

A comparative overview of surveys

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Jews in many European countries have a deep emotional and religious attachment to Israel. Therefore, “negativity toward Israel expressed by non-Jews is likely to be a cause for significant concern and apprehension among many Jews”.¹ Two studies conducted by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), in 2013 and 2018, and a German study on “Jewish perspectives”, from 2017, all show that a large majority of Jews evaluates the equation of Israeli policy toward the Palestinians with that of the Nazis toward Jews, support for the boycott of goods from Israel, a “distorted presentation” of Israeli policy in the mass media, and “criticism of Israel” to all be expressions of an antisemitic attitude² – while others deny that this is the case. While 85% of Jews in twelve European countries classify the statement “Israelis behave ‘like Nazis’ toward the Palestinians” as definitely or possibly antisemitic, only 14% reject such an evaluation (probably not, definitely not). Criticism of Israel, on the other hand, is classified as antisemitic less often (38%). Jews in Spain are most likely to agree that criticism of Israel is antisemitic (62%), followed by those in France (42%), Austria, Italy, and Germany (37%), and Belgium and the United Kingdom (34%). Jews in Denmark (17%), the Netherlands (25%), Poland (27%), and Sweden (28%) are least likely to agree. Evaluation of support for a boycott of Israel or Israelis shows a similar distribution across European countries but at a significantly higher level: on average, 82% of Jews surveyed consider such support to be antisemitic.³

Sergio Della Pergola’s analysis of data from the FRA’s 2018 study found that Jewish experiential perceptions of antisemitism can be divided into four domains: “judgments of

* I am very grateful to Vibeke Moe, Christhard Hoffmann, and Ottar Hellevik for their suggestions and critical review of the text. I also have to thank Karl Levesque for carefully editing the text in terms of language and content.

The translation of the quotations from non-English-language contributions was done by the author himself.

¹ L. Daniel Staetsky, *Antisemitism in contemporary Great Britain. A study of attitudes toward Jews and Israel*, London 2017, p. 27.

² European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), *Discrimination and hate crime against Jews in EU member states: experiences and perceptions of antisemitism*, 2013; European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), *Experiences and perceptions of antisemitism. Second survey on discrimination and hate crime against Jews in the EU*, 2018; Andreas Zick/Andreas Hövermann/Silke Jensen/Julia Bernstein, *Jüdische Perspektiven auf Antisemitismus in Deutschland. Ein Studienbericht für den Expertenkreis Antisemitismus*, Bielefeld 2017, pp. 12 and 16 (<https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/record/2913036> – 12th November 2021).

³ European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), *Experiences and perceptions of antisemitism*, p. 26, table 3 and p. 29, table 5.

Jews responding to attributes that conform to the tenets of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, such as dominance, foreignness and selfishness”; “judgment about the Shoah (The Holocaust is a myth or has been exaggerated [...]); Jews exploit Holocaust victimhood for their own purposes [...]); judgements “about self-culpability (Jews bring antisemitism on themselves [...]); and judgements about “Israel (Israelis behave as Nazis toward the Palestinians [...]); The world would be a better place without Israel [...])”.⁴ In the view of European Jews, anti-Israel sentiment figures increasingly as an integral part of the larger complex of anti-Jewish and antisemitic notions and behavior. According to 55%, support for Israel is an aspect of Jewish identity. “The notable and growing centrality of Israel in Jewish identification perceptions went hand in hand with a diminishing distance between perceptions of legitimate criticism of Israel – let alone defamation or boycott – and perceptions of antisemitism.”⁵ For Della Pergola, therefore, the role of the perception of Israel within the antisemitism paradigm as a whole “calls for further clarification in the light of its increased prominence in Jewish and general perceptions”.⁶

For many years now, there has been a simmering debate about the relationship between antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes – one in which political interests have also come into play.⁷ Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, some scholars have referred to a “new antisemitism”, one that treats Israel as a kind of “collective Jew”.⁸ Some scholars even believe that antisemitism today appears mainly in the guise of hostility toward Israel. As early as the 1980s, Werner Bergmann and Rainer Erb, with their concept of communication latency, suggested that negative statements about Israel might be a form of indirect or “detour”

⁴ Sergio DellaPergola, “Jewish Perceptions of Antisemitism in the European Union, 2018: A New Structural Look”, in: *Analysis of Current Trends in Antisemitism – ACTA 40/2* (2020) (<https://archive.jpr.org.uk/object-1141> – accessed 10th October 2021) (4.2.2 Experiential Level). “The growing perception of negative public opinion and political build-up against Israel may have caused a significant increase in the perceptual salience of Israel. [...] The present findings [...] unequivocally demonstrate that in the latent perception of the European Jewish public, Israel is tending to become a more central identificational locus of attention and concern. Perceptions of critiques and even more so, delegitimization and sometimes demonization versus Israel may have been interpreted by many Jews as attacks against the core of Jewish identification at large” (“7 A Note on Antisemitism and Jewish Identity” in *ibid.*).

⁵ “8 Summary and Concluding Remarks” in *ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ Edward H. Kaplan/Charles A. Small, “Anti-Israel Sentiment Predicts Anti-Semitism in Europe”, in: *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50/4 (2006), pp. 548–561, here p. 548f. See also: Robert Fine, “Fighting with phantoms: a contribution to the debate on antisemitism in Europe”, in: *Patterns of Prejudice* 43 (2009), pp. 459–479; Werner Bergmann, “Is there a ‘New European Antisemitism’? Public Opinion and Comparative Empirical Research in Europe”, in: Lars Rensmann/Julius H. Schoeps (eds.), *Politics and Resentment. Antisemitism and Counter-Cosmopolitanism in the European Union*, Leiden/Boston 2011, pp. 83–117.

⁸ Pierre-André Taguieff, *La nouvelle judéophobie*, Paris 2002; Brian Klug, “The collective Jew: Israel and the new antisemitism”, in: *Patterns of Prejudice* 37/2 (2003), pp. 117–138; Doron Rabinovici, Ulrich Speck/Natan Sznaider (eds.), *Neuer Antisemitismus? Eine globale Debatte*, Frankfurt am Main 2004; more recently: Christian Heilbronn/Doron Rabinovici/Natan Sznaider (eds.), *Neuer Antisemitismus? Fortsetzung einer globalen Debatte*, Berlin 2019.

communication, as such statements are less negatively sanctioned than negative statements about Jews.⁹ However, there is a problem when this concept leads to a situation where almost any criticism of Israeli policies is considered a detour communication for antisemitic attitudes.

Henrik Bachner is correct in stating that the “question of when and how the debate on Israel or Zionism becomes antisemitic is not always easy, and must be open for different and conflicting interpretations”.¹⁰ Although this does not mean that all negative statements about Israel are acceptable, how a statement is best evaluated often depends on the context and the individual speaker. Therefore, in many cases one can speak of a “grey area” in which it is difficult to determine whether anti-Israel statements should be regarded as antisemitic.¹¹ The question of the extent to which antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes are linked (or are almost identical) is the most hotly debated issue in recent research on antisemitism, and no consensus has emerged so far.¹²

In the twenty years since the early 1991 study by Bergmann and Erb, there have been an increasing number of empirical studies on the connection between hostility toward Israel and antisemitism. It is no coincidence that these have often been tied to discussions about the “new antisemitism”. The concept of a new antisemitism, first introduced by Pierre-André Taguieff in 2002,¹³ is meant to denote hostility toward the State of Israel among leftists, antiracists, and critics of colonialism and globalization. But the existence of left-wing hostility toward Israel is nothing new. As early as the late 1960s, anti-Zionism and antisemitism were already “a part of a larger ideological package consisting of anticolonialism, anticapitalism, and a deep suspicion of US policies. In the eyes of members of the developing countries, Jews became a symbol of the West and legitimate targets for hatred”.¹⁴ While this ideological package was prevalent in the communist states as far back as the early 1950s, it was adopted by the radical Left in the West after the Six-Day War in 1967.

⁹ Werner Bergmann/Rainer Erb, “Kommunikationslatenz, Moral und öffentliche Meinung. Theoretische Überlegungen zum Antisemitismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland”, in: *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie* 38 (1986), pp. 223–246.

¹⁰ Henrik Bachner, “Contemporary Antisemitism in Europe and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict”, in: Emma O’Donnell Polyakov (ed.), *Antisemitism, Islamophobia, and Interreligious Hermeneutics. Ways of Seeing the Religious Other*, Leiden/Boston 2019, pp. 86–104, p. 89.

¹¹ See also Bachner, who speaks of “cases that are ambiguous, involving arguments and expressions that for good reasons can be understood differently” (ibid., p. 89).

¹² Fine, “Fighting with phantoms”; David Feldman, “Antizionismus und Antisemitismus in Großbritannien”, in: *Jahrbuch für Antisemitismusforschung* 23 (2014), pp. 43–49; Klug, “The collective Jew”; Bachner, “Contemporary Antisemitism in Europe”, p. 89.

¹³ Taguieff, *La nouvelle judéophobie*.

¹⁴ Shulamit Volkov, “Readjusting Cultural Codes: Reflections on Anti-Semitism and Anti-Zionism”, in: *Journal of Israeli History* 25/1 (2006), pp. 51–62, here p. 51.

Five years of unprecedented conflict in the Middle East at the beginning of the twenty-first century led the renowned historian Shulamit Volkov to return to her concept of a “cultural code”, which she had developed for the analysis of late–nineteenth century antisemitism.¹⁵ In her view, put forth in 2006, taking a position on Israel had become of central importance for the European Left today; she wondered whether this “can still be considered a cultural-code” – meaning, a sign of belonging to a larger ideological camp – or whether it instead indicated “a more direct anti-Jewish attack, above all as a result of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict”. She asked whether opposition to Israel could be considered a side issue, with Israel being secondary to some other evil, or whether it had become a “major concern” for the Left, which increasingly feared the global implications of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.¹⁶

The question is whether this opposition to Israeli policies on the part of the Left is best understood as an attack directed against Jews in general, or whether the claim that the Left’s criticism of Israel is antisemitic is instead the result of a politically motivated expansion of the concept of antisemitism. Daniel C. Brecher, former director of the Leo Baeck Institute in Jerusalem, recently stated that the “understanding of antisemitism has greatly expanded and radicalized” in Germany as well as in Israel (but this is now likely true of many other countries as well), since it is “no longer understood solely as a threat to the Jews in the diaspora” but “also as a danger to Israel”. “This Israelization of the understanding of antisemitism has not only strongly affected perceptions among Jews and the diaspora; it has also made a public discussion about antisemitism considerably more difficult.”¹⁷ According to Brecher, since the Six-Day War in 1967, Israeli media and information policy has endeavored to “mark criticism of Israeli policy in the Western public with the stigma of antisemitism”; this has included criticism of Israeli policies by Jews.¹⁸

¹⁵ In a seminal essay, Shulamit Volkov showed how in the German Empire society underwent a process of cultural polarization, leading to the formation of two warring camps. According to Volkov, one part of German society at that time developed a “cultural pattern”, understood as a “total network of all types of thinking, feeling and acting”, in which nationalist thinking (German ideology), racism, aggressive nationalism, militarism, cultural pessimism, anti-socialism, and antisemitism formed a “great symbolic unit”, the core of which was the larger and more important cultural phenomenon of anti-modernism. (“Anti-Semitism as a Cultural Code: Reflections on the History and Historiography of Anti-Semitism in Imperial Germany”, in: *Yearbook of the Leo Baeck Institute* 23 (1978), pp. 25–46).

¹⁶ Volkov, “Readjusting Cultural Codes”, pp. 51 and 60.

¹⁷ Daniel Cil Brecher, “Zwischen Stigma und Identität. Antisemitismus, Israel und die Juden in Deutschland”, in: Wolfgang Benz (ed.), *Streitfall Antisemitismus. Anspruch auf Deutungsmacht und politische Interessen*, Berlin 2020, pp. 33–60, here p. 35. Brecher quotes a British and an Israeli researcher who have written about the phenomenon of the Israelization of antisemitism: “What is the ‘Jewish question’ today? Is there still a ‘Jewish question’ at all, apart from an ‘Israel question’?” (Toby Greens/Yossi Stein, “The Israelization of British Jewry: Balancing between home and homeland”, in: *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 18/4 [2016], p. 48).

¹⁸ A stigmatization that prominent Jewish critics of Israeli policy such as Judith Butler and Tony Judt have experienced (Brecher, “Zwischen Stigma und Identität”, p. 44f). Brecher sees the discourse of Israeli policy since

The accusation of antisemitism from Israel and by non-Jewish and Jewish voices outside of Israel has not been directed primarily against the extreme Right but against critics of Israeli policy on the Left, who criticize Israel on the grounds of human rights violations, racism, and colonialism.¹⁹ In Germany, for over ten years now, there has been a shift in what statements are deemed antisemitic, from traditional and secondary antisemitism to critical statements about Israeli policy.²⁰ In Great Britain, allegations were raised that Jeremy Corbyn turned a blind eye to antisemitism in the Labour Party and associated with Holocaust deniers, terrorists, and outright antisemites.²¹ In Norway, the article “God’s Chosen People” by the famous writer Jostein Gaarder sparked a heated debate in 2006, his remarks being seen as an example of how criticism of Israel could cross the line into antisemitism.²²

In the context of the intensification of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict following the second Intifada and the anti-Jewish and anti-Israel attacks that accompanied it in 2002, there has been an increased interest on the part of the governments of OSCE countries to arrive at a definition of what is meant by antisemitism.²³ In 2005, the European Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) developed a “Working Definition of Antisemitism”. The EUMC (today the Fundamental Human Rights Agency, FRA) and several other political associations – such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Task Force for International Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research (today the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance, IHRA) – were involved in establishing the definition. Various Jewish organizations – for example, the American Jewish Committee –

1980 as a process of reinterpretation, “which trivialized the Middle Eastern origin of the conflict with the Palestinians, assigned it to the European historical era of 1933–1945 and linked it with antisemitism” (p. 57).

¹⁹ See, for example: Taguieff, *La nouvelle judéophobie*.

²⁰ In Germany, the renowned writer Günter Grass (in 2012) and the journalist Jakob Augstein (also in 2012) were accused of making antisemitic statements related to Israel and its policies, while the Mayor of Berlin Michael Müller was accused by the Simon Wiesenthal Center (Los Angeles) of having failed to publicly distance himself from the anti-Israel BDS (Boycott Divestment Sanctions) campaign. In 2018, the Center ranked Jeremy Corbyn in fourth place in their antisemitism ranking. The American company Airbnb was in sixth place in the antisemitism ranking, for announcing in November that it would be withdrawing accommodations in Israeli settlements because they were at the “center of the dispute between Israelis and Palestinians”. The German “Bank for Social Economy” is in seventh place; the reason given was that the bank was working with the organization “Jewish Voice for a Just Peace in the Middle East”, which advocates a boycott of Israel and is one of the supporters of the BDS movement (in: *Jüdische Allgemeine*, December 26, 2018). Events such as the Ship-to-Gaza incident (2010) and Al-Quds Day anti-Israel demonstrations were also seen as antisemitic.

²¹ Rowena Mason, “Jewish Chronicle accuses Corbyn of associating with Holocaust deniers”, in: *The Guardian*, August 13, 2015; Ben Gidley/Brendan McGeevers/David Feldman, “Labour and Antisemitism: a Crisis Misunderstood”, in: *The Political Quarterly* 91/2 (April–June 2020), pp. 413–421.

²² Claudia Lenz/Theodor Vestavik Geelmuyden, “Drawing the Demarcation Line between Legitimate and Illegitimate Criticism of Israel”, in: Christhard Hoffmann/Vibeke Moe (eds.), *The Shifting Boundaries of Prejudice: Antisemitism and Islamophobia in Contemporary Norway*, Scandinavian University Press (Universitetsforlaget AS), Oslo 2020, pp. 51–75.

²³ For the OSCE conferences on antisemitism in Vienna (2003), Berlin (2004), and Cordoba (2005), as well as several meetings on racism and discrimination, see the report of the German Bundestag: *Wissenschaftlicher Dienst*, Initiativen der OSZE zur Bekämpfung des Antisemitismus, Deutscher Bundestag 2006, WD2 -215/06.

were also involved in this process.²⁴ In the case of the latter, there was an interest in using this “Working Definition” to classify human rights–motivated criticism of Israel’s current occupation policy as antisemitic.²⁵ It is therefore not surprising that most of the concrete examples that are classified as antisemitic refer to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and not to Jews in general.²⁶ This proposal, intended merely as a legally non-binding “working definition” and having attracted much criticism from the scientific community,²⁷ was nevertheless adopted by the IHRA in 2016 and has been implemented by 36 countries since then (as of 2021) as an official definition of antisemitism intended to guide the actions of the police, the judiciary, and the government.²⁸ Michael Kohlstruck has argued that this has established in the “public discussion a systematically delimited, morally grounded, and generally usable semantic field for the term antisemitism”.²⁹ This broadening of the concept of antisemitism has had an impact on the question of which statements regarding Israeli policy are to be considered antisemitic and where exactly the line between harsh critical

²⁴ Michael Kohlstruck, “Zur öffentlichen Thematisierung des Antisemitismus”, in: Wolfgang Benz (ed.), *Streitfall Antisemitismus*, p. 148, here p. 136f. The well-known 3D test proposed by Natan Sharansky, at the time (2003) a minister in Ariel Sharon’s government, has also played a role, according to which statements can be classified as anti-Israel antisemitism if they demonize Israel, delegitimize it, or apply double standards in evaluating Israeli policy. (Natan Sharansky, “3D Test of Antisemitism: Demonization, Double Standards, Delegitimization”, Foreword in: *Jewish Political Studies Review* 16, Fall 2002, pp. 3–4).

²⁵ For the corresponding influence of the American Jewish Committee and the Simon Wiesenthal Center (LA), as “interested partisan organisations”, on the formulation of the “Working Definition” (and especially on the eleven examples), see the research for a doctoral thesis at Wolfson College, Oxford University, by Jamie Stern-Weiner: *The Politics of a Definition. How the IHRA Working Definition of Antisemitism Is Being Misrepresented*, April 2021 (<https://freespeechonIsrael.org.uk/wo-content/uploads/2021/04/The-Politics-of-a-Definition.pdf> – accessed 12th November 2021).

²⁶ Kohlstruck, “Zur öffentlichen Thematisierung”, p. 135. For Kohlstruck, this “Working Definition” is an example of a persuasive definition, which is characterized by the fact that its definiendum (in this case, antisemitism) has a descriptive (value-neutral) component as well as an emotive (evaluative) component, and its definiens (an evil ideology) changes the descriptive interpretative component but retains the emotive, in order to transfer it to the new meaning. So, in this case, the extremely negative evaluation of Nazi antisemitism is applied to positions that are considered to be a new antisemitism, an antisemitism related to Israel. In other words, it is about the transfer of associations connected with Nazi antisemitism to an antisemitism related to Israel (p. 138).

²⁷ See Rebecca Ruth Gould, “Legal Form and Legal Legitimacy: The IHRA Definition of Antisemitism as a Case Study in Censored Speech”, in: *Law, Culture and the Humanities*, August 2018, pp. 1–34; Antony Lerman, “Labour should ditch the IHRA working definition of antisemitism altogether”, in: *openDemocracy* September 4, 2018 (www.opendemocracy.net/en/opendemocracyuk/labour-should-ditch-ihra-working-definition-of-antisemitism-altogether/ – accessed 12th November 2021); Peter Ullrich, “Gutachten zur „Arbeitsdefinition Antisemitismus“ der International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance”, in: *Rosa-Luxemburg Papers* 2019. In March 2021, the Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism, which has been signed by more than 200 scholars (of Jewish history, antisemitism, Middle East Studies, and Holocaust history) was published as a response to the IHRA Definition. The JDA evaluates the IHRA Definition “as unclear in key respects and widely open to different interpretations, so that it has caused confusion and generated controversy”. The JDA claims to offer “(a) a clearer core definition and (b) a coherent set of guidelines” (<https://jerusalemdeclaration.org/> – accessed 12th November 2021).

²⁸ According to Stern-Weiner, “IHRA’s decision-making body, the Plenary, did not adopt any examples of ‘antisemitism’ as a part of the Working Definition”, and “Senior IHRA officials and pro-Israel groups have misrepresented the IHRA Plenary’s decision in order to smuggle into the Working Definition examples that can be used to protect Israel from criticism. These examples have been used in practice, to censor Israel’s critics” (*The Politics of a Definition. Executive Summary*, p. 4).

²⁹ Kohlstruck, “Zur öffentlichen Thematisierung”, p. 147; see also Gould, “Legal Form and Legal Legitimacy”.

statements and antisemitism should be drawn.³⁰ It is no coincidence that debates on the Middle East conflict are considered a “special battleground of instrumentalized criticism of Israel”.³¹

According to L. Daniel Staetsky, a “strictly empirical social scientific approach to this question requires an ‘overlap-test’”.³² The research question examined by the surveys that constitute the focus of the present study is not whether anti-Israel *statements* are antisemitic in effect or content; what they have measured is the extent to which individuals’ antisemitic attitudes overlap with their anti-Israel attitudes. The question about a connection between antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes is to be treated as an open research question and cannot simply be taken for granted, despite what is often assumed.³³ The finding that negativity toward Israel in many countries is significantly more common than negativity toward Jews gives a first indication that we should not expect a perfect overlap between the two.³⁴ As the following results from previous surveys show, some respondents with a very negative attitude toward Israel do not agree with any of the antisemitic ideas. This finding raises the question as to whether their support for anti-Israel statements should be classified as antisemitic or as hostility “purely” directed against the State of Israel or its policies but not against Jews in general. The problem with correlations in social science is that you cannot clearly determine the direction of causality. In the case at hand, this means that antisemitic attitudes can negatively affect perceptions of Israel, just as, conversely, it is possible that the policies of Israel, as a Jewish state, contribute to a more negative attitude toward Jews in general (see below).

³⁰ For example, the philosopher Brian Klug, who teaches at Oxford University, was attacked as an “anti-Israel activist” in an article by Clemens Heni and Michael Kreutz (“Die Grenzen der Toleranz. Peter Schäfer machte das Jüdische Museum zum Inkubator für Israel-Ressentiments”, in: *Der Tagesspiegel*, January 2, 2020), merely because in 2003 Klug had disputed the assertion that criticism of Israel constituted a new form of antisemitism (Klug, “The collective Jew”).

³¹ Micha Brumlik, “‘Israelsolidarität’ als Islamophobie – Formen eines neuen McCarthyismus”, in: Wolfgang Benz (ed.), *Streitfall Antisemitismus*, pp. 166–181, here p. 177.

³² Staetsky, *Antisemitism in contemporary Great Britain*, p. 33.

³³ *Ibid.*, pp. 11 and 63. As the small pilot study (N=122) by Daniel Allington and David Hirsh does not fulfill this condition, but only works with an Antizionist Antisemitism Scale, which is supposed to be an instrument to measure antisemitic attitudes “articulated in the language of hostility to Israel and its supporters”, it is not considered here (“The AzAs (Antizionist Antisemitism) Scale: Measuring Antisemitism as Expressed in Relation to Israel and Its Supporters”, in: *Journal of Contemporary Antisemitism*, 2019, pp. 43-51, here p. 43; DOI:10.26613/jca/2.2.32 – accessed 16th November 2021).

³⁴ In the British case, the correlation between the antisemitic and anti-Israel indices is statistically significant: the Pearson correlation (r) is 0.48 and 23% of variation in the Anti-Israel Index is explained by variation in the Anti-Semitism Index (*ibid.*, p. 35, footnote 24). In the Norwegian survey, the Pearson correlation of the Anti-Israel Index and the Combined Index of Antisemitism is lower ($r = 0.32$) than in the British study.

Staetsky seeks to explore the attitude of the population toward Israel “along the same lines as their attitudes toward Jews: first, at the level of favourable or unfavourable opinion, and second, testing the prevalence of specific ideas about Israel”,³⁵ and to then look for an overlap with antisemitic emotions and ideas. Although many researchers on antisemitism today believe that an Israel-related antisemitism is of central importance, surveys on antisemitism often still limit themselves to identifying “classical” antisemitic attitudes. There are only a handful of studies dealing explicitly with the correlation between antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes.³⁶

1. Antisemitism and Anti-Zionism – Are anti-Israel attitudes anything more than veiled antisemitism? An early survey in West Germany (1987/1991)

³⁵ Ibid., p. 27.

³⁶ There are not many studies investigating the link between antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes. For an early example, see Werner Bergmann/Rainer Erb, *Antisemitismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Ergebnisse der empirischen Forschung von 1946 bis 1989*, Opladen 1991 (English edition: Werner Bergmann/Rainer Erb, *Anti-Semitism in Germany. The Post-Nazi Epoch since 1945*; see chapter on “Antizionism and Antisemitism”, pp. 182–191); Wolfgang Frindte/Dorit Wammetsberger/Susan Wetting, “Old and New Anti-Semitic Attitudes in the Context of Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation – Two Studies in Germany”, in: *Peace and Conflict. Journal of Peace Psychology* 11/3 (2005), pp. 239–266; Edgar H. Kaplan/Charles Small, “Anti-Israel sentiment predicts anti-Semitism in Europe”, in: *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50/4 (2006), pp. 548–561, which used the data from the ADL survey, *Attitudes toward Jews, Israel and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict in Ten European Countries*, New York 2004; for Germany, see the study by Aribert Heyder/Julia Iser/Peter Schmidt, “Israelkritik oder Antisemitismus? Meinungsbildung zwischen Öffentlichkeit, Medien und Tabus”, in: Wilhelm Heitmeyer (ed.), *Deutsche Zustände* 3, Frankfurt am Main. 2005, pp. 144–165; András Kovács, *The Stranger at Hand. Antisemitic Prejudices in Post-Communist Hungary*, Leiden/Boston 2006, Chapter 2, Section 4, pp. 122–135; Claude Longchamp/Monia Aebersold/Stephan Tschöpe/Silvia-Maria Ratelband-Pally (Gesellschaft für Sozialforschung, Bern), *Kritik an Israel von antisemitischen Haltungen unabhängig. Antisemitismus-Potential in der Schweiz neuartig bestimmt. Schlussbericht zur Studie: Anti-jüdische und Anti-israelische Einstellungen in der Schweiz*, Bern 2007; Wilhelm Kempf, “Israel-criticism and modern anti-Semitism”, in: *Diskussionsbeiträge der Projektgruppe Friedensforschung Konstanz* no. 62 (2009) (www.regner-online.de). For a discussion of these and some other studies (on Sweden and Switzerland), see Werner Bergmann, “Is there a ‘New European Anti-Semitism’?”, p. 89f.; Florette Cohen/Kent Harber/Lee Jussim/Gautam Bhasin, “Modern Anti-Semitism and Anti-Israeli Attitudes”, in: *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 97 (2009), pp. 290–306; Center for Studies of the Holocaust and Religious Minorities, *Antisemitism in Norway? The Attitude of the Norwegian Population towards Jews and other Minorities*, Oslo 2012; Maximilian Elias Imhoff, “Linker antiisraelischer Antisemitismus als Antijudaismus”, in: *Zeitschrift für Politik* 59/2 (2012), pp.144–167; Andreas Zick/Silke Jensen/Julia Marth/Daniela Krause/Geraldine Döring, *Verbreitung von Antisemitismus in der deutschen Bevölkerung. Ergebnisse großer repräsentativer Umfragen* Expertise für den unabhängigen Expertenkreis Antisemitismus, 2017 (<https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/record/2919878> – accessed 12th November 2021); Christhard Hoffmann/Vibeke Moe (eds.), *Attitudes Towards Jews and Muslims in Norway 2017. Population Survey and Minority Study*, Oslo 2017; Staetsky, *Antisemitism in contemporary Great Britain*, London 2017; Wilhelm Kempf, *Israelkritik zwischen Antisemitismus und Menschenrechtsidee. Eine Spurensuche*, Berlin 2015; Wilhelm Kempf, “Über die Bedeutung von NS-Vergleichen im Israel-kritischen Diskurs”, in: *Conflict & Communication Online* 16/2 (2017), pp. 1–13; Johannes Kiess/Oliver Decker/Ayline Heller/Elmar Brähler, “Antisemitismus als anti-modernes Ressentiment: Struktur und Verbreitung eines Weltbildes”, in: Oliver Decker/Elmar Brähler (eds.), *Autoritäre Dynamiken. Neue Radikalität – alte Ressentiments. Leipziger Autoritarismus Studie 2020*, Gießen 2020, pp. 212–248.

Based on a 1987 survey on attitudes toward Jews,³⁷ Werner Bergmann and Rainer Erb were the first to construct and correlate an Index of Antisemitism and an Index of Anti-Zionism, which is how anti-Israel attitudes were labeled at that time.³⁸ Out of a list of twenty positive and negative statements about the State of Israel, the study extracted five highly correlated items that, using factor analysis, had significant loading on the factor “aggressive Israel” and contained relatively harsh criticisms of Israeli policies but did not take up prejudices against Jews in general:

Items – Anti-Zionism Scale

“They take land away from their neighbors illegally” (21.3% agree)

“They start wars and blame others” (14.9%)

“A country that simply does not want peace” (11.6%)

“A state that stops at nothing” (18.0%)

“The way the State of Israel treats the Palestinians is in principle not different from how the Nazis treated the Jews in the ‘Third Reich’” (16.9%)

The statement on “Support for the Palestinian struggle”, which can be seen as part of an anti-Israel complex in terms of its content, did not have a significant loading on the factor “aggressive Israel” and so correlated only slightly with corresponding items. “Rejection of Israel was apparently not strongly correlated with the support for its opponents.”³⁹

³⁷ The questionnaire for the main survey was designed based on exploratory interviews and a pretest. The main survey was conducted in 1987 by the Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach using face-to-face interviews. The representative study surveyed 2,002 West Germans over the age of 16 (for further information, see: Bergmann/Erb, *Anti-Semitism in Germany*, Chapter 2).

