affiliation and about how they perceived representations of their respective religions in the public sphere. All the questions were also asked in 2017, apart from the question about religion in the public sphere.

The results for 2022 show that there has been an increase in the number of negative experiences in both groups. A perceived negative trend was also found in the surveys conducted among Muslims and Jews in other European countries (see, for example, FRA, 2017; FRA, 2018).

Moreover, Muslims more commonly report negative experiences than do Jews, but far more Jews than Muslims report that they sometimes avoid showing their religious affiliation out of fear of negative attitudes. Again, it is important to emphasise that the large differences between the Jewish and the Muslim samples make direct comparisons of the results difficult.

### 5.1 COOPERATION IN COMBATING PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION

The Jewish and the Muslim samples were asked whether they believed that Jews and Muslims could cooperate in combating prejudice and discrimination. A large majority of both samples believed this was possible in both 2017 and 2022, and more so in 2022 than in 2017. Eighty-four per cent of the Jewish sample answered “yes” to this question in 2022. The corresponding proportion in the Muslim sample was 75 per cent. Uncertainty is larger among the Muslim respondents, but there is a marked decrease in the proportion that answers “don’t know” in 2022.

Table 5.1 Cooperation in combating prejudice and discrimination (per cent)

	Sample	Yes	Don't want to answer/NA	Don't know	No	Total
Do you think that Jews and Muslims can cooperate in combating prejudice and discrimination?	Jews 2017	81.5	2.4	7.4	8.6	100.0
	Jews 2022	84.3	3.7	6.7	5.2	100.0
	Muslims 2017	69.5	6.8	19.6	4.1	100.0
	Muslims 2022	75.4	6.9	12.2	5.5	100.0

## 5.2 PERCEPTIONS OF SHARED EXPERIENCES

We also asked respondents in the two minority samples whether they believed that Jews and Muslims had any shared experiences as minorities in Norway. This question was also asked in the 2017 survey.

A large majority of both samples believe that Jews and Muslims have some shared experiences as minorities in Norway. The proportion of the Jewish sample that believe this is larger (84 per cent), though the Muslim sample shows a marked increase since 2017 (from 48 per cent to 61 per cent). At the same time, the proportion of the Muslim sample that is unsure has decreased. The Jewish sample shows a decrease in the proportion that answer “no” to this question.

## 5.3 PERSONAL EXPERIENCES IN THE PAST 12 MONTHS

We asked the Jewish and Muslim respondents whether they had had negative experiences in the past 12 months. The respondents were asked whether they had experienced being made to feel that they do not belong in Norwegian society, being rejected because of their religious affiliation or being harassed on account of such affiliation.

As shown in the table, most of the respondents reported “rarely” or “never” having experienced any of these situations. Nonetheless, the results show an increase in such experiences between 2017 and 2022, with the exception of experiences of harassment in the Jewish sample.

Table 5.2 Perceptions of shared minority experiences (per cent)

Do you think that Muslims and Jews/Jews and Muslims have any shared experiences as minorities in Norway?	Sample	Yes	Don't want to answer/NA	Don't know	No	Total
	Jews 2017	74.7	3.1	4.9	17.3	100.0
	Jews 2022	83.5	3.0	6.0	7.5	100.0
	Muslims 2017	48.1	6.3	39.9	5.8	100.0
	Muslims 2022	61.2	7.9	23.5	7.4	100.0

Table 5.3 Personal experiences in the past 12 months (per cent)

In the past 12 months, have you experienced:	Sample	Often	Sometimes	Rarely	Never	No response	Total	Often + Sometimes
... that people give you the feeling of not belonging in Norwegian society?	Muslims 2017	9.5	26.0	30.2	32.0	2.3	100.0	35.5
	Muslims 2022	11.6	31.7	29.9	25.5	1.2	100.0	43.3
	Jews 2017	4.9	22.8	30.9	41.4	0.0	100.0	27.7
	Jews 2022	2.2	28.4	38.8	29.1	1.5	100.0	30.6
... people behaving negatively towards you when they learned that you were Muslim/Jewish?	Muslims 2017	6.3	20.6	29.7	38.0	5.4	100.0	26.9
	Muslims 2022	9.9	26.2	30.0	30.7	3.3	100.0	36.0
	Jews 2017	3.1	15.4	29.6	48.1	3.7	100.0	18.5
	Jews 2022	3.7	21.6	28.4	41.8	4.5	100.0	25.4
... being harassed on account of your religious affiliation?	Muslims 2017	2.7	11.5	22.8	60.3	2.7	100.0	14.2
	Muslims 2022	4.6	16.0	25.9	51.9	1.7	100.0	20.6
	Jews 2017	0.6	10.5	16.0	72.8	0.0	100.0	11.1
	Jews 2022	2.2	8.2	21.6	67.2	0.8	100.0	10.5

In the 2022 survey, the experience most respondents report having in the past 12 months was that of being made to feel that they do not belong in Norwegian society. Forty-three per cent of the Muslim sample and 31 per cent of the Jewish sample report that this had happened “often” or “sometimes”. In response to the question of whether they had experienced people behaving negatively towards them when they learned that they were Muslim/Jewish, 36 per cent of the Muslim sample and 25 per cent of the Jewish sample answered affirmatively. Respondents who had experienced harassment because of their religious affiliation account for the smallest proportion, though this had happened to one-fifth (21 per cent) of the Muslim sample and 11 per cent of the Jewish sample.

The results also show that the distribution between the response options has changed between 2017 and 2022. With the exception of the question about belonging for the Muslim sample, the proportion that reported “never” having experienced any of the situations in 2017 was markedly larger than the proportion that reported “rarely” having experienced such situations. The corresponding result in 2022 differs in that fewer respondents report “never” having had such experiences.

## 5.4 DISCRIMINATION BY PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS

The respondents were asked whether they had experienced discrimination by Norwegian public institutions.

Far larger proportions of both samples answered “no” than answered “yes” to this question in both 2017 and 2022, but the proportion reporting not having experienced such unfair treatment has decreased in 2022. Moreover, both samples show an increase in the proportion that confirms having experienced this situation and an increase in the proportion that is unsure. Muslims more commonly experience discrimination by public institutions than do Jews; 21 per cent of Muslims and 11 per cent of Jews answered affirmatively to this question in 2022.

The increase in reported discrimination does not necessarily suggest an increase in actual discrimination by public institutions in Norway. It more likely suggests that those who experience such treatment are more conscious of and more willing to report it; in other words, that such cases were previously under-reported. The high level of education in both minority samples may also play a role; the level in the Muslim sample in 2022 is higher than it was in 2017. In sociological research, a tendency for increased structural integration (specifically higher educational level) to be associated with increased reporting of discrimination is known as an “integration paradox” and is related to, among other things, lower acceptance of discriminatory treatment (see, for example, Steinmann, 2019; Diehl, Liebau & Mühlau, 2021).

Table 5.4 Discrimination by public institutions (per cent)

	Sample	Yes	Not sure	No response	No	Total
Do you feel you have been unfairly treated by Norwegian public institutions (NAV, school, health service, police) on account of your religious affiliation?	Jews 2017	6.8	5.6	0.0	87.7	100.0
	Jews 2022	10.5	14.3	1.5	73.7	100.0
	Muslims 2017	14.6	16.9	2.4	66.1	100.0
	Muslims 2022	21.2	22.8	1.6	54.4	100.0

### 5.5 NORWEGIAN AUTHORITIES' TREATMENT OF JEWS AND MUSLIMS

We asked the two minority samples whether they thought that Norwegian authorities treated Jews and Muslims equally. This question was also asked in 2017.

Table 5.5 Equal treatment by Norwegian authorities (per cent)

Do you think that authorities in Norway treat Jews and Muslims equally?	Sample	Yes	No, treat Jews best	Don't know	No response	No, treat Muslims best
	Jews 2017	22.2	7.4	46.3	7.4	16.7
Jews 2022	20.3	6.0	45.1	1.5	27.1	
Muslims 2017	27.6	21.3	32.0	18.9	0.1	
Muslims 2022	19.7	36.0	40.7	3.0	0.6	

The proportion that believes that the authorities treat the minorities equally has decreased, particularly in the Muslim sample. The proportions that believe this are now the same in both samples, at around 20 per cent. Furthermore, both samples show an increase in the proportions that think that the other minority is treated best. The proportion of the Muslim sample that think that Jews are treated best increased from 21 per cent in 2017 to 36 per cent in 2022, while the proportion of the Jewish sample that think that Muslims are treated best increased from 17 per cent in 2017 to 27 per cent in 2022. Almost no respondents in the Muslim sample think that Muslims are treated best, and few respondents in the Jewish sample think that Jews are treated best. Respondents who answered “don't know” account for the largest proportion in both samples. The proportion in the Muslim sample shows a marked increase since 2017 (from 32 per cent to 41 per cent).

### 5.6 RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE

The respondents were asked two questions dealing with the topic of visible religiosity and religion in the public sphere. The question about hiding one's religiosity

was asked of the Jewish and Muslim samples in both 2017 and 2022. The question about representations of religion in the public sphere was new in 2022. The respondents in the Muslim sample were asked whether they thought that the way in which Islam is represented in the public sphere is prejudiced, and Jews were asked

Table 5.6 Avoid showing religious affiliation (per cent)

Do you sometimes avoid showing your religious affiliation out of fear of negative attitudes?	Sample	Yes	No	No response
	Muslims 2017	26.0	71.8	2.2
Muslims 2022	32.7	65.3	1.2	
Jews 2017	60.6	34.7	4.7	
Jews 2022	70.9	27.6	1.5	

a corresponding question about Judaism.

Between 2017 and 2022, both samples show a marked increase in the proportions reporting that they sometimes avoid showing their religious affiliation. Moreover, this proportion is substantially larger among Jews than among Muslims; the proportion that answered “yes” to this question in the Muslim sample is 33 per cent, while the corresponding proportion in the Jewish sample is 71 per cent. This difference can be related to the fact that many Muslims' religious affiliation is already visible through their clothing (particularly the women's head dress), so hiding it is less of an option. On top of that, hiding an item of clothing such as hijab is more difficult than hiding certain Jewish symbols such as a star of David on a necklace.



Table 5.7 Visible symbols of religious affiliation (per cent)

Do you wear visible symbols of your religious affiliation?	Sample	Yes	No	No response
	Muslims 2017	26.6	69.3	4.2
	Muslims 2022	29.4	68.3	2.3
	Jews 2017	21.0	75.9	3.1
	Jews 2022	26.3	72.2	1.5

A majority of respondents in both the Jewish and the Muslim samples report that they do not wear visible symbols of their religious affiliation. Twenty-nine per cent of Muslim respondents and 26 per cent of Jewish respondents report that they wear such symbols. These figures are slightly higher than in 2017 for both samples.