³⁸ Bergmann/Erb, *Anti-Semitism in Germany*. In 1982, Gregory Martire and Ruth Clarke (*Anti-Semitism in the United States. A Study of Prejudice in the 1980s*, New York 1982, pp. 77–95) cross-tabulated an Antisemitism Index with attitudes toward Israel and found a “significant association between negative attitudes toward Israel and negative attitudes toward American Jews” (p. 95). But the items used to measure attitudes toward Israel dealt only with questions about supporting Israel, Israel’s attitude toward a Palestinian state on the West Bank, and its treatment of Arabs in Israel. Therefore, negative answers to these items cannot be counted as a sign of an Israel-related antisemitism. While 32% of those respondents who were “critical” toward Israel were also “prejudiced” on the Antisemitism Index, 30% of the “neutrals” and 22% of the “unprejudiced” were also “critical”.

³⁹ Bergmann/Erb, *Anti-Semitism in Germany*, p. 183. Regarding the right-wing respondents with anti-Israel attitudes, it is true that most of them were also generally xenophobic and thus did not express any sympathy for the Palestinians – as other studies discussed here also show (Heyder et al., see Section 3.1, fn 62; Kempf, see Section 8).

Table 1: Index of Anti-Zionism


“Yes” Answers	N	%	cumulative %
0	1,216	57.8	57.8
1	431	20.5	78.4
2	238	11.3	89.7
3	101	4.8	94.5
4	80	3.8	98.3
5	36	1.7	100.0
Total	2,012	100.0	

Reliability – alpha = .67; Bergmann/Erb, *Anti-Semitism in Germany*, p.184, table 7.6.

The decision as to how many negative statements are required to classify someone as anti-Israel or anti-Zionist can't be ascertained from the data but has to be justified with the help of additional information. The following criteria are used: Before someone was ascribed a clear ideological negative view on Israel the respondent should have agreed with more than one anti-Israel statement. Furthermore, the correlation of the Anti-Zionism Index with the specific anti-Israel statements listed above indicated a clear pattern: those who answered “yes” only once on the index still fell within the overall average in their agreement with such statements; agreement only increased clearly with two or more “yes” answers. Using this method, we found that 21.6% of the West German population scored high on the Anti-Zionism Index.

The antisemitism indices were composed of negative emotional attitudes toward Jews,⁴⁰ of cognitive antisemitic ideas,⁴¹ and of questions concerning negative behavior toward Jews.⁴² We constructed three indices: a very broad definition of antisemitism (33% of the population), a narrower definition of clearly antisemitic individuals (12% of the population), and a very narrow definition of vehemently antisemitic respondents (7%). The correlation between the Anti-Zionism Index and the Antisemitism Index is quite high: $r = .56$ ($p < .001$). “The stronger the antisemitic convictions, the more likely it is that they will go hand in hand with anti-Zionist views. The same is true in reverse, with anti-Zionism as a starting point: for the high scorers on the anti-Zionism index (10.3% = 3–5 agreements) antisemitic attitudes increased with the intensity of anti-Zionist convictions.”⁴³ On the other hand, a large number of anti-Zionists did not express antisemitic views. Even under the very broad definition of antisemitism, “36% of the anti-Zionist and 22% of the extreme anti-Zionists [were] classified as non-antisemitic” in 1987.⁴⁴

Figure 1: The overlap of antisemitism and anti-Zionism among the West German population in 1987 – by differently broad definitions of who is counted as antisemitic



Very narrow definition of antisemitism ($n = 146$); narrow definition ($n = 244$), broad definition ($n = 697$), total $N = 2,102$.

⁴⁰ *Index AS-Social Distance*: “It’s better not to have too much do to with Jews”; Belonging to “People, who don’t like Jews”; “It would be best for us Germans if all Jews would go to Israel”. See Bergmann/Erb, *Anti-Semitism in Germany*, pp. 46–57, table 2.2.

⁴¹ *Index AS-Stereotype*: “radical politics; unforgiving/unreconcilable; arrogant; conspiratorial; cowardly; stingy; ugly; ruthless; oversensitive; destructive/subversive; false/conniving; avaricious/greedy; crafty/shrewd; power-hungry; weak; unpredictable; sinister” (Bergmann/Erb, *Anti-Semitism in Germany*, p. 44, table 2.1 and p. 347f.).

⁴² *Index AS-Discrimination*: “One shouldn’t go to Jewish doctors”; “Jews should be prohibited from either immigrating or returning to Germany”; “Jews shouldn’t be allowed to hold high public offices here”; “Letters to the editor should be written strongly criticizing reparations payments to Israel” (Bergmann/Erb, *Anti-Semitism in Germany*, p. 48, table 2.3).

⁴³ Bergmann/Erb, *Anti-Semitism in Germany*, p. 184.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

Bergmann/Erb, *Anti-Semitism in Germany*, composed of pp. 185–186, figures 7.2, 7.3, and 7.4. Explanation: In the case of the vehemently antisemitic respondents, the share of those who are only antisemitic without at the same time also harboring anti-Zionist attitudes is clearly smaller (28%) than among the larger group, which includes respondents with less pronounced antisemitic attitudes (58%). Antisemitic and anti-Zionist attitudes go together more often among respondents with strong antisemitic convictions as compared with those with weaker convictions.


Thus, the negative attitudes toward Israel can be explained only in part by antisemitic attitudes; they also partly comprise an independent complex of other motives. This is also evident in the fact that the demographic distribution of antisemitic attitudes differs from that of anti-Israel attitudes. This is the case for the age distribution. The clear generational differences, typical in the case of antisemitism, are missing for the anti-Zionist attitudes.⁴⁵ In contrast to the measure of antisemitism, voters for the various parties in the German Bundestag barely differed in their strong rejection of Israel. While voters for the Green Party were clearly less antisemitic than voters for the other three parties, there were no differences in terms of anti-Zionism.⁴⁶ The assumption that there were two different clusters of motives justifying anti-Israel attitudes was confirmed by looking at the relationship between anti-Zionism and “support for Palestinians struggling for their homeland” by party preference. Willingness to support the Palestinians among the voters for the conservative Christian Democratic Party (CDU/CSU) rose only slightly as anti-Zionism increased; this was different for voters for the other parties, where the number of respondents with pro-Palestinian views increased with the number of “yes” answers on the Anti-Zionist Index. Only a quarter of anti-Zionist CDU/CSU voters supported the Palestinian cause, compared with 33% among anti-Zionist Social Democratic Party (SPD) voters, 40% among the anti-Zionist Free Democratic Party voters, and 52% among anti-Zionist voters for the Green Party. Israel was judged more within the context of anti-Jewish prejudice by the voters for the two larger parties (the *Volksparteien*: the CDU/CSU and SPD) than among the two smaller parties, whose voters tend to be more liberal and better educated. Overall, attitudes toward Israel were more heavily influenced by current events and political views than were attitudes toward Jews. The distribution of sympathies in the Middle East conflict among West Germans, as shown in Figure 2, confirms that siding with Israel increased significantly in periods of threats to that

⁴⁵ This was still the case in 2013: older generations in Germany were clearly more often antisemitic than the young, but concerning Israel’s policies toward the Palestinians there were no significant differences between the age groups (Steffen Hagemann/Roby Natanson, *Deutschland und Israel heute. Verbindende Vergangenheit, trennende Zukunft?* Bertelsmann Stiftung 2014, p. 41, figure 19).

⁴⁶ Bergmann/Erb, *Anti-Semitism in Germany*, p. 187. Every respondent out of the small sample of voters (7) for the extreme-right National Democratic Party (NPD) agreed with more than two items on the Anti-Zionist Index. Here antisemitism and anti-Zionism overlap completely.

country (1967, 1973, 1978, 1991) but generally decreased again afterwards. Sympathies for Israel suffered from the conflict between Israel's Prime Minister Begin and the Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt⁴⁷ as well as from the massacres in Sabra and Shatila in 1982. Since the 1970s, however, the proportion of the undecided – of those who do not take sides for either Israel or the Arab countries – has been increasing.

Figure 2: West German Sympathies in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1956–1991



*1956 Suez War; *1967 June: Six-Day War; +1967 July/August; 1973 April; *October: Yom Kippur War; *1973: October: after end of war; *1978 Israel invades Lebanon; *1981 Begin attacks Schmidt; *1982 Beirut massacre; *1991 March: Iraqi missiles strike Israel; +1991 December.

Sources: Institut für Demoskopie, *Jahrbuch*; *Allensbach Report* no. 41 (1973); *Jahrbuch IX* (1993); *Emnid-Informationen* nos. 11–12 (1973); Emnid, *Antisemitismus in Deutschland. Repräsentativumfrage im Auftrag des „Spiegel“*, Bielefeld 1992.

Bergmann/Erb, *Anti-Semitism in Germany*, p. 172, table 7.2.

These results from Germany are also confirmed by the results from many other European countries since 2004. In different European countries, distribution of sympathy for the two parties in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict depends both on the traditional attitude of the country in question toward the parties in conflict and on events as they occur in the course of the conflict.

⁴⁷ Werner Bergmann, “Tagespolitik versus Geschichtspolitik. Der Schmidt-Begin-Konflikt von 1981”, in: *Jahrbuch für Antisemitismusforschung* 7 (1998), pp. 266–287.

1.2 Sympathies in the Middle East Conflict and attitudes toward Jews – the 2004–2012 ADL Studies

Sympathy for the Palestinian and Israeli sides in the Middle East conflict varies in the different European countries according to the traditional attitudes of these countries towards Israel and the Arab states respectively, and less according to the level of antisemitism:

Only in the Netherlands and Italy was sympathy for Israel slightly higher than for the Palestinians (Netherlands: 28% to 27%; Italy: 16% to 13%). In Germany sympathy for Israel was only slightly less than for the Palestinians (17% to 21%). In countries such as Denmark, Belgium and France, where antisemitic attitudes were held only by a small part of the population, but which have been critical of Israel's policy for a long time, sympathy for the Palestinian side was much higher (DK: 27% to 13%, B: 30% to 12%, F: 17% to 8%). These countries in particular were also more likely to attribute the violence against Jews in Europe in 2002 to anti-Israel sentiment rather than to anti-Jewish feelings, the difference was most striking in Denmark where 65% of the respondents identified anti-Israel feeling as the cause and only 10% held anti-Jewish feelings responsible. Responses to the surveys of 2004 and 2005 show that in each of the European countries the percentage of respondents who held anti-Israel resentments responsible for the wave of violence declined by 19 percentage points. In contrast, those who saw the cause for violence in anti-Jewish sentiment increased clearly (to 14%). This also shows that the presumed causality between Israel's policies and manifestations of antisemitism is apparently not a fixed parameter but actually varies in relation to the political situation in the Middle East conflict.⁴⁸

According to this 2004 ADL study: “regarding the current conflict, the past three years of violence has had an effect on European attitudes, making them less sympathetic to both the Israelis and Palestinians”.⁴⁹

In terms of perception of the conflict, media coverage in each country also appears to play an important role, as those who followed the news more carefully were much more likely to express sympathy for the Palestinians than those who did not.⁵⁰ This also suggests that attitudes toward Israelis and Palestinians develop more strongly as a reaction to current

⁴⁸ Bergmann, “Is there a ‘New European Antisemitism?’”, pp. 91f.

⁴⁹ ADL, *Attitudes Toward Jews, Israel and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict in Ten European Countries*, April 2004, p. 28.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

political events and the respondent’s judgement of them and less due to entrenched views motivated by antisemitic feelings.

In 2005, the ADL asked about the connection between the perception of Israeli actions and attitudes toward Jews. First, the ADL asked the question “Is your opinion influenced by actions taken by the State of Israel?” On average, 29% of the European respondents said their views were influenced by this. Those who admitted to this influence were then asked whether their opinion of Jews had improved or worsened (“Is your opinion of Jews better or worse?”). Just slightly more than half of the respondents, 53% on average throughout Europe, said their views had worsened, but the direction and the magnitude of the attitude change varied strongly from country to country.⁵¹

Table 2: Percentage of population whose view of Jews worsened as a consequence of Israel’s actions⁵²

Country	% of population
France	7
Hungary	8
Poland	12
Italy	13
Denmark	13
Germany	16
Netherlands	16
Belgium	16
Great Britain	16
Austria	18
Switzerland	24
Spain	25

Author’s own calculations based on ADL data from 2005.

⁵¹ ADL, *Attitudes Toward Jews in Twelve European Countries*, New York 2005, pp. 10 and 11. The ADL has regularly asked these questions over the years – in 2007, 2009, and 2012 – with very similar results: in 2007, 25% were influenced, 52% of them in the negative direction (ADL, *Attitudes Toward Jews and the Middle East in Five European Countries*, New York 2007, pp. 11 and 12); in 2009, 23% were influenced, 58% of them in the negative direction (ADL, *Attitudes Toward Jews in Seven European Countries*, New York 2009, pp. 12 and 13); in 2012, 28% were influenced, 65% of them in the negative direction (ADL, *Attitudes toward Jews in Twelve European Countries*, New York 2012).

⁵² See Bergmann, “Is there a ‘New European Antisemitism’?”, p. 94, table 2.

This distribution of opinions is not easy to interpret. On the one hand, populations in the former East Bloc countries Hungary and Poland appear to be less influenced by events in the Middle East. Only a small percentage is affected negatively in their view of Jews, while the populations of both countries show a comparatively high agreement with the antisemitic items. In France, which was seen by many observers as the center of the “new antisemitism” in recent years and where a large number of anti-Jewish attacks occurred, the reaction of the population to the Middle East conflict seems to contradict this picture. In the case of Spain, on the other hand, the ADL survey suggests a connection between the changed view and the widespread anti-Jewish bias. The available data for Switzerland suggests that such an explanation for the negative change does not apply to this country. The ADL studies did not pursue the question of whether respondents who harbored extreme anti-Israel views were also more inclined to have antisemitic leanings, although based on the data, this would have been possible to investigate. Although a larger proportion of respondents in 2005 said their attitudes toward Jews had worsened because of Israel’s actions, the 2005 survey indicates that compared with the 2004 ADL study there had been, on average, some decline in the acceptance of certain traditional antisemitic stereotypes in the European countries tested.⁵³

Edward H. Kaplan and Charles A. Small have explored the question of the connection between anti-Israel and anti-Jewish attitudes more closely using the data from the ADL’s 2004 survey.

2. Anti-Israel sentiment predicts antisemitism in Europe (2005)

It is no coincidence that the thesis of a “new antisemitism”, which was drawn up in early 2000, and the wave of antisemitism and anti-Israel hostility in 2002 in Western Europe led to an increase in empirical examinations of how antisemitism and hostility toward Israel/criticism of Israel are related. In the year 2005 alone, three empirical studies (based on

⁵³ In the 2012 ADL study, it is striking that of the 28% who say they were influenced by Israel’s actions, almost two-thirds (65%; 18% of the sample) said their opinion had worsened. Looking at the change in the extent of antisemitic attitudes in these countries, however, several countries showed little or no change from 2009 to 2012, with only a few countries showing some increase. From this, one can conclude that, for many of the respondents, a deterioration in their opinion about Jews did not result in an antisemitic attitude: Austria even experienced a slight decrease of two percentage points, from 30% to 28%, in 2009. In Poland, the number remained unchanged. In Germany, antisemitism increased by one percentage point, to 21% of the population. In France, the overall level of antisemitism increased by 4 percentage points, from 20% to 24% of the population. In Spain, 53% percent of the population, compared with 48% in 2009 (an increase of 5 percentage points). In the United Kingdom, antisemitic attitudes jumped to 17% of the population, compared with 10% in 2009 (an increase of 7 percentage points). In Hungary, the level rose by 16 percentage points, from 47% to 63% of the population.

data from 2004) were published; one with data from several European countries and two with German data.⁵⁴

Whereas in the public discussion the question of the connection between anti-Israel attitudes and antisemitism is mainly posed in terms of examining in what way antisemitic attitudes motivate anti-Israel attitudes, Kaplan and Small reversed the direction of the question and took anti-Israel attitudes as their point of departure. Their study was based on a study of attitudes toward Jews, Israel, and the Palestinians from 2004, commissioned by the Anti-Defamation League.⁵⁵ The study was based on telephone interviews with 500 respondents in ten different European countries, for a total sample of 5,004 respondents. Respondents were also asked to provide standard demographic information, such as age, gender, income, etc. Kaplan and Small used two indices; the first of these was the Anti-Semitic Index that had already been used in previous ADL studies, which is composed of eleven anti-Jewish statements. This Anti-Semitic Index is somewhat problematic in that it contains several questions on different dimensions of anti-Jewish prejudice, which in essence measure something very similar. For example, it asks twice about Jews wielding too much financial and economic power, three times about disreputable business practices, twice about Jewish clannishness. Despite its importance in Europe, it includes no questions about secondary antisemitism.

⁵⁴ Frindte/Wammetsberger/Wetting, "Old and New Anti-Semitic Attitudes in the Context of Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation"; Kaplan/Small, "Anti-Israel Sentiment"; Heyder et al., "Israelkritik oder Antisemitismus?" For an extended analysis of the data from Heyder et al., see: Peter Schmidt/Julia Iser/Aribert Heyder, "Ist die Kritik an Israel antisemitisch? Die politische Orientierung macht den Unterschied", in: Andreas Langenohl/Jürgen Schraten (eds.), *(Un-) Gleichzeitigkeiten. Die demokratische Frage im 21. Jahrhundert*, Marburg 2011, pp. 189–222.

⁵⁵ Anti-Defamation League (ADL), *Attitudes Toward Jews, Israel and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict in Ten European Countries*, New York, April 2004. The survey was administered by Taylor Nelson Sofres by telephone between March 16 and April 8, 2004. In the end, 500 interviews were carried out among the general public in each of the ten countries, so that the entire sample included 5,004 respondents. "Data results for each individual country were weighted based on age and gender. The completed interview data underwent minor weighting to national population data using official government information on age and gender [...] Interviews were conducted in the native language of each of the countries and were completed by TNS. The margin of error for each country is +/- 4.4 at 95% level of confidence" (ibid., Methodology, p. 3). For Kaplan/Small no information was available regarding the non-response rate, so that a non-response bias could not be ruled out (See Kaplan/Small, "Anti-Israel Sentiment", Data, p. 550f.).

In an earlier study by the Anti-Defamation League (*European Attitudes Towards Jews*, New York 2002), which does not contain any questions about attitudes toward Israel, between 34% and 72% of respondents in Europe found it "probably true" that Jews were more loyal to Israel than to their home country. These results could be related to a distinct view of the Middle East conflict and Israel and might indicate that some of the respondents negatively associate Israel's policies with the local Jews in their own country. The ADL data report is convinced that the responses to the loyalty question are an indication of a "new anti-Semitism": "This new anti-Semitism is fueled by anti-Israel sentiment and questions the loyalty of Jewish citizens" (2004, p. 17). The available data does not support this conclusion. A French study did not find any significant correlation between holding Israel responsible for the Middle East conflict and believing that Israel is more important than France to French Jews (Nonna Mayer, "Transformations in French anti-Semitism", in: *Journal für Konflikt- und Gewaltforschung* 7/2 [2005], Table 6).

Table 1: Statements Comprising the Anti-Semitic Index with Corresponding Response Frequency in Agreement ($N = 5,004$) and Percentages

Statement	Agreement (<i>n</i>)	%
Jews don't care what happens to anyone but their own kind.	1,052	21.0
Jews are more willing than others to use shady practices to get what they want.	784	15.6
Jews are more loyal to Israel than to this country.	2,200	43.9
Jews have too much power in the business world.	1,309	26.1
Jews have lots of irritating faults.	545	10.9
Jews stick together more than other (citizens of respondent's country of residence)	2,942	58.8
Jews always like to be at the head of things.	1,150	23.0
Jews have too much power in international financial markets.	1,460	29.2
Jews have too much power in our country today.	500	10.0
Jewish business people are so shrewd that others do not have a fair chance at competition.	884	17.6
Jews are just as honest as other business people.	485*	9.7

* Number of respondents who disagreed with the statement; Kaplan/Small, "Anti-Israeli Sentiment", p. 551, table 1.

Those respondents who agreed with more than five of the eleven statements were classified as antisemitic. Defined in this way, the proportion of respondents harboring antisemitic views was on average 14% across all ten countries.⁵⁶

⁵⁶ Kaplan/Small, "Anti-Israel Sentiment", p. 551, table 1. The authors checked the sensitivity of results to the chosen specific cutoff point (index values in excess of 5) and came to the conclusion that any other threshold for the Anti-Semitic Index did not change the basic pattern of association with the Anti-Israel Index (p. 560).

The second index used by Kaplan and Small is an Anti-Israel Index composed of four items.


Table 2: Statements Comprising the Anti-Israel Index with Corresponding Response Frequency in Agreement (of $N = 5,004$) and Percentages

Statement/Question	Agreement <i>n</i>	%
The Israeli treatment of the Palestinians is similar to South Africa's treatment of blacks during apartheid.	705 ^a	14.1
Who do you think is more responsible for the past three years of violence in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the Israelis, or the Palestinians?	1,254 ^b	25.0
In your opinion, during military activities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, do the Israeli Defense Forces intentionally target Palestinian civilians, or are the civilian casualties an accidental outcome of Israel's military response?	1,765 ^c	35.3
In your opinion, is there any justification for Palestinian suicide bombers that target Israeli civilians?	426 ^d	8.5

- a. Frequency of respondents that agree a lot with this statement.
- b. Frequency of respondents stating Israelis.
- c. Frequency of respondents stating that Israeli Defense Forces intentionally target civilians.
- d. Frequency of respondents stating yes.

Figure 1 shows the distribution of those 14% of respondents who were identified as antisemitic (having agreed with more than five items on the ADL Study's Anti-Semitism Index) on the Anti-Israel Index, ranging from 0 to 4 answers.

Figure 1: Percentage of Respondents Classified as Antisemitic



This figure reports the proportion of respondents who agreed with more than five of the eleven antisemitic statements ($N = 701$; 14% of the total sample of 5,004); Kaplan/Small, p. 554, figure 2, B.

Kaplan and Small conclude that “presumably those with anti-Semitic views are more likely to oppose a Jewish state than others; therefore, the greater the extent of anti-Israel sentiment revealed, the higher the likelihood of associated anti-Semitism”.⁵⁷

The authors then discuss the possibility that the relationship between anti-Israel sentiments and antisemitic attitudes may be the result of third factor interaction. They explore such interactions between anti-Israel sentiments and antisemitic attitudes while controlling for the levels of six possible third factors: country of residence, income, religion, attitudes toward illegal immigrants, frequency of contact with Jews, and degree of agreement with specific antisemitic attitudes. While the authors observe considerable differences in the amount of antisemitism according to country, religion, age, income, attitudes toward illegal immigration, contact with Jews, etc. (as we already know from many other studies on antisemitism), this does not change the basic pattern of association between the extent of anti-Israel and antisemitic attitudes, although the rise in antisemitic prejudice over the four stages of the Anti-Israel Index may vary significantly.⁵⁸ Finally, Kaplan and Small used a multiple logistic

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 555; see also p. 558, table 3.

⁵⁸ Of all the factors in the logistic model, the effect of the strength of the anti-Israel attitudes was by far the greatest (chi-squared 195.67), followed by the effect of attitudes toward immigrants (97.50), religion (76.73), the respective European country (75.22), having a lot in common with other races or religions (60.41), and age

regression model to further explore the association between the proportion of respondents harboring antisemitic views and the Anti-Israel Index, to control for possible confounding factors (country of residence, age, income, religion, gender, agreement with specific antisemitic attitudes, immigrants' drain on economy, frequency of contact with Jews, and degree of agreement with specific antisemitic attitudes).⁵⁹ The authors come to the conclusion that simultaneously taking the aforementioned factors into account “did not meaningfully alter the relationship between anti-Semitism and anti-Israel attitudes in the data”,⁶⁰ but one can see the significant influence of some of the factors on antisemitic attitudes, which in turn influence attitudes toward Israel. Unfortunately, the 2004 ADL study did not record the political orientation of the respondents, which would have played an important but highly varied role in their attitude toward both Jews and Israel. Both empirical studies and political analyses show that antisemitism is primarily linked to a right-wing political orientation, while negative statements about Israel are found on the Right as well as on the Left. The importance of political orientation can already be seen in the fact that attitudes toward Israel depend much more on political events in the Middle East conflict than on the significantly more stable attitude toward Jews (see Section 1, Figure 2). A question about education was asked, but according to Kaplan and Small it did not provide a useful measure for determining the extent of education.

The authors come to the conclusion that “the prevalence of those harboring (self-reported) anti-Semitic views consistently increases with the respondents’ degree of anti-Israel sentiment”, but they also emphasize that “fewer than one quarter of those with anti-Israel index scores of only 1 or 2 harbor anti-Semitic views [...], which supports the contention that one certainly can be critical of Israeli policies without being anti-Semitic”.⁶¹ But they also rightly stress that of those with the most extreme anti-Israel sentiments (index scores of 4), more than half (56%) reported antisemitic leanings. Based on their analysis, Kaplan and Small conclude that “when an individual’s criticism of Israel becomes sufficiently severe, it does become reasonable to ask whether such criticism is a mask for underlying anti-Semitism”.⁶²

(48.62). Income (19.73) and contact with Jews (23.90) were of only minor importance (ibid., “Anti-Israel Sentiment”, p. 558f., table 3).

⁵⁹ Kaplan/Small rightly note that education, a major explanatory factor, was not included in the ADL survey (ibid., p. 559). But it is not the only major explanatory factor that is missing: political orientation is also absent. See the studies by Heyder et al., Zick et al., Kempf, Kovács, Imhoff, Staetsky, and Hoffmann/Moe, below.

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 557.

⁶¹ Ibid. p. 560.

⁶² Ibid.

Nonetheless, the design of the study precluded identifying a causal link between the two attitudes.

3.1 Criticism of Israel or patterns of antisemitism? (2005)

Whether and how negative attitudes toward Israel or its policy toward the Palestinians are related to antisemitic attitudes was also examined in the course of a long-term research project on Group-Focused Enmity (GFE).⁶³ In Volume 3 of *Deutsche Zustände*, Aribert Heyder, Julia Iser, and Peter Schmidt published a chapter presenting the results of the 2004 survey examining the relationship of different dimensions of antisemitism with attitudes toward Israel.⁶⁴ Years later, the authors published an expanded analysis of the 2004 data, examining how right-wingers and leftists differ in terms of the various dimensions of antisemitism.⁶⁵ In doing so, they took into account the political dimension, which is important for attitudes toward Israel. The authors sought to investigate whether criticism of Israel is a new, socially acceptable form of antisemitic expression or whether criticism of Israeli policies can be separated from antisemitic attitudes.⁶⁶ The authors used the concept of communication latency in their analysis, in which negative judgements about Israel are to be seen as sometimes representing a kind of detour or substitute communication for antisemitic attitudes, which are more likely to face negative sanctions in the public arena in Western countries than are negative statements toward Israel.⁶⁷

⁶³ According to the “Group-Focused Enmity” concept, group-specific prejudices such as xenophobia, antisemitism, racism, sexism, homophobia, etc. are understood as part of a syndrome that involves a generalized devaluation of out-groups, which is determined at its core by an ideology of inequality. The elements of this syndrome were investigated in a survey project that ran over ten years. See the publications: Wilhelm Heitmeyer (ed.), *Deutsche Zustände* 1–10, Frankfurt am Main. 2003–2012.

⁶⁴ Aribert Heyder/Julia Iser/Peter Schmidt, “Israelkritik oder Antisemitismus? Meinungsbildung zwischen Öffentlichkeit, Medien und Tabus”, in: Wilhelm Heitmeyer (ed.) *Deutsche Zustände* 3, Frankfurt am Main. 2005, pp. 144–165. A modified English version is available: Aribert Heyder/Julia Iser, “Criticism of Israel or Patterns of Anti-Semitism? A Representative Study in Germany” (DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.1.3599.4322). The main survey, by the social research institute tns-Infratest, used telephone interviews (CATI method) based on the Infratest telephone master sample (ITMS), which guarantees distortion-free samples without clumping effects. The survey took place in spring 2004 and included 3,000 people aged 17–92, of whom 1,998 were West Germans and 1,002 were East Germans. Only 103 respondents said they did not have German citizenship (for further information, see Heyder et al., “Israelkritik oder Antisemitismus?”, p. 33f.).

⁶⁵ Schmidt et al., “Ist die Kritik an Israel antisemitisch?”, pp. 189–224.

⁶⁶ Heyder et al., “Israelkritik oder Antisemitismus?”, p. 144.

⁶⁷ The concept of communication latency assumes that today antisemitic attitudes can no longer be expressed publicly in Western countries without the person being held morally (or even criminally) accountable. Therefore, it is assumed that antisemitic attitudes remain mostly latent and are either only expressed among similar-minded people or else by means of a “detour communication” in which the antisemitic criticism is directed at Israel.