Table 5.8 Views about the representation of Judaism and Islam in the public sphere (per cent)

Do you perceive the way in which Judaism/Islam is represented in the public sphere to be prejudiced?	Sample	Often	Sometimes	Rarely	Never	No response
Islam	Muslims 2022	57.4	25.2	7.2	7.2	3.1
Judaism	Jews 2022	44.0	46.3	7.5	0.8	1.5

A large majority of both samples believe that the way in which their religion is represented is prejudiced. Eighty-three per cent of Muslim respondents and 90 per cent of Jewish respondents confirm that this happens “often” or “sometimes”. Again, it is reasonable to assume that the high figures can at least in part be attributed to debates on religious practices, such as the debates on circumcision and the debate on hijab, the Muslim head covering. It may also have to do with a more general perception that religiosity is represented in a prejudiced manner or, more specifically, that it has do with Jewish or Muslim religiosity. Moreover, as shown in chapter 4, a pattern emerged in the explanations for negative attitudes towards Muslims given by the Muslim respondents in the open responses, where they are attributed to lack of knowledge and to misrepresentations of Islam in the public sphere.



## 6. THE NORWEGIAN RESULTS IN AN INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT, 2017–2022

To understand whether the levels of antisemitism and Islamophobia in Norway are relatively high or low, it is useful to view our results from an international perspective. In this chapter some specific findings from our survey are compared with those from similar surveys conducted in other countries. It is worth mentioning that a direct comparison of the results is often difficult because question wording and response options vary, but we can nonetheless discuss thematic overlaps. Although several relevant empirical studies have been conducted of attitudes towards Jews, particularly in European countries, fewer studies have been conducted that investigate attitudes towards Muslims. Knowledge about Jews' and Muslims' experiences of antisemitism, Islamophobia and discrimination has been limited so far, but recent years have seen considerable growth in the number of surveys dealing with these issues. This chapter shows that Norway is at around the same level as other Northern and Western European countries in many respects.

### 6.1 ANTISEMITIC STEREOTYPES

The statement that Jews consider themselves to be better than others is an old prejudice based on the idea of the Jews as a “chosen people”. Support for this statement was also measured in the Anti-Defamation League’s survey (2019–2022) entitled ADL Global 100, which measured antisemitic attitudes in more than 100 countries worldwide<sup>17</sup>. According to this survey, Norway is at around the same level as other Western European




Figure 6.1 Statement: “Jews consider themselves to be better than others”/“Jews think they are better than other people”. – Fully/partly agree (per cent). Sources: Norwegian Center for Holocaust and Minority Studies (2022) and ADL Global 100 (2019–2022).

countries such as Austria, France, the United Kingdom and Denmark (see Figure 6.1).

Another statement that touches on one of the core elements in traditional antisemitism is the accusation that Jews have too much power over the global economy and the finance industry. In our study, the statement “Jews have too much influence on the global economy” is supported by 14 per cent of the Norwegian population (compared with 43 per cent in the Muslim sample). If we compare the results from ADL’s survey (2019–2022) and an opinion poll from CNN (2018), we see that the idea of Jewish influence on the global economy is more prevalent in other European countries.

Figure 6.2 shows that the statement is particularly supported in Poland and Hungary, as well as in Spain. The statement has relatively low support in the Northern European countries, and Norway is at around the same level as the UK and Denmark.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>17</sup> It is worth noting that the sample size in the ADL study, which can often number as few as 500 respondents, is too small to say anything with certainty about the representativeness of a country. Moreover, little information is provided on the methodology for data collection and the translation of the questions and statements into different languages. The findings should therefore be treated with caution.

<sup>18</sup> In addition to the transnational ADL study and the CNN opinion poll, studies from individual countries in Western Europe have been conducted that include similar statements dealing with Jews and the economy. The level of support in these studies is between 13 and 26 per cent (see Reynié & Benzaquen, 2020; Bachner & Bevelander, 2020; Jones & Unsworth, 2021; and Zeglovits




Figure 6.2 Statement: “Jews have far too much influence on the global economy”/“Jews have too much influence on finance and business across the world”. – Fully/partly agree (per cent). Sources: The Norwegian Center for Holocaust and Minority Studies (2022), ADL Global 100 (2019) and CNN (2018).

A third statement from our study that can be compared with figures from other countries is the conspiratorial idea that “World Jewry is working behind the scenes to promote Jewish interests”. Figure 6.3 shows that the proportion of Norwegian respondents that answered that they fully or partly agree with this (14 per cent) is lower than the average in Europe (21 per cent). The figure also shows that the idea that Jews secretly conspire is less prevalent in Northern and Western Europe than in Eastern Europe. It is most prevalent in Greece, where 58 per cent of the population agreed with the statement.




Figure 6.3 Statement: “World Jewry is working behind the scenes to promote Jewish interests”/“There is a secret Jewish network that influences political and economic affairs in the world”. – Fully/partly agree (per cent). Sources: Norwegian Center for Holocaust and Minority Studies (2022) and Kovács & Fischer (2021).

et al., 2021). In a study from Germany, 49 per cent of Muslims agreed that Jews had too much power in business and finance (IfD Allensbach, 2022, p. 19).

A fourth statement deals with the Jews' supposed "fault" for or complicity in their own persecution. This type of statement is often used to measure what is known as "secondary antisemitism". In Norway, 8 per cent of the population sample and 12 per cent of the Muslim sample support the idea that Jews largely have themselves to blame for being persecuted. A similar statement was also used in Kovács and Fischer's (2021) study of antisemitic prejudices in Europe. Figure 6.4 shows that the proportion of Norwegian respondents that answered that they fully or partly support this is lower than the average in Europe (15 per cent). Nonetheless, Norway scores higher than other Northern and Western European countries such as the United Kingdom, Sweden and the Netherlands, where only 2 to 5 per cent of the population support this statement. The idea that Jews themselves are to blame for being persecuted is most prevalent in Greece, Poland and Hungary, where 31 to 37 per cent of the population support this statement.




Figure 6.4 Statement: "Jews largely have themselves to blame for being persecuted"/Jews are also to blame for the persecution against them".- Fully/partly agree (per cent). Sources: Norwegian Center for Holocaust and Minority Studies (2022) and Kovács & Fischer (2021).

As noted above, the Norwegian Center for Holocaust and Minority Studies' surveys show that there has been a decrease in antisemitic attitudes in the Norwegian population since 2011. Studies show that this pattern is also found in certain other European countries. According to a study from Germany, antisemitic attitudes have decreased from 9.5 to 3.6 per cent in the period 2002–2020 (Decker & Brähler, 2020). Furthermore, ADL's surveys show that there has been a significant decrease in several countries from 2014 to 2019. For example, the level of antisemitic attitudes in Austria has dropped from 28 to 20 per cent and in France from 37 to 17 per cent.<sup>19</sup> ADL's surveys also show that the level has more or less stagnated in a number of other countries, both those with low levels of antisemitic attitudes (such as Sweden, the United Kingdom and Denmark) and those that score high (such as Poland and Hungary).<sup>20</sup> In Western Europe as a whole, ADL's surveys show that the level of antisemitic attitudes is stable: 23 per cent in 2014, 21 per cent in 2015, and 24 per cent in 2019. Although the level of antisemitic attitudes is falling in many European countries, studies show that concern for antisemitism is growing among Jews and the wider population (see Figures 6.7 and 6.8 regarding perceptions).

## 6.2 NEGATIVE ATTITUDES TOWARDS MUSLIMS AND ISLAM

Regarding attitudes towards Muslims, fewer studies investigate this issue, and it is therefore more difficult to find comparable statements. A recurring theme in several studies is cultural distance, which examines

whether Muslims are seen as a threat to the culture of a given country. This issue was investigated in our survey by asking to what extent the respondents support the following statement: "Muslims pose a threat to Norwegian culture". Unlike our study, studies from other Western European countries investigated the population's views of Islam. The results will be influenced by whether one asks about attitudes towards Islam or attitudes towards Muslims. Table 6.1 suggests that negative attitudes towards Islam are more prevalent than negative views of Muslims.

*Table 6.1 Negative statements about Muslims/Islam and culture (per cent). Sources: Norwegian Center for Holocaust and Minority Studies (2022), Jones & Unsworth (2021), Pickel (2019) and IFOP (2019).*

Country	Statement (wording in the original language given in brackets)	Fully/partly agree
Norway	Muslims pose a threat to Norwegian culture (Muslimer utgjør en trussel mot norsk kultur)	33
United Kingdom	Islam threatens the British way of life	36
Germany	Islam is threatening (Der Islam is bedrohlich)	52
France	Islam is incompatible with the values of French society (L'islam est incompatible avec les valeurs de la société française)	61

According to a study from the United Kingdom, 36 per cent of the population believes that Islam threatens the British way of life. However, the same study showed that only 20 per cent reject the positively worded statement that Muslim immigrants have made a positive contribution to British society and culture

<sup>19</sup> The marked changes in the measurements in the ADL survey may be due to the small number of respondents. Moreover, the scale used is different from and simpler than the one used in the survey conducted by the Norwegian Center for Holocaust and Minority Studies.

<sup>20</sup> Sweden: 4 per cent (no change); Denmark: from 9 to 10 per cent; United Kingdom: from 8 to 11 per cent; Poland: from 45 to 48 per cent; Hungary: from 41 to 42 per cent.

(Jones & Unworth, 2021). In a survey of perceptions of Islam conducted in Germany, 52 per cent agree that Islam is threatening while 36 per cent believe that Islam is enriching (Pickel, 2019). In another study from Germany, 28 per cent believed that Islam “as a whole” is a threat while 63 per cent believed that there was only a threat from “certain groups” (IfD Allensbach, 2022). Furthermore, A French opinion poll showed that 61 per cent of the population of France considered Islam to be incompatible with the values of French society. The broad support for this statement can probably be explained by the importance attributed to the separation of religion and state in France. In the same study, 78 per cent agreed that secularism is under threat in France (IFOP, 2019).

In our survey, we also measured the prevalence of a selection of anti-Muslim stereotypes. Two of these stereotypes, dealing with whether Muslims oppress women and whether they are (particularly) violent, were also investigated in a Canadian study (Woodley et al., 2018).<sup>21</sup> Whereas in our study, 67 per cent of the population sample agreed that Muslims oppress women, 76 per cent of the Canadian population sample believed this to be the case. Regarding the question about whether Muslims are more violent than others, 26 per cent of the Norwegian population sample agreed with the statement, while in the Canadian study the corresponding figure was 35 per cent.