In academia as well as in the public sphere, there has been an ongoing debate as to which statements about the State of Israel and its policies should be considered antisemitic and which should not. The authors classified statements as antisemitic if the criticism includes at least one of the following elements:

1. Denial of Israel's right to exist, or of its right of self-defence.
2. Historical comparisons between Israel's policies towards the Palestinians and the persecution of Jews under the Third Reich.
3. The application of double standards in judging Israeli policies. In other words, particular political measures are criticized in Israel but not in other countries.
4. The projection of anti-Semitic stereotypes onto the State of Israel, making Israel into a "collective Jew". Characteristics that normally serve to justify discrimination against Jews are projected onto Israel and instrumentalized to discriminate against and isolate the country. The opposite case also springs from the same logic, namely where the criticism of Israel is projected onto all Jews and they are held responsible for Israel's actions. Here criticism of Israel's policies is instrumentalized to justify discrimination against Jews".⁶⁸

The study introduced a new perspective: in addition to examining how antisemitic attitudes can lead to a critical/negative attitude toward Israel, it also asked, conversely, whether criticism of Israeli policies can reinforce antisemitic attitudes toward Jews in general. The authors developed questions along three dimensions: a) Israel-focused antisemitism, b) Nazi

Regarding this concept of communication latency, see: Bergmann/Erb, "Kommunikationslatenz, Moral und öffentliche Meinung". One would have to investigate whether this assumption of detour communication remains valid, since criticism of Israeli policies is today increasingly likely to elicit accusations of antisemitism. This indicates that the detour may now be closed.

⁶⁸ Heyder/Iser, "Criticism of Israel or Patterns of Anti-Semitism?" In a recent Swedish study, Henrik Bachner and Pieter Bevelander constructed an Index of Israel-Related Antisemitism including three items, which correspond to the criteria proposed here by Heyder, et al. One item denies Israel's right to exist ("As long as Israel exists, we will not have peace in the world"), a second addresses the effect of Israeli policies on attitudes toward Jews ("Because of Israel's policies, I increasingly dislike Jews"), and a third item uses a classical anti-Jewish stereotype to characterize Israel's policies ("Israel's policies are characterised by a vengefulness rooted in the Old Testament [An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth]"). Their analysis also shows that "some respondents agreed with one or more Israel-related antisemitic statements, but did not agree with any statement in the multi-dimensional index [composed of questions about social distance and traditional and Holocaust related antisemitic beliefs]; they also show, however, that the more statements respondents agreed with in the Israel-related index, the more statements they agreed with in the multidimensional index". "Antisemitism i Sverige. En jämförelse av attityder och föreställningar 2005 och 2020". English Summary: "Antisemitism in Sweden: A Comparison of Attitudes and Ideas in 2002 and 2020", pp. 101–109 (https://www.levandehistoria.se/sites/default/files/material_file/study-antisemitism-i-sverige-summary-english.pdf).

analogy, c) critical attitude toward Israel.⁶⁹ In addition to these three forms of antisemitism related to Israel, three further dimensions were distinguished: *Classical antisemitism*, which is defined as open prejudice and discrimination against Jews on the basis of traditional negative stereotypes. *Secondary antisemitism*⁷⁰ is a post-Holocaust form of antisemitism that tries to relativize or minimize the persecution of Jews, accompanied by a reversal of the victim-perpetrator relationship and by blaming Jews for exploiting their victim status for material or political ends. Criticizing Jews or Israel and accusing them of immoral behavior or motives can be seen as an attempt to ward off one’s own guilt. *Antisemitic separation* describes a mechanism whereby Jews are separated from German society by raising doubts as to their loyalty to Germany and implying that they are more loyal to Israel. “Although this is an old classical antisemitic stereotype, it is particularly relevant in the discussion about antisemitism and criticism of Israel.”⁷¹

The study is based on a representative GFE survey (standardized telephone interviews) in 2004, which consisted of 2,656 respondents with German citizenship (1,712 from western, 944 from eastern Germany).

Table 1: Statements and values for antisemitic/critical political attitudes (percentages). Values that reflect antisemitism or views critical of Israel are shaded grey.

Categories and statements	Fully disagree	Tend to disagree	Tend to agree	Agree fully
<i>Classical Anti-Semitism</i>				
Jews have too much influence in Germany.	43.6	34.9	10.9	10.6
Because of their behavior, Jewish people are partly to blame for their persecution.	50.4	32.2	11.1	6.3

⁶⁹ Aribert Heyder/Julia Iser, “Criticism of Israel of Patterns or Antisemitism?” The German terms are: *Israelbezogener Antisemitismus*, *NS-vergleichende Israelkritik*, and *Israelkritische Einstellung* (Heyder et al., “Israelkritik oder Antisemitismus?”, p. 148).

⁷⁰ For a brief explanation, see: Werner Bergmann. “Sekundärer Antisemitismus”, in: Wolfgang Benz (ed.), *Handbuch des Antisemitismus. Judenfeindschaft in Geschichte und Gegenwart* 3, Berlin 2010, pp. 300–302.

⁷¹ Heyder/Iser, “Criticism of Israel or Patterns of Anti-Semitism?”, p. 6.

<i>Secondary anti-Semitism</i>				
I find it annoying that today the Germans are still held to blame for the crimes against the Jews.	11.9	19.8	23.8	44.5
I am sick of hearing about the German crimes against the Jews all the time.	14.6	23.2	20.9	41.3
<i>Israel-focused anti-Semitism</i>				
Israeli policies make me feel increasingly unsympathetic towards the Jews.	23.1	45.2	19.1	12.6
Looking at Israeli policies, it is no surprise that people are against Jews.	18.9	36.8	28.9	15.5
<i>Anti-Semitic Separation</i>				
German Jews have stronger ties to Israel than to Germany.	7.9	36.6	33.7	21.9
Jews in this country care more about Israeli affairs than German affairs.	10.7	41.5	29.2	18.6
<i>Nazi analogy</i>				
Israel is waging a war of extermination (<i>“Vernichtungskrieg”</i>) against the Palestinians.	7.6	24.0	33.2	35.1
There is not much of a difference between what the state of Israel is doing to the Palestinians today and what the Nazis did to the Jews during the Third Reich.	18.8	30.0	23.9	27.3
<i>Critical attitude toward Israel</i>				
It makes me angry to think of the way Israel is treating the Palestinians.	4.0	14.2	37.5	44.4
It is unjust for Israel to take away the Palestinians’ land.	3.9	10.0	34.5	51.5

The order of items was altered after the survey. The larger the value, the stronger the agreement with the statement (Heyder et al., 2005, p. 151, table 1; data from the GFE Survey 2004). For the English translation, see Heyder/Iser, “Criticism of Israel or Patterns of Anti-Semitism?”

A look at the levels of approval shows that these vary in degree according to the individual dimensions of antisemitism. The fact that approval for classical antisemitism is significantly lower (21.5% and 17.4%) than the Nazi-analogy attitude toward Israel (63.3% and 51.2%)⁷²

⁷² The authors explain the high level of approval for the “war of extermination” item as a sign that respondents do not necessarily always associate this term with the war of extermination carried out by the Nazi regime. The surprisingly high approval of the comparison between the Nazi persecution of Jews and Israel’s treatment of the

and criticism of Israel (81.9% and 85.6%) indicates that antisemitism and hostility to Israel/criticism of Israel only partially overlap. The study by Heyder et al. explores this relationship by asking to what extent attitudes toward Israel are influenced by antisemitism and, conversely, whether the interviewees perceived that Israeli policy had a negative impact on their attitude toward Jews. The results show that one third of respondents reported that their negative view of Israel's policies made them view Jews less favorably (a majority of respondents [56%] regarded Jews as being strongly attached to Israel). Half of the respondents equated Israeli policies to the policies of the National Socialists against Jews. They explained or justified their negative view as a consequence of the Jews'/Israelis' actions. The factor analysis⁷³ reveals that an Israel-focused antisemitism is a separate factor that correlates very strongly with classical antisemitism (.70) and with the belief that Jews generally feel more closely attached to Israel (.57). It can be said that all political camps harbor antisemitic attitudes but that they are more widespread among the political right-wingers. On the other hand, an attitude critical of Israel was more often found among left-wing than among right-wing respondents. Even with the items that compare Israeli policy to that of the Nazis, we observe no clear differences between the political camps (see Figure 1).

The correlation matrix, however, confirms that not every form of criticism of Israel is an expression of antisemitic feelings, but that in some dimensions they are closely related.

Palestinians may partly be the result of the use of comparisons to the Third Reich in the media and political discourse in order to legitimize interventions in many armed conflicts over the last decades (Yugoslav wars, Iraq war). In the authors' view, this may have led to a certain desensitization of large parts of the population (Heyder et al., "Israelkritik oder Antisemitismus?", p. 152).

⁷³ Factor analysis is a method in multivariate statistics that is used to reduce a large number of empirical observations of many different manifest variables (for example, a list of negative traits of a group) into a smaller number of underlying factors or latent variables or clusters of traits.

Table 2: Empirical relationships between dimensions of antisemitism and a critical attitude toward Israel (Pearson's *r* correlations)

	Secondary Antisemitism	Israel-Focused Antisemitism	Antisemitic Separation	Nazi Analogy	Critical Attitude Toward Israel
Classical Anti- Semitism	.50 .45/.40	.70 .65/.72	.53 .60/.57	.36 .31/.37	n.s. n.s./.25
Secondary Anti- Semitism		.40 .37/.26	.40 .57/.45	.49 .72/.39	n.s. n.s./n.s.
Israel-Focused Antisemitism			.48 .48/.48	.54 .57/.61	.21 n.s./.45
Antisemitic Separation				.48 .48/.48	.14 n.s./.23
Nazi Analogy					.31 n.s./.46

significance level < 1% probability of error


n.s. = not significant

Numbers in italics: Respondents with leftist political leanings. Bold typeface: Respondents with right-wing political leanings.

(Heyder et al., “Israelkritik oder Antisemitismus?”, p. 160, table 2). Additions in 2011 from Schmidt et al., “Ist die Kritik an Israel antisemitisch?”, p. 211.

The approval for classical and Israel-related antisemitism, compared with critical attitudes toward Israel, is significantly different among those with a left-wing political attitude than among those with a right-wing point of view (this also applies in part to the use of Nazi analogies to describe Israeli policies). This suggests that these answers reflect different motivations; namely, anti-Jewish convictions on the one hand and those based on human rights concerns on the other.

Figure 1: Dimensions of Antisemitism and Criticism of Israel by Political Orientation



Heyder et al., “Israelkritik oder Antisemitismus?”, figure 1.

Left $n = 189$ (7.5%); Moderately Left $n = 614$ (24%); Center $n = 1,334$ (53.2%); Moderately Right $n = 292$ (11.6%); Right $n = 80$ (3.2%) (Schmidt et al., “Ist die Kritik an Israel antisemitisch?”, pp. 197f.).

This confirms the correlation analysis (see Table 2), which reveals interesting differences between the values for all the respondents (normal font), those with leftist political leanings (italics), and those with right-wing political leanings (bold). Among right-wing respondents, Israel-focused antisemitism and antisemitic separation correlate much higher with classical antisemitism than among the left-wing respondents, and the critical attitude toward Israel

correlates significantly with classical antisemitism ($r = .28$) and more strongly with an Israel-focused antisemitism ($r = .48$), which is not the case in the sample as a whole or among left-wing respondents. This means that right-wing people are more likely to harbor a critical attitude toward Israel along with one toward all Jews (this is proven by the significant correlation to classical antisemitism). It is interesting to note that among left-wing respondents – unlike the sample as a whole or right-wing respondents – we do not observe any significant correlation between criticism of Israel and the *transfer* of this critical view onto Jews in general.⁷⁴ This suggests that the criticism, regardless of whether it is correct or not, is actually directed at the concrete policies of Israel and is not generalized or being used to confirm one's own antisemitism.⁷⁵

However, it is not only in the case of political orientation that differences become apparent in terms of approval of antisemitic or anti-Israel statements; age distribution and education level also reveal different patterns. While the degree of agreement with statements along the different dimensions of antisemitism decreases with increasing levels of education, Germans across all education levels share the view that Israeli policy toward the Palestinians is unacceptable.⁷⁶ As for the influence of age, for classical antisemitism and Israel-focused antisemitism, and to a lesser extent for antisemitic separation, we find the typical distribution showing that approval for prejudices increases with age. Again, this does not apply to the critical attitude toward Israel, where we observe only very small differences between age groups, and for secondary antisemitism and the Nazi analogy the differences between the age groups are also only small.

Based on a confirmatory factor analysis, Heyder, Iser, and Schmidt come to the conclusion that, overall, it can be said that the five dimensions of antisemitism and a critical attitude

⁷⁴ In a later study (“Ist die Kritik an Israel antisemitisch?”, p. 214), Schmidt et al. correlated the dimensions of antisemitism and a critical attitude toward Israel with other forms of group-focused enmity, such as hostility toward foreigners, Islamophobia, homophobia, racism, and sexism. While antisemitic attitudes correlate more or less strongly with other forms of group-focused enmity, this is not the case for negative attitudes toward Israel. The results show that for all respondents there are low-negative or insignificant correlations between a critical attitude toward Israel and hostile attitudes to other groups. Among left-leaning people, the negative correlation is even higher than for the population average. The stronger the criticism of Israel is for these respondents, however, the lower their prejudices against other out-groups. Surprisingly, the right-wing respondents also display negative or not significant correlations with other forms of group-focused enmity.

⁷⁵ This is also confirmed by the fact that in the same survey a very widespread, albeit not unanimous, criticism of Palestinian policies was registered: 61.4% agreed fully or tended to agree with the item: “The Palestinian attacks against Israel are unjustifiable.” (12.4% rejected this statement fully and another 26.2% tended to reject it.) In response to the item: “I think it is bad how the Palestinians are trying to destroy the State of Israel”, 67.5% agreed, 9.4% completely disagreed, and another 23.1% tended not to agree (Heyder et al, “Israelkritik oder Antisemitismus?”, p. 162).

⁷⁶ Heyder et al, “Israelkritik oder Antisemitismus?”, p. 153.

toward Israel are all regarded differently by the German population. As they see it, it makes a difference to respondents whether the questions deal with classical antisemitic attitudes, with the comparison of Israeli policies to those of the Third Reich, or whether Jews are being made collectively responsible for these policies (Israel-focused antisemitism).⁷⁷

The question as to whether a critical attitude toward Israel is a form of detour communication for antisemitism is answered negatively by the authors, because as Table 2 shows there is no significant correlation with classical or secondary antisemitism. This is in distinction to the case of Israel-focused antisemitism (.70/.40) and also, though less clearly, the Nazi analogy (.36/.49). But a critical attitude toward Israel may also be motivated by antisemitism, as people on the political Right use this criticism to communicate their antisemitic opinions (see the positive correlation between classical antisemitism, Israel-focused antisemitism, antisemitic separation, and Nazi analogy). These theoretical observations show that what is important is not “whether” Israel is criticized but “how” and by whom.⁷⁸

3.2 Criticism of Israel or patterns of antisemitism? – revisited (2011/2014)

Although the following studies were conducted later on, they are presented here after the 2004 study by Heyder et al. because they used the same items to analyze the connection between antisemitism and Israel-related antisemitism (see Section 3.1 above). They are also based on the data from the 2011 long-term GFE study and from the 2014 Mitte study, published by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES), and from the supplemental survey in September 2014,⁷⁹ all carried out by the Institute for Interdisciplinary Research on Conflict and Violence (IKG) at Bielefeld University.⁸⁰

⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 159.

⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 161.

⁷⁹ Regarding the main cross-sectional surveys used here, the 2011 GFE study was based on 2,000 respondents, mainly persons with German citizenship (only 51 foreigners), while the 2014 Mitte study was based on 1,915 respondents with German citizenship only, aged 16–95 and over, living in private households with a telephone connection. The selection of the target persons for the surveys for the long-term study was carried out according to what is known as the Swedish key; for the sample realisation in the 2014 mid-study the last-birthday method was used. The interviews in both research contexts were realized as computer-assisted telephone interviews (CATI). Thus, the data of 1,920 persons from the 2011 GFE studies and of a total of 1,915 persons from the main survey of the 2014 Mitte study are available for analysis. In the supplemental non-representative Mitte study of September 2014, 572 persons were interviewed. Detailed documentation about the sampling and survey designs can be found in the GFE publication series *Deutsche Zustände* (Wilhelm Heitmeyer [ed.], *Deutsche Zustände* 1–10, Frankfurt am Main 2002 to 2012) as well as in Eva Groß, “Untersuchungsanlage, Methodik und Stichprobe der Analyse”, in: Andreas Zick/Anna Klein, *Fragile Mitte – Feindselige Zustände. Rechtsextreme Einstellungen in Deutschland 2014*, with contributions from Eva Groß/Andreas Hövermann and Beate Küpper, edited for the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung by Ralf Melzer, Bonn 2014, pp. 24–31; and Anna Klein/Andreas Zick/Eva Groß, *ibid.*, pp. 61–84, for the 2014 Mitte study and its supplemental survey, respectively.

⁸⁰ Andreas Zick/Silke Jensen/Julia Marth/Daniela Krause/Geraldine Döring, *Verbreitung von Antisemitismus in der deutschen Bevölkerung. Ergebnisse großer repräsentativer Umfragen. Expertise für den unabhängigen Ex-*

As in the study by Heyder et al., a distinction is made between three varieties of antisemitism:

- *Traditional or classical antisemitism* is defined by open prejudice and discrimination against people solely on the basis of their actual or supposed affiliation to Jewry, through use of traditional negative stereotypes.⁸¹
- *Secondary antisemitism* is a post-Holocaust form of antisemitism, which tries to relativize or minimize the persecution of Jews and is accompanied by a reversal of the victim-perpetrator relationship and by blaming Jews for exploiting their victim status for material or political ends. It is essentially characterized by perception defence, guilt defence, knowledge defence, rejection of responsibility, memory defence, and perpetrator/victim reversal.⁸²
- Finally, *Israel-related antisemitism* describes a devaluation of Jews in which open criticism of the policies of the State of Israel is used as an outlet for antipathy toward Jews and antisemitic stereotypes are transferred onto the Israeli state.⁸³

While in the study by Heyder et al. (2005) the two dimensions Israel-focused antisemitism and Nazi analogy are kept separate, in this study they are combined under the term Israel-related antisemitism. Doing so implies the suggestion that both items are aiming at the same object. However, this is not necessarily the case. In Israel-focused antisemitism (as Heyder et al. call it), Israeli policies are considered to be an element reinforcing a negative attitude toward Jews, while Israel itself is only indirectly evaluated. In contrast, the use of the Nazi

pertenkreis Antisemitismus, 2017 (<https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/record/2919878> – accessed 12th November 2021); Zick/Klein, *Fragile Mitte – Feindselige Zustände*. Questions about attitudes toward Israel have also been collected in other large surveys, but they are not related to the data also collected on other dimensions of antisemitism. At the same time, there is a follow-up project on Group-Focused Enmity (GFE); the pilot study, realized by the IKG, is funded by the Mercator Foundation (project coordinators Andreas Zick and Madlen Preuß), further information at <https://docplayer.org/36953609-Zugleich-zugehoerigkeit-und-un-gleichwertigkeit.html> – accessed 12th November 2021. The study is based on surveys on antisemitism and the relationship between Germans and Israelis, conducted by the Bertelsmann Foundation (2007, 2013, 2015).

⁸¹ The devaluation is based on a religious-cultural construction of difference (Jews as the opposite of Christians), on negative and traditional stereotypes (e.g., greed for money), clichés and prejudices (e.g., exertion of influence), resentments and aversions. In addition, there are racist, religious (e.g., Christian anti-Judaism), political, and social motives (Bergmann/ Erb, *Anti-Semitism in Germany*; Andreas Zick/Beate Küpper, “Transformed Anti-Semitism – A Report on Anti-Semitism in Europe”, in: *Journal für Konflikt- und Gewaltforschung*, 7/1 [2005], pp. 50–92; Kurt Möller, “Antisemitismus unter Jugendlichen in Deutschland. Formen, Ausmaße, spezifische Ausprägungen und Begünstigungsfaktoren”, in: *deutsche jugend* 60/12 [2012], pp. 519–526).

⁸² The authors use a quite broad definition of secondary antisemitism here.

⁸³ “Israel is thus made into a ‘collective Jew’. Characteristics that normally serve to devalue Jews are projected onto Israel and used to devalue and isolate it. This logic also results in the reverse case, namely when criticism of Israel’s policy is transferred onto all Jews and responsibility for it is thus attributed to them” (Heyder et al., “Israelkritik oder Antisemitismus?”). This antisemitic manifestation thus stands in contrast – not always clearly – to a position criticizing prevailing Israeli policy, which in itself does not have to be an expression of antisemitic attitude patterns. See also Möller, “Antisemitismus unter Jugendlichen in Deutschland”.

analogy is a direct criticism of Israel itself, which does not necessarily have to be an expression of a generally anti-Jewish attitude and that may also be fueled by other political convictions. In the case of Israel-focused antisemitism, on the other hand, perceptions of Israeli policies can reinforce both traditional and secondary antisemitism – in this respect, it does not form a separate dimension of antisemitic attitudes but only differs in terms of the motive.

The operationalizations used in the data sets are listed in the following table (see Table 1). In each case, the statements and evaluations of the respondents were recorded by means of closed questions; as a rule, rating scales were used (response options: 1, “do not agree at all”, to 4, “fully agree”). The formulations of the individual items used in the studies to map the subdimensions of the three variants of antisemitism in focus are also presented below.

Table 1: Dimensions of antisemitism – operationalizations used

Dimension	Item/Question	used in:
<i>Traditional antisemitism</i> Conspiracy myth	“Jews have too much influence in Germany.”	GFE 2011 FES Mitte study 2014 FES Mitte study 9/2014 (supplemental survey)
Imputation of shared guilt	“Because of their behavior, Jewish people are partly to blame for their persecution.”	GFE 2011 FES Mitte study 2014
<i>Secondary antisemitism</i> Accusation of taking advantage	“Many Jews today try to take advantage of the history having to do with the Third Reich.”	GFE 2011
Call for a line to be drawn under the past	“I find it annoying that today the Germans are still held to blame for the crimes against the Jews.”	GFE 2011 FES Mitte study 9/2014 (supplemental survey)
<i>Israel-focused antisemitism</i> Detour communication Israel	“Israeli policies make me feel increasingly unsympathetic toward the Jews.” “Looking at Israeli policies, it is no surprise that people are against Jews.”	FES Mitte study 9/2014 (supplemental survey) GFE 2011 FES Mitte study 9/2014 (supplemental survey)
Nazi analogy	“Israel is waging a war of extermination against the Palestinians.” “There is not much of a difference between what the State of Israel is doing today to the Palestinians and what the Nazis did to the Jews during the Third Reich.”	GFE 2011 FES Mitte study 9/2014 (supplemental survey) GFE 2011 FES Mitte study 9/2014 (supplemental survey)

Source: Zick et al., *Verbreitung von Antisemitismus*, p. 21, table 4.

Within the framework of the GFE studies and the 2014 Mitte study, one sixth (14%) of the German population agreed with the traditional dimension of antisemitism, which is expressed in the conspiracy myth “Jews have too much influence in Germany”, and 11% agreed with “Jews are partly responsible for their persecution through their behavior”, which imputes shared guilt to Jews (see Table 2).

Table 2: Dimensions and statements of antisemitism

Dimensions and statements ⁸⁴	GFE 2011	June 2014	September 2014
Traditional/classical antisemitism			
Jews have too much influence in Germany.	14.7	14.0	15.0
Because of their behavior, Jewish people are partly to blame for their persecution.	11.0	10.0	18.0 ⁸⁵
Secondary antisemitism			
I find it annoying that the Germans today are still held to blame for the crimes against the Jews.	64.0		55.0
Many Jews today try to take advantage of the history having to do with the Third Reich.	39.0		
Israel-related antisemitism: Detour communication			
Israeli policies make me feel increasingly unsympathetic toward the Jews.			20.1
Looking at Israeli policies, it is no surprise that people are against Jews.	34.0		28.0
Israel-related antisemitism: Nazi analogy			
Israel is waging a war of extermination against the Palestinians.	57.0		39.9
There is not much of a difference between what the State of Israel is doing to the Palestinians today and what the Nazis did to the Jews during the Third Reich.	43.0		27.1
Criticism of Israel			

⁸⁴ Due to differences in how strongly worded the statements used to identify antisemitism are, absolute comparisons between the approval rates for the different dimensions of antisemitism are not possible.

⁸⁵ Traditional antisemitism (the only type of antisemitism surveyed in the supplemental survey) increased after the end of the “Gaza conflict” or “Gaza war”, as the media referred to the Israeli military’s Operation Protective Edge. It began on July 8, 2014, and ended on August 26 with an indefinite ceasefire. Before and during the conflict, about 10% of respondents agreed with the statement that Jews are “complicit in their persecution”, whereas in September 2014, 18% agreed. For the statement “Jews have too much influence in Germany”, however, the agreement in the second 2014 survey increased only slightly, from 13.7% to 15.3%. However, a direct comparison of the two surveys is only possible to a limited extent, as the supplemental survey did not include a representative sample. A comparison with the approval rates of the Mitte study’s main survey before and during the Gaza conflict shows a minimally higher approval during the conflict, but this difference is not significant (Zick et al., *Verbreitung von Antisemitismus*, p. 35ff.).

I get angry when I think about how Israel treats the Palestinians.		81.9	59.8
It is unjust that Israel is taking land away from the Palestinians.		86.0	68.6

Answers: Strongly agree/mostly agree, in %

Zick et al., *Verbreitung von Antisemitismus*, pp. 24–29, tables 1–8; Zick/Klein, *Fragile Mitte* 2014, table 4.2.1., pp. 70–71.

According to Zick et al., depending on the design of the 2014 study, the level of approval in Germany for *traditional antisemitism* can be situated between about 10 and 20 percent. The level of approval for *secondary antisemitism* in the GFE studies is very high compared with traditional antisemitism and Israel-related antisemitism.

Since grouping items into a scale is more effective to determine the prevalence of an attitude than if only the individual items are considered, Zick et al. decided to summarize the individual statements in a superordinate construct for the 2011 survey year (see Table 3). In this case, the scales were created using mean values (mean value scale). The mean values could range from 1 to 4, where 1 indicated complete rejection of an item and 4 indicated complete support for it.

The mean values show a clear difference between support for traditional antisemitism and the other two dimensions. For traditional antisemitism, the mean value for the answers of all respondents shows that negative statements about Jews are predominantly more or less clearly rejected, while in the two other dimensions the approvals exceed the rejections. In other words, many respondents who agree with negative statements regarding secondary and Israel-related antisemitism do not do so in the case of the traditional dimension.⁸⁶

Table 3: Mean approval for antisemitism

Scaling	<i>Traditional AS</i>		<i>Secondary AS</i>		<i>Israel-related AS</i>	
	Mean	Standard	Mean	Standard	Mean	Standard

⁸⁶ Although this is expressly true for only a very small group, Zick et al. took a closer look at those people who specifically agreed with the manifestations of antisemitism listed in the 2011 survey. A separate look at each of the three dimensions shows that 5% of those surveyed display a clear traditional antisemitic attitude pattern, in that they “tend to” or “completely” agree with both of the statements contained therein. Almost a third (32%) of the respondents clearly agree with the secondary form of antisemitism, and 16% agree with all three items for the Israel-related dimension. Those who support all relevant items across all three dimensions can be described as extremely antisemitic. In 2011, the percentage of the sample that could be classified as such was 2.2% (Zick et al., *Verbreitung von Antisemitismus*, p. 30).

			deviation		deviation		deviation
2011	1–4	1.64	.70	2.57	.90	2.45	.75

Zick et al., *Verbreitung von Antisemitismus*, p. 30, table 5.

The authors then investigated the extent to which the individual indicators of the various dimensions of antisemitism were related to one another.⁸⁷ In order to verify this connection, the GFE study data for 2011 are examined below.⁸⁸ Table 4 shows the connections between the individual dimensions of antisemitism in the form of product-moment correlations (Pearson correlations).⁸⁹

Table 4: Correlations between the dimensions of antisemitism (mean scales)

	secondary antisemitism	Israel-related antisemitism
<i>traditional antisemitism</i>		
GFE 2011	.53***	.46***
<i>secondary antisemitism</i>		
GFE 2011		.53***

*** $p = .001$

Zick et al., *Verbreitung von Antisemitismus*, p. 31, table 6.

All three dimensions show roughly equal correlations of medium strength. As Table 5 shows, the statements for all three dimensions of antisemitism are statistically significantly related,

⁸⁷ The authors generally assume “that the indicators used all measure antisemitism more or less equally [...]. However, whether these are actually equivalent indicators of a theoretical construct or rather independent attitude dimensions must be examined in more detail” (ibid., p. 29; see also Wilhelm Kempf, *Israelkritik zwischen Antisemitismus und Menschenrechtsidee*, p. 30).

⁸⁸ The data from the supplemental survey of the 2014 Mitte study confirm the connection between approval for the indicators of traditional and of Israel-related antisemitism. Since the dimension of secondary antisemitism was only surveyed with one question, a direct comparison with the results of 2011 is not possible here. Therefore, the results of the supplemental survey are not included here.