### 6.3 SYMPATHY AND DISLIKE

In addition to the cognitive dimension of prejudices against minorities, attitude surveys often measure an affective (emotional) dimension. This is done by asking questions about sympathy and dislike or about whether respondents have positive or negative views of specific groups. In our survey we ask respondents about the extent to which the following statements fit with their own views: “I have a certain dislike of Jews” and “I have a certain dislike of Muslims”. Whereas 6 per cent of the population sample expressed dislike of Jews, 26 per cent expressed dislike of Muslims.<sup>22</sup> The fact that dislike of Muslims is significantly more prevalent than dislike of Jews reflects a pattern that is also found in other European countries. A survey from PEW Research Center (2019) measured negative and positive views of Jews and Muslims in 16 countries.<sup>23</sup>

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21 The Canadian study also asked to what degree this applied to Christians and Jews.

22 Eight per cent of the Muslim sample agreed that they have a certain dislike of Jews and 16 per cent of the Jews expressed the same about Muslims. As far as we know, only one other survey has asked about mutual emotional attitudes among Jews and Muslims (see Mohaged & Mahmood, 2019).

23 Wording: “How favourable or unfavourable are you towards the following groups?”

Table 6.2 Dislike of and sympathy for Jews and Muslims (per cent). Sources: Norwegian Center for Holocaust and Minority Studies (2022)\* and Pew Research Center (2019).

Country	Jews		Muslims	
	Dislike	Sympathy	Dislike	Sympathy
Norway*	6	83	26	61
Sweden	3	92	28	68
Netherlands	5	92	28	70
Germany	6	86	24	69
France	6	89	22	72
United Kingdom	6	90	18	78
Ukraine	11	83	21	62
Italy	15	77	55	41
Czech Republic	17	65	64	23
Hungary	18	60	58	11
Bulgaria	18	69	21	69
Russia	18	75	19	76
Spain	19	76	42	54
Lithuania	26	67	56	26
Slovakia	30	58	77	16
Poland	31	59	66	26
Greece	38	51	57	37

Here, too, we see a difference between Eastern Europe and Western Europe. Overall, dislike of both Jews and Muslims is more prevalent in many of the Eastern European countries and Greece. At the same time, the level of negative attitudes towards Muslims is lower in Bulgaria, Russia and Ukraine than in many Western European countries. Considering that these three countries have a long history of Muslim minorities, this seems to confirm the socio-psychological contact hypothesis, which states that social contact between groups can have a positive effect on attitudes. Negative views of Muslims is also less prevalent in the United Kingdom and France, both of which have a relative long history of immigration from Muslim countries.

Two other more recent comparative studies are relevant here, but they only measured emotional attitudes towards Jews. The CNN opinion poll (2018), which covered seven EU countries, and the study by

Kovács and Fischer (2021) found quite similar results. In the latter of these, 11 per cent reported having “negative feelings towards Jews” (average across 16 European countries). In Western European countries such as the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Sweden but also in Latvia, the level of agreement was between only 2 and 5 per cent. In Austria and Eastern European countries such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia, the level of negative feelings towards Jews was between 15 and 27 per cent. The highest level of negative attitudes towards Jews was found in Greece, where 36 per cent of the population agreed with the question that was asked.



## 6.4 SOCIAL DISTANCE FROM JEWS AND MUSLIMS

In addition to measuring the cognitive dimension (prejudices/stereotypes) and the affective dimension (feelings) of attitudes in our survey, we also measured the respondents' degree of social distance from Jews and Muslims. We did this by asking questions about having Jews and Muslims as friends and neighbours.

When asked about having Jews as neighbours, 5 per cent of the Norwegian population answered that they would “dislike it a little” and 1 per cent that they would “dislike it a lot”. A similar question was asked in Kovács and Fischer's (2021) survey on antisemitic attitudes in Europe.




Figure 6.5 Negative attitudes towards having Jews as neighbours. Sources: Norwegian Center for Holocaust and Minority Studies (2022) and Kovács & Fischer (2021).

The distribution of responses to the questions about social distance (having as neighbours) from Jews largely corresponds with the pattern in the responses to the questions about sympathy and dislike. Figure 6.5 shows that Norway makes up part of a group of Western and Northern European countries where between 4 and 6 per cent of the population are negative towards having Jews as neighbours. In Eastern European countries such as the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia, this proportion is substantially larger (between 27 and 33 per cent), and in Greece, 36 per cent would be very or a little uncomfortable to have Jews as neighbours.<sup>24</sup>

Another relevant survey was conducted by Pew Research Center between 2015 and 2017 (PEW Research Center, 2018) in which social distance from Jews and Muslims was investigated in 34 countries by asking about people's willingness to accept these two minorities as neighbours. Norway was also included in this survey. Whereas our survey shows that 90 per cent of the population would “like” or “wouldn't mind” having Jews as neighbours, PEW Research Center's survey showed that as much as 98 per cent of the population would “be willing to accept” it. Our study also shows that 72 per cent of the population would “like” or “wouldn't mind” having Muslims as neighbours. The figure in the PEW study for willingness to accept Muslim neighbours was 92 per cent.

Figure 6.6 shows that all countries expressed more acceptance for having Jews as neighbours than for having Muslims.<sup>25</sup> Acceptance of Jews and Muslims as neighbours is greater in the Nordic countries and in other Northern and Western European countries such as Belgium, France and the United Kingdom. Acceptance of Jews is also greater in Southern and Eastern European countries such as Serbia, Bulgaria, Croatia and Bosnia,

<sup>24</sup> Regarding the question asking for Muslims' views about having Jews as neighbours, the level of negative attitudes in Norway is the same as for the general population.

<sup>25</sup> Average acceptance for having Jews as neighbours: 81 per cent. Average acceptance for having Muslims as neighbours: 65 per cent.

where antisemitism has historically had low prevalence.

The same survey also shows that negative attitudes towards having Muslims as neighbours are most prevalent in some Eastern European countries in which the smallest numbers of Muslims live. This confirms the theory that racism deals with imagined rather than actual notions of “the other”. However, the survey also shows

that the level of negative attitudes is substantially lower in Eastern European countries with some proportion of Muslims in their populations (such as Russia, Georgia, Bulgaria and Bosnia) and states previously comprised of multi-ethnic countries (such as Ukraine, Moldova, Serbia and Croatia). PEW Research Center’s conclusion that, with regard to attitudes towards Jews and Muslims,




Figure 6.6 Willingness to accept Jews/Muslims as neighbours (per cent). Source: PEW Research Center (2018).

there was a “continental divide in attitudes and values” between Western and Eastern Europe applies thus only to a limited extent to attitudes towards Muslims.

## 6.5 EXPERIENCES OF DISCRIMINATION

In our survey, we asked both Jews and Muslims whether they had experienced harassment in the past 12 months on account of their religious affiliation. Eleven per cent of the Jewish sample and 21 per cent of the Muslim sample reported having had such experiences.

A similar question was asked in a French study: “Do you ever feel threatened in your daily life because of your religious affiliation, sexual orientation, gender or ethnic origins (often/from time to time)?” Thirty-seven per cent of the Jewish respondents stated that they often or from time to time feel threatened because of their religion, and 22 per cent stated that they often or from time to time feel threatened because of their ethnic origins. Furthermore, 48 per cent of the Muslim respondents stated that they often or from time to time feel threatened because of their religious affiliation and 40 per cent stated that they feel threatened because of their ethnic origins (Reynié & Rodan-Benzaquen, 2020).

In the European FRA survey from 2018, Jewish respondents were asked whether they had experienced antisemitic harassment in the past 12 months and in the past five years.<sup>26</sup> Across the 12 EU countries included in the survey, an average of 28 per cent and 39 per cent respectively stated that they had experienced such harassment (FRA, 2018).

In another study conducted by FRA (2017), Muslim respondents were asked whether they had experienced harassment due to their ethnic background in the past

12 months. Experiences varied considerably depending on the Muslim respondents’ region of origin and the EU country. An average of 27 per cent across the 15 EU countries included in the study reported having experienced harassment. The same study also showed that an average of 27 per cent had experienced discrimination, 17 per cent of which stated “religious belief” and 9 per cent stated “skin colour” as the reasons.

Fear of harassment and discrimination can lead religious minorities to avoid wearing visible symbols of their religious identity. In our study we asked Jews and Muslims about whether they sometimes avoid showing their religious affiliation out of fear of negative attitudes. As we have seen, 71 per cent of the Jewish respondents and 33 per cent of the Muslim respondents answered “yes” to this question. The proportion of Jews reporting that they avoid showing their religious affiliation is therefore the same as the average in the FRA survey (2018), where Jews in 12 EU countries were asked about their perceptions and experiences of antisemitism. Among the 71 per cent reporting that they avoid showing their religious affiliation, 6 per cent reported that they always avoid it, 22 per cent that they frequently avoid it and 43 per cent that they occasionally avoid it. There were significant variations between the countries included in the survey. The proportion of Jews that avoid showing their religious affiliation was largest in France (82 per cent), Denmark (81 per cent) and Sweden (78 per cent) and smallest in Hungary (57 per cent) and the United Kingdom (61 per cent) (FRA, 2018, p. 37). These country-specific differences and similarities are difficult to explain, but they do not seem to be related to the prevalence of antisemitic attitudes or actions.<sup>27</sup> To our knowledge, no similar surveys have been conducted on the use of religious symbols and fear of negative attitudes among Muslims.

26 This included offensive letters or emails, phone calls, threatening comments or behaviour and offensive comment on social media.

27 Similar studies that investigate these topics have also been conducted in individual countries. See Reynié and

### 6.6 PERCEPTIONS OF ANTISEMITISM AND ISLAMOPHOBIA

In our survey we asked respondents about their perceptions of the development of antisemitic and Islamophobic attitudes in the population in recent years and of the extent of such attitudes.

In response to the question “Do you think that negative attitudes towards Jews have become more or less prevalent in Norway in the past five years?”, 68 per cent of Jewish respondents stated that they thought such attitudes have become more prevalent, 27 per cent stated “as prevalent as before” and 3 per cent stated “less prevalent”. A similar question was asked in the FRA survey (2018, p. 19), where Jews in 12 EU countries were asked to consider the development of antisemitism in their respective countries: “Over the past five years, has antisemitism increased, stayed the same or decreased in your country?”.