⁸⁹ Correlations measure the strength of a connection between two variables, they do not permit one to make statements about the direction of the causal connection.

albeit to different degrees. The main interest of this study is in the connections between the items of traditional as well as secondary antisemitism with those that are supposed to measure Israel-related antisemitism. Correlations of medium strength can only be found for both items of traditional antisemitism with the two items of Israel-related antisemitism in which Israeli policy is the reason for an intensification of antipathy toward Jews. When one looks at the two items that make an analogy between Israel's policies and National Socialism, the only item for which there is a medium-strength correlation is "There is not much of a difference between what the State of Israel is doing today to the Palestinians and what the Nazis did to the Jews during the Third Reich", whereas the correlation with regard to the accusation "Israel is waging a war of extermination against the Palestinians" is only of low and moderate strength (between $r = .13$ in 2014 and $r = .24$ in 2011).

As far as secondary antisemitism is concerned, the item "Many Jews today try to take advantage of the history having to do with the Third Reich" has medium-strength correlations with both the assumption that Israeli policy would reinforce the rejection of Jews and (albeit to differing degrees) with the two anti-Israel items involving Nazi analogies (here too, however, the correlation to the "war of extermination" analogy is significantly lower). On the other hand, the second item of secondary antisemitism, "I find it annoying that the Germans today are still held to blame for the crimes against the Jews", which receives a very high level of approval amongst the German population, shows significantly lower correlations for both "Israel-related antisemitism: Detour communication" items ($r = .15$ in 2014 to $r = .27$ in 2011 and $r = .21$ in 2014), as well as for the item "Israel is waging a war of extermination against the Palestinians" ($r = .27$). The data from the 2011 GFE survey alone shows a medium-strength correlation with the item "There is not much of a difference between what the State of Israel is doing today to the Palestinians and what the Nazis did to the Jews during the Third Reich" ($r = .43$, but only $.30$ in 2014).

These results show that the demand to not dwell on the past (or to draw a line under the past) is no longer a particularly suitable item for measuring secondary antisemitism, as it is now more often represented by the younger age groups who are at the same time less often antisemitic than the older age groups. On the other hand, they show that the accusation that Israel is waging a war of extermination against Palestine ($r = .27$) does not seem to have a very pronounced connection to either traditional or secondary antisemitism, as compared with

the second item that “There is not much of a difference between what the State of Israel is doing today to the Palestinians and what the Nazis did to the Jews during the Third Reich.”⁹⁰

Table 5: Correlations between the dimensions of antisemitism (single items)

		Imputat ion of shared guilt	Accusat ion of taking advanta ge	Call for a line under the past	Detour Israel	Detour Israel (antipat hy)	Nazi analogy (war of extermi nation)	Nazi analogy (compar ison)
<i>traditional antisemitism</i>								
Conspiracy myth	GFE 2011	.56***	.56***	.33***	.38***	-	.24***	.36***
	Mitte study 9/2014	.58***	-	.24***	.38***	.43***	.13***	.35***
Imputation of shared guilt	GFE 2011		.49***	.27***	.38***	-	.18***	.34***
	Mitte study 9/2014		-	.21***	.43***	.39***	.18***	.34***
<i>secondary antisemitism</i>								
Accusation of taking advantage	GFE 2011			.49***	.44***	-	.30***	.44***
	Mitte study 9/2014			-	-	-	-	-
Call for a line under the past	GFE 2011				.27***	-	.27***	.43***
	Mitte study 9/2014				.23***	.15***	.27***	.30***
<i>Israel-related Antisemitism</i>								
Detour communication Israel	GFE 2011					-	.33***	.45***
	Mitte study 9/2014					.48***	.35***	.33***
Detour communication (antipathy)	GFE 2011						-	-
	Mitte study 9/2014						.31***	.32***
Nazi analogy (war of	GFE 2011							.43***

⁹⁰ Zick et al., *Verbreitung von Antisemitismus*, p. 30, table 7. The authors of the study explain this finding as follows: “In contrast, the connection between the statement ‘Israel is waging a war of annihilation against the Palestinians’ and the two indicators of traditional antisemitism is relatively weak, albeit significant. This connection, which is conspicuously weak in comparison, could be due to the fact that agreement with this statement does not necessarily conceal antisemitism, because the respondents do not necessarily associate the term war of annihilation with the war of annihilation of the National Socialists in Europe” (pp. 30f.). See also: Heyder et al., “Israelkritik oder Antisemitismus?”, p. 152.

extermination)

Mitte study 9/2014

.45***

*** $p = .001$ / Zick et al., *Verbreitung von Antisemitismus*, pp. 32–33, table 7.

On the relationship between Israel-related antisemitism and criticism of Israel without antisemitism

From the antisemitic criticism of Israel's policy, for which the above items comparing Israel and National Socialism and the generalized transfer of responsibility for Israeli policy onto all Jews can be seen as indicators, the authors identify two items that criticize Israeli policies without being antisemitic ("I get angry when I think about how Israel treats the Palestinians" and "It is unjust that Israel is taking land away from the Palestinians"). Although the boundaries between criticism of Israel and antisemitism are fluid,⁹¹ the empirical analyses within the framework of the GFE project on antisemitism reveal that not many people are critical of Israel without simultaneously agreeing with antisemitic stereotypes and prejudices.

In the following, the authors examine whether and to what extent criticism of Israel is accompanied by antisemitic attitudes. On this complex of questions, Heyder et al. (see above, Section 3.1) originally collected three critical statements about Israel in the 2004 GFE survey series, but Heyder et al. used only two for their analysis (like the study analyzed here).⁹²

Based on the 2004 GFE data, Heyder et al. (see Section 3.1.) were unable to find any (or only slight) statistical correlations between non-antisemitic attitudes critical of Israel and classical and secondary antisemitism. This finding suggests that the concepts can be separated. The results of Heyder et al. can be partially replicated using the data from the September 2014 supplemental survey from the Mitte study (see Table 6). In this study, based on the two questions asked about criticism of Israel, 46% of those questioned can be classified as critical of Israel. For this purpose, people were classified as critical of Israel if they achieved a mean

⁹¹ Klaus Holz, *Die Gegenwart des Antisemitismus. Islamistische, demokratische und antizionistische Judenfeindschaft*, Hamburg 2005, p. 98.

⁹² Two critical statements about the Palestinians that were also collected were not used in the analysis. This is unfortunate, as other studies have shown that respondents can criticize both Israeli policy and the behavior of the Palestinians at the same time (Zick et al., *Verbreitung von Antisemitismus*, p. 37, fn. 29).

value of at least 3 for the two statements critical of Israel, on a mean value scale comprising values between 1 and 4.

The data initially confirm that there is no connection between the critical-of-Israel and traditional antisemitism items. However, unlike the GFE data from 2004, a statistically random positive connection between criticism of Israel and secondary antisemitism can be observed. However, the authors rightly added a caveat noting that in the Mitte study secondary antisemitism was only recorded with one question, “I am annoyed that the Germans are still being accused of crimes against the Jews” (an item that has proven to be not particularly well suited for measuring secondary antisemitism, see above), and thus the result is only partially comparable with that of 2004. There, secondary antisemitism was also recorded via the question of whether “Jews are trying to take advantage of the Holocaust”. In addition, the authors pointed out that that the supplementary survey from the Mitte study is only approximately representative, so that the results should be interpreted with caution.⁹³

However, the data from 2014 confirm the connection established by Heyder et al. between criticism of Israel and antisemitism related to Israel.

Table 6: Correlations between dimensions of antisemitism and Criticism of Israel / Mitte study 9/2014 (scales)

	Traditional antisemitism	Call for a line under the past	Israel-related antisemitism
Criticism of Israel	<i>n.s.</i>	.16**	.29***
Traditional antisemitism		.24***	.42***
Call for a line under the past			.35***

*** $p = .000$, ** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$

n.s. = not significant

Zick et al., *Verbreitung von Antisemitismus*, p. 38, table 9.

⁹³ Ibid., p. 38.

The two statements involving criticism of Israel differ mainly in that one statement is very emotionally charged. Therefore, the authors examined the two items separately and not as a common construct. It then becomes clear that agreeing with the statement “It is unjust that Israel is taking land from the Palestinians” corresponds to neutral criticism of Israel (see Table 7), since there is still no connection to traditional antisemitism. This is different from agreeing with the statement about “getting angry at Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians”, which correlates, if only weakly, with statements of traditional antisemitism. In the opinion of the authors, this indicates “an emotional connection between antisemitism and the focus on the victims in Palestine”.⁹⁴ They rightly emphasize that a precise differentiation between emotional and rational arguments and the processing of antisemitic stereotypes and prejudices about the Middle East conflict is still absent from almost all studies (for an exception, see Longchamp et al., Section 6).

Table 7: Correlations between dimensions of antisemitism and criticism of Israel /
Mitte study 9/2014 (single items)

	unjust that Israel is taking land away	traditional antisemitism	call for a line under the past	Israel-related antisemitism
angry when I think about how Israel treats the Palestinians	.49***	.11*	.14**	.28***
unjust that Israel is taking land away		<i>n.s.</i>	.13**	.22***
traditional antisemitism			.24***	.42***
call for a line under the past				.35***

*** $p = .000$, ** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$

⁹⁴ The fact, reported by the authors, that an above-average number of respondents in September 2014 refused to answer the telephone survey questions about the other forms of antisemitism being examined also speaks in favor of a high level of emotionalization among many respondents, likely related to the Israeli Protective Edge campaign earlier that summer. This may also be an indication that we have to reckon with a period effect in the data (“Sonderauswertung Antisemitismus im September 2014”, in: Zick/Klein, *Fragile Mitte*, p. 69, fn 10).

Silke Jensen, Julia Marth, Daniela Krause, Geraldine Döring and Andreas Zick, *Verbreitung von Antisemitismus in der deutschen Bevölkerung. Ergebnisse großer repräsentativer Umfragen. Expertise für den unabhängigen Expertenkreis Antisemitismus*, May 2016, p. 37, table 10 (an earlier version of Zick et al., *Verbreitung antisemitischer Einstellungen*, 2017),

To summarize, the authors state “that a ‘neutral’ criticism of Israel is entirely possible. No connection with traditional antisemitism can be proven, while this ‘neutral’ criticism of Israel is related to an Israel-related antisemitism. Whether criticism of Israel is statistically significantly related to secondary antisemitism, however, depends on how the concepts are measured. So although it is possible to criticize Israel without holding traditionally antisemitic views at the same time, the results also indicate that many respondents are critical of Israel but also agree with the transformed manifestations of antisemitism.”⁹⁵

On the influence of common demographic characteristics on antisemitism

The results for the demographic characteristics are presented as mean value comparisons that identify possible differences in the degrees of antisemitism, along the characteristics of gender, age, schooling, and political orientation.⁹⁶

Overall, the differences between men and women in terms of extent of antisemitism are very small. There are no significant differences in secondary antisemitism at all, and there are only minor differences in the somewhat stronger tendency of men toward traditional antisemitism and in the somewhat clearer approval of the Israel-related manifestation among female respondents. This is somewhat surprising, since the rejection of Israeli policy might have been expected to be more widespread among men, since in surveys men are more likely to express themselves on political issues. According to the authors’ findings, there is no significant difference in terms of the respondents’ age for any of the three dimensions of antisemitism.

In general, it can be said that the lower the level of formal schooling, the higher the agreement with all three dimensions of antisemitism. The differences in the mean values of the three groups (“low”, “medium”, and “high” education level) prove to be significant for all three manifestations of antisemitism. However, while the differences between the “low” and “high” educational levels, as well as between “medium” and “high”, occur for all three dimensions of antisemitism, the levels “low” and “medium” do not differ significantly for secondary and

⁹⁵ See Zick et al., *Verbreitung von Antisemitismus*, p. 39.

⁹⁶ For the following, see Chapters 8 and 9 in: *Ibid.*, pp. 46–53.

Israel-related antisemitism, and for traditional antisemitism the differences are only slightly significant.

In some of the previously analyzed studies, political orientation played an important role, especially since antisemitism in all its forms is part of the self-image and worldview of the extreme Right. Although this does not apply to the left-wing spectrum, where antisemitism and racism contradict the self-image of left-wing groups,⁹⁷ the assumption that a “left-wing antisemitism” exists is widespread in political and academic discussions, particularly in terms of attitudes toward Israel. Especially with regard to positioning on the Middle East conflict, it is assumed that due to an anti-imperialist worldview on the Left, which divides the world into a binary between rulers and oppressed, Israel is seen as the oppressor and Palestinians as the oppressed in the Middle East conflict (see the study by Imhoff, Section 9).

Therefore, in their evaluation of the data from the GFE 2011 and the supplemental survey of the 2014 Mitte study, the authors paid special attention to the question of “how widespread is antisemitism on average on the political Left in Germany”.⁹⁸


As already proven in numerous studies (see above), the 2011 GFE survey shows that antisemitic attitudes can also be found in across the entire political spectrum; i.e., also among leftists, though an increase from Left to Right is evident. Only in the case of traditional antisemitism is the average agreement among the politically “left” even higher than among the “moderately left” (see similar results previously in Bergmann/Erb [1991] discussed in Section 1, above). About 21% of respondents in the GFE study classify themselves as “moderately left” and about 5% as “left”.⁹⁹

⁹⁷ Claudia Globisch, *Radikaler Antisemitismus. Inklusions- und Exklusionsmechanismus von links und rechts in Deutschland*, Wiesbaden 2013, p. 44.

⁹⁸ Zick et al., *Verbreitung von Antisemitismus*, p. 46.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

Figure 1: Antisemitism by political orientation / GFE 2011, $N = 1.191$ (mean values)



Zick et al., *Verbreitung von Antisemitismus*, p. 46, table 12.

In the case of traditional and secondary antisemitism, people who described themselves politically as “moderately left” or “left” expressed statistically significant lower levels of approval than people who placed themselves politically “exactly in the middle”, “moderately right”, or “right”.¹⁰⁰ The authors conclude that “in the case of traditional and secondary antisemitism, it is therefore not possible to speak of an explicitly left-wing antisemitism. Rather, the results indicate that people who come politically from the left spectrum are conspicuous for their disproportionately weaker antisemitic attitudes.”¹⁰¹

When it comes to Israel-related antisemitism, respondents from all political camps are closer together in their attitudes. Thus, no differences can be found between those who are left of center and those who are exactly in the center or “moderately right-wing”. The leftists differ significantly here only from the “rightists”. Here, too, the authors come to the conclusion that “it is therefore not possible to speak of a particularly strong left-wing antisemitism”, as in this

¹⁰⁰ “Results of univariate analysis of variance/post hoc test: Traditional antisemitism: Significant differences are found between people who classify themselves as ‘left-wing’ and respondents with a ‘moderately right-wing’ ($p \leq .01$) or ‘right-wing’ political orientation ($p \leq .01$) as well as between people who describe themselves as ‘moderately left-wing’ and the political center as well as the two right-wing subgroups (each $p \leq .001$). Secondary antisemitism: Significant differences are found between ‘leftists’ or ‘moderate leftists’ and all other groups ($p \leq .001$ in each case). Israel-related antisemitism: There are significant differences between respondents with ‘left-wing’ or ‘moderately left-wing’ and ‘right-wing’ political attitudes ($p \leq .05$ in each case).” (Ibid., p. 43, fn. 41).

¹⁰¹ Ibid., p. 47.

case the “left-wingers” and “moderately left-wing” do not differ from those who describe themselves as politically in the center or “moderately right-wing”.¹⁰²

*Regression analyses*¹⁰³

The influence of socio-demographic characteristics, social and political attitudes, and personality dispositions (authoritarian orientation, social dominance orientation, lack of orientation [anomie], lack of power [feeling of political powerlessness], feeling of social devaluation [relative deprivation]) on antisemitism were also examined with regression analyses using the data from the 2011 GFE study. Examining the effect of various socio-demographic influences on traditional, secondary, and Israel-related antisemitism by means of regression analysis, only education shows an influence in all three dimensions. Age has a minor influence on traditional antisemitism, gender on Israel-related antisemitism, and the explanatory value is low (adj. R^2); i.e., the variance explained is 4.6% for traditional antisemitism, 5.2% for secondary antisemitism, and only 3.2% for Israel-related antisemitism.¹⁰⁴

Based on the 2011 GFE study, the authors took into account socio-demographic factors as well as political orientation and some ideological attitudes (see Table 8). In addition to these factors, the motivation to present oneself as being unprejudiced is included in the lower part of the table.¹⁰⁵ The purpose of this was to examine whether the tendency to present oneself to the outside world as being unprejudiced has an independent influence on antisemitism.

¹⁰² Ibid. In the supplemental survey from the 2014 Mitte study, where 6% of respondents classified themselves as “left-wing” and 20% as “moderately left-wing”, the picture of traditional antisemitism that emerged was similar to that of the GFE survey from 2011. The authors conclude from this that the existence of an explicitly left-wing antisemitism cannot be empirically confirmed with the available data. They therefore consider the term “left-wing antisemitism” not entirely appropriate, even though the extent of agreement with antisemitic items is also high among left-of-center respondents.

¹⁰³ For the following, see Sections 9.1 and 11, in: Ibid., pp. 50–53 and pp. 71–73.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 48. The proportion of explained variance (variability) of a variable to be explained by a statistical model is provided by the measure R^2 . Since the coefficient of determination R^2 becomes greater the more explanatory variables are used, the adjusted coefficient of determination (Adj. R^2) is normally used – as it is here (ibid. p. 50, fn 46).

¹⁰⁵ See Chapter 10, “Einflussfaktor soziale Erwünschtheit”, in: Ibid., pp. 66–70. The authors use two items from a scale developed by Rainer Banse and Bertram Gawronski (“Die Skala Motivation zu vorurteilsfreiem Verhalten: Skaleneigenschaften und Validierung”, in: *Diagnostica* 49 [2003], pp. 7–13): “I don’t care if someone thinks that I harbor prejudices against minorities” (in German: “Es ist mir egal, wenn jemand glaubt, dass ich Vorurteile gegenüber Minderheiten habe”) and “There is no point in constantly worrying about whether you are doing the wrong thing towards someone.” (in German: “Es ist sinnlos, sich ständig Gedanken darüber zu machen, ob man sich gerade irgendwem gegenüber falsch verhält.”). Thus, the formulation of the second item used by Zick et al. differs from the original in Banse and Gawronski. There it says: “It’s not worth worrying all the time about whether you’re *being prejudiced* towards anyone” (p. 8). It is incomprehensible why in a survey to measure prejudice “prejudicial” was replaced by the much more general term “doing the wrong thing”. Moreover, Banse and Gawronski emphasize that the overall Motivation to Act without Prejudice Scale (which consists of 16 items) has sufficient internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha between .75 and .83) but that this does not

Table 8: Results of simultaneous regression analyses / GFE 2011 (β coefficients)¹⁰⁶

	traditional antisemitism	secondary antisemitism	Israel-related antisemitism
Age	<i>n.s.</i>	-.07*	<i>n.s.</i>
Gender (1 = m, 2 = f)	-.08**	<i>n.s.</i>	<i>n.s.</i>
Education	<i>n.s.</i>	<i>n.s.</i>	<i>n.s.</i>
West/East (1 = W, 2 = E)	<i>n.s.</i>	-.07*	<i>n.s.</i>
income	<i>n.s.</i>	<i>n.s.</i>	<i>n.s.</i>
political orientation: Left/Right	.12***	.15***	<i>n.s.</i>
individual relative deprivation	<i>n.s.</i>	<i>n.s.</i>	<i>n.s.</i>
anomie	<i>n.s.</i>	.08*	.09*

apply to the three subscales on their own, and it certainly does not apply to the use of only two items from one or two of the subscales. They prove to be “neither sufficiently reliable nor discriminantly valid” (p. 11). In fact, the reliability analysis for this scale consisting of only two items, which was used by Zick et al., showed an insufficient Cronbach’s alpha of .49. According to the authors, however, this alpha was to be expected and should be regarded as acceptable, since the inter-item correlation is .32 (Zick et al., *Die Verbreitung des Antisemitismus*, p. 69, fn 80).

¹⁰⁶ “The standardized regression coefficient β is provided in each case. In a regression analysis, this indicates the strength of the correlation between a dependent and one or more independent variables on a scale between 0 and 1, where -1 reflects a perfect negative correlation, +1 a perfect positive correlation, and 0 no correlation. A positive correlation means that the higher the expression on characteristic a (e.g., age), the higher it also is on characteristic b (e.g., traditional antisemitism)” (Zick et al., *Verbreitung von Antisemitismus*, p. 52, fn 47).

authoritarianism	<i>n.s.</i>	.18***	<i>n.s.</i>
social dominance	.17***	<i>n.s.</i>	<i>n.s.</i>
political powerlessness	.12***	.19***	.14***
economistic attitude	.14***	.13***	.11**
desire to present oneself as being unprejudiced	-.11***	-.12***	-.11**
adj. <i>R</i> ²	.24	.29	.12

*** $p \leq .001$; ** $p \leq .01$; * $p \leq .05$

Zick et al., *Verbreitung von Antisemitismus*, p. 72, table 14.

The regression analysis shows that socio-demographic factors in combination with the other factors play virtually no role in explaining antisemitism in any of the three dimensions. Education and income have no significant influence on antisemitism. Secondary antisemitism tends to increase with age, but the influence of age is low overall. Gender also has only a minimal influence, with men tending slightly more toward traditional antisemitism than women.

As already expected from the results of the mean value comparisons (see Figure 1), political orientation exerts a weak influence on traditional and secondary antisemitism, with a right-wing political attitude having a strengthening effect on these two manifestations. Although extreme-right attitudes have a higher mean value for Israel-related antisemitism, different political orientations do not exert a significant influence on attitudes toward Israel,¹⁰⁷ which could be a sign that such attitudes are less determined by ideological convictions than by political events and partisanship.

If we look at the basic ideological value attitudes or orientations, then with the exception of relative deprivation, these have a significant reinforcing influence on antisemitism, but not all of them exert an equal influence in all dimensions. In the case of traditional antisemitism, in addition to a moderately right-wing political orientation and a feeling of disorientation

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., pp. 72–74.

(anomie), dominance-oriented and economic attitudes (meaning, attitudes that measure people's worth by their economic benefit to society), as well as feelings of political powerlessness, all have a similarly strong influence – which, however, is not particularly high. In the case of secondary antisemitism, on the other hand, a right-wing political orientation, authoritarianism, an economic orientation, and especially the subjective feeling of powerlessness in the political sphere are salient. Here, on the other hand, the social dominance orientation – i.e., the idea that there are natural hierarchies – is irrelevant, as secondary antisemitism is about defense against memory of historical guilt and not about a hierarchical relationship between groups. Social dominance orientation is similarly not influential regarding attitudes toward Israel.

It is striking that in the case of Israel-related antisemitism, the demographic factors are consistently not significant, but the basic ideological motives/orientations also show no or only weak influences overall. Accordingly, the proportion of variance explained by the selected possible influencing factors is also very low for Israel-related antisemitism (adj. $R^2 = .12$) and only half as large as for the other two dimensions (for the traditional and secondary dimensions, the explanatory power is 24% and 29% respectively). This means that so far there is very little we can say about what factors are responsible for negative attitudes toward Israel. The authors therefore conclude that “only a limited part of antisemitism can be explained by the factors considered here using the GFE data from 2011”.¹⁰⁸

The low explanation of the variance of Israel-related antisemitism identified in this study (and also in some other studies) in the regression analyses, compared with traditional and secondary antisemitism, ultimately leads to the question of whether assessments of a state and its policies can be meaningfully evaluated in any way using the instruments developed to analyze the devaluation of ethnic, religious, sexual, or other minorities within a society – and if it can, can doing so produce a significantly better empirical explanation of variance than it does in the case of attitudes toward Israel? This raises the question as to whether attitudes toward the policies of a state represent something categorically different than prejudices or resentments against minority groups, which are generally regarded as weak.¹⁰⁹ This also raises the question as to whether the thesis that the State of Israel serves as a “collective Jew” is actually justified. Wilhelm Kempf's approach, placing attitudes toward Israel (and toward the Palestinians) in the context of the Middle East conflict, is likely to be of greater assistance

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 73; see also Table 8.

¹⁰⁹ See previously Brian Klug, “The collective Jew”, p. 117. Klug rejects the “new antisemitism” thesis that hostility toward Israel represents a new form of hostility toward Jews.

here, as far as ascertaining what is behind the critical-to-rejecting attitude of a section of the interviewees. At the same time, another section, the convinced antisemites, may indeed transfer their rejection of Jews onto Israel (see below, Section 8).¹¹⁰

Also relevant to our question about the connection between attitudes toward Israel and antisemitic attitudes is the “desire to present oneself as being unprejudiced”, as the more respondents wish to present themselves as being unprejudiced, the less likely they are to openly agree with anti-Jewish sentiments. In other words, it is expected that people with such a motivation will conceal their actual attitudes because they want to present themselves positively to their counterparts (motivation for positive self-presentation). In this multivariate regression analysis this motivation is effective on all three manifestations of antisemitism to the same extent and in the same direction; this suggests that the pressure of communication latency is felt to a similar degree. If this assumption is correct, the argument that respondents often do not express their negative attitudes toward Jews out of fear of negative sanctioning, but that they do so by way of Israel-related antisemitism (detour communication), would no longer be plausible, since expressing it in such a way is also considered risky.¹¹¹


However, in a section that was included in a first draft but was then omitted in the final report, Jensen et al. also examined the effects of both a weak and a strong motivation for unprejudiced self-presentation. For this purpose, they carried out simple t-tests in which “highly significant differences between the two groups under consideration ($p < .001$) were found for the traditional ($m = 1.58$ vs. 1.32) and the secondary manifestation ($m = 2.47$ vs. 2.12) of antisemitism”, while the differences for the Israel-related manifestation were smaller ($m = 2.37$ vs. 2.23) ($p < .05$) and were only slightly significant.¹¹²

¹¹⁰ Cf. the results of the simultaneous regression analysis by Zick, Hövermann, and Krause, in which calculating for variance clarification showed $R^2 = .30$ for racism, $.44$ for xenophobia, $.33$ for Islamophobia, $.29$ for homophobia, $.27$ for sexism. For some other forms of group-focused enmity, the values are lower (between $.16$ and $.21$ for hostility toward disabled people, homeless people, and asylum seekers). However, the variance explanation of $.24$ for antisemitism is also lower than for other groups. This could be due to the fact that attitudes toward Jews have a dual character, in which inequality is combined with a feeling of inferiority (vis à vis “Jewish power”) and with the influence of the special historical relationship (Andreas Zick/Andreas Hövermann/Daniela Krause, “Die Abwertung von Ungleichwertigen. Erklärung und Prüfung eines erweiterten Syndroms der Gruppenbezogenen Menschenfeindlichkeit”, in: Wilhelm Heitmeyer [ed.], *Deutsche Zustände* 10, Frankfurt am Main 2012, pp. 64–86, here p. 74f., table 3).

¹¹¹ In “Kommunikationslatenz, Moral und öffentliche Meinung”, in 1986, Bergmann and Erb restricted the concept of detour communication to negative statements about the State of Israel, while the concept was later expanded to include secondary antisemitism (see Heiko Beyer/Ulf Liebe, “Antisemitismus heute. Zur Messung aktueller Erscheinungsformen von Judenfeindlichkeit mittels des faktoriellen Surveys”, in: *Zeitschrift für Soziologie* 42/3 [2013], pp. 186–200; see also Zick et al., *Verbreitung von Antisemitismus*).

¹¹² Zick et al., *Verbreitung von Antisemitismus*, p. 70, fn 82.


Figure 2: Antisemitism according to “motivation for an unprejudiced self-presentation” (mean values)



Jensen et al., *Verbreitung von Antisemitismus in der deutschen Bevölkerung*, May 2016, p. 65, figure 24, (an earlier draft version of Zick et al., *Verbreitung antisemitischer Einstellungen*)

Regarding Israel-related antisemitism, the slight differences between the strongly and weakly motivated respondents, which can be observed in the comparison of the mean values, disappear in the percentage representation.

Figure 3: Antisemitism according to “motivation for an unprejudiced self-presentation” (in %)



Regarding both traditional and secondary antisemitism, those respondents who displayed a strong motivation to present themselves as unprejudiced agreed less frequently than those who were weakly motivated; this is interpreted by the authors to mean that they often hid their true thoughts. Since, when it comes to Israel-related antisemitism, there is only a slight difference between respondents who are strongly and weakly motivated, it is assumed that this dimension is subject to less severe negative sanctions and is therefore suitable for the indirect communication of antisemitic resentments.¹¹³ It is somewhat surprising that the authors do not elaborate on the result of the multivariate regression, which revealed an equally strong influence of the “motivation toward an unprejudiced self-presentation” on all three dimensions of antisemitism – contradicting the results of the mean values and percentages, which are derived from bivariate analyses. Obviously, this motivation is influenced by the other variables that were included in the multivariate regression, meaning that the control variables conceal (suppress) part of the effect of the motivation variable.