Figure 6.7 shows that an average of 89 per cent of

the Jewish respondents in the sample of EU countries believe that antisemitism has increased a lot or a little in recent years, 9 per cent believe it has stayed the same, and only 2 per cent believe it has decreased or find it difficult to answer. The percentage of Norwegian Jews that believe that antisemitism is increasing thus seems to be well below the average in Europe, but a direct comparison is not possible, due particularly to differences in the response options. Respondents in the FRA survey could choose between stating that antisemitism has “increased a lot” or “increased a little”, which may have led more respondents to state that it is increasing because the threshold for expressing agreement might be perceived to be lower. It is also worth noting that Jewish respondents believe that antisemitism is increasing both in countries with relatively low prevalence of antisemitic attitudes (such as Sweden, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) and in countries with higher prevalence of such attitudes (such as Poland).

The question that was used in the FRA survey was also used in a Eurobarometer survey (2018) that included respondents from the populations of 28 EU countries. In order to compare the results between the general population and Jewish respondents, only the 12 countries that participated in the FRA survey are included here.




Figure 6.7 Perceptions of changes in the level of antisemitism over the past five years. Jewish respondents (per cent). Sources: Norwegian Center for Holocaust and Minority Studies (2022) and FRA (2018).

Rodan-Benzaquen (2020) and American Jewish Committee (2020).




Figure 6.8 Perceptions of changes in the level of antisemitism over the past five years. Populations of selected EU countries (per cent). Source: Eurobarometer (2018).

On average, the general population was much less likely than Jews to think that there had been an increase in antisemitism in the respective countries (41 per cent versus 89 per cent). This also applies if we look at the proportion of Jews that thought that antisemitism had increased a lot (63 per cent).<sup>28</sup> We also see a difference here between the Western and Northern European countries on the one hand and the Eastern European countries on the other. In the former of these, antisemitism is more often regarded as an increasing problem and is more rarely denied. Since antisemitic attitudes are more common in Hungary and Poland than in the Western European countries, it seems as if public opinion and political culture play more decisive roles in the assessment than do any real developments in this area.

In response to the question “How prevalent do you think negative attitudes towards Jews are in Norway today?”, 81 per cent of the Jewish respondents in the Norwegian Center for Holocaust and Minority Studies’ survey thought that it was very or fairly prevalent. By comparison, only 24 per cent of the population sample thought the same. Similar questions were asked in the FRA study (2018) and in the Eurobarometer survey (2018).<sup>29</sup> This means that here, too, we can study the differences between Jewish respondents and the general population, both in Norway and in selected EU countries.

28 Studies from individual countries also show that Jews believe that antisemitism is increasing significantly more than do populations in general. See Reynié & Rodan-Benzaquen (2020), American Jewish Committee (2020), IfD Allensbach (2022) and Legrand et al., (2022).

29 Question wording in the FRA study (2018): “In your opinion, how big a problem, if at all, is antisemitism in your country today?”. Question wording in the Eurobarometer survey (2018): “Do you think that antisemitism is a problem in your country or not?”




Figure 6.9 Perceptions of the extent of antisemitism: Very big problem/very prevalent + fairly big problem/fairly prevalent Population and Jews (per cent). Sources: Norwegian Center for Holocaust and Minority Studies (2022), FRA (2018) and Eurobarometer (2018).

First and foremost, it is clear to see that, on average, the assessments of the Jewish respondents and the population in general are quite far apart. Overall, Jews consider antisemitism to be a problem to a much higher degree than does the general population. One exception is Sweden, where both Jews (82 per cent) and the population (81 per cent) consider antisemitism to be a very big problem. Another general pattern is found in the way in which the populations of Western and Northern European countries far more often regard antisemitism as a problem in their country of residence (between 43 and 95 per cent) than do the populations of Eastern European countries and some Southern European countries (between 6 and 28 per cent).

The grounds for comparing perceptions of the prevalence of Islamophobia are more limited. In response to the question “How prevalent do you think negative attitudes towards Muslims are in Norway today?”, 86 per cent of Jews, 75 per cent of the general population and 66 per cent of Muslims in our survey stated that they believe such attitudes to be very or fairly prevalent.

A similar question was asked in a European survey (FRA, 2017, p. 40), where Muslims in 15 EU countries were asked to what degree they believed that “discrimination on grounds of religion, ethnic origin or skin colour is very or fairly widespread in their country”.




Figure 6.10 Muslim respondents' perceptions of discrimination and grounds for discrimination (skin colour; ethnic origin or immigrant background; religion or religious belief): Very widespread + Fairly widespread (per cent). Source: FRA (2017). Total N = 10 527. Weighted results. The figures cited in brackets are based on a small number of respondents and are therefore not representative.

Here we see that the average in the 15 European countries is lower than that in the Norwegian results: 58 per cent of Muslims believe that discrimination on grounds of religion is very or fairly widespread in their country of residence, 54 per cent believe that discrimination on grounds of ethnic origin or immigrant background is widespread, and 48 per cent believe that discrimination on grounds of skin colour is widespread. The figure also shows that there are wide variations between countries, and it is unlikely that the numbers give a full picture of the situation in the individual countries. In countries where most Muslim respondents

report that discrimination is widespread (such as France, the Netherlands and Sweden), Islamophobic attitudes are relatively less widespread. In Spain, however, where negative attitudes towards Muslims is more widespread (see the table for sympathy and dislike), far fewer Muslims report that discrimination is a problem.

Furthermore, a Eurobarometer survey (2015) shows that the populations in 15 EU countries believe to a larger extent than Muslim respondents (FRA, 2017) that discrimination on grounds of ethnic origin or religion is widespread in the respective countries.

Populations of Northern and Western European countries in particular believed that discrimination on grounds of ethnic origin (70–84 per cent) or religion (69–76 per cent) was widespread. This is likely due to the relatively large proportion of Muslims in these countries. In the Eastern European countries, where very few Muslims live, far fewer respondents believed that discrimination on grounds of ethnic origin (29–46 per cent) and religion (14–18 per cent) was widespread.

The integration paradox may also play a role in this assessment (see section 5.4).

## 6.7 VIEWS ABOUT COMBATING ANTISEMITISM AND ISLAMOPHOBIA

In our report we also investigated whether the general population and the minorities themselves consider it necessary to combat antisemitism and Islamophobia respectively. Although the basis for comparison is limited, particularly in the case of combating Islamophobia, some surveys from other countries exist that have asked similar questions.

One of the questions we asked deals with the degree to which “harassment and violence against Jews concern everyone and constitute an attack on our society”.

Seventy-eight per cent of the population sample and 59 per cent of the Muslim sample supported this statement. Studies from France and Germany have yielded relatively similar results. In France, 73 per cent agreed that “Antisemitism is a problem for everyone because it concerns society as a whole” (Legrand et al., 2022, p. 14). In Germany, 73 per cent of the population and 66 per cent of Muslims believed that antisemitism is a problem for the whole of society (IfD Allensbach, 2022, p. 10). The German study also showed that 8 per cent of the population and 14 per cent of Muslims believed that antisemitism was a problem for Jews only.

Another question we asked was whether it was

necessary to do something to combat anti-Jewish harassment in Norway, to which 50 per cent of the population sample answered “yes” (compared with 96 per cent of the Jewish sample and 41 per cent of the Muslim sample). A similar question was asked in the transnational opinion poll conducted by CNN (2018) in which respondents were asked whether they agreed that their governments “should do more to fight antisemitism in this country”. In the seven European countries that participated, an average of 49 per cent agreed with the statement. The result for Norway is thus almost the same as the average in this study.

Regarding the question about the necessity to do something to combat anti-Muslim harassment in Norway, 59 per cent of the population sample answered “yes” (compared with 72 per cent of the Muslim sample and 81 per cent of the Jewish sample). A similar question was asked in a Canadian study in which respondents were asked to consider whether the government should take action to combat Islamophobia, to which 60 per cent answered that they agreed and 35 per cent that they disagreed (Woodley et al., 2018).



## 7. YOUTH STUDY

The youth study consisted of a survey and a qualitative part using group interviews as the method. As we have seen above, the results from the quantitative survey largely reflected attitudes in the general population, but we measured less prevalence of social distance (friendship) and dislike of Muslims among the youth. At the same time, the answers of the respondents in the youth sample regarding the causes of antisemitism indicate that they were more likely to attribute such attitudes to older generations or to “the past” than the general population. Negative attitudes towards Muslims, on the other hand, were described as a problem in contemporary society. In the following section we will look more closely at the results from the group interviews. It also includes an analysis of the youth’s views about the causes of negative attitudes. The study engaged the participants in active reflection on attitudes towards Jews and Muslims. Through the interviews we wanted to gain insight into how the youth interpreted different expressions of negative attitudes and how social control and negotiation of meaning characterise what they consider to be the boundaries for (un)acceptable statements and behaviour.

We conducted seven group interviews with a total of 30 youth divided into groups of four to five. The interviews were conducted in Oslo and Viken, in Bergen and in Trøndelag between October 2021 and March 2022.<sup>30</sup>

Interview no.	Where?	No. of participants/gender
1	Bergen	4 girls
2	Bergen	4 boys
3	Viken	4 girls and boys
4	Trøndelag	5 girls and boys
5	Oslo	4 girls and boys
6	Oslo	5 girls and boys
7	Oslo	5 girls and boys

Schools in both urban and rural areas were included in the sample. All the informants were pupils of upper secondary schools (in programmes for both specialisation in general studies and for vocational subjects) and all the interviews were conducted on the schools’ premises during school hours.

We did not ask the participants about their religious affiliation or ethnicity. Some informants in two of the groups positioned themselves as Muslims, and several mentioned that one or both parents were non-Norwegian in the course of the interviews. We do not know whether any Jews were among the participants. In the analysis below, girls are denoted by “G” and boys by “B”.

The questions about reactions to incidents were also part of the quantitative survey. Combined, the two methods offer deep insight into the various reactions in terms of both prevalence (quantitative study) and how youth explain and justify their views (qualitative survey).

### 7.1 QUANTITATIVE SURVEY: REACTIONS TO INCIDENTS

The incidents included in the quantitative survey described real-life situations or variations on situations where attitudes towards Jews and Muslims were expressed in different ways. The youth were asked about how they would have reacted to the situations: whether they were unacceptable or totally fine, would have interpreted some of them as a joke, were uncertain or did not know.

<sup>30</sup> Interviews were also planned in south-western and northern Norway but could not be carried out due to COVID-19 restrictions and the burden they placed on schools in the academic year 2021/2022.

Table 7.1 Reactions to incidents (per cent. Youth 2022). Total N = 1027, of which girls = 566, boys = 417, other/no answer = 44.