Another analysis of the same 2011 GFE data, by Leibold et al., came to the same conclusion as Zick et al., confirming the lower latency pressure with regard to anti-Israel prejudice. Like Zick et al., Leibold et al. also used two statements selected out of the sixteen items from the Motivation to Act without Prejudice Scale developed by Rainer Banse and Bertram Gawronski. One item is identical to one that Zick et al. used, while the second is based on one from a different subscale, Behavior Control. In Zick et al. both items came from one and the same subscale, Unprejudiced Self-Presentation.¹¹⁴ The two items used by Leibold et al. were:

“One should, when in society, speak rather positively about minorities.” (correct)

“I don't care if someone thinks that I harbor prejudices against minorities.”¹¹⁵ (not correct – used with reverse polarity)

¹¹³ Ibid., p. 70. In the case of secondary antisemitism, the significant difference between the strongly and weakly motivated respondents suggests that this is apparently also viewed as socially undesirable and therefore as not suitable for detour communication – despite what some researchers have assumed.

¹¹⁴ This means that the results of Zick et al. can no longer be compared exactly with those of Leibold et al.

¹¹⁵ The German version of the items is: “Man sollte in Gesellschaft eher positiv über Minderheiten sprechen” and “Es ist mir egal, wenn jemand glaubt, dass ich Vorurteile gegenüber Minderheiten habe”. The first item deviates from the formulation used by Banse and Gawronski in their “Skala zu vorurteilsfreiem Verhalten”: “Man sollte in Gesellschaft nichts Negatives über Minderheiten sagen” (The Motivation Scale, 8, table 2). The wording used by Leibold et al. clearly changes the meaning of the statement, because it makes a distinction between the requirement “not to say anything negative about minorities” and the requirement to “only say positive things about them”.

Table 9: Strength of the relationship in the structural models for explaining antisemitic and anti-Muslim attitudes, taking into account the effect of the Motivation to Act without Prejudice¹¹⁶ – 2011 GFE survey – weighted data

dependent variables	Explanatory variables						R^2
	motivation to act without prejudice		social dominance orientation (SDO)		authoritarian aggression		
	standardized	non-standardized	standardized	non-standardized	standardized	non-standardized	
dimensions of antisemitism							
SDO	.611	1.270					.373
author. aggression			.537	.621			.289
class. antisemitism	.288	.584	.263	.256	.243	.208	.419
SDO	.695	.970					.483
author. aggression			.524	.517			.275
secondary antisemitism	.486	.774			.426	.493	.570
SDO	.702	1.072					.495
author. aggression			.540	.590			.291
criticism of Israel	.160 ¹¹⁷	.149			.341	.190	.183

Leibold et al., table 3, shortened version.

¹¹⁶ “High values on the Motivation to Act without Prejudice Scale (MVV) suggest a low motivation for behavior free of prejudice” (Leibold et al., “Mehr oder weniger erwünscht?”, p. 196, fn 13).

¹¹⁷ The term “criticism of Israel” is used here differently than in Zick et al. It is measured here using two items that compare Israeli policy with that of the Nazis (Nazi analogy): “Israel is waging a war of extermination [*Ver-nichtungskrieg*] against the Palestinians” and “There is not much of a difference between what the State of Israel is doing to the Palestinians today and what the Nazis did to the Jews during the Third Reich”.

In this explanatory model, approval for the first item and rejection of the second item are used to measure the motivation to act without prejudice. As a control variable, the motivation to act without prejudice exerts the greatest influence on secondary antisemitism (.486),¹¹⁸ followed by traditional/classical antisemitism (.280), while its influence on anti-Israel attitudes is significantly lower (.160). The authors therefore conclude that “the less strongly respondents pay attention to social norms that apply to minorities, the more they are willing to divide groups in society according to their usefulness and value and the more they tend toward authoritarian aggression”.¹¹⁹ With one exception, the motivation to act without prejudice proves to be the most important factor influencing both classical and secondary antisemitism. It is only in the case of criticism of Israel that this motivation has little influence – authoritarian aggression dominated here. This means that this dimension of antisemitism is less taboo and may therefore be suitable for articulating antisemitic beliefs that are otherwise taboo.¹²⁰ However, in a multivariate regression of the same data, the effect is equally strong for all three variants of antisemitism (see Table 8 above), and the authors ignore the fact that the two items from the Motivation to Act without Prejudice Scale refer to attitudes toward minorities in society and are therefore not really suited for measuring attitudes toward state policies. It may be that this is the reason why the influence of this motivation turns out to be so much smaller. As an additional caveat, reference should be made to the low reliability and validity of using only two items from the Motivation to Act without Prejudice Scale, as noted above.

4. Antisemitism and anti-Israel/anti-Zionist views (2005)

Wolfgang Frindte, Susan Wettig, and Dorit Wammetsberger conducted two non-representative studies in 2002/2003 in Germany; one of these, Study 2, examined the connection between antisemitic and anti-Israel/anti-Zionist views.¹²¹ In Study 2 the authors

¹¹⁸ This confirms yet again that secondary antisemitism cannot serve as a detour communication for traditional antisemitism, since the motivation to be free of prejudice is too great here as compared with the case of traditional antisemitism.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 191.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 192f.

¹²¹ Between December 2002 and March 2003, 411 participants between the ages of 18 and 83 (average 40.28 years old) from five German Federal States (Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, Lower Saxony, Saxony, and Thuringia) were surveyed. Of these respondents, 58% were women and the higher education levels (academic degree) were overrepresented. “The participants were provided with a booklet containing different aspects of the role of

used four scales: a Manifest and Latent Antisemitism subscale, composed of 10 items regarding classical antisemitism and items measuring secondary or latent antisemitism (internal reliability $\alpha = .90$); a Rejection of Responsibility toward Jews subscale with six items (internal reliability $\alpha = .80$); an Exaggerated Anti-Israel Attitude subscale made up of six items (internal reliability $\alpha = .79$); and an Anti-Zionist Attitudes subscale with four items (internal reliability $\alpha = .60$). After several exploratory factor analyses the number of items was reduced to the following nineteen.

Manifest and Latent Antisemitism Subscale¹²²

One should avoid having business dealings with Jews.

I don't like Jews

It would be better for Germany to have no Jews at all.

The Jews should not hold higher positions in government.

The Jews in Germany have too much influence.

Marriages between Jews and non-Jews should be avoided.

One should not interact with Jews.

Jews living here should not push themselves where they are not wanted.

The subject of "Jews" is an unpleasant thing for me.

Jews teach their children values and skills different from those required to be successful in Germany.

Rejection of Responsibility toward Jews Subscale

Jews in German society and the political conflict between Israel and Palestine [...] Randomly selected participants completed the questionnaire either on the campus, at several public places, or at home before sending the questionnaire back to the university." Anonymity was guaranteed. (Frindte at al., "Old and New Anti-Semitic Attitudes", pp. 250ff.)

¹²² Frindte at al., "Old and New Anti-Semitic Attitudes", Appendix, p. 265f.

Decades after the end of the war, we should not talk so much about the Holocaust. We should close the discussion about the past.

One should finally stop the discussion about our guilt toward the Jews.

Exaggerated Anti-Israel Attitudes (criticism of Israel) Subscale

Israel is solely responsible for the development and maintenance of the conflicts in the Middle East.

Israel is a state that stops at nothing.

Israelis are illegitimate occupiers of the Palestinian areas.

The way Israelis deal with the Palestinians is similar to what Nazi Germany did to the Jews.

Anti-Zionism Subscale

The foundation of the State of Israel was a mistake.

It would be better if the Jews would leave the Middle East.

Table 1: Factor analysis


Items	Factor 1 Manifest & Latent Antisemitism	Factor 2 Anti-Israel Attitudes	Factor 3 Rejection of Responsibility toward the Jews	Factor 4 Anti-Zionism
One should avoid having business dealings with Jews.	.747			
One should not interact with Jews.	.810			
I don't like Jews	.768			
It would be better for Germany to have no Jews at all.	.760			
The Jews should not hold higher positions in government.	.725			
The Jews in Germany have too much influence.	.675			

Marriages between Jews and non-Jews should be avoided	.674			
Jews living here should not push themselves where they are not wanted.	.727			
The subject of “Jews” is an unpleasant thing for me.	.571			
Jews teach their children values and skills different from those required to be successful in Germany.	.569			
Decades after the end of the war, we should not talk so much about the Holocaust. We should close the discussion about the past.			.764	
One should finally stop the discussion about our guilt toward the Jews.			.826	
The foundation of the State of Israel was a mistake.				.771
Israel is solely responsible for the development and maintenance of the conflicts in the Middle East.		.726		
Israel is a state that stops at nothing.		.723		
Israel starts wars and blames others for them.		.791		
Israelis are illegitimate occupiers of the Palestinian areas.		.748		
It would be better if the Jews would leave the Middle East.				.617
The way Israelis deal with the Palestinians is similar to what Nazi Germany did to the Jews.		.594		

Note: Four-dimensional factor solution of the Antisemitism Scale, loadings < 0.3 were suppressed. Explanation of variation: Factor 1: 26.95%; Factor 2: 15.69%; Factor 3: 11.39%; Factor 4: 6.35%
 Frindte et al., “Old and New Anti-Semitic Attitudes”, p. 252, table 3.

The factor analysis shows that antisemitism, rejection of responsibility toward the Jews, and anti-Israel attitudes, as well as anti-Zionism, each form a factor of their own, and no item loads on two factors. In some of the other studies presented here, all dimensions load on one factor (Imhoff, see Section 9; Decker et al., see Section 12). However, in this case the four dimensions also correlate quite highly with each other. Based on several exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses, the authors were able to develop a four-part model comprising four strongly interrelated dimensions: manifest/latent antisemitism, rejection of responsibility toward the Jews, exaggerated anti-Israel views, and anti-Zionism (with regard to the existence of the Jewish state in the Middle East), with the two latter factors (which correlate with each other at .65) correlating significantly with manifest/latent antisemitism (.45 and .49) and rejection of responsibility (.48 and .41).¹²³

Figure 1: Statistical structural model



¹²³ Frindte et al., “Old and New Anti-Semitic Attitudes”, p. 251ff.

These results correspond to the findings of Bergmann and Erb from 1991. Based on the positive correlations between antisemitism and exaggerated criticism of Israel and anti-Zionism, Frindte et al. conclude that antisemites use the latter to express their antisemitic prejudice or that they use exaggerated criticism of Israel as a "form of substitutional communication in public if there are strong social sanctions against direct communications of one's own prejudices".¹²⁴ In other words, the authors do not ascribe an independent motive to negative views of Israel. Instead, they rightly acknowledge that more investigation is necessary to determine the causal relations between antisemitism, anti-Zionism, and anti-Israel sentiments.¹²⁵ The correlations with values below .50 suggest that some of the respondents harbor such views without actually being antisemitic. Similar to Bergmann and Erb (Section 1) and Heyder et al. (2005) (Section 3.1), these findings also reveal the influence of political orientations, as Wolfgang Frindte (2006) has shown in another publication also based on the 2002/2003 data: Whereas antisemitism and rejection of responsibility receive a higher level of agreement the more right-wing the respondent's political views are, criticism of Israel and anti-Zionism are represented mostly by respondents who fall within the extreme-left and extreme-right categories (see below for the same findings from Staetsky, Section 10). In their study, 47% of extreme-left respondents expressed an anti-Israel position, while only 3% expressed antisemitism. On the other hand, 25% of the extreme-right individuals shared anti-Israel positions, while 75% also harbored antisemitic views. Frindte et al. draw the conclusion that criticism of Israeli policies comes from two politically opposing camps: One is made up of left-wing, multiculturally-oriented individuals who have no antisemitic prejudices. The other is made up of right-wing antisemitic individuals. This interpretation is confirmed by the findings that right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) correlates significantly to manifest/latent antisemitism ($r = .45$), rejection of responsibility toward Jews ($r = .26$), and, to a lesser degree, to anti-Israel attitudes ($r = .22$), but not to anti-Zionism. The Left-Right Orientation (LRO) correlates significantly but negatively to anti-Israel attitudes ($r = -.27$) and does not correlate to either dimension of antisemitism or to anti-Zionism. The negative value stands for a left-wing orientation.¹²⁶ Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) has no significant


¹²⁴ Ibid., p. 255.

¹²⁵ Ibid., p. 257.

¹²⁶ Ibid., p. 255, figure 3. The authors point to the possibility that exaggerated criticism of Israel amongst the left-leaning Germans may be a sign of latent anti-Jewish prejudice, but they then conclude that their low scores on

effect on the four components of anti-Jewish attitudes (for different results for traditional antisemitism from Leibold et al., see Section 3.2, Table 9).

Figure 2: Formation of clusters according to extent of antisemitic attitudes¹²⁷



Reprinted from Frindte, “Neuer Antisemitismus?”, p. 139, figure 3.

Using a cluster analysis, Frindte was able to identify four clusters: Cluster 4 (32.2%) shows a low value in all four attitude dimensions and can be categorized as being without prejudice. Cluster 3 (27.6%) had, in comparison with the first one, significantly higher values in all four dimensions, particularly in the dimensions concerning Israel. At the same time, Cluster 3 had

the dimensions of manifest and latent antisemitism and rejection of responsibility toward Jews speak against this interpretation. “The exaggerated Israel criticism amongst left-wing oriented Germans is independent of antisemitism” (p. 256).

¹²⁷ Wolfgang Frindte, “Neuer Antisemitismus? Empirische Studien zu Formen und Facetten gewandelter antisemitischer Einstellungen”, in: Rudolf Egg (ed.), *Extremistische Kriminalität: Kriminologie und Prävention*, Wiesbaden 2006, pp. 127–147, here p. 139.

lower values than Clusters 1 and 2 in so far as the two dimensions of antisemitism were concerned, while its agreement with the Israel-related dimensions was even higher. The respondents in Clusters 4 and 3 hardly differed in their social cultural background. They were for the most part younger than 45 years old, the majority had a high-school diploma (Abitur) and classified themselves as more to the left or left of center on the political spectrum. Frindte categorized the respondents in Cluster 3 as “left-wing critics of Israel without antisemitic views”.¹²⁸ Cluster 2 (21.7%) only expressed a high level of agreement in the dimension “rejection of responsibility”. In the other three dimensions this cluster lies only slightly higher than Clusters 4 and 3. Frindte categorizes this mostly younger (54% under 45) and more to the right or right of center (55%) group of respondents as “right-wing conservative individuals who want to put the past behind them and who are without pronounced antisemitic or anti-Zionist views”.¹²⁹ And finally, Cluster 1 (17.9%) shows the highest values in all dimensions. It consists mostly of older, less educated, and right-wing individuals. Frindte describes them as “secondary antisemites”, who hold anti-Israel and anti-Zionist views as a way to articulate their antisemitism in a socially acceptable manner. Frindte chooses to see in them the “new antisemites”, who are “hostile to Jews in a modern way”.¹³⁰ The newness of this view is, however, questionable, a point that Frindte himself concedes at the end of his presentation when he notes that evidence of concealed communication existed as early as 1945. It would also be a surprise to see mostly older, uneducated, right-wing persons as the base of a “new antisemitism” – at least, this contradicts the assumptions of Pierre-André Taguieff, who located the “new antisemites” among young, well-educated, and anti-racist people on the Left.¹³¹ In my opinion, there is no reason to assume detour communication for Cluster 1, since those who have both traditional and secondary antisemitic attitudes are expected to have a negative attitude toward Israel as a Jewish state as well. Whether criticism of Israel, which in the surveys is always measured as an attitude and not as a form of communication or something one is willing to communicate, is actually a form of substitutional communication or communicational detour, still needs to be empirically examined beyond the analysis of factual communication. Attitude studies are not able to do this.

5. The relationship between the “old” and the “new antisemitism” and attitudes toward Israel

¹²⁸ Ibid., p. 132.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Taguieff, *La nouvelle judéophobie*.

In 2006, András Kovács conducted the only empirical study on the relationship between antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes in a non-Western, post-communist country.¹³² Although the Eastern Bloc states pursued an anti-Zionist policy prior to 1989, the state position had little effect on the population’s attitude toward Israel. Today, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict receives less attention in the Eastern European states than in the West. Support for the Palestinians’ right to have a state of their own and criticism of the Israeli occupation play much less of a role in public debates there than in the West, so that attitudes toward Jews seem to be less linked to attitudes toward Israel.¹³³

Although Kovács used survey items similar to those used in other (especially Western European) countries to measure new antisemitism and attitudes toward the State of Israel, but he assigns them to the two indices “New Antisemitism” and “Israel” in a different way. The statement “What Israel is doing to the Palestinians is just the same as what the Nazis did to the Jews”, which represents a Nazi analogy, is not included in the Israel Index (as it is in the GFE studies in Germany, see Sections 3.1 and 3.2, and in a Norwegian survey, see Section 11) but is assigned to the New Antisemitism Index.

Table 1: Relationship between new antisemitism and attitudes toward Israel (percent)

	Fully agree	Partially agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Partially disagree	Fully disagree	Don’t know/ no answer
Israel’s political system is more progressive than that of the hostile Arab countries	7	18	26	10	9	29
Israel is waging a just war of self-defence against its attackers	5	12	31	13	14	24
Jews living here are more loyal to Israel than to this	8	15	23	13	14	28

¹³² András Kovács, *The Stranger at Hand. Antisemitic Prejudices in Post-Communist Hungary*, Leiden/Boston 2006, Chapter 2, Section 4, pp. 122–135. “MEDIÁN Public Opinion and Market Research Institute conducted the survey using a sample of 1,200 people. The sample was representative of the general adult population [in Hungary] in terms of gender, age, place of residence, and education.” (Ibid., p. 123.)

¹³³ The ADL’s data from 2005 show that populations in the former East Bloc countries Hungary and Poland appear to be less influenced by events in the Middle East than West European populations. Only a small percentage is affected negatively in their view of Jews, while the populations of both countries show a comparatively high agreement with the antisemitic items (see above, Section 1, Table 2).

country						
What Israel is doing to the Palestinians is just the same as what the Nazis did to the Jews	8	14	27	14	12	25
Influential Jews control US policy	11	17	26	8	10	28

Kovács, *The Stranger at Hand*, p. 127, table 66.

An analysis of the internal correlations between these items shows that they are correlated significantly, a principal component factor analysis revealing that “two dimensions were manifest behind the five items”.¹³⁴ Using the three items at the bottom of Table 1, Kovács builds the New Antisemitism Index.

Table 2: New Antisemitism Index (percent)

Agrees with none of the statements	43
Agrees with one statement	27
Agrees with two statements	18
Agrees with three statements	12

Kovács, *The Stranger at Hand*, p. 129, table 68.

The two items at the top of Table 1 “had a shared background content that differed from the other three items expressing a *pro-Israel* or – at the negative extreme – *anti-Israel stance*”.¹³⁵

Table 3: Israel Index (percent)

Anti-Israel (agrees with neither statement)	23
---------------------------------------------	----

¹³⁴ Ibid., p. 128

¹³⁵ Ibid.

Moderately anti-Israel (agrees with one statement)	58
Pro-Israel (agrees with both statements)	18

Kovács, *The Stranger at Hand*, p. 129, table 69.

Contrary to other studies, an anti-Israel attitude is not indicated here by means of negative statements about Israel (e.g., the Nazi analogy) but by means of the rejection of positive opinions about the Israeli political system and the denial that Israel is waging a legitimate war of self-defense (for a similar approach, see Cohen et al., Section 7). It is doubtful, to say the least, whether the view that Israel’s political system is no more progressive than that of its Arab neighbors really expresses an anti-Israel attitude. This also applies to rejection of the claim that Israel’s wars are merely defensive. One wonders why the item “What Israel is doing to the Palestinians is just the same as what the Nazis did to the Jews”, which is also used in the survey, would not have been more suitable for measuring an anti-Israel attitude, especially since it has been used in a number of other studies for this purpose.

While antisemitic attitudes are more often represented by older people with conservative or right-wing extremist attitudes, the “social and demographic features of the group supporting anti-Israel views are rather blurred”.¹³⁶ Respondents from smaller cities are somewhat overrepresented in this group, their social status is “typically middle to lower” class, while respondents with pro-Israel attitudes tend to belong to middle and upper social strata. But the crucial difference between the groups is the age structure: anti-Israel attitudes are much more common among young people between the ages of 18 and 29. Kovács describes the political attitudes of the anti-Israel respondents as also rather diffuse, but far-right and liberal voters are both overrepresented. This indicates, as we have already seen in the other studies presented here, that a negative attitude toward Israel can be found among both right-wing antisemites (which is not surprising) and liberal people, for whom these attitudes are not based on antisemitic motives. Accordingly, Kovács concludes that “it is not clear that hostility toward Israel is also an expression of antisemitism”.¹³⁷

The distribution of answers in Table 4 also shows that there is no linear correlation between antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes.

¹³⁶ Ibid., p. 130.

¹³⁷ Ibid., p. 131.

Table 4: Antisemitism and hostility toward Israel (percent)

Agreement with how many anti-Israel statements			
	0	1	2
Non-antisemites	17	56	27
Moderate antisemites	21	64	15
Extreme antisemites	20	48	31
Total population	18	59	23

Kovács, *The Stranger at Hand*, p. 132, table 70.

We leave aside the differences between the “old antisemitism”¹³⁸ and the “new antisemitism” that Kovács also examined, as the connections between these two forms and anti-Israel attitudes do not differ very much from one another. In neither case is there a linear relationship between antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes.¹³⁹ For Kovács, the analysis of correlations at the level of statements shows that in Hungary antisemitism does not imply a pro-Arab attitude (rather the opposite) and that both the “new antisemites” and the “old antisemites” tend to have a positive opinion of Israel’s political system and consider it to have waged war in self-defense.¹⁴⁰ In contrast, left-wing critics of Israel more frequently express sympathy for Israel’s Arab opponents and are “particular likely to dispute that the Jewish state’s political system is more ‘progressive’ than that of the Arab countries and that Israel is engaged in a war of self-defence with these states”.¹⁴¹ What is more interesting in regard to the question of the connection between antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes is not so much which antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes or non-antisemitic and pro-Israel attitudes go together,¹⁴² but the constellations that do not fit into either logical sample: the anti-Israel non-antisemites and the pro-Israel antisemites. The latter two groups differ in two main ways: in their age structure and in their political orientation. As Kovács explains:

¹³⁸ “Old antisemitism” is measured by seven items, which relate to the political, discriminatory, and religious types of antisemitic prejudices, using statements about the power of Jews in the cultural and economic spheres, about social distancing and restricting areas of employment for Jews, and about the crucifixion of Jesus and the suffering of the Jewish people as God’s punishment (ibid., p. 124, table 63).

¹³⁹ Ibid., p. 132, tables 71 and 72.

¹⁴⁰ Even 40% of the extreme “old antisemites” believe that Israel’s political system is more progressive and that Israel is engaged in a just war of self-defense. Among the “new antisemites”, 29% believe that Israel’s political system is more progressive and 18% believe that Israel is engaged in a just war of self-defense (ibid., p. 133).

¹⁴¹ Ibid., p. 131f.

¹⁴² The antisemitic and anti-Israel group is composed of hard-core antisemites (ibid., p. 134).

... in Hungary the non-antisemitic anti-Israel group is dominated by young people of liberal attitudes and party allegiances, who consciously distinguish themselves from the post-communist left. Most members of this group evidently support universalist liberalism that forms the ideological foundation – in post-communist systems – of criticism of both the old communist regime and the nationalist policies that emerged after the fall of communism. Thus, what lies behind the negative view of Israel is not antisemitism but a universalist, anti-nationalist – perhaps excessively radical – critique of Israel’s policies.¹⁴³

The second group, the pro-Israel antisemitic group, consists mainly of members of middle-age groups who were politically socialized at the time of communist rule. For them, antisemitic attitudes go hand in hand with a positive view of Israel because they see Israel as part of the developed West, which has to assert itself against the Arab states, considered to be backward countries.

As in Western countries, we also find a group with anti-Israel attitudes in Hungarian post-communist society whose negative attitudes are not based on antisemitic motives. Instead, members of this group criticize Israel’s policies on the basis of universalist values. According to Kovács, however, the role of hostility toward Israel in Hungary differs from that in Western countries. Even though antisemitism is occasionally accompanied by an anti-Israel stance, many of the people who grew up in the communist era do not transfer their rejection of Jews onto the Jewish state and do not side with Israel’s Arab enemies. In contrast to the Western European countries, we can observe an obvious generational break in Hungary between persons socialized under the old communist regime and those born afterwards.¹⁴⁴

6. Emotional and Cognitive Anti-Jewish and anti-Israel attitudes in Switzerland (2007)

A study examining anti-Jewish and anti-Israel attitudes and the possible connections between

¹⁴³ Ibid. The political orientation of this Israel-critical group seems to differ from that in Western European countries, where we find a critical view of Israel to be especially pronounced in the radical and moderate Left, while in Hungary such criticisms are more common among liberal younger people and left-wing voters instead tend to hold a pro-Israel position (regarding, for example, the answers about Israel’s political system and the question of a just war of self-defense). According to Kovács, it was difficult in Hungary to “identify the phenomenon usually known as left-wing antisemitism” (ibid., p. 135).

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 135.

them was conducted in Switzerland in 2007 by Claude Longchamp, Monia Aebersold, Stephan Tschöpe, and Silvia-Maria Ratelband-Pally.¹⁴⁵ This study differs from the others we have looked at, in that it examines not only the cognitive dimension (stereotypes) but also emotional attitudes in a differentiated way. On the emotional level, the Swiss respondents had mostly positive associations with Jews (respect 55%, admiration 26% – both attitudes show a relatively high correlation), but more than 20% expressed negative feelings such as incomprehension (25%) and disappointment (25%) toward them. A smaller percentage (less than 10%) had extremely negative feelings, such as rejection (10%), contempt (6%), or hatred (5%). In a factor analysis, the positive emotions (respect and admiration) are allocated to one factor and all the negative ones are loaded on a second factor.

With regard to emotions toward Israel, however, we find three factors: The first factor is composed of positive emotions like respect and admiration, which are closely correlated ($r = .37$). The second factor loads strongly negative emotions like hate (8%), rejection (18%), envy (8%), and contempt (12%). The third factor has allocated to it emotional reactions that are situation- and event-dependent, such as disappointment, anger, and incomprehension. On this emotional dimension, which is also negative, respondents agree with the individual items much more frequently than on the second factor (anger: 20%; incomprehension: 49%; disappointment: 43% – the latter primarily among older respondents and people in left-wing circles). The authors of the study interpret this to mean that the negative reactions toward Israel are more differentiated, with event-related (political) feelings such as anger or disappointment about Israel's policies being expressed, which do not necessarily imply a general attitude toward the State of Israel. The greater event-dependence of these negative emotions coincides with the findings of the other studies discussed here, according to which the attitudes toward Jews among interviewees who otherwise express themselves non-antisemitically are worsened – but only briefly – by incidents in the Middle East conflict. In this case we are not dealing with a stable anti-Jewish attitude. It is mainly people in anti-imperialist circles who see Israel as the “extended arm of the USA in the Middle East”; at the same time, it is in these circles that disappointment about Israel's policies is particularly widespread.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁵ Claude Longchamp/Monia Aebersold/Stephan Tschöpe/Silvia-Maria Ratelband-Pally (Gesellschaft für Sozialforschung, Bern), *Kritik an Israel von antisemitischen Haltungen unabhängig. Antisemitismus-Potential in der Schweiz neuartig bestimmt. Schlussbericht zur Studie: Anti-jüdische und Anti-israelische Einstellungen in der Schweiz*, Bern 2007. This study is based on a telephone survey of 1,030 selected representative residents from the whole of Switzerland, with and without Swiss citizenship. The survey was conducted by trained interviewers in February 2007 using computer-aided telephone interviews. The statistical margin of error is +/- 3.1% (ibid. p. 6).

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 42.

The question is whether the anti-Israel emotions have an influence on attitudes toward Jews – or vice versa. The connection between feelings toward Jews and Israel was investigated using a two-dimensional scale (MDS), which “makes it very clear that on an emotional level – i.e., unconsciously – the population hardly distinguishes between Jews as a people and Israel as a state”.¹⁴⁷ When the interviewees were asked about the connection between their personal emotional attitudes toward Jews and Israel, 68% of them denied that the behavior of the State of Israel should have an influence on their attitude toward Jews, but one must assume that the interviewees generally overestimated the degree of differentiation in their feelings about Jews and Israel. Only every fourth respondent acknowledged this influence: 6% of the respondents said that the actions of Israel strongly influenced their personal attitude toward Jews, while another 19% said the influence was “somewhat strong”.¹⁴⁸ People in right-wing political circles, people who attend church regularly, and men rather than women were most likely to admit to this transfer of emotions – the very same groups that are most likely to harbor traditional antisemitism.¹⁴⁹ In those cases (approximately a quarter of the interviewees) in which Israel’s policies triggered strong emotions, these rubbed off on their attitude toward Jews by creating disappointment and incomprehension toward the latter.¹⁵⁰


Figure 1: Two-dimensional Scaling of Emotions toward the State of Israel and Emotions toward Jews

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 37.

¹⁴⁸ In many European countries, survey data as well as the statistics regarding antisemitic offenses show that conflicts involving Israel – from the Lebanon War in 1982 and the war between Israel and Hezbollah in 2006, up to the Gaza conflicts in 2009 and 2014 – led to an (albeit short-lived) increase in the number of anti-Jewish offenses and also in the level of approval for antisemitic statements. These conflicts also had an impact on the prevalence of anti-Jewish discourses. For an overview, see Bachner, “Contemporary Antisemitism in Europe”, p. 90f. Although the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has an impact on antisemitism in Europe, Bachner is right to reject the claim that antisemitism is just a “pure epiphenomenon” of this conflict, suggesting that Israeli policies not only give rise to criticism and hostility toward Israel but also generate antisemitism. “It is crucially important to differentiate between underlying causes of antisemitism and factors and circumstances that can nourish and trigger antisemitic reactions” (p. 91).