How would you have reacted to the following situation?	Gender	I would have thought it was unacceptable	I would have thought it was totally fine	I would have interpreted it as a joke	Impossible to answer/ Don't know	Total
Someone calls out: "The last one is a Jew" before running a race.	Boys	42.5	4.4	45.3	7.8	100.0
	Girls	84.7	0.6	9.2	5.5	100.0
	All	63.3	2.6	27.3	6.8	100.0
When a Muslim pupil enters the classroom and their classmates call out 'Allahu akbar' and make machine gun noises.	Boys	61.9	3.1	29.2	5.8	100.0
	Girls	83.2	0.1	9.8	6.9	100.0
	All	72.5	1.8	19.2	6.5	100.0
When a group of young people point at a girl wearing hijab and giggle. One calls out: "Are you wearing that thing voluntarily?"	Boys	67.7	9.2	6.5	16.7	100.0
	Girls	89.2	2.0	1.4	7.4	100.0
	All	78.0	5.7	3.9	12.4	100.0
Someone asks a Jewish classmate: "Why do you treat the Palestinians that way?"	Boys	52.3	12.8	9.3	25.6	100.0
	Girls	71.6	3.8	2.3	22.3	100.0
	All	61.8	8.2	5.8	24.3	100.1
In a Christianity, religion and ethics class, someone says to a Jewish classmate: "You Jews think you're better than others".	Boys	74.4	5.1	11.2	9.3	100.0
	Girls	89.0	0.3	3.2	7.6	100.0
	All	81.3	2.7	7.1	8.9	100.0
In a classroom discussion on Norwegian history, a pupil says: "You Muslims can never be completely Norwegian".	Boys	68.2	10.8	6.3	14.6	100.0
	Girls	85.9	2.8	1.4	9.9	100.0
	All	76.8	6.9	3.9	12.4	100.0

The results show that a clear majority of the youth indicated that they would have found the statements and actions problematic. The largest proportion (8 per cent) answered "totally fine" for the situation where someone asks a Jewish classmate: "Why do you treat the Palestinians that way?" and the smallest proportion found this problematic. This was also the situation to which most respondents (24 per cent) found it difficult to react.

The situation which the largest proportion of respondents (27 per cent) interpreted as a joke was: "Someone calls out: 'The last one is a Jew' before running a race". The situation where someone makes machine gun noises and calls out 'Allahu akbar' when a Muslim classmate enters the classroom was also interpreted by many (19 per cent) as a joke. At the same time, the results show marked gender differences, with far more

boys interpreting the situations as expressions of jokes and far more girls finding the situations problematic. This gender difference was particularly marked in the case of the first incident ("the last one is a Jew"). Almost twice as many girls as boys thought this was problematic (85 per cent and 43 per cent respectively) while five times as many boys as girls would have interpreted it as a joke (45 per cent and 9 per cent respectively). The distribution of responses to the situation referring to the treatment of the Palestinians also showed a larger proportion of boys that would have interpreted the situation as a joke (13 per cent of boys compared with 4 per cent of girls).

The respondents could only select one of the options. It is possible that some otherwise would have wanted to combine response because, for example, they interpreted the incidents as (primarily) a joke but

found them problematic nonetheless. The reason the respondents could only select one response option was so that we could see where the majority landed if they had to choose. It seems clear from the results that most would have interpreted the incidents as unacceptable, though there is a difference between responding to imaginary situations in a questionnaire and responding to something that happens in real life. It is not certain that the response patterns would have been the same in real-life encounters.

## 7.2 QUALITATIVE SURVEY: GROUP INTERVIEWS

The group interviews consisted of three parts. After a warming-up exercise in which each participant made a note of what they associated with the terms “Jew” and “Muslim”, the groups were asked to discuss ten statements and descriptions of incidents and to categorise them along a scale from “very problematic” to “totally unproblematic” (or “couldn’t agree”).

Some of the statements were either identical with or variations on those that were used in the quantitative survey. Several of the described incidents were inspired by real-life incidents. The final part of the interview consisted of a group discussion in which the youth were asked to discuss what they believed were the causes of negative attitudes towards Jews and Muslims. This part was also a follow-up of the quantitative study, where the same questions were included in the section with open response options (see chapter 4).

Since the purpose of holding group interviews was to gain insight into how the youth negotiated meaning and discussed boundaries, the researchers stood back. The discussions ran almost without any involvement from the researchers except to guide the youth through the different parts of the interview.

### DISCUSSING BOUNDARIES: PROBLEMATIC AND UN-PROBLEMATIC

The pupils were asked to categorise the following 10 statements along a scale from “very problematic” to “totally unproblematic”:

Very problematic	Fairly problematic	A bit problematic	Totally unproblematic	Couldn't agree
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1. When a Muslim pupil enters the classroom, the classmates call out “Allahu akbar” and make machine gun noises.
2. A group of young people point at a girl wearing hijab and giggle. One of them calls out: “Are you wearing that thing voluntarily?”
3. Someone asks a Jewish classmate: “Why do you treat the Palestinians that way?”
4. In a Christianity, religion and ethics class, someone says to a Jewish classmate: “You Jews think you’re better than others”.
5. In a classroom discussion on Norwegian history, a pupil says: “You Muslims can never be completely Norwegian”.
6. In a Christianity, religion and ethics class, someone says: “Muslims think they’re better than others”.
7. The Muslims are trying to take over Europe.
8. Jews are more intelligent than others.
9. Jews work behind the scenes to promote Jewish interests.
10. Someone calls out: “The last one is a Jew” before running a race.

As expected, the placement of the 10 pieces of paper largely corresponded with the results from the quantitative survey, where a large majority of the respondents indicated their disapproval of the described situations by selecting the response option “I would have thought it was unacceptable”. A large proportion of the pieces of paper were placed under “very problematic” or “fairly problematic” by the informants in the group interviews, very few were placed under “a bit problematic”, and none under “totally unproblematic”.

However, the group interviews showed how the youth reflected on the descriptions and negotiated among themselves before agreeing on where the pieces of paper should be placed. The pupils rearranged the statements/incidents during the discussions or held long discussions before deciding where to place them. In some instances they failed to reach agreement. One important theme in these discussions was the variety of contexts in which the statements could be interpreted.

### CONTEXTUALISATION

The youth’s negotiations largely centred around contextualisation. They discussed different scenarios and how these might influence their assessment. The analysis shows that they generally applied the same criteria when discussing how to categorise the situations:

- Is the statement directed at one person with the intention to offend or is it a generally prejudiced statement?
- Is the statement meant to be derogatory/offensive or is there something else behind it (humour, ignorance)?
- Does the statement promote categorisation and thereby generally negative attitudes towards a group in society?

Regarding the latter question, the reactions to statement no. 5 – that Muslims can never be Norwegian – can be taken as an example. A discussion arose in almost all the groups about what lies and what ought to lie in the definition of “Norwegian”. In this connection, the youth also problematised how the statement excludes Muslims to a larger extent than others:

G2: What I feel is the problem with this is that it’s specifically Muslims that can’t become Norwegians, that others can become Norwegians; like if you’re from Lithuania, you could well become Norwegian, it’s the Muslims specifically that have something about them that means that they clearly can’t become Norwegians, if that’s what they want, that is.

In this case it was not the (potentially) personally offensive nature of the comment that was considered to be the most problematic aspect, but rather the underlying assumptions that assign Muslims a distinct position.

### HUMOUR AS A MITIGATING FACTOR?

The significance of contextualisation was particularly obvious in the incident describing a Muslim pupil entering the classroom and classmates calling out “Allahu akbar” and making machine gun noises. Several groups discussed the significance of proximity to the Muslim pupil in question, and whether it was possible the act could be meant as a joke.

As in the quantitative study, a gender dimension also seemed to apply to this assessment in the group interviews, where the boys more often interpreted the situations as a joke while the girls more often interpreted them as stigmatising and thereby serious (and unacceptable). Support for the latter interpretation was also expressed in an interview in Oslo where all the pupils except one had minority backgrounds.

In the group from Trøndelag (group interview no. 4), the following exchange took place in connection with the discussion about the incident where the pupils call out “Allahu akbar”:

B4: That was weird; it's not something you do to a Muslim pupil who you don't know.

B1: No [laughs], because those are things people did at lower secondary school, but they didn't do it because someone was Muslim.

B4: No, that's true.

B1: But they did do it repeatedly.

B3: You have to be friends if someone's going to do it.

B4: Yes, it's more of a thing mates do, I think.

B1: Yes, even if it's not totally fine, it's still something that goes on between mates, like...

B4: Like boys mucking around, I would have said.

B3: To a stranger, it's a bit awkward for the others.

G1: What if that person – if he's a mate, I mean, and that person doesn't feel he can say anything because the others think it's funny or something – well it can be ...

B1: That's a problem.

B4: It's a slight problem, that, yes. But in this context it's when a Muslim pupil enters the classroom and people in the room or the classmates call out 'Allahu akbar' and make machine gun noises, then ...

B2: If the boy who calls out is Muslim, then I think it's better, at least.

G1: But why would any Muslims call it out?

B2: To muck around, maybe.

B4: Yes, that's true. If it's Muslim to Muslim, that would have been a different situation from one where someone who calls out isn't [Muslim], [then] it's a bit weird. I don't know what I think about that – what about you guys?

B1: It's not OK.

B4: Yes [places the piece of paper on the table].

This exchange demonstrates how different senders influence the assessment of the situation, where an imagined closeness and friendship between the actors makes the incident an acceptable part of social interaction. Conversely, it would be “not OK” to do something like that to “a stranger”. It is also implied that the situation could have played out between pupils without any of them being Muslim, but then in lower secondary school, not upper secondary school.

The youth essentially agree that if those involved are friends, it is easier to accept that something is meant as a joke. However, peer pressure can lead one to join in on the joke even though one does not find it funny. If the person who calls out is also Muslim, it is even more likely that everything is OK. Nonetheless, G1's question about why a Muslim would call this out raises the point that it is not a neutral act that can be funny in any situation; on the contrary, it would seem to lose its meaning if a Muslim were to call it out to another Muslim.

The significance of the group participants' own positioning in the discussions clearly emerged in group interview no. 5, where different meanings of the incident were discussed (such as the possibility of it being an in joke between Muslim pupils) until the only boy in the group asserted that he could have been the one who called out “Allahu akbar” to a friend:

B1: If one of the boys in the class had been a Muslim, I could have called that out. [G1 laughs] I think it should be allowed to muck around. As long as he's in on it, I think it should be allowed to muck around with it.

After this comment, the group moved the statement from “fairly problematic” to “a bit problematic”. G1's laughter indicates that she accepted B1's point of view, and the rearrangement of the statement thereafter “exonerates” B1 from having made a blunder. This underlines the general observation that the youth were

concerned that they themselves were not prejudiced and that much of the negotiations that went on in the groups dealt with being able to adopt this position.

### PREJUDICE AND LEGITIMATE QUESTIONS

The discussion about incident no. 2 (“A group of young people point at a girl wearing hijab and giggle. One of them calls out: ‘Are you wearing that thing voluntarily?’”) also centred on context, only this time not on whether it might be motivated by humour. The underlying assumption that hijab is a symbol of oppression was immediately interpreted as prejudiced and problematic. This occurred in, for example, group interview no. 7, where a female participant who herself wore hijab stressed the unpleasantness of having to deal with such perceptions.

The participants in group interview no. 5 were also quick to agree on the prejudiced nature of the described incident:

G2: [reads the description on the piece of paper]  
Problematic.

G1: Yes, it’s problematic.

G2: First of all because they aren’t friends of this girl; they’re a group of youth who point at a girl wearing hijab and giggle.

B1: Yes, then it’s bullying ... or racism.

G1: Yes, it’s very prejudiced, like ‘are you wearing that thing voluntarily?’.

To the extent to which the problematic nature of the statement was negotiated, the participants considered the possibility that the question might be an expression of genuine interest:

G3: Ehm ... yes, I don’t know about you, but I find it problematic. Simply because I feel that you can ask a girl who’s wearing hijab, and ask her respectfully about why she has chosen to wear hijab, because after all it’s an interesting thing to

hear about when you haven’t chosen it yourself. But giggling and calling out so that it kind of turns into mocking someone – that’s a rotten thing to do.

G1: Hmm.

G2: Yes, and then you should ... or I wouldn’t have thought it was ... well, that when you see someone with hijab and ... well, they ask because they’re insecure, don’t they? So they think the person isn’t wearing hijab voluntarily.

[...]

G3: Yes, but it’s not certain that when they call out in that way that they really are interested in getting an answer.

G2: No, that’s well ... but ehm, well yes ...

G1: Think they’re more interested in pointing them out because they ... why do you do it, why have you made that choice, kind of, to laugh at that choice or to ... it’s not very respectful of her choice ... so I think it’s problematic.

The possibility that wearing hijab might not be a matter of choice is not rejected here, but there is clearly uncertainty about how in that case a question could be asked in a respectful manner. The mocking element in the incident therefore became the criterion for labelling it as “problematic”. Again, the youth demonstrated their disapproval of the situation by defining it as “childish”.

One interesting example of how group dynamics led participants to moderate their comments is the following excerpt from group interview no. 3. One of the participants opened the discussion by placing hijab in a context that was conservative and oppressive towards women. He therefore meant it should be possible to ask about the background for wearing the head covering, but he partly retracted this as the discussion progressed:

B1: Well, I personally think that, well like, of course maybe it's something you should ask in private and not, like, ridicule someone because they wear it, but I do think it's ... many Muslims have a rather orthodox culture and views about girls, with traditions and so on. So what I really think is that if you ask a girl in private, then I think it's really totally OK to ... to ask, and that it doesn't have to be so personal that they can't answer you.

G2: Then you're doing it out of pure curiosity, but here it's sort of to ...

[they speak all at once]

G4: But it's not OK to laugh

G2: In order to ridicule, yes.

G1: Pointing and laughing ...

G2: And it's like, we don't know what the situation really is, so it's like, we almost assume ...

G1: We have to be a bit careful about it, like, but why do we have to know whether she's wearing it voluntarily or not? Like, what is it ... does it help you? I don't know, I mean, I just think that, like ... they're wearing it. Do we have to know whether they're wearing it voluntarily or not?

B1: Yes, and now that it's become so normalised, too, like a piece of clothing, then I don't really think it's something we should ask others about, but I also think that ehm, ...

G2: It's OK to be curious.

B1: It's OK to be curious, absolutely.

B1 moderates his original comment on orthodox culture by commenting on how the hijab had become "so normalised" that it was not right to ask whether it was worn voluntarily. This may indicate a wish to avoid appearing prejudiced after G1 questioned the intention behind the question. In light of this, G1's final comment and reaction are interesting in that they "redeem" B1 and reassure him that it is OK to be curious. This exchange

provides a clear insight into the negotiation that went on behind the final decision to categorise the incident as "fairly problematic" and where we find no purely "politically correct" consensus.

#### **FACTUAL BASIS: TO WHAT DEGREE WERE THE DESCRIPTIONS CONSIDERED REALISTIC?**

In the preceding section we elucidated how the question of whether the hijab could be categorised as a tradition that symbolised oppression of women caused some uncertainty. To what degree was this a prejudice?

The participants discussed the factual basis in several of the statements, which involved assessing to what extent a statement or comment implied stereotyping and problematic generalisation. A certain dynamic played out in the discussions of the statements that included what can be defined as positive stereotyping.

For example, the participants in group interview no. 6 discussed the factual basis in the statement "Jews are more intelligent than others". While they began by indicating some support for the idea of higher IQ among Jews, the statement was then contextualised through references to historical situations which, among other things, have governed choices of occupations among Jews in Europe. One of the informants asserted that Jewish commercial activities had long traditions that could explain a certain level of success. In their assessment of how problematic the statement was, they discussed both the problematic principle of categorisation and the differences associated with groups. One of the boys commented:

B1: If you had heard it about white people - 'Aryans are more intelligent than others' - then we wouldn't have placed it here ["fairly problematic"/"a bit problematic"]; we would have placed it under 'very problematic'. Do you see what I mean? It's difficult to decide where to place it.

As well as implying that there is a difference between the stereotyping of minorities and the stereotyping of majorities, the statement implies that there is a difference related to who makes the statement. Whereas the statement about Jews is interpreted as a comment made by others on Jews' intelligence, the statement about white people is interpreted as a comment made by the "we", which simultaneously implies a high assessment of this "we". Although the conversation essentially contrasts these two statements, the ensuing discussion contributes to elucidating why both statements are potentially problematic.

The participants in group interview no. 4 also drew on analogies before moving the statement closer to "problematic":

G3: [picks a new card] 'Jews are more intelligent than others'.

That's like ... how do I put it ... turning it around completely. And this ... you might think right away that ... this is better, in a way. If you turn the situation the other way around, then ...

G1: But that's arrogant ... for a Jew to say "We're so much better than you".

G4: But they're known for being very hard-working.

B1: And industrious and ...

G2: ... and highly educated.

G1: So I would have placed it under ... [pause]

G3: Well I think it's the same ...

G2: Imagine if it was the other way around ...

G3: Yes, that's it. It would have been just as bad if we had said that, eh ...

G1: 'Christians are so much better than others'.

B1: Yes, that's a good point.

Both excerpts show that support for certain positive stereotypes of Jews could be discerned among the youth, yet at the same time they were conscious of fundamental stereotyping and generalising mechanisms

(even in cases where they, as G3 points out in the excerpt, are turned around completely). The youth quoted in the examples turn to analogies to try out how the stereotypes work when they are directed at other groups. We find that this is an important control element in the discussions, one that challenges and problematizes stereotypes and prejudices directed at Jews and Muslims.

Regarding assumptions about the factual basis in the negative conceptions of Muslims, we also find these in the discussions about "legitimate questions" about the hijab and coercion, in which the groups allowed for the possibility that Islam can be linked to practices that are oppressive of women. However, the youth avoided repeating generalising comments about Muslims and Islam similar to those about assumed "Jewish characteristics" cited above.

The same can be said of the link between Islam and terrorism, which the youth discussed in connection with the "Allahu akabar" incident. In several interviews, the participants referred to various facts about Islamic terrorism and how the perpetrators claim to represent Islam, though the informants quickly concluded that generalisations were not justifiable.

However, we found one exception where this view was challenged. In group interview no. 3, one of the participants repeatedly tried to suggest that negative attitudes towards Muslims are based on real challenges. In the following sequence, the discussion referred to the Progress Party politicians' casting suspicion on Muslims as criminals:

B1: And one of their most important core issues is decriminalisation, making it safer and getting crime off the streets. And that's where it's always been a big issue, since much of the crime occurs among, eh, ... minority people with minority backgrounds, doesn't it?



Two of the other participants immediately protested, which led the boy to moderate his statement:

G2: But it's people like him that keep them going ... those types of, ehm, negative attitudes.

G3: In a way it's about weeding out what's relevant and what's irrelevant. It's relevant to look at how we could prevent it. It's irrelevant to look at which, well, which religion ...

B1: But at the same time, isn't it ... I'm not saying this to defend him in any way, nor am I a fan of the Progress Party.

When the boy stops himself and instead distances himself from a position which the majority of the group finds problematic, he also avoids falling outside the established and accepted frame of reference. Retractions like these do not necessarily imply a change in point of view, but may indicate that underlying negative conceptions are under-communicated or are toned down in social contexts in which they are deemed unacceptable. This is an example of how what Bergmann and Erb (1986) termed communication latency was in this study not only related to an anti-antisemitic norm but also to an expanded anti-prejudice norm.

### THE CONSPIRACY STATEMENTS

Two of the statements (nos. 7 and 9) express well known conspiracy theories about Jews and Muslims. While the groups typically saw a parallel between the statements "Muslims want to take over Europe" and "World Jewry is working behind the scenes to promote Jewish interests", there were some informants who only recognised the conspiratorial element in the statement dealing with Muslims. One example of such a difference emerged in group interview no. 2. This interview was characterised by rather brief replies, and participants' contributions mostly went unchallenged. This was the

case in a sequence in which one of the informants commented on the statement "World Jewry is working behind the scenes to promote Jewish interests". The boy asserted that Jews control social media and exploit this to put themselves in a favourable light while at the same time working to put Muslims in an unfavourable light. This received no response, even though the statement "Muslims want to take over Europe" had earlier been linked to the ideology behind the 22 July terrorist attacks. The difference suggests that the group did not recognise the prejudice element in the statement about Jews while the statement about Muslims was familiar.

A sequence in group interview no. 4 also shows that the youth did not immediately catch the conspiratorial element in the statement "World Jewry is working behind the scenes to promote Jewish interests". The statement was first categorised as "a bit problematic" but was subsequently moved closer to "problematic" after a discussion about the generalising and conspiratorial aspects of other statements. When the interviewer asked the youth to explain their change of mind, it emerged that they initially had misunderstood the statement:

Interviewer: That one has been moved, that statement ["World Jewry is working behind the scenes to promote Jewish interests"]. Do you have any thoughts about that? That you first thought it was OK and then not OK at all?

B3: I think we just misunderstood.

B4: Yes, slightly misunderstood the question.