¹⁴⁹ Longchamp et al., *Kritik an Israel*, pp. 37 and 74.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 36.



N = 1,030. GfS Bern, *Antijüdische und antiisraelische Einstellungen in der Schweiz*, February 2007, p. 37, figure 1.

On the cognitive level, however, the relationship looks quite different. A majority of the Swiss population expressed a basically positive attitude toward Israel, which was seen as a “state just like any other” (68%) and part of the Western world (58%). Two-thirds of respondents accepted and understood Israel’s reaction “to the threats from the Islamic world”. But this did not stop them from judging certain aspects of Israeli policy negatively: Half of the Swiss believe that Israel is conducting a “war of extermination against the Palestinians”; 43% hold Israel partially responsible for terrorism worldwide; 54% believe that “in Israel, religious fanatics are pulling the strings”; and 40% believe that Israel has “too much influence in the world”. Thirteen percent – a clear minority – expressed an explicitly anti-Zionist position, calling for the State of Israel to be dissolved.¹⁵¹ This radical position was expressed most often by church-goers and people in right-wing circles, by residents of the French region of Switzerland, and by less educated people. The cognitive level differed from the emotional

¹⁵¹ Ibid., tables 25, 26, and 27.

level in that it did not easily reveal a clear identification of Jews with the State of Israel. The factor analysis separates anti-Jewish attitudes from views critical of Israel, although there are two items bridging the two attitudes: “excessive influence on world affairs” and “Israel’s role as the extended arm of the US” (58% agree).¹⁵²

The following factor analysis of items representing the dimensions of antisemitism reveals that the cognitive views and the situational emotions toward Israel are distinct from hostile views toward Jews.

Table 1: Results of the factor analysis on attitude dimensions

Attitude dimensions	1st factor	2nd factor	3rd factor
Negative stereotype about Jews	.79		
Anti-Jewish views about their foreignness to Christian culture	.56		
Anti-Jewish opinions regarding world domination	.52	.57	
Situational negative emotions toward Israel		.76	
Anti-Israel opinions		.73	
Negative emotions toward Jews			.81

¹⁵² Ibid., p. 41.

Generally negative emotions toward Israel			.72
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Source: GfS Bern, *Antijüdische und antiisraelische Einstellungen in der Schweiz*, p. 48, table 6.

The distribution of the items on the three factors suggests that “anti-Israel attitudes are not essential ... to determining antisemitism”. The authors of the Swiss study came to the conclusion that “anti-Israel views in Switzerland ... are increasingly common and widespread”, but that “because the distribution of these views in the population differs quantitatively and qualitatively from the distribution of anti-Jewish attitudes, it should be regarded as a separate phenomenon and evaluated independently from antisemitism”.¹⁵³ The factor analysis (Table 1) also shows, however, that two “bridges” connect both phenomena – the stereotype that “Jews exert too much influence on world affairs”, which combines anti-Jewish attitudes (factor 1) and anti-Israel attitudes (factor 2), and the very pronounced negative emotions of hate, envy, and anger toward Jews and Israel, which both load on the same factor (3). Consequently, the authors of the study assume that some of the respondents who are emotionally disappointed with Israel’s political behavior in the Middle East also transfer their negative emotions onto Jews in general.¹⁵⁴ There is a lack of understanding as to how “former victims could themselves become perpetrators in the Israel-Palestine conflict”.¹⁵⁵ Interestingly, incomprehension is found among all segments of the population and cannot be tied to any specific group.¹⁵⁶

The study’s claim that “criticism of Israel is independent of antisemitic attitudes” is a rather daring conclusion for a number of reasons. For one, the authors themselves acknowledge that further investigation is required to determine the degree to which those with antisemitic attitudes are directly or indirectly influenced by perceptions of Israel. Furthermore, it is not clear to what degree negative emotions toward Israel are fueled directly by antisemitism.¹⁵⁷

The correlation analysis does not allow for any conclusions to be drawn regarding the direction of this causality. However, the authors of the study rightly point out that antisemitic

¹⁵³ Ibid., p. 48.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 54. To the question “Is your personal opinion of Jews very strongly, more or less strongly, more or less not, or not at all influenced by the behavior of the State of Israel?” 6% answered very strongly and another 19% more or less strongly (p. 37, figure 22).

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 42.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 55. Approximately 15% of Swiss respondents are considered to be emotionally disappointed by Israel’s policies, irrespective of their Right–Left political orientation, level of education, or other demographic characteristics, while only 3% of the left-wingers are labeled as clearly antisemitic, compared with 16% of the right-wingers (p. 56).

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 48.

attitudes may well include strong anti-Israel opinions but that these are also found among people who clearly cannot be considered antisemitic. An equation of the two attitude complexes has not been confirmed empirically. Nor can anti-Israel attitudes be equated with anti-Zionism. However, anti-Israel attitudes are widely held by the Swiss population, especially in connection with Israel's behavior in the Middle East conflict.¹⁵⁸

A cluster analysis shows that the connection between anti-Jewish and anti-Israel attitudes applies primarily to the generally negative emotions but not to stronger situational emotions. Five clusters were identified using a cluster analysis: a pro-Jewish cluster (37%); an "emotionally disappointed with Israel's policies" cluster, in which disappointment about its policies, perceived as too radical, was also frequently transferred onto Jews in general without the disappointment having any effect on the image of Jews (15%); a cluster with selective anti-Jewish views, without more negative emotions than average (28%); an antisemitism cluster, similarly without more negative emotions than average (10%); and an incoherent views cluster (10%).¹⁵⁹ The "emotionally disappointed" cluster is interesting in that the respondents expressed disappointment over Israel's Middle East policies and increasingly expressed disappointment about Jews in general, but this did not translate into a negative attitude toward Jews on the cognitive level. In terms of their attitude toward Jews, the emotionally disappointed respondents differed from the population average on only two points: in their feeling of disappointment and in their perception of Jews as "politically radical", which suggests that an attitude transfer had taken place, originating from their view that Israel's actions toward the Palestinians were harsh and radical.

The results of this study show that in order to analyze the connection between antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes, it is important not to focus the analysis of respondents' attitudes on their attitudes toward Israel alone. Their views and positions on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict must also be examined, as studies by Wilhelm Kempf and his colleagues have done (see below, Section 8).

7. Modern Antisemitism and Anti-Israel attitudes: Terror Management Theory (2009)

A psychological study by Florette Cohen, Kent Harber, Lee Jussim, and Gautam Bhasin used Terror Management Theory to experimentally investigate the influence of an awareness of one's own mortality (mortality salience) on attitudes toward Jews and Israel in the United

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 65. In this study, anti-Zionism is operationalized with the call for the dissolution of the State of Israel (ibid., p. 41, figure 27).

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 49.

States.¹⁶⁰ Terror Management Theory (TMT) is both a social and evolutionary psychology theory;¹⁶¹ it proposes that a basic psychological conflict results from having a self-preservation instinct while realizing that death is inevitable. This conflict produces feelings of fear (terror), which are then managed by embracing cultural beliefs or symbolic systems that act to counter biological reality with more durable forms of meaning and value. The most obvious examples of cultural values that assuage death anxiety are those that purport to offer literal immortality (e.g., belief in afterlife, religion). However, TMT also argues that other cultural values – including some that are seemingly unrelated to death – offer symbolic immortality; for example, values of national identity, immortality through special achievements, survival through one’s lineage, etc. have been linked to death concerns. In many cases, these values are thought to offer symbolic immortality, either a) by providing the sense that one is part of something greater that will ultimately outlive the individual (e.g., country, lineage, species), or b) by making one’s symbolic identity superior to biological nature. Mortality salience has the potential to cause worldview defense, a psychological defense mechanism that strengthens people’s connection with their in-group. Studies also show that mortality salience can lead people to feel more inclined to punish minor moral transgressions.¹⁶²

The authors see the connection between TMT and antisemitism in the fact that the focus on one’s own mortality and the resulting need to protect one’s own worldview lead to hostility toward Jews, “because Jews represent a unique challenge to their worldviews”.¹⁶³ This challenge consists, first of all, in the fact that Christians and Muslims acknowledge their roots in the Bible, while Judaism does not recognize their Holy Scriptures, which results in the need to convert, oppress, or annihilate Jews. It is also based on the socio-cultural exclusion of Jews by Christians and Muslims as well as the self-segregation of Jews. According to the authors, a further threat to the worldview of Christians and Muslims is to be found in the economic and political success of Jews in the USA, Europe, and Israel.

¹⁶⁰ Florette Cohen/Kent Harber/Lee Jussim/Gautam Bhasin, “Modern Anti-Semitism and Anti-Israeli Attitudes”, in: *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 97 (2009), pp. 290–306. The essay’s title is in fact slightly misleading, as the scale used to measure attitudes toward Israel measures support for Israel rather than an actual anti-Israel attitude.


¹⁶¹ Originally proposed by Jeff Greenberg/Sheldon Solomon/Tom Pyszczynski, “The causes and consequences of a need for self-esteem: A terror management theory”, in: R.F. Baumeister (ed.), *Public Self and Private Self*, New York 1986, pp. 189–212; S. Solomon/J. Greenberg/T. Pyszczynski, “A terror management theory of social behavior: The psychological functions of self-esteem and cultural worldviews”, in: *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* 24 (1991), pp. 93–159. Codified in their book: *The Worm at the Core: On the Role of Death in Life*, New York 2015.

¹⁶² This theory is reminiscent of the authoritarian personality theory, in which conformism and rejection of everything alien go hand in hand with a willingness to punish deviant behavior.

¹⁶³ Cohen et al., “Modern Anti-Semitism”, p. 291.

The authors consider the connection between mortality salience and antisemitism to be a “well-established link”. In three experiments they test the thesis that “mortality salience leads to increased antisemitism (path 1) and that increased antisemitism leads to decreased support for Israel (path 2)”. However, the model used by the authors predicts that antisemitism only partially mediates the effect of mortality salience on attitudes toward Israel, as mortality salience can also increase opposition to Israel without increasing antisemitism (path 3). This is because, according to TMT, mortality salience also increases the willingness to negatively sanction the violation of moral codes, which can lead to opposition to Israel due to the accusations that it violates human rights norms.¹⁶⁴

Figure 1: Theoretical model of Antisemitism



Path 1 = mortality salience increases antisemitism. Path 2 = antisemitism decreases support for Israel. Path 3 = mortality salience decreases support for Israel without antisemitism.
 + means the path is predicted to be positive. - means the path is predicted to be negative.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 292. One hundred eighty-three psychology students from Rutgers University took part in the study, receiving credits for their participation. The data from the Jewish students were not used in the analysis, leaving 151 participants. Of these, 99 were women and 52 men; 9 identified themselves as African-American, 30 as Asian-American, 18 as Latino, 77 as White, 16 as belonging to other ethnic groups, and one did not answer; 79 identified themselves as of Christian faith, 3 as Muslim, 2 as Buddhist, 19 as Hindu, 28 as “other”, and 3 did not answer (ibid., p. 293).

Cohen et al., “Modern Anti-Semitism”, p. 292, figure 1.

To circumvent the problem of social desirability on a sensitive issue such as antisemitism, the studies used bogus pipeline manipulation, whereby some respondents were led to believe that their expressed attitudes were transparent (thus making deception futile), while others were assured that their underlying attitudes were private (thereby making deception viable).¹⁶⁵ It was assumed that the mortality salience effect would be particularly visible if the respondents were led to believe that they could not hide their prejudices.¹⁶⁶

The three experiments used three 5-point Likert scales: an Antisemitism Scale consisting of 23 less blatant attitude items,¹⁶⁷ an Attitudes toward Israel Scale consisting of ten items measuring levels of pro-Israel sentiment, and an Attitudes toward Palestinians Scale consisting of 10 items measuring a pro-Palestinian attitude.¹⁶⁸

Attitudes toward Israel Scale¹⁶⁹

- The Israelis have been terrorized by Arabs for decades.
- I strongly support the Israeli cause.
- The Jews deserve a homeland in Israel.
- The Israelis have the right to fight against Palestinian terrorism using any means necessary.
- Israeli incursions into the West Bank and Gaza are necessary to preserve Israel’s security.

¹⁶⁵ “Half the participants believed that the purpose of the experiment was to study prejudice (prejudice obvious), and the other half believed that the purpose of the experiment was to study attitudes and that we would be able to detect any lies about their true attitudes (bogus pipeline)” (ibid., p. 293).

¹⁶⁶ See ibid., p. 292f. Series of 2 (mortality salience, exam salience) × 2 (prejudice obvious, bogus pipeline) Analyses of Variance (ANOVAs) performed on antisemitism scores, attitude toward Israel, and attitudes toward the Palestinians were analyzed (p. 294).

¹⁶⁷ The authors have not published the list of prejudices. In a 1996 article, Thomas F. Pettigrew and R.W. Meertens introduced the distinction between “blatant” and “subtle” prejudices and developed two scales for this purpose, but they did not refer to antisemitism: “Blatant prejudice is the traditional, often studied form; it is hot, close and direct. Subtle prejudice is the modern form; it is cool, distant and indirect” (see: Thomas F. Pettigrew/Roel W. Meertens, “Subtle and blatant prejudice in Western Europe”, in: *European Journal of Social Psychology* 25/1 (1996), pp. 57–75, here p. 57).

¹⁶⁸ Neither the Antisemitism Scale nor the Attitudes toward Palestinians Scale were included in the article.

¹⁶⁹ Cohen et al., “Modern Anti-Semitism”, Appendix A, p. 306. The Attitude toward Israel Scale does not measure a hostile attitude toward Israel, unlike the parallel scales in the other studies, which consist of statements critical of or hostile toward Israeli policy. Instead, it measures the degree of support or non-support for the policies of the State of Israel toward the Palestinians or for the behavior of the Arab states and the Palestinians toward Israel and Jews. In the case of some statements, one cannot help but be sceptical that a rejection of approval also implies a rejection of support for Israel, especially since in one case it is an incorrect assertion (“Palestinian suicide bombers kill far more Israeli civilians than Israelis kill Palestinian civilians”). In other cases the items indicate support for behavior that is questionable in terms of international law and human rights (“The Israelis have the right to fight against Palestinian terrorism using any means necessary”).

- Israeli attacks on Palestinian terrorist targets are as justified as the American war in Afghanistan.
- Arabs have attempted to forcibly expel the Israelis for years.
- Many Israelis or their ancestors were forcibly expelled from Arab countries in 1948.
- All Jews should have the right to become citizens of the state of Israel.
- Palestinian suicide bombers kill far more Israeli civilians than Israelis kill Palestinian civilians.
- Terrorist attacks on Israeli civilians must end before Israelis even begin to negotiate peace.

The scale used to measure attitudes toward Israel consists of items that measure the willingness to unilaterally support Israel in its conflict with the Arab side. However, the title of the paper refers to “anti-Israel attitudes”. It is not unproblematic to infer a hostile attitude toward Israel from the rejection of some of the items used to call for such extensive and boundless support for the Israeli position.

Mortality salience was measured using two open-ended questions: “Please describe the emotions that the thought of your own death arouses in you” and “Write down as specifically as you can, what you think will happen to you physically when you die.” The other half of the sample (the control group) responded to parallel questions about taking an upcoming exam, which read as follows: “Please describe the emotions that the thought of your next important exam arouses in you” and “Write down as specifically as you can, what you think will happen to you physically as you take your next important exam and when it’s over.”¹⁷⁰


The first study ($N = 147-148$) found that respondents displayed a higher level of antisemitism and a lower level of approval toward Israel under mortality salience than under exam conditions; this was also the case under bogus pipeline conditions as compared with those who thought the experimenters had no means to detect their prejudices and that “therefore disguising such attitudes remained a viable tactic”.¹⁷¹ The intercorrelations between bogus pipeline and antisemitism ($r = .25$) and mortality salience and antisemitism ($r = .24$) are significant ($p < .01$). They are significant at the same level between mortality salience and Israel support ($r = -.27$) but not between bogus pipeline and Israel support ($r = -.16$). Neither the mortality salience nor the bogus pipeline are significantly correlated with Palestinian

¹⁷⁰ Cohen et al., “Modern Anti-Semitism”, p. 293.

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

support (-.09 and .10). The correlation between mortality salience and bogus pipeline in terms of antisemitism (.40) and Israel support ($r = -.32$) are both significant at the $p < .01$. Furthermore, in a mediational analysis the authors show that “those who were more anti-Semitic also were less supportive of Israel, $r = -.42, p < .001$ ”. To test the hypothesized model, two separate regressions were conducted: one regression assessed the effects on antisemitism for the participants under the other three conditions and a second regression tested the effect on support for Israel by controlling for antisemitism. In the first regression the link between antisemitism and support for Israel remained significant ($B = .35, p < .05$); this supports the hypothesis that antisemitism at least partially mediates the effects of mortality salience on support for Israel, since support for Israel decreased significantly from $\beta = -.32, p < .001$ to $\beta = -.19, p < .05$. This result supports the hypothesis that “there would be two routes by which mortality salience reduced support for Israel: one route involving mediation by increased anti-Semitism and one route independent of anti-Semitism”.¹⁷²

Figure 2: Mediational Model 1: Does antisemitism mediate effects of mortality salience on support for Israel?



Cohen et al., “Modern Anti-Semitism”, p. 296, figure 2.


* The asterisk means that the change in this coefficient was statistically significant ($p < .05$).

Since causal inferences regarding the relationship between antisemitism and attitudes toward Israel could also run in the opposite direction, the authors then tested an alternative assumption: that opposition to Israel caused antisemitism and, therefore, mediated the effects

¹⁷² Ibid., p. 296.

of mortality salience on antisemitism. The Mediational Model 2 was identical to Model 1, except for the assumed causal relationship between antisemitism and support for Israel.

Figure 3: Mediational Model 2: Does support for Israel mediate effects on Antisemitism?




Cohen et al., “Modern Anti-Semitism”, p. 297, figure 3.
 ** The double asterisk means that the change in this coefficient was statistically significant ($p < 0.01$).

The result of the second Mediational Model shows that the causal direction can also run from the attitude toward Israel to antisemitism; i.e., the attitude toward Israel mediated the effect of mortality salience on antisemitism. The authors drew the conclusion that “neither Model 1 nor Model 2 provided evidence of complete mediation. These results, therefore, mean that both models do a moderately good job of explaining the correlation between anti-Semitism and attitudes toward Israel”. It is a plausible assumption that antisemitism and opposition to Israel “exist in a cycle of mutual causation” and that Model 1 and Model 2 must be supplemented by an additional path from attitudes toward Israel to antisemitism.¹⁷³

The completed model, which I am adding here as a graphic, should then look like this:

Figure 4: Mediational Model 3: Antisemitism mediates effects of mortality salience on support for Israel and support for Israel (hostility toward Israel) mediates effects on antisemitism

¹⁷³ Ibid., p. 296.



Study 3 by the same authors – a survey of 235 people from Ramsey, New Jersey, and Middletown, New York – sought to determine whether or not prejudice against a group is a motive for punishing moral transgressions.¹⁷⁴ In order to be able to answer this question, one can determine experimentally whether transgressions committed by a group are punished just as severely as the same transgressions by another group that is not generally a target of prejudice. The authors developed two hypotheses: the first suggested that mortality salience increases willingness to target countries that violate moral standards (as shown in Path 3 of Model 1) and that mortality salience therefore leads to opposition to Israel (unmotivated by antisemitism). “If mortality salience leads to increasing opposition to perceived moral transgressions [...] then mortality salience should increase opposition to any country committing such transgressions.”¹⁷⁵ The second hypothesis postulated that mortality salience also increases antisemitism, so that the willingness to punish Israel should be greater than that for other countries.

Each respondent was presented with one of three versions of an identical text, based on a report by Amnesty International, about serious human rights violations committed by either Israeli, Indian, or Russian troops. Respondents were asked how much they agreed (on a 5-point Likert scale) with the following five possible punishments: “national campaign against

¹⁷⁴ The participants had an average age of 45; 155 (70%) were women and 95 were men; 6 identified as African-American, 6 as Asian-American, 19 as Latino, 196 as White, and 8 identified themselves as belonging to other ethnic groups. In the experiment they were randomly assigned to one of six experimental conditions in this study’s 2 (mortality salience: death or pain) × 3 (target country: Russia or India or Israel) independent-group design (ibid., p. 300).

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 300.

the target country, a citizens' boycott, withdrawal of aid, government economic bans, and installation of a new government".¹⁷⁶ The respondents were divided into two groups, one of which was exposed to the experimental condition of mortality salience (death), the other to pain salience. The results show that those respondents under mortality salience conditions had significantly higher mean values in the case of Israel and Russia; i.e., they agreed with more severe sanctions. While the mean for India under mortality salience conditions did not increase (2.84 to 2.81), it increased for Russia from 2.81 to 3.21 (significant $p < .01$) and for Israel from 2.52 to 3.36 (significant $p < .001$). As to the possible objection that support for punishing Israel under mortality salience conditions was not much greater than that for punishing Russia (mean of 3.36 compared with 3.21), which would speak against any additional influence of antisemitism, the authors saw its influence in the fact that punitiveness toward Israel had increased more (0.85) than toward Russia (0.40) and in that Israel received greater contrast coefficients for pain salience and mortality salience (-2 and 2) compared with India and Russia (-1 and 1). In this, they saw their hypothesis confirmed that "mortality salience increased support for sanctioning Israel more than mortality salience increased support for sanctioning the other countries".¹⁷⁷

The authors presented a new model for explaining antisemitism by showing that, according to TMT, "(a) Mortality salience will increase anti-Semitism; (b) mortality salience will increase opposition to Israel without increasing anti-Semitism, and (c) mortality salience will increase opposition to Israel because it increases anti-Semitism".¹⁷⁸ Since the authors did not take note of the German and Hungarian studies from before 2009, with the exception of the study by Kaplan and Small (see above, Section 2), they erroneously claimed that their results were the first to show that "attitudes toward Israel are a potential marker for anti-Semitism". The studies they carried out confirm the results of previous (and later) studies that "(a) anti-Semitism evokes hostility to Israel, (b) hostility to Israel may occur without anti-Semitism, (c) hostility to Israel can feed back to produce anti-Semitism".¹⁷⁹ What is really new in this research (apart from the introduction of the mortality salience approach) is that not only are correlations between antisemitism and hostility toward Israel calculated but that causality is observed in both directions here.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid. The answers of the respondents, who were able to assign from 1–5 points for each of the five options, were then divided by five, so that the mean for all respondents could have a value between 1 and 5 (p. 301).

¹⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 301.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 302.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid. Their point (d) does not concern the relationship between antisemitism and opposition to Israel, but refers to the measurement of subtle antisemitism.

With regard to ongoing discussions about the relationship between antisemitism and hostility toward Israel, the authors rightly reject the assumption that there is no relationship between the two (which to my knowledge nobody claims seriously), and their research results confirm that “at least sometimes, there is indeed a link between anti-Semitism and anti-Israel sentiment” and that, to some degree, “anti-Semitism increases hostility toward Israel, but not all hostility toward Israel stems from anti-Semitism”. In terms of the causal direction between antisemitism and hostility toward Israel, both paths may be valid.¹⁸⁰

At the end of their article, the authors list a few caveats, which primarily concern the composition of the samples used, the limitation that not all opposition to Israel is antisemitic, and the limitations of only using TMT and not including other sources of prejudice. For the authors, their model provides a preliminary explanation of the international rise in antisemitism in the first decade of the new millennium, since wars and conflicts (especially in the Middle East, in which Israel and the Palestinians were partly involved, too) have increased mortality salience and have thus contributed to the increase in antisemitism.

Apart from the fact that large-scale trials to test TMT theory have failed to show support for the mortality salience effect on worldview defense,¹⁸¹ one might ask why the acceptance of mortality salience is necessary, since in prejudice research the reinforcing effect of in-group-favoritism on prejudice – be it in the form of nationalism, the perceived threat of immigration, or competition, conflict, etc. – is already well established.

8. Israel-criticism and modern antisemitism (2009–2012)

Wilhelm Kempf has criticized the aforementioned positions of Kaplan and Small and of Heyder, Iser, and Schmidt, because, “Due to the scales and items they used, which do not do

¹⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 303.

¹⁸¹ While some of the foundational studies on which TMT is based have failed to replicate, thereby drawing criticism from within the field of psychology, the framework continues to resonate for many (see: *Psychology Today* <https://www.psychologytoday.com/intl/basics/terror-management-theory>). A broad-scale effort to test the theory failed to obtain support for the mortality salience effect on worldview defense, i.e., a greater preference for an essay writer adopting a pro-US argument than an essay writer adopting an anti-US argument. The test is a multi-lab replication of Study 1 by Jeff Greenberg et al. (1994). Psychologists in 21 labs across the United States re-executed the original experiment, with a total of 2,200 participants. The results showed no reliable evidence for a mortality salience effect, adding to the replication crisis. Importantly, the results were not only close to zero for attempts by researchers who independently re-executed the experiment, but also for researchers who consulted with the original author (<https://osf.io/8ccnw/>). The authors of the TMT have defended themselves against this criticism: Arman Chatard/Gilad Hirschberger/Tom Pyszczynski, “A Word of Caution about Many Labs 4: If You Fail to Follow Your Preregistered Plan, You May Fail to Find a Real Effect”, 2020 (<https://psyarxiv.com/ejubn/> – accessed 12th November 2021)

justice to the differences [between] criticism of Israel motivated by anti-Semitism and other attitudes critical of Israel, these studies are only to a limited extent informative [...].”¹⁸²

In contrast to the research presented so far, the research group around Kempf focused on positioning around the Israeli-Palestinian conflict using a conflict-theory perspective. Though it cannot be ruled out that criticism of Israeli policy may represent a medium for the articulation of antisemitic attitudes in a politically and socially acceptable manner, Kempf has suggested that “from a conflict-theoretical perspective we must assume that criticism of Israel could also derive from a variety of other sources”.¹⁸³ According to conflict theory, any escalating conflict will eventually reach a point at which the parties to the conflict will each seek out supporters and at the same time will try to inflict a loss of face on their opponent. Each side uses the means of demonization and delegitimization of their opponent and employs double standards.¹⁸⁴

In terms of attitudes toward this conflict, Kempf distinguishes between people with a War Frame and with a Peace Frame:

Table 1: Patterns of positioning toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict¹⁸⁵

	Pro Israel	Neutral	Pro Palestine
War Frame	Uncritical support of the Israeli policy, delegitimation of the Palestinians and justification of Israeli		Criticism of Israeli policy, delegitimation of Israelis and justification of Palestinian violence

¹⁸² Wilhelm Kempf, “Israel-criticism and modern anti-Semitism”, *Diskussionsbeiträge der Projektgruppe Friedensforschung Konstanz* no. 62 (2009), p. 2 (www.regener-online.de). See also Section 3.4 on “The limited usability of questionnaire scores”.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

¹⁸⁴ Wilhelm Kempf, “Antisemitismus und Israelkritik”, in: *Diskussionsbeiträge der Projektgruppe Friedensforschung Konstanz* no. 79 (2017), p.1 (www.regener-online.de – accessed 12th November 2021). In a critical turn against the “3-D test” to identify Israel-related antisemitism, Kempf emphasizes that demonization, delegitimization of one’s adversary, and double standards *are not features specific* to antisemitic criticism of Israel, but are used in *every* escalated conflict by the hardliners on *both sides*, most of whom do not realize that they themselves are using double standards. “Whether the delegitimization and demonization of Israel is actually directed against ‘the Jews’ or (only) against ‘Zionism’ can only ultimately be ascertained from which patterns it shares in common with other antisemitic and/or anti-Zionist tropes” (p. 2).

¹⁸⁵ Kempf, “Israel-criticism and modern anti-Semitism”, p. 4, table 2.

	violence		
Peace Frame	Criticism of both sides' policy, accentuation of the vital needs of the Israelis and condemnation of violence from both sides	Criticism of both sides' policy, accentuation of the vital needs of both societies and condemnation of violence from both sides	Criticism of both sides' policy, accentuation of the vital needs of the Palestinians and condemnation of violence from both sides

Kempf, "Israel-criticism and modern anti-Semitism", p. 4, table 2.

While only one of these patterns is uncritical of Israel, Kempf insists that none of the critical positions can be considered antisemitic per se.

For Germans as well as other Europeans, positioning in the Middle East conflict may be motivated by support for the victims of National Socialism and/or support for global human rights. The former motivation implies "a tendency toward unconditional solidarity with Israeli policy and a weakening of the Peace Frame", the latter implies "a tendency to refrain from supporting at least some aspects of Israeli policy, and includes expressing solidarity with the Israeli peace movement and at least a certain degree of empathy with the Palestinian side".¹⁸⁶

Kempf substantiates his criticisms of previous research by analyzing eight items widely used in studies to record anti-Israel attitudes, identifying the different motives that may lead to approval or rejection of the questions, so that the items are ultimately shown to not be reliable indicators as to motivations for Israel-critical statements.¹⁸⁷ Kempf points to the limitations of questionnaire scores, given the multivalency of the answers to questionnaire items, which prevent them from having a clear meaning. Therefore, Kempf advocates for what is known as Latent Class Analysis, through which response patterns can be identified. According to this approach, it is crucial to ascertain which worldview critical attitudes toward Israel are embedded in.¹⁸⁸

¹⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 3.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 5f.

¹⁸⁸ On the methodology, see Wilhelm Kempf, "Anti-Semitism and criticism of Israel: Methodology and results of the ASCI survey", in: *conflict and communication* 14/1 (2016), pp. 1–20. Here Kempf discusses the limited use of factor analysis and correlation studies in attitude measurement (p. 3f). Latent Class Analysis (LCA) or Latent Structure Analysis "is a statistical procedure that can be used to classify individuals into homogeneous subgroups ('latent classes'). The starting point for classification is the observed response patterns of individuals across a series of categorical (nominal or ordinal) test or questionnaire items [...] In an LCA, correlations between items are explained by the presence of a priori unknown subpopulations (latent classes). In other words,

Therefore, analysis of the connection between antisemitism and criticism of Israel must consider a number of points:¹⁸⁹

- 1) Antisemitism today has a number of different expressions. In addition to *manifest or classical antisemitism* and *secondary antisemitism*, already introduced by Heyder et al., Kempf refers to *latent antisemitism*, which seeks to avoid the subject of Jews in reaction to the communication taboo on antisemitic resentment. However, he assumes that these manifestations are more or less interchangeable indicators of antisemitism.
- 2) It is necessary to consider the possibility that a rejection of Israeli policies is not based solely on reservations about Jews or Israelis or Palestinians or Arabs; it can also result from knowledge about the conflict, from emotional proximity to one of the parties to the conflict, or from political orientations such as pacifism and/or a human rights orientation.
- 3) One must distinguish between prejudices and the *interpretive framework* by which one understands the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Whether someone unconditionally supports one of the two sides or whether one argues – due to a neutral attitude or solidarity with both sides – for a balanced approach to both parties to the conflict (see Table 7), Kempf emphasizes that in either case the frames are ambivalent, since
They promise security and simultaneously create insecurity: (1) the war frame offers security because tried-and-true action patterns can be continued, but also poses the risk of continuing violence. (2) The peace frame also offers security, because it promises an end to violence, but at the same time it creates insecurity, because new behavioral patterns must be tried whose efficacy is still uncertain.¹⁹⁰
- 4) One must take into account that the lessons of Auschwitz *are not clear*. One can conclude that the need is for advocacy for the immediate victims of National Socialism, which results in a tendency toward *solidarity with Israel*. But one can also conclude that the need is for advocacy for universal human rights, which leads in turn to a *distancing from Israeli policy* and, to a certain extent, *empathy* with the Palestinians.

the interindividual differences in response patterns observed for a set of items are explained by the membership of latent classes with class-specific response profiles” (Christian Geiser, *Datenanalyse mit Mplus. Eine anwendungsorientierte Einführung*, Wiesbaden 2010, p. 235).

¹⁸⁹ Kempf, “Antisemitismus und Israelkritik”, p. 3.

¹⁹⁰ Kempf, “Anti-Semitism and criticism of Israel”, p. 2.

The questionnaire for Kempf's study, the "Anti-Semitism and Criticism of Israel (ASCI) survey" of 2010,¹⁹¹ covers four dimensions: manifest antisemitism, secondary antisemitism, latent antisemitism, and anti-Zionism. Most of these dimensions are subdivided into further subscales consisting of 3–4 items. The manifest antisemitism dimension includes the subscales "Dislike of Jews" (MA1), "Conspiracy myth" (MA2), and "Exclusion of Jews" (MA3); the secondary antisemitism dimension includes the subscales "Closing the books" (SA1), "Defense against guilt" (SA2),¹⁹² and "Perpetrator-victim reversal" (SA3); the latent antisemitism dimension contains only one subscale, "Avoiding to speak about Jews" (LA); Anti-Zionism contains the subscales "Generalizing criticism of Israel" (AZ1) and "Political anti-Zionism" (AZ2).¹⁹³

Manifest anti-Semitism¹⁹⁴

Dislike of Jews

Jews are somehow all the same.

There is something simply idiosyncratic about the Jews, and they don't fit in with us very well.

It is better to have nothing to do with Jews.

Conspiracy Myth

There is a Jewish network that has a decisive influence on political and economic processes in the world.

¹⁹¹ For the objectives, the questionnaire design, the preparatory pilot study, and the description of the study sample, see: Wilhelm Kempf, *Israelkritik zwischen Antisemitismus und Menschenrechtsidee. Eine Spurensuche*, Berlin 2015, p. 10f. The overall sample consisted of three subsamples: a study of $n = 996$, which is representative for Germany, with half from West Germany and half from East Germany; a subsample of $n = 243$ younger respondents (under 30) with a high level of education; and $n = 464$ of more or less active critics of Israel, selected according to the snowball principle (p. 107). For the analysis of some subscales it was possible to include the data from three experimental studies, so that all in all the actual sample size varied between 1,702 and 2,677.

¹⁹² The scale SA2 – defense against guilt – cannot be subsumed under the antisemitic attitude dimension because of psychometric deficiencies (Kempf, *Israelkritik zwischen Antisemitismus und Menschenrechtsidee*, p. 152f).

¹⁹³ Ibid., p. 121f, table 2.1.1.

¹⁹⁴ For the list of the following subscales, see Kempf, "Anti-Semitism and criticism of Israel", p. 8.

An important goal of the Jews is to safeguard their dominant position in the world.

The Jews have too much influence in the world.

Exclusion of Jews

One shouldn't engage in any trade and commerce with Jews.

Important positions in the state and economy should (better) not be held by Jews.

Jews should not get involved where they are not wanted.

Secondary anti-Semitism

Closing the books on the past

Decades after the end of the war, we shouldn't talk so much about the persecution of Jews anymore, but rather finally close the books on the past.

We should ultimately put an end to all the talk about our guilt vis-a-vis the Jews.

The German people have a particular responsibility vis-à-vis the Jews (negative).

Defense against guilt

Without the help of the population, Hitler could not have started the persecution of the Jews (negative).

If the Jews had defended themselves more energetically under Hitler, not as many would have perished.

People talk only about the persecution of the Jews. No one ever talks about how much the Germans suffered.

Perpetrator-victim reversal

The Jews have only themselves to blame that people don't like them.

Many Jews exploit the Holocaust today.

The way the Jews behaved, it is easy to understand why they were persecuted.

The Jews are unforgiving and harm Germany when they point a finger at the Holocaust again and again.

Latent anti-Semitism

Avoiding to speak about Jews

The whole topic of the “Jews” is somehow unpleasant for me.

It would be better not to talk about the Jews.

You cannot say what you really think about the Jews.

Anti-Zionism

Generalizing criticism of Israel

The Holocaust is a welcome means for the Jews to justify Israel’s policies.

Without the worldwide power of Jewry Israel could not so easily disregard international law.

We should not let ourselves continue to be pressured by the Jews to let Israel’s Palestinian policies go unchallenged.

Political anti-Zionism

Zionism has made the victims of yesterday into the perpetrators of today.

The goal of Zionism has always been to expel the Palestinians and take over their land.

Zionism is essentially a variety of racism.

The participants in the study responded to a 5-point Likert scale (1–5) indicating whether they regarded the statements as mere prejudice or as a defensible opinion.¹⁹⁵ The scale established a range as follows: prejudice (1); more of a prejudice (2); partly both (3); moderately justified (4); justified (5). The scale values 1.0 to 2.0 are regarded as a strong rejection of the statement; greater than 2.0 and up to 2.7 as rejection; 2.8 to 3.3 as cautious approval; greater than 3.3 and less than 4.0 as approval; 4.0 to 5.0 as strong agreement.¹⁹⁶ The mean of the representative quota sample varies significantly for the various subscales; i.e., some dimensions of antisemitism and anti-Zionism are considered to be more significant as an expression of prejudice than others. The mean values are:

Subscales	Mean Values	Standard Deviation
MA1	M = 1.81	SD 0.898
MA2	M = 2.43	SD 0.837
MA3	M = 1.97	SD 0.798
SA1	M = 3.14	SD 0.926
SA2	M = 2.26	SD 0.360
SA3	M = 2.28	SD 0.849
LA	M = 2.17	SD 0.705
AZ1	M = 2.89	SD 0.868
AZ2	M = 2.79	SD 0.828

In addition, however, a number of other scales were also developed: three subscales for measuring anti-Palestinian and Islamophobic resentment, a scale for human rights orientation, three scales for reconstructing the mental models used by respondents to explain the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (position on the conflict, emotional proximity to the conflict, and

¹⁹⁵ Since the middle category “partly both” implies that the statement in question is viewed as a partly legitimate or defensible opinion, Kempf counted only scale values up to 2.7 as a rejection of the statement, while values between 2.7 and 3.2 are seen as indicative of an antisemitic or anti-Zionist tendency (Kempf, “Anti-Semitism and criticism of Israel”, p. 9).

¹⁹⁶ Kempf, *Israelkritik zwischen Antisemitismus und Menschenrechtsidee*, p. 106.

sensitivity to the ambivalence of war and peace), and a test measuring knowledge of the Middle East conflict.¹⁹⁷

According to Kempf, it can be assumed that the three dimensions of antisemitism (manifest, secondary, and exclusionary antisemitism) ultimately share the same stance toward “the Jews” and thus represent the same attitudinal dimension. This is not the case for anti-Zionist attitudes, which one can have because of an antisemitic attitude but which can also be directed against various policies for reasons other than antisemitism.¹⁹⁸


A look at the mean values shows that anti-Zionist attitudes (2.89 and 2.79) are more widespread than antisemitic ones – with the exception of the secondary antisemitic attitude to finally close the books on the past. The Second Order Latent Class Analysis shows that the two anti-Zionism scales (AZ1 and AZ2) display a different ranking than the antisemitism scales; therefore, Kempf concludes that a subsumption of anti-Zionism as a manifestation of antisemitism is not possible and that one must assume, as a consequence, that while the two do indeed correlate with each other, they represent *different* attitudinal dimensions. Antisemitic and anti-Zionist attitudes appear in combination with one another at the extremes, so that strongly antisemitic interviewees are also heavily anti-Zionist (Class 6), and, conversely, a strong rejection of antisemitism is associated with strong rejection of anti-Zionism (Classes 1 and 4), but there is no linear relationship. Meanwhile, a trend reversal takes place in the middle range (Classes 5 and 2), as anti-Zionist attitudes become more pronounced the more respondents reject antisemitic prejudices.¹⁹⁹

Figure 1: The relation between antisemitic and anti-Zionist attitudes – subscale profiles

¹⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 104. As far as knowledge about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is concerned, only 17% of Germans rate their knowledge as good or very good, another 38% as moderate, and 45% as low or very low. Also, 17% said that the conflict was slightly or very emotional to them, 46% only slightly, and 15% not at all (ibid., p. 52).

¹⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 119f.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 153.



Reprinted from: Kempf, "Israelkritik zwischen Antisemitismus und Menschenrechtsidee", p. 152, figure 2.5.1.

MA1 = Dislike of Jews; MA3 = Exclusion of Jews; SA3 = Perpetrator victim reversal; AZ1 = Generalized criticism of Israel; MA2 = Conspiracy myth; SA1 = Closing the books; LA = Avoiding to speak about Jews; AZ2 = Political anti-Zionism

The factor analysis (a rotated Principal Component Analysis) confirms the finding that antisemitism and anti-Zionism represent two different attitudinal dimensions and identifies two factors with eigenvalues greater than one, which explain 62.25% of the variance.

Table 2: Matrix of VARIMAX-rotated factor loadings

	Factor

Subscales	1	2
MA1 Dislike of Jews	0.780	0.194
SA3 Perpetrator-victim reversal	0.757	0.404
MA3 Exclusion of Jews	0.756	0.286
SA1 Closing the books	0.683	0.229
LA Avoiding to speak about Jews	0.676	0.312
SA2 Defence against guilt	0.628	-0.172
MA2 Conspiracy myth	0.622	0.511
AZ1 Generalizing criticism of Israel	0.240	0.809
AZ2 Political anti-Zionism	0.084	0.839

Only the subscale MA2 (Conspiracy myth) also shows significant loading on factor 2 (explaining 26.1% of the variance). It can be concluded that some interviewees regard the “worldwide power” of Judaism not as a prejudice but as an explanation for Israel’s ability to defy international law with impunity.²⁰⁰

The ASCI study confirms a previous finding that attitudes toward the Middle East conflict are more political than a simple matter of sympathy or antipathy toward Jews or Palestinians.²⁰¹ Respondents are more likely to agree with anti-Israel prejudices when these contain a clear political connotation. Agreement decreases when the resentments against Israel become more generalized and exaggerated. That attitudes toward the Middle East conflict are strongly influenced by politics is confirmed by the prevalence of anti-Palestinian resentment. Palestinians are seen as backward and primitive people, as terrorists and as ill-suited for democracy. The study finds that antisemitic and anti-Israel prejudice as well as anti-Palestinian prejudice are all most widespread among older (55+), less educated, and more right-wing respondents.²⁰² However, Kempf emphasizes that the analysis of the demographic differences presents a mixed picture: anti-Israel resentment does not seem to constitute a homogeneous attitude dimension but instead results from a mixture of antisemitic and anti-

²⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 155. In the Swiss study the opinion about “Jewish world domination” also loads on two factors: anti-Jewish and anti-Israel – see above, Section 6, Table 1.

²⁰¹ Bergmann, “Is there ‘New European Antisemitism’?”

²⁰² Kempf, *Israelkritik zwischen Antisemitismus und Menschenrechtsidee*, p. 49.

Zionist attitudes, on the one hand, and political motives, on the other.²⁰³ Sympathy/Antipathy toward Israel and the Palestinians are positively correlated. More than half of the respondents harbor both anti-Israel and anti-Palestinian resentments, while another third rejects such resentments toward either group. The declared sympathies of the German respondents in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict show a pattern similar to that in Great Britain and Norway (see below): 8% side with the Israelis, 15% with the Palestinians, while the overwhelming majority either feels solidarity with both sides (28%) or with neither (47%). The results of the ASCI survey “show that the perception of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in Germany is rather controversial”.²⁰⁴ There is a certain bias in favor of the Palestinian side, but both pro-Palestinian and pro-Israel hardliners are in the minority. The majority seeks a balanced approach to both parties to the conflict, but they only see the hopeful side of a peace solution without being attuned to the dangers of changing policies or of continuing with the status quo. Kempf identifies four typical patterns of criticism and of support for Israeli policies toward the Palestinians, in which different attitudes and positions connect with each other: 1) position on the Middle East conflict; 2) related ambiguous, antisemitic, anti-Zionist, and anti-Israel ideas; 3) anti-Palestinian and Islamophobic attitudes; 4) pacifism, moral detachment, and a human rights orientation; 5) emotional proximity to the conflict; 6) knowledge about the conflict.²⁰⁵

- 1) The *supporters of Israeli policy* can be further divided into two subgroups: one consists of pro-Israel hardliners, while the other smaller group positions itself less radically in support of Israeli policy. Both groups, but especially members of the radical group, share a tendency to harbor resentments against Palestinians and Muslims, and both support the secondary-antisemitic demand to “close the books”. Therefore, Kempf wonders how reliable this support for Israel is or whether it is really just a matter of wanting to look good in the eyes of the world.
- 2) Another group shows a *latent antisemitic aversion to criticizing Israel* and abstains from taking positions on the Middle East conflict, but tends to hold negative attitudes toward Palestinians and Muslims as well antisemitic, anti-Zionist, and anti-Israel attitudes.
- 3) The study reveals that there are two kinds of criticism of Israel, resulting from different motivational systems. Those German Israel-critics who side with the Palestin-

²⁰³ Ibid.

²⁰⁴ Kempf, “Antisemitismus und Israelkritik”, p. 5.

²⁰⁵ Ibid.

ians can be divided into two subgroups: *Antisemitic critics of Israel*, who share strong to very strong antisemitic prejudices, are politically more likely to be center-right or extreme-right, and are less likely to vote for Die Linke or the Greens. The more radical they are in favor of the Palestinians, the less they are informed about the Middle East conflict, the less their emotional proximity to the conflict. The lower their pacifist attitudes, the more inconsistent their human rights orientation, and the less they side with the victims of human rights violations. These respondents are more generally prejudiced and display anti-Muslim and anti-Palestinian resentments. Therefore, Kempf concludes that the antisemitic dimension of their hostile attitude toward Israel is not so much a result of an attitude directed specifically against Jews as of a comprehensive racism, which is also directed against Muslims.²⁰⁶ *Pro-human rights critics of Israel* reject antisemitic prejudices. They are better informed about the Middle East conflict (even better than supporters of Israel's policies) and have a greater emotional proximity to the conflict. They have strong pacifist attitudes, a more consistent human rights orientation as compared with the antisemitic critics of Israel, and they stand up more strongly for the victims of human rights violations.²⁰⁷

These results of the population survey are confirmed by the findings of the subsample of relatively active critics of Israel's policy. Among the 464 Israel critics, of whom only 2% display antisemitic resentments, Kempf identified two radical subgroups (60% of the online sample) that side with the Palestinians completely. One of these harbors no antisemitic prejudice at all (38%), while the other somewhat smaller subgroup (22%) tends to transfer their negative attitudes regarding Israel onto Jews and tends to believe in a Jewish world conspiracy. The latter group was less well informed about the Middle East conflict, displayed less of a human rights orientation, and was less likely to stand up for victims of human rights violations. Kempf estimated the radical pro-human rights critics of Israel (hardliners) at 2% of the German population.²⁰⁸ They are found only on the radical political Left.

The research conducted by Kempf and his collaborators goes beyond the usual correlation analyses of the connection between antisemitism and criticism of Israel by examining attitudes to the Middle East conflict in much greater detail, while in many of the other studies

²⁰⁶ Kempf, "Antisemitismus und Israelkritik", p. 5f.

²⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 6.

²⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 82.

discussed it remains largely out of sight. This research allows us to draw a very detailed picture of the existing attitudinal patterns and mental models that we find in the (German) population, with all their ambivalences. Only the essential arguments and results of this broad-based research project could be presented here, the various facets and detailed accounts of which having been presented by Kempf and his colleagues in a number of essays.

9. Left-wing anti-Israel Antisemitism as Anti-Judaism (2012)

In 2011, there was a discussion in Germany about antisemitism in the Die Linke party (the Left Party),²⁰⁹ which was triggered by an essay written by the sociologist Samuel Salzborn and the historian Sebastian Voigt. The two accused elements within the party of a pronounced anti-Zionist antisemitism.²¹⁰ The essay, which was first published in the German newspaper *Frankfurter Rundschau* (it later appeared somewhat revised in the *Zeitschrift für Politik*), led to a debate in the German Bundestag at the request of the conservative Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) and the liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP). A public controversy ensued, as the sociologist Peter Ullrich and the political scientist Alban Werner criticized the Voigt/Salzborn article as “methodologically flawed” and “inconsistent” in an essay that also appeared in the *Zeitschrift für Politik*. Ullrich and Werner referred to specific party resolutions that explicitly opposed anti-Zionist antisemitism.²¹¹ Maximilian Elias Imhoff took this controversy as an occasion to conduct an empirical study, since neither of the two essays could base their arguments on data indicating a basis for anti-Zionist antisemitism among party members as a whole.²¹² The study by Imhoff is the first of its kind and is intended to lay the foundation for a future quantitative survey on antisemitism in Die Linke, by demonstrating that antisemitism exists among (radical) leftists and by examining its

²⁰⁹ The Die Linke (The Left) party was formed in 2007 from a merger of the SPD (Social-Democratic Party) splinter WASG (Electoral Alternative for Labour and Social Justice) and the Die Linkspartei.PDS (The Left Party.Party of Democratic Socialism), which in turn had emerged from the successor party to the SED (Socialist Unity Party of Germany), the PDS (Party of Democratic Socialism), in June 2005. Die Linke describes itself as a democratic socialist party.

²¹⁰ Samuel Salzborn/Sebastian Voigt, “Antisemiten als Koalitionspartner? Die Linkspartei zwischen antizionistischem Antisemitismus und dem Streben nach Regierungsfähigkeit”, in: *Zeitschrift für Politik* 58/3 (2011), pp. 290–309.

²¹¹ Peter Ullrich/Alban Werner, “Ist DIE LINKE antisemitisch? Über Grauzonen der „Israelkritik“ und ihre Kritiker”, in: *Zeitschrift für Politik* 58/4 (2011), pp. 424–441.

²¹² Maximilian Elias Imhoff, “Linker antiisraelischer Antisemitismus als Antijudaismus”, in: *Zeitschrift für Politik* 59/2 (2012), pp. 144–167.

transmission in the left milieu.²¹³ Going forward, the causes of left-wing antisemitism are to be examined and corresponding items proposed for its detection; as such, what we have here is an exploratory study. The study, in contrast to the other works presented in this article, is thus concerned solely with the connection between antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes in a very specific group; namely, among a politically far-left group of people.

Imhoff suggests that one essential characteristic of left-wing anti-Israel resentment is that there is a lack of awareness among leftists that they are hostile toward Jews and not only toward Israel. Their antisemitism is, in other words, considered to be an unintentional attitude. Accordingly, Imhoff assumes that it is primarily latent and expressed in coded language.²¹⁴ He defines criticism of Israel as antisemitic when negative attributes imputed to Jews and Judaism are imputed to Israel, a criterion also used in the EUMC's "Working Definition of Antisemitism". In other words, if Israel, Israelis, or Zionism are characterized using the same negative ascriptions that are typically applied to Jews in antisemitism, these are to be regarded as ciphers or placeholders for antisemitism and can be categorized as anti-Israel antisemitism. Given this definition, Imhoff asks the following two basic research questions:

- 1) Does criticism of Israel make use of antisemitic resentments?
- 2) Is antisemitic criticism of Israel transferred onto Jews in Germany?

Imhoff then presents eleven hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: Antisemitic criticism of Israel is related to anti-Jewish statements.

According to Imhoff, in order to confirm this hypothesis, it must be proven that Die Linke's antisemitism is "embedded in a leftist ideology". Therefore, he examines a left milieu rather than selecting a sample of party members.

Hypothesis 2: Members of Die Linke are no different from other leftists in their inclination to antisemitism. If this hypothesis is correct, results for the broader Left can be extrapolated onto Die Linke.

²¹³ This, despite the fact that a number of studies have already shown that antisemitic attitudes also exist among radical-left respondents (see Bergmann/Erb, *Anti-Semitism in Germany*; Heyder et al., "Israelkritik oder Antisemitismus?").

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 145. But this assumption is in my view not entirely logical, as the use of ciphers is a deliberate approach to avoid a direct negative statement, which might meet with moral rejection, in favor of an allusion. So the question is whether there can be an unintentional use of ciphers.

In their essay, Salzborn and Voigt stated that opposition to the State of Israel stems from the anti-imperialism of the Left, standing with the oppressed Palestinians against Israel, which is regarded as a colonial power.²¹⁵ The question now is whether this partisanship is an expression of a commitment to justice and solidarity with the Palestinians or whether it is only a pretext for openly expressing antisemitic attitudes. Imhoff seeks to verify the “authenticity” of this commitment to justice and solidarity by examining the pacifist attitude of the Left, to see whether it (only) cares about the Palestinian victims while being indifferent to the Israeli victims in the conflict. From this, he derives the following research questions: “Which leftist milieu tends to be antisemitic? How do leftists feel about terrorist attacks?”

Some of Imhoff’s other hypotheses:

Hypothesis 3: Among leftists, anti-Zionists in particular tend to be antisemitic.

Hypothesis 4: Among leftists, anti-imperialists in particular are prone to antisemitism.

Hypothesis 5: Among leftists, pacifists in particular are inclined toward antisemitism.

Hypothesis 6: Left-wing pacifists are more tolerant of terrorist attacks than the rest of the Left.²¹⁶

Hypothesis 7: Palestine solidarity is related to antisemitism.

Based on the thesis of Salzborn and Voigt, that opposition to the State of Israel stems from the Left’s anti-imperialism, Imhoff also assumes that antisemitism is probably to be found among orthodox communists, since Leninism is assumed to be the source of left-wing ideas about theories of imperialism and to also be “structurally antisemitic”; i.e., to have thought structures that are also found in antisemitism (a Manichaean worldview, a personalized critique of capitalism, etc.). From this he derives the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 8: Antisemitism is related to Leninism, Maoism, and Trotskyism.

Hypothesis 9: Antisemitism is connected to a backward-looking critique of capitalism.

²¹⁵ Salzborn/Voigt, “Antisemiten als Koalitionspartner?” p. 298.

²¹⁶ This hypothesis is not explained in detail, although at first sight it seems rather illogical. Why should people who reject violence more often than those who do not be also more likely to approve of it? In other words, an explanation would have been necessary here.

Hypothesis 10: Antisemitism is connected to a personalized critique of capitalism.

Since Leninism and anti-imperialism emphasize the right of peoples to self-determination,²¹⁷ if one wants to deny Jews the right to a state of their own then one must deny that Jews constitute a people.²¹⁸ Israel would then be defined as an artificial entity (*ein Gebilde*) without a “people of the state”. Such thinking ignores the fact that nations and national identities are social constructions and not naturally given communities. Viewing Israel as a state without a “proper state people” may therefore be seen an expression of essentialist ethnic thinking (*völkisches Denken*).²¹⁹

The following hypotheses are derived from this:

Hypothesis 11a: Antisemitism is related to a “völkish” way of thinking.²²⁰

Hypothesis 11b: The Left, which supports the right to self-determination for peoples, considers Israel and the Israeli nation to be an artificial entity.²²¹

When it comes to conducting surveys of radical leftists, there is the issue of getting a suitable sample. Imhoff chose the method of standardized online surveys. The survey was freely accessible to anyone with the link to a certain web address (<http://www.unipark.info>).²²² Since in Germany one has to differentiate between a pro-Palestinian and Israel-critical camp within the Left and an Israel-solidarity tendency (the *Antideutschen*/anti-Germans), Imhoff publicized his survey by placing an advertisement once in a Palestine-solidarity newspaper (*junge Welt*) and once in the anti-German media (*Jungle World* and *konkret*) as well as in the Internet Studivz/Meinsz groups. The link, accompanied by a text presenting the study, was

²¹⁷ W.I. Lenin, “Die sozialistische Revolution und das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Völker – Thesen. Januar-Februar 1916”, in: W. I. Lenin, *Werke*, 22, translated into German from the fourth Russian edition. The German edition was published by the Institute for Marxism-Leninism of the Central Committee of the SED, Berlin 1960, pp. 144–150; Boris Meissner, “Lenin und das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Völker”, in: *Osteuropa* 20/4 (1970), pp. 245–261.

²¹⁸ Imhoff draws here on the work of Robert Bösch, “‘Unheimliche Verwandtschaft’: Anmerkungen zum Verhältnis von Marxismus-Leninismus zum Antisemitismus”, in: *Krisis* 16/17 (1995), pp. 161–175.

²¹⁹ Imhoff, “Linker antiisraelischer Antisemitismus”, p. 149.

²²⁰ The attribution of a “völkish” way of thinking to the Left is somewhat surprising, since their ideological core ideas tend to include a critical view of “*Volk*” (people) and nation, which is why the Left has also historically been opposed to Zionism as a national movement.

²²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 147–149.

²²² Repeat participation was only inadmissible if using the same computer (Imhoff, “Linker antiisraelischer Antisemitismus”, p. 149). Unipark provides software for online surveys for students and universities; it is the academic program of Questback, one of the leading software providers for market research and experience management.

also disseminated via email using snowball sampling. In addition, the advertisement was sent to left-wing activists with the request to distribute it further. Imhoff acknowledged that this meant that the exact distribution of the link could no longer be traced. What's more, the link went out via the Münster alternativ e-mail listserv, which is used by leftists of all stripes, as well as some others.²²³

In this way, a sample of 218 completed questionnaires came together, 187 of them identified as having been answered by politically left-wing persons.²²⁴ This included 64 readers of *junge Welt*, 50 of *konkret*, and 71 of *Jungle World*.²²⁵ The sample is characterized by a clear predominance of male and younger respondents: 71% are male and 75% are younger than 31 years of age.²²⁶ This imbalance is not interpreted, although research on antisemitism shows that men are slightly more likely to have antisemitic attitudes than women, while younger people are less likely to have antisemitic attitudes than older people. On the other hand, when it comes to political-ideological questions, such as the Middle East conflict, younger and male persons are more likely to hold radical views than older persons and women. This may have an influence on the correlations analyzed here.

Operationalization

²²³ “An Internet sample is generally not a random selection, but (almost) always a self-selected sample. The question that arises here in order to at least begin to be able to assess the quality of the sample is now whether between the participants and non-participants, systematic differences exist.” This is not possible in this kind of survey via the Internet, as the population is virtually unknown. Since an active sampling does not take place, “the systematic failure mechanisms must be assumed. No information is available about the nonrespondents” (W. Bandilla/P. Hauptmanns, “Internetbasierte Umfragen als Datenerhebungstechnik für die empirische Sozialforschung?” *ZUMA Nachrichten*, 22/43 [1998], pp. 36–53, here pp. 40 and 42; <https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-208229>). In fact – with the advertising banners, links, etc. – it may be that Imhoff mainly attracted those leftists who were already particularly concerned with the subject of Israel.

²²⁴ Imhoff used the following criteria to distinguish the leftists from the non-leftists among the 218 respondents: Those who fully agree with the statements “My political goal is to create a classless society” and “It is not enough to reform capitalism, it must be overcome” and those who call themselves “communists” or “anarchists” were classified as “left”. If the interviewees had chosen values 5, 6, or 7 on the 7-point scale that capitalism had to be overcome but had not agreed with the question of a classless society, they were subsequently asked whether they classified themselves as “anti-fascists”, “anti-nationalists”, or “anti-German” in order to rule out their being political right-wingers (Imhoff, “Linker antiisraelischer Antisemitismus”, p. 154).

²²⁵ Imhoff, “Linker antiisraelischer Antisemitismus”, p. 150.

²²⁶ At 71% ($n = 132$), male participants in the survey are clearly overrepresented compared with female respondents (27%; $n = 50$), while 5 persons (3%) refused to provide information about their gender. The age of the interviewees was between 16 and 70 years, with the younger age groups clearly overrepresented: 25% were under 23 years of age; 25% were 24–27, and only 25% over 31 years old. As Imhoff's figures only add up to 75%, it can be assumed that the missing 28–30 years old category accounts for 25%. This means that the age structure of the sample differs significantly from the age structure of the Die Linke party, so that the claim that the results can be transferred to it appears questionable.

The topic Jews and Israel consists of 43 items,²²⁷ which are to be answered on a 7-step Likert-scale ranging from “totally agree” (1) to “totally disagree” (7), whereby (4) forms a neutral center.

From these 43 items, 13 were selected as particularly “hard” items, which were combined to form an antisemitism score.²²⁸ These 13 items are supposed to represent nine important dimensions of antisemitism,²²⁹ but they are formulated in such a way that they do not deal with “Jews” but with “Israel”; i.e., these items are supposed to directly measure anti-Israel antisemitism by using typical antisemitic statements, in which the word “Israel” is used instead of the word “Jews”. In fact, however, Imhoff does not proceed in this way, because typical anti-Jewish prejudices are only used for a few items. In most cases the items relate solely to Israel and its policies.

The nine dimensions of antisemitism and their respective items are:²³⁰

1. *Construct. Compared with other states, is Israel accused of being a construct? Are the Jews not recognized as a nation?*

The Jews are not a real nation, so the idea of a Jewish nation state is actually absurd.

Israel is an artificial construct in comparison with other states.

2. *Traditional metaphor: Is Israel perceived as particularly cruel?*

An eye for an eye, a tooth and a tooth, it’s an Old Testament call for revenge, which Israel seems to have made into a principle of action for itself today.

²²⁷ According to Imhoff, the questionnaire includes 43 items, 35 of which are critical of Israel or Jews, and a further 7 items represent Israel positively (Imhoff, “Linker antiisraelischer Antisemitismus”, p. 156). This only adds up to 42 (!) items; a complete list of the 43 items is unfortunately not included in the article. In order to check how strongly the 43 items are related, Imhoff carried out a factor analysis (main component analysis – not published) with the result that all items load on only one decisive factor, which also explains 49% of the variance (40 items have a factor load of more than 0.5 or less than -0.5. The next factor explains only 4.84% of the variance and has only small factor loadings).

²²⁸ Cronbach’s alpha coefficient is 0.93, which means that the scale has a very high reliability (Imhoff, “Linker antiisraelischer Antisemitismus”, p. 150).

²²⁹ The author refers in part to the “Working Definition of Antisemitism” developed by the European Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia and adopted by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA); see: www.holocaustremembrance.com/de/node196. This definition is considered problematic by many researchers (see above, fn 27).

²³⁰ These 13 items have been selected from the 43 items in the survey for reasons of content rather than statistical criteria (Imhoff, “Linker antiisraelischer Antisemitismus”, p. 156). As the 43 items are not included in full, it is difficult to verify the selection. Imhoff stated that these 13 items were chosen because they were particularly strongly worded items.

3. Equation of victims and perpetrators. Is Israel's behavior compared to the crimes of National Socialism?

Norbert Blüm [former German Federal Minister for Labor and Social Affairs] spoke in 2002 of Israel's 'unrestrained war of annihilation' against the Palestinians. The wording may be very drastic, but in my opinion it expresses the truth.

It is shocking to note that the descendants of those who suffered so much at the hands of the Nazis are now inflicting the same suffering on the Palestinians.

With the blockade and closure of Gaza, the inhabitants of Gaza live there like the inhabitants of the Warsaw Ghetto during the Second World War.

4. Collective responsibility: Are the Israelis treated as a monolithic collectivity?

Most Israelis are not interested in what their army is doing to the Palestinians.²³¹

The Israelis are not interested in a peaceful solution to the Middle East conflict.

5. Media power: How is Jewish influence on the media landscape assessed?

Zionist lobby groups have too much influence in Germany on German media.

6. Political power: How powerful are pro-Israel organizations considered to be?

Zionist lobby groups have very great influence on US policy.²³²

7. Taboo: Is it taboo to criticize Israel?

Unfortunately, there are still unofficial bans on thinking that prevent people from expressing their opinion on the Middle East conflict in public.

²³¹ There is a difference here between the formulation of collective responsibility, according to which "the Israelis" are treated as a monolithic collectivity, and the item formulation that specifies "majority of" as opposed to "all Israelis", thereby not lumping them all in together. As such, whether this is the expression of a prejudice through over-generalisation or a possibly correct empirical assertion cannot be ascertained here.

²³² Later in this study, Imhoff over-interpreted the statement about the influence of Zionist groups on US foreign policy as a variant of the myth of the Jewish world conspiracy, but the influence referred to in the question is not described as "hidden" or "secret". Furthermore, the extent to which lobby groups support the interests of a state is an empirical question. There is a categorical difference between attributing to Jews, as a minority, a secret influence on state policies or global affairs and attributing this to political interest groups.

8. *Instrumentalization: Is Israel accused of instrumentalizing (German) history?*

Israel should not always remind the Germans of their past if it wants support from the German state.

9. *Assigning blame: Is it assumed that hatred of Jews is encouraged, especially by the behavior of Jews themselves?*

Israel's policy toward the Palestinians is the main cause of antisemitism in the world today.

On the scale (A-score) finally constructed by Imhoff, the respondents could achieve theoretically possible values between a minimum of 10 and a maximum of 70 points.²³³ As far as the cutoff points are concerned, he classifies those respondents who scored between 40 and 50 points in a “grey zone”, as they are not completely free of anti-Israel antisemitic resentment, while those who scored 50 points or more have an image of Israel that is marked by antisemitic resentment, which is why he classifies them as “anti-Israel antisemites”.

The procedure used by Imhoff, paralleling nine dimensions of antisemitic prejudice with prejudice against the State of Israel simply by replacing the term “Jew” with the term “Israel”,

²³³ Since some of the nine elements (dimensions) of antisemitism identified by Imhoff are measured by more than one item, one must first determine the value that the respondent gave on the 7-point scale for each individual item. If an element contains several items, these must first be added and the value obtained must be divided by the number of items related to the element. The values calculated for each of the nine elements are added and divided by the number of elements (i.e., 9), and the calculated value is then multiplied by 10. If a respondent had chosen the value 1 for all items on the 7-point scale (total rejection of antisemitic resentments) the A-Score would have achieved the value 10; if someone had always chosen the value 7 (total agreement with antisemitic resentments) they would have achieved the maximum value 70.

is not entirely unproblematic, as prejudice against a generally quite small and powerless minority is equated here with opinions about the actions of a state. While in some cases this is convincing (Table 1: items 7, 8, 11, 13), there are some items referring only to the policies of Israel or the behavior of Israelis (Table 1: items 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 12) that are not meaningful to ask in relation to Jews (who do not wage war, who do not have an army, who are not necessarily citizens of Israel, etc.). This is also partly true for questions 6 and 7, as it is not convincing to interpret positive answers to these items as expressions of resentment against Jews in general.²³⁴

Take point 4: whether all Jews are held responsible for the behavior of one or a group of Jews – as in the case of the ritual murder legend, for example – is by no means the same as whether the majority of citizens of a state are held responsible for its actions. In the case of Israel, the government has been elected by a majority of Israelis. It also makes a difference whether one is accusing Jewish (fellow) citizens of exerting too much influence on one's own country's media (5) or on the policies of the United States (6), or whether this is attributed to groups that lobby on behalf of another state.²³⁵

Table 1: A-score Items ($N = 187$)

²³⁴ It is difficult to understand how Imhoff comes up with the claim that this form of antisemitism is reminiscent of anti-Judaism, since in today's research on antisemitism this term primarily refers to a religiously based form of hostility towards Jews, which is present here only in item 7. Imhoff even uses the term anti-Judaism in the title of the study, although it is not otherwise defined or used there.

²³⁵ Such influence by lobby groups has been scientifically proven. See: John J. Mearsheimer/Stephen Walt, *The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy*, New York 2007; Alexandra Senfft, "Deutschland und Israel: Dynamik einer komplexen Beziehung", in: Wolfgang Benz (ed.) *Streitfall Antisemitismus. Anspruch auf Deutungsmacht und politische Interessen*, Berlin 2020, pp. 270–283.

	Item	mean value (SD)	agreement (n ≥ 5)	agreement (n ≥ 4)
1	Zionist lobby groups have very great influence on US policy.	4.06 (1.80)	43%	63%
2	Most Israelis are not interested in what their army is doing to the Palestinians.	3.70 (1.72)	34%	58%
3	The Israelis are not interested in a peaceful solution to the Middle East conflict.	3.68 (2.08)	40%	52%
4	Norbert Blum spoke in 2002 of Israel's 'unrestrained war of annihilation' against the Palestinians. The wording may be very drastic, but in my opinion, it expresses the truth.	3.16 (2.22)	35%	42%
5	It is shocking to note that the descendants of those who suffered so much at the hands of the Nazis are now inflicting the same suffering on the Palestinians.	3.07 (2.26)	30%	41%
6	Unfortunately, there are still unofficial bans on thinking that prevent people from expressing their opinion on the Middle East conflict in public.	3.04 (1.93)	26%	38%
7	An eye for an eye, a tooth and a tooth; it's an Old Testament call for revenge, which Israel seems to have made into a principle of action for itself today.	3.01 (2.05)	25%	45%
8	Israel should not always remind the Germans of their past if it wants support from the German state.	2.88 (1.97)	25%	39%
9	Zionist lobby groups have too much influence on German media.	2.82 (1.78)	20%	36%
10	With the blockade and closure of Gaza, the inhabitants of Gaza live there like the inhabitants of the Warsaw Ghetto during the Second World War.	2.80 (2.07)	22%	36%
11	The Jews are not a real nation, so the idea of a Jewish nation state is actually absurd.	2.43 (1.86)	13%	30%
12	Israel is an artificial construct in comparison with other states.	2.43 (1.91)	16%	31%
13	Israel's policy toward the Palestinians is the main cause of antisemitism in the world today.	2.41 (1.65)	14%	25%

Those who chose the values 5–7 on the 7-point answer scale agreed with the items with varying degrees of certainty. Those who chose the neutral value 4 neither agreed with the negative statements nor rejected them. In the right column, Imhoff has added up all those who did not reject the item (4–7). If we want to determine the value of only the “undecided” (4), this is the difference between the rightmost column and the column to its left.

Imhoff, “Linker antiisraelischer Antisemitismus”, p. 157, table 1.

With values between 10 and 66.7, the A-scores cover almost the entire range from 10 to 70. The mean value for the entire scale is 30.4 (with a standard deviation of 14.6). Overall, the mean value for the entire scale is still below the so-called grey zone according to the cutoff point (40) established by Imhoff. Nine percent of interviewees ($n = 35$) score values in the range of 40 to 49 and thus fall within the “grey zone”, meaning they do not completely separate their image of Israel from antisemitic resentment (which according to Imhoff’s wording is in fact anti-Israel antisemitism), while a further 12% ($n = 22$) score above the value of 50 and are therefore categorized by Imhoff as anti-Israel antisemites. Taken together, just under a third of the respondents (31%, $n = 57$) “have at least some problems in demarcating themselves from Israel-related antisemitism”.²³⁶

Items to test the hypotheses

In order to test the eleven hypotheses presented above, a subsequent section of the article uses further items suitable for testing.

To test hypothesis 1, Imhoff examined how anti-Israel antisemitism operationalized in the A-score correlates with the following four anti-Jewish statements:²³⁷

Evoking the horrors of the Holocaust, some Jews presume to act like the public’s moral conscience.

The fact that the Central Council of Jews in Germany intervenes publicly on so many issues often damages the reputation of the Jews.

The compensation paid to Jewish Holocaust survivors is too low. (recoded)

Do you believe that the Jews in Germany feel loyal to Israel’s interests? / Do you believe that the Jews in Germany feel loyal to the interests of Germany? (The two sub-questions were placed at different points in the questionnaire).

²³⁶ Imhoff, “Linker antiisraelischer Antisemitismus”, p. 158.

²³⁷ Ibid. This choice of items to measure antisemitism is problematic in several ways. Three of the items could be used to measure secondary antisemitism, two of which have a very similar thrust in addressing public interventions from the Jewish side. It is also problematic because a similar item – “Israel should not always remind the Germans of their past” – is also used in the A-score. On the other hand, items measuring “classical antisemitism” are absent. The two items that are supposed to measure antisemitism have not been formulated very convincingly – one does not refer to Jews in general but only to the behavior of “some Jews” (“By exhorting themselves to the horrors of the Holocaust, some Jews presumed in public to present a kind of moral conscience”) or of an organization like the Central Council (“The fact that the Central Council of Jews in Germany intervenes publicly on so many issues often damages the reputation of the Jews.”). To detect prejudice, however, one should ask generalized questions (“Jews” or “the Jews”), because there may indeed be examples of “some Jews” doing so.

In order to test hypothesis 1 – whether the anti-Israel antisemites identified by means of the A-score also harbor anti-Jewish prejudices (i.e., were antisemites) – Imhoff calculated the correlations of the A-score with four items that he had selected as indicators of anti-Jewish attitudes (see footnote 237 for critical objections). With the statement “Terror is acceptable”, Table 2 contains an item that actually pertains to the Middle East conflict (see hypothesis 3) and is therefore not suitable for measuring anti-Jewish attitudes.

Table 2: Anti-Jewish Items and Correlation with the A-Score ($N = 187$)

Item	mean value and SD	agreement $n \geq 5$ in %	agreement $n \geq 4$	correlation with A-Score
Through the admonishing remembrance of the horrors of the Holocaust, some Jews presume in public to represent a kind of moral conscience.	2.88 (1.80)	18% ($n = 34$)	35%	.775**
The fact that the Central Council of Jews in Germany intervenes publicly on so many issues often damages the reputation of the Jews. ²³⁸	2.83 (1.61)	13% ($n = 24$)	39%	.646**
Under the given circumstances, the terrorist attacks by the Palestinians are an acceptable means in order to defend oneself against Israel.	2.58 (1.70)	16% ($n = 30$)	16%	.585**
The compensation paid to Jewish Holocaust survivors is too low. (recoded)	2.24 (1,49)	4% ($n = 7$)	27%	.410**
Do you believe that the Jews in Germany feel loyal to Israel's interests? / Do you believe that the Jews in Germany feel loyal to the interests of Germany? (Difference between the two loyalty ratings) ²³⁹	-0.35 (1.69)	10% ²⁴⁰ ($n = 19$)	4%	.338**

Imhoff, "Linker antiisraelischer Antisemitismus", p. 158, table 3.** $p < 0.001$ (1-sided)

²³⁸ Imhoff interprets this to mean "that the anti-Israel Left apparently does not like to see Jews speaking as Jews or expressing themselves in relation to an (imaginary) Jewish community". The point here does not seem to me to be that Jews should not express themselves as Jews, but rather that it is a defense-against-guilt reaction, since some of the interviewees do not want to be reminded of the Holocaust, antisemitic incidents, etc. by Jewish individuals or by the Central Council of Jews in Germany. This can be interpreted as an expression of secondary antisemitism.

²³⁹ The answers to the item, which asks whether respondents think Jews feel more connected to the interests of Israel or the interests of Germany, are not interpreted convincingly in my opinion. If the respondents choose one of the two alternatives, this implies a factual assumption about the attitude of Jews in Germany. This in no way implies a normative statement in the sense of rejecting the alternative assumption of loyalty to Israel. Imhoff assumes that the respondents would feel themselves acquitted of antisemitism, if they did not include all Jews in their criticism of Israel. This implies that the leftists would judge the German Jews just as negatively as Israel if the former identified themselves with the latter's interests. But there is no evidence of this imputation in the surveys on antisemitism in Germany as far as we know.

²⁴⁰ In this case, the scale values were determined differently, they result here from the subtraction of two items. All those with a value greater than >1 (10%) thus include those 4% with scale values of $n = 4$ or $n > 4$, which are correspondingly high values.

The high correlations of the first two anti-Jewish items with high A-score values show that anti-Israel antisemitic beliefs are closely related to anti-Jewish statements ($r = .775$ and $r = .646$), while the correlations of the last two items with the A-score are less pronounced. Both items (too much compensation or questions of loyalty to Israel or Germany) increase only slightly with antisemitic criticism of Israel. The correlation of the A-score with the “terror” item is not surprising, given that it measures an opinion on the Middle East conflict and not an anti-Jewish attitude. Neither met with much approval. For all items in Table 2 the level of agreement is below 20% and the mean values plus standard deviation are below 5.

Imhoff considers hypothesis 1, that antisemitic criticism of Israel is related to antisemitism, to be confirmed. According to this hypothesis, 12% ($n = 22$) are anti-Israel antisemites, 4% ($n = 7$) are antisemites, and 19% ($n = 35$) fall within a “grey zone.”²⁴¹

To test hypothesis 2, the first question to be answered is who in the entire sample ($N = 187$) is a member of Die Linke, their youth association Linksjugend, or their university group Die Linke.SDS (*Sozialistisch-Demokratischer Studierendenverband*).

The twenty members of Die Linke in the sample scored the same values as the non-members, with a mean A-score of 30.5%. Although Imhoff concedes the results are “not meaningful enough” due to the small number of cases, he considers the argument of hypothesis 2 confirmed – albeit with reservations given the exploratory nature of the study.²⁴²

The operationalization of anti-Zionists, anti-imperialists, and pacifists (hypotheses 3–6) is accomplished by the respondents’ self-classification. In the sample, 16% ($n = 30$) describe themselves as anti-Zionists, 34% ($n = 64$) pacifists, 50% ($n = 94$) anti-imperialists, 40% ($n = 76$) socialists, 24% ($n = 45$) anarchists, and 49% ($n = 92$) communists. Many of the 187 respondents must have simultaneously placed themselves in several categories in their self-categorizations, as the number of answers adds up to 399; i.e., multiple categories must have been selected by almost all respondents. This fact is not mentioned by the author, who simply acts as if each respondent was clearly assigned to one group. Since many interviewees have obviously assigned themselves to several categories, it is unclear to which self-categorization they granted the “master status”. It is therefore likely that the results in Table 4 are distorted by the fact that a person classified as a pacifist, for example, also categorized themselves as a

²⁴¹ It is not clear where the 4% figure comes from or how it was calculated.

²⁴² Imhoff, “Linker antiisraelischer Antisemitismus”, p. 159. As to whether the results can be transferred to members of the Die Linke party, see critical fn 226 above.

communist or an anti-imperialist, which may have been more important regarding their attitude toward Israel. Of the 22 respondents classified as anti-Israel antisemites, almost all must necessarily also find themselves in one or more of the other four “Left currents”, since the total of those questioned in all four categories is 63. That is, an anti-Zionist is very likely to also be an anti-imperialist, a socialist, or a pacifist – and vice versa. No reliable statement can therefore be made about which of the respondents’ characteristics is decisive for their anti-Israel stance.²⁴³ For anarchists and communists, no significant relationship to the A-score could be determined. This result contradicts the finding reported later in the study, that anti-Israel antisemitism is primarily located within the orthodox communist spectrum.²⁴⁴

Imhoff does not take into account the fact that many interviewees apparently placed themselves in several categories at once. This remains the case in Table 4, where the sum of the number of respondents (*n*) for the four groups mentioned is 264, even though the anarchists and communists are no longer counted and the whole sample consists of only 187 respondents. These results should therefore be treated with caution.

Table 4: Left currents and correlation with the A-score (*N* = 187)

Left currents	“grey zone” (<i>n</i> = 57) ²⁴⁵ (Percentage of the current)	anti-Israel antisemites (<i>n</i> = 22) (Percentage of the current)	correlation with A-score (<i>r</i>)
Anti-Zionists	22 (73%)	15 (50%)	.506**
Anti-Imperialists	46 (49%)	19 (20%)	.541**
Pacifists	24 (53%)	16 (19%)	.381**
Socialists ²⁴⁶	36 (47%)	13 (17%)	.327**

** *p* < .001

Imhoff, “Linker antiisraelischer Antisemitismus”, p. 160, table 4.

²⁴³ Of course, the same also applies to the results if you include the respondents classified in the “grey zone”. The answers of the 57 respondents add up to 128 in the four categories.

²⁴⁴ This result for the communists is surprising, as Imhoff states in his footnote on page 159 that the ten members of the German Communist Party (DKP) included in the sample achieve a mean value of 43.8% on the A-score, which is 14.2 percentage points higher than the overall sample. This should have placed them in the “grey zone”, at least.

²⁴⁵ In Imhoff’s account, it simply says “grey zone”, even though the number of respondents assigned to this category is only *n* = 35 and not *n* = 57 (see *ibid.*, p. 158). What Imhoff has actually done here is to group together the 35 respondents from the “grey zone” and the 22 people he classifies as anti-Israel antisemites.

²⁴⁶ The socialists are no longer mentioned in the subsequent analysis, although they appear in the “grey zone” with 47%, and 17% were even classified as anti-Israel antisemites.

The results in Table 4 can be summarized as follows: Anti-Zionists in particular display antisemitic resentments (measured, however, using anti-Israel items – it is to some extent tautological that anti-Zionists should agree with negative statements about Israel). One in two of them fall within the group of anti-Israel antisemites, while for the other three groups this figure is only around 20%. Nevertheless, Imhoff considers hypotheses 3, 4, and 5 to be confirmed.

But does it make sense to treat anti-Zionism as an independent variable, explaining hostility against Israel as the result of an anti-Zionist attitude? Anti-Israel antisemitism, anti-Zionism, as well as support for the Palestinians are the dependent variables, the reasons for which are what one wants to clarify. But this can only be done through independent – i.e., explanatory – variables; meaning, in this case, convictions such as anti-imperialism or a backward-looking or personalized critique of capitalism, all of which are associated with more or less orthodox communist ideologies, such as Marxism, Maoism, or Trotskyism.

The acceptance of terrorist attacks (hypothesis 6) is measured using the following statement:

Under the given circumstances, the terrorist attacks by the Palestinians are an acceptable means in order to defend oneself against Israel.

In my opinion, the problem of self-categorization also applies to the examination of hypothesis 6, according to which left-wing pacifists are supposed to be more tolerant of terrorist attacks than other leftists, even though the use of violence should actually contradict the pacifist worldview (regarding the different results in the studies by Kempf, see above, Section 8). Unfortunately, Imhoff gives no explanation as to how he came to this rather unintelligible hypothesis or how to explain that pacifists (20%) approve of terrorist attacks more often than other leftists, given that half reject them and another 27% opted for the neutral answer category. It is conceivable, therefore, that among the 20% of pacifists other self-categorizations may play a more important role and are to be blamed for the higher tolerance for the use of force.

In order to test hypotheses 7–11, Imhoff determined the correlations between these items and the A-score; unfortunately, he does not report the answer distributions for the items used in each case.

Table 5: Correlations with the A-Score ($N = 187$)

Solidarity in the Middle East conflict	.803**
Völkish thinking	.734**
Backward-looking critique of capitalism	.619**
Personalized critique of capitalism	.590**
Sympathy for Leninism	.441**
Sympathy for Maoism	.373**
Sympathy for Trotskyism	.205*

** $p < 0.001$; * $p < 0.01$

Imhoff, “Linker antiisraelischer Antisemitismus”, p. 161, table 5.

To test hypothesis 7, the distribution of solidarity in the Middle East conflict is measured using a 7-point scale. The participants were asked how strongly they feel solidarity with either side in the conflict, where 1 indicates strong solidarity with Israel and 7 indicates strong solidarity with the Palestinians. The mean value of the items used to measure the distribution of solidarity in the Middle East conflict is 4.22, almost neutral, and tends only slightly to the Palestinian side. This result should actually be explained because at first glance it contradicts the negative attitude many leftists have toward Israel. It is probably due to the high proportion ($n = 121$) of *Antideutschen* (readers of *Jungle World* and *konkret*), who are known to be decidedly pro-Israel and anti-Palestinian. The other left-wingers (readers of *junge Welt*, $n = 64$) appear to be on the side of the Palestinians, so that here the sympathies and antipathies of both left-wing camps cancel each other out. According to Imhoff, the high correlation with sympathy for the Palestinian side in the Middle East conflict shows that criticism of Israel in the Palestine-solidarity Left is not exempt from antisemitic ways of thinking. But shouldn't taking the Palestinian side be treated as a dependent variable that has to be explained by independent variables – in this case, by left-wing beliefs? Aren't support for the Palestinians and a critical view of Israel connected, as two sides of the same coin?²⁴⁷

²⁴⁷ It is therefore not surprising that solidarity with the Palestinians in the Middle East conflict alone explains 64.48% of the variance in the A-score.

To test the impact of a Leninist, Maoist, or Trotskyist ideology (hypothesis 8), a 7-point scale is again used to measure how the interviewees rate the “theoretical and practical work” of the persons in question, i.e., Lenin, Mao, and Trotsky. Appreciation of the theoretical work and practical accomplishments of Lenin has a medium-strength relationship to the A-Score; for Mao and Trotsky the connection is still present but rather weak. An orientation toward any of these directions seems to have little validity.

To test hypotheses 9–10, the backward-looking critique of capitalism and the personalized critique of capitalism are measured by the following two statements:

Globalization must be reversed because it only serves the interests of the rich.

A few financiers and big capitalists decide everything in the world.

It is surprising that among leftists a critique of capitalism is apparently personalized in “the rich” rather than being expressed as a criticism of the structures of capitalism. Thomas Haury has described this phenomenon as structurally antisemitic, since criticism is often personalized in the Jews.²⁴⁸ Here too, there is a high correlation between this way of thinking and the A-score.

To test hypotheses 11a and 11b, völkish thinking is measured using the following two statements:

Every people should be able to exercise self-determination on its own territory.²⁴⁹

I am against globalization because it destroys the identity of many peoples: everywhere in the world the same products, the same music, and the same films are consumed. This displaces the local culture.

Imhoff wants to interpret advocacy of peoples’ right to self-determination as an expression of ethnic thinking. At the same time, however, he claims this right for Israel, since he criticizes

²⁴⁸ Thomas Haury, *Antisemitismus von links. Kommunistische Ideologie, Nationalismus und Antizionismus in der frühen DDR*, Hamburg 2002.

²⁴⁹ In my view, it is quite odd that the declaration of the right to self-determination for all peoples should be used here as an indicator of national thinking, especially since it has in fact been Israel that has invoked precisely this right to found a state for the Jewish people. The fact that the left-wingers demand this for the Palestinians does not make them representatives of a völkish/nationalist way of thinking. The right to self-determination of peoples is mentioned in Articles 1, 2, and 55 of the United Nations Charter and is referred to as a basis for relations between states (<https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text>). See also Héctor Gros Espiell, “Der Begriff des Selbstbestimmungsrechts der Völker in heutiger Sicht”, in: *Vereinte Nationen* 2/82 (https://zeitschrift-vereinte-nationen.de/fileadmin/publications/PDFs/Zeitschrift_VN/VN_1982/Heft_2_1982/03_Beitrag_Espiell_VN_2-82.pdf – accessed 20th October 2021).

the Left for apparently denying Jews the right to be a nation and for not recognizing the State of Israel as a state of the Jews, but rather as a “construct”. I consider it implausible that the Left, which is usually critical of nationalism, should cultivate a nationalist way of thinking. The statistical connection between this item and the assignment of a special role for Israel, as determined by Imhoff, is based on the fact that the part of the Left that is in solidarity with the Palestinians and supports Palestinians’ right to self-determination, at the same time delegitimizes Israel as a mere “construct” or as a colonial power, which thus denies Israel this same right.

Imhoff considers all eleven hypotheses to be confirmed and then carries out a linear regression analysis by checking which of the predictors used in his analysis (see hypotheses 1–11) have explanatory value for predicting anti-Israel antisemitism.

Table 6: Linear regression – predictors of the A-Score ($N = 187$)²⁵⁰

Model	Predictor	r	r^2	P (change in r^2)
1	Solidarity in Middle East	.803	.643	.000
2	Model 1 + völkish thinking	.835	.695	.000
3	Model 2 + anti-Zionism	.846	.711	.001
4	Model 3 + personalized critique of capitalism	.851	.719	.015
5	Model 4 + backward-looking critique of capitalism	.856	.725	.021

Imhoff, “Linker antiisraelischer Antisemitismus”, p. 152, table 6.

According to Imhoff’s findings, the question of solidarity in the Middle East conflict (at 64.3%) already clears up a large part of the variance of the A-Score. As can be seen in Table 6, the four additional predictors, which are added in a linear fashion, each contribute only a slight increase to the explanation of the variance. None of the other possible predictors, such as Leninism or anti-imperialism, increase the explanation of the variance any further, and so they are therefore