G1: Yes, we thought it should be allowed to promote one's own interests, in a way, but when we realised that it's a statement that someone says, who believes that they do that, it sounds more negative because, well, 'behind the scenes'.

The two conspiratorial statements were not immediately considered problematic in some groups because

they were regarded as statements that were made by individuals and were therefore less serious. The following sequence from group interview no. 1 shows how disagreement arose over the placement of the statement “Muslims want to take over Europe”:

G2: I just feel it's so terrible that people are going around and being told all the time or often or through their entire childhood that, well, that they're trying to take over Europe, that they're not good, that we don't want them here.

G1: I think we all think that, that it's terrible.

G3: No one thinks it should be that way.

G2: And yet it's only “fairly problematic”? [criticises the others' suggested categorisation]

G1: It's not problematic that there's one man who's sitting at home and thinking ...

G2: Yes it is! If there's one, there's more.

G1: No, but, if there's only one.

The discussion shows how, on the one hand, the participants saw the serious (problematic) nature of the statement and how, on the other, they argued that if only one person supported the idea, it would have made the matter less serious. The arguments appear to be that one individual is hardly capable of causing serious harm. The sequence also shows how the group members have different views about the matter, and G2 cannot imagine that this applies to only one individual; whatever one person thinks has the potential for widespread support.

Several of the groups reasoned differently, and some of the youth suggested that the fact that the content of the statement applied so broadly was in itself very problematic. For example, the participants in group interview no. 6 agreed that the statement “World Jewry is working behind the scenes to promote Jewish interests” is more problematic than “The last one is a Jew” because the former has more wide-reaching consequences at societal level and is likely to spread hate and fear:

G2: Well, I would say that it [the statement “World Jewry is working behind the scenes to promote Jewish interests”] is much more harmful, much more like ... whereas this one [“The last one is a Jew”] ... I also think the main problem with someone calling out “The last one is a Jew” before running a race is a bit like ... attitudes. In any case, I think that most people will now agree that they aren't ... they don't mean anything that bad by it, even though I don't think it's good, but I can't place it on the same scale as this one [“World Jewry is working behind the scenes to promote Jewish interests”].

The youth therefore placed the statements in different contexts, in which different consequences were also taken into consideration. In instances where they did not catch the conspiratorial element in the statements, these could be regarded as flippant and even “childish”. Thus, categorising such a statement as unproblematic did not necessarily imply support for the conspiratorial element.

#### COMPARISON OF NEGATIVE ATTITUDES TOWARDS JEWS AND MUSLIMS

In the previous section we saw that the two conspiratorial ideas about Jews and Muslims were partly discussed together and that, to the extent the prejudices were recognised, were considered to be equally problematic. We could observe something similar in the reactions to the two statements asserting that Muslims and Jews consider themselves to be better than others (statements no. 4 and 6). Combined, they provide an opportunity to compare the participants' assessments of negative attitudes against both minorities. One example of how the participants compared statements no. 4 and 6 can be found in group interview no. 1. The youth in this group fully agreed on this point:

G1 [reads the statement]: “Jews think they are better than others”. It has to be the same category, right? We can't treat them differently.  
G2: We mustn't discriminate.

This quotation indicates the fundamental thinking about the type of group construct that is reflected in the statements: because the statements are, in principle, equal, they must be treated equally. At the same time, the comments show how the participants were concerned with treating those who are subjected to negative attitudes equally. They saw no difference between derogatory comments directed at Jews and the same type of comments directed at Muslims.

In some of the discussions, however, the participants pointed out differences between antisemitic and Islamophobic ideas by referring to, for example, the particular gravity of antisemitism following the Holocaust or of what they believed was a more far-reaching current problem related to Islamophobic attitudes. The participants in group interview no. 4 commented on both similarities and differences between what could be said about Jews and Muslims and a difference in time:

B1: I feel that many used “Jew” as a term of abuse without speaking very negatively about Jews, but no one used “Muslim” as a term of abuse though they spoke negatively about Muslims ... in lower secondary school, at least. Not as many say it any longer.

The comment describes a trend where terms of abuse are more common among younger age groups. This was also asserted in several of the other groups and can be detected in the quantitative study. At the same time, it is implied that use of the word “Jew” as a term of abuse is not necessarily related to deeper negative attitudes and that use of the word perhaps was not considered

to refer to Jews. By contrast, negative views of Muslims appear to be prevalent and explicit, though not to the extent that “Muslim” is used as a term of abuse.

### 7.3 THE GROUPS' DISCUSSIONS ABOUT THE CAUSES OF NEGATIVE ATTITUDES

In several of the group interviews, the youth seemed to struggle more to explain the reason for negative attitudes towards Jews than to explain the reasons for negative attitudes towards Muslims, something they also put down to not encountering negative attitudes towards Jews as often. The following examples recount how participants in both Bergen and Oslo referred to such a difference:

G4: But I personally don't think, like - and maybe it's because there aren't that many Jews in Norway - but I personally don't feel that, like, I don't notice so many negative prejudices against Jews, really.

G1: I don't, either.

G4: I think it's more relevant with Muslims. That I notice more dissatisfaction against Muslims than against Jews. [Group interview no. 1]

\*

G3: Yes, I also feel that if we're going to compare these prejudices we have against Muslims with those against Jews, then I feel that the difference is that it's now become the case that a lot more people no longer have negative views of Jews and that we no longer feel that they pose a threat but, on the other hand, a lot more people feel that Muslims do; we have SIAN [Stop Islamisation of Norway], for example, with over fifteen thousand members. [Group interview no. 5].

In these excerpts, the problems in describing what constitutes anti-Jewish attitudes were ascribed to the low prevalence of such attitudes and the small number of Jews. The latter implies that the minority's presence is what causes negative attitudes to be expressed.

A key general pattern of interpretation in this study was that negative attitudes towards Jews belonged to the past, it was something that "lingered on", while the causes of negative attitudes towards Muslims was situated in the present. Nonetheless, different reasons were cited for each minority.

#### NEGATIVE ATTITUDES TOWARDS MUSLIMS

The group interviews linked the question of causes of negative attitudes towards Muslims to two phenomena in particular: terrorism and general xenophobia, and partly to the connection between them. In the group interviews in Viken and Oslo, the participants readily agreed on what they considered to be most relevant:

G1: I think ... a lot of terror and war.

B1: Fear, the fear of it.

G1: Yes, I think fear of it is a very big reason for negative attitudes towards Muslims. [Group interview no. 3]

\*

G2: Terrorism

G1: Yes, that's it.

G2: The key words here ... Yes, just think of 9/11. It's not that long ago. [Group interview no. 5]

Different aspects of Islamic terrorism and terror organisations were mentioned in the group interviews, which showed that the youth were both concerned with and up to date on this topic. At the same time, several groups expressed a distinct opinion that Islamic terrorism was deliberately used to stigmatise Muslims generally.

G2: The unfortunate fact is that Muslim extremist terrorist groups have become quite powerful and big. What we associate with terrorism - which actually lots of different ethnic groups have used - we associate with Muslims because they're the ones that have become powerful.

This participant conceded that part of the reason for drawing a connection between Muslims and terrorism lay in the fact that Islamic terrorist groups had become powerful and big; in other words, something that could be "used against" Muslims. However, she also stressed that terrorism was a more widespread phenomenon which other groups also stood for, and in doing so diminished the connection between Muslims and terrorism. The following excerpt from group interview no. 3 shows how the youth incorporated their rejection of this connection into their rejection of xenophobia in general:

G3: I think that what we just talked about is kind of important, that we think that when someone carries out terrorist acts and justifies them with the Quran, then we think that all Muslims kind of think [the same].

G2: Since everyone reads the Quran and ...

B1: Think it's quite simply a defence mechanism, quite simply.

G2: For everything that's different?

B1: Yep.

G4: Yes, and it's like, we live in Norway and what we see in the media isn't what others see in the media. We sort of see things from our perspective.

G1: Yes, with our eyes, our lives.

G4: Yes,

G1: Yes, I kind of think that the terrorism bit ... has destroyed a lot.

G3: And it probably has a lot to do with ... that it's easy to adopt prejudices when you don't know enough about religion, isn't it? If you've never met a Muslim, say, and then you hear about things that are written in the Quran and those kinds of things, then maybe you form a picture of that person, those stereotypes, and adopt prejudices and all that.

In this sequence, the participants refer to lack of knowledge and social distance from Muslims in Norwegian society ("We sort of see things from our perspective"). This perspective causes one-sided representations to dominate people's impressions. At the same time, reference is made to a "we" who live in Norway where Muslims are not included. Religion, specifically related to the Quran, is singled out as the connection between extremism and the general image of Muslims. This is interesting in light of how the youth in other examples pointed out that prejudice against Muslims could also have something to do with the religion's conservative and oppressive nature. This shows that the comment "[s]ince everyone reads the Quran" may also make up the interpretive patterns which to a large extent hold Muslims themselves responsible for negative attitudes towards their group (see also Moe et al., 2016; Døving, 2020).

### NEGATIVE ATTITUDES TOWARDS JEWS

As suggested, antisemitism was typically associated with the past, especially with World War II and attitudes that do not belong in our time, but that "linger on":

G1: Maybe history [explains it], but I think it is a combination [of reasons]. If you know the history of the Jews, I think it might work like [opposite] ...; for example if they learn about it in Germany, that they think: 'Yes, that was Germany's golden age. It was during World War II'. And that they

might then begin to think: 'We'll do what Hitler did, because of history'. It might work completely ... it will most likely have the opposite effect.

G2: Yes, but Nazism and neo-Nazism are still alive in Norway and around the world.

G4: I think it's very ... I think it's very much bound by history. After all, Jews have been discriminated against for a very, very, very long time. [Group interview no. 1]

The following quotation from group interview no. 6 illustrates how awareness of the fate of the Jews during the Holocaust was also drawn into a comparison between negative attitudes towards Jews and Muslims:

G3: And I also feel it has a bit to do with how we, after World War II, in a way the whole world basically said sorry to the Jews, like, the poor Jews. There's been a lot more talk about all the bad things the Jews had to go through, but that hasn't been the case for the Muslims. It's more a case of they're dangerous here and now and we don't like Muslims, while the Jews have been more like, they're like me and you, we must just leave them alone.

The Holocaust, or "what they've already been through" as one informant put it, is used to explain why negative attitudes towards Jews are no longer accepted and, by extension, are no longer expressed. The excerpt is interesting because it suggests that a strong anti-antisemitism norm following the Holocaust contributes to an empathy with Jews that does not apply to Muslims.

In some groups, negative attitudes towards Jews were also linked to the Middle East conflict/Israel, but this was in no way a reason that was given much weight. Equating Israel with Jews was problematised in group interview no. 1, despite some disagreement arising over the conflict itself:

G3: I think that if you're going to put Jews in some kind of bad prejudices category, then it will be Israel, but it's not the fault of the Jews.

G4: No, it's not ...

G3: No, I mean, the fact that a war broke out, that wasn't the Jews' fault. Ehm, that's a mess in itself. But they're getting the blame now ... it seems.

G4: No, I mean, those who are waging war against the Palestinians in Israel, well they're not totally innocent. Even if they didn't create the State of Israel themselves.

G3: Yes, but part of the problem is how the areas were split up in the first place ...

G4: Yes, yes.

It may seem surprising how little emphasis the youth place on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a cause of negative attitudes towards Jews. As shown earlier in this report, a certain connection is drawn between critical attitudes towards Israel and antisemitism in the Norwegian population. The results of the quantitative analyses showed that a large proportion of the youth supported Palestine in the conflict. Nonetheless, there is little to suggest that they themselves confuse criticism of Israel with negative attitudes towards Jews generally. However, they do not seem to be aware that this generalisation actually occurs in the public debate on the conflict.

#### GENERAL XENOPHOBIA: JEWS AND MUSLIMS

As already mentioned, antisemitism and Islamophobia were both placed in a general interpretative framework as "xenophobia", where both immigration and religion were cited. Here is an example illustrating how Muslims were perceived as more "foreign":

G2: And so I think it's xenophobia, or much of it.

[The others agree]

G3: Fear of the unknown.

G1: They're even more different from us maybe, or Jews more closely resemble Christianity, and were maybe not so distant from us, and have been in Norway a long time. While Muslims are maybe even more ... their culture is maybe even more distant from ours, and then there's xenophobia, I think. [Group interview no. 1]

The youth generally positioned themselves as a generation that is used to socialising with people from different backgrounds, something which can be regarded as a key aspect in the anti-racist norm we find in the material. This means that xenophobia is a problem that belongs to the older generation, who did not have the same experiences. Similar interpretations emerged in connection with antisemitism and Islamophobic attitudes:

B2: Yes, as far as parents and grandparents are concerned, there was a lot of that, xenophobia. I don't think any Jews lived in the valley where my grandparents grew up. [Group interview no. 4]

In response to the statement "Muslims are trying to take over Europe" as follows, one of the informants exclaimed as follows, with support from the others:

G1: I feel it's very typical of something an old lady and an old man would say because they're they so uninformed about society, I mean what's happening now, kind of.

We find something similar in group interview no. 5, where the youth agree to regard anti-immigration attitudes as something reactionary and outdated:

G1: I think it's interesting to talk to my grandparents. I mean my grandfather, he's voted for the Progress Party, the Conservative Party,

the Centre Party, so a good mix, to talk to him about immigration. What I understand from what he says is, yes, afraid of change and, like, thinks that when they're gone, things will change too much, that we'll leave our traditions behind. But I thinks it's so strange, because OK, imagine if Norway becomes like that, [that] we don't want any immigration, like, and the rest of the world continues.

G2: We will lag behind if we stop ...

G1: Yes, then Sweden, Denmark, everyone will kind of flourish with culture and ... [latter]. And we're supposed to just carry on, like, eating potatoes?

G1: Will we just be old-fashioned?

#### 7.4 WHAT IS AT STAKE: ASPECTS OF GROUP DYNAMICS

As illustrated in the review of the findings from the group interviews so far, the topics and statements/incidents the youth were asked to respond to generated considerable engagement. The discussions demonstrated that the youth understood that the topics entailed fundamental normative and moral questions, and to some extent, they negotiated their own moral positioning. The emotional reactions we could observe in some participants give an indication of how much is at stake for these young people. The two examples cited illustrate different communicative and social dynamics that were triggered.

The first example is from interview no. 1, where one of the participants expressed early on in the discussion that she found all the situations on the list totally unacceptable. The informant seemed deeply affected by the topic, and not long into the discussion she almost started to cry when the other participants insisted on some nuance. This clearly made the others uneasy

and created a rather tense atmosphere. The turning point came when the emotionally affected participant (G2) said that she had grown up and still lived in an environment where coarse prejudiced language was the norm:

G3: Seriously – you've sat there and listened to people do it?

G2: Yes.

G3: Wow.

G2: And no one reacted, more or less.

G1: What?

G3: That's disappointing.

G2: Yes, it is. And very problematic. Just saying. [laughter]

G3: Now I get why you have so many strong views. [laughter]

After this the group had only one statement left to discuss. It was categorised as "very problematic" without much discussion. The dynamic can be interpreted as an indication that the other participants experienced G2's emotional reaction as some kind of moral pressure. The tense atmosphere suggested that no one dared to challenge her strong condemnation of the statements. At the same time, G3 in particular expressed irritation at what she saw as a limitation on open discussion. G2's tears may have been perceived as a strategic means to dominate the discussion. It was only when she opened up about the personal reasons for her reaction that the tension between the participants dispersed (with laughter). The others appeared to understand and therefore acknowledged her perspective. This way, emotions became a factor in the social regulation of attitudes.

Whereas in this example the emotions were clearly expressed and changed the discussion dynamic, we could observe the opposite in group interview no. 5, where one of the participants quickly came to

dominate the discussion. She picked up all the cards, read the statements aloud and then immediately began arguing very categorically for placing them as “very problematic”. While the other girls somehow managed to follow the discussion and supplement it with arguments supporting the stance the first girl had defined, the only boy in the group leaned back and fell silent. The only time he was active was when the discussion centred around the ‘Allahu akbar’ incident and he opposed the perception that this was “very problematic” (we analysed his intervention above). The interviewer observed how the boy gradually began destroying a pen he was holding in his hands. He seemed dissatisfied with the situation. Towards the end of the discussion, the interviewer turned directly to him and remarked that he had been so quiet. He replied that it was not necessarily because he disagreed with the conclusions, but in the way the things were discussed.

The situation can be interpreted such that the boy grew angry at getting no chance to share his thoughts in what he perceived as a very principled and normative discussion among the girls. A potential challenge is that a principled and “politically correct” discourse can have exclusionary effects both on participants and on perspectives that could challenge and provide nuance.

#### **THE MINORITY PARTICIPANTS’ PRESENCE**

As mentioned in the introduction, participants who positioned themselves as Muslims were present at two of the group interviews, while other forms of (national) minority positions were expressed in two of the other discussions. None of the youth positioned themselves as Jews. The dynamic of the two discussions in which Muslims participated was influenced by their presence.

In one of the interviews in Oslo, four of five informants were Muslims, including a girl who positioned herself both through her use of hijab and through her own comments. Throughout the interview she used negative experiences of being subjected to prejudice

as a principled argument that any form of stereotyping and generalisation – directed at Muslims and at Jews – was unacceptable. The others agreed with this and all the statements were duly categorised as “very problematic” without any objections made or nuance offered, as we have seen in the other discussions. We interpret this dynamic such that this participant gained strong interpretive authority by substantiating points of view with her own negative experiences.

In the second example, taken from group interview no. 2, the two Muslim participants, one of whom was in the integration class at the school, also took an active part in the discussion. Here, too, these pupils talked about their own negative experiences of prejudice. Clear differences also emerged in the interpretation of the statements and incidents dealing with Jews that could have been the subject of disagreement and debate, but when one of the Muslim participants expressed what were obvious conspiracy theories about Jews, he was not opposed by the two majority pupils. A little later in the interview, however, one of the majority pupils made a comment that disproved the theories without drawing any link to the previous comment. The course of the discussion can be interpreted as a form of fear of confrontation on the part of the majority pupils, that it would be unpleasant to call out a minority pupil for making a prejudiced comment. One consequence of this was that conspiracy theories were allowed to go unchallenged. Another possible reason for this evasion was a communication problem in the form of some linguistic challenges on the part of the two Muslim pupils. It can seem as if the participants in this group quite literally lacked a common language for negotiating the topic, on which they held highly disparate and asymmetrical points of view.



### 7.5 CONCLUSION: AN ANTI-PREJUDICE NORM WITH ROOM FOR NEGOTIATION

As we have seen, the final categorising of the described situations generally do not reflect rapidly achieved consensus within the groups, but rather discussions in which different positions were voiced. In some instances the groups could not agree. The figure below shows how the statements were placed and moved in group interview no. 5. Several of the pieces of paper were moved multiple times before finally being placed. The arrows indicate that the notes were moved during the discussion while the brackets indicate that the statements were placed analogous to the above with little discussion.

attitudes among youth than that which emerges from the quantitative study alone.

#### HOW CAN THE FORMAT OF AND INSIGHTS FROM THE GROUP INTERVIEWS BE USED IN THE CLASSROOM?

Following the interviews, we asked the youth about how they had experienced the discussion. Many replied that they had found it interesting and that they would like to have this type of discussion as part of their tuition. They rarely had the opportunity to discuss such topics. The teachers we contacted in connection with recruiting informants also believed that the structured format might be an interesting way to treat issues dealing with prejudice and boundary setting in their teaching. Several pointed out the challenges of dealing with such topics and that pupils withdraw from plenary discussions for various reasons, one of them being the high conflict level.

Very problematic	Fairly problematic	A bit problematic	Totally uproblematic	Couldn't agree
1, 5, 10	2 ←2	3 ←3		8
	7 → (9)	4 (6)		

As we have shown, the youth themselves demonstrated openness and tolerance during the interviews. In group interview no. 6, the participants jokingly described themselves as “politically correct” before categorising yet another statement as “very problematic”. This was said with a touch of irony, thus easing the moral pressure which the clearly anti-prejudice norm seems to exert. The youth’s approach to setting this boundary can be described as “tolerance limits under negotiation” (Eriksen & Lyng, 2018). The most intense negotiation in the interviews centred on to what degree humour and “fun” could allow saying something which in principle was not deemed acceptable. Overall, the qualitative interviews therefore provide a broader picture of

We believe the findings from the group interviews provide valuable insight into the potential and challenges of providing pupils with a space where they can voice and argue for their personal points of view on these topics. Of course, a format that was developed in a research context follows considerations other than a didactically oriented teaching plan. Adaptations will therefore be needed to, among other things, ensure that misconceptions based on lack of knowledge do not go unchallenged and that everyone is allowed to have their say, be heard and respected. In cooperation with teachers and teacher educators affiliated with the school-based development project Dembra, the Norwegian Center for Holocaust and Minority Studies

will implement a research and development project in which one or more educational programmes focusing on prejudiced language and boundary setting is developed, tested and evaluated. Such a development project can form the basis for a broader competence development programme for teachers and teacher educators.

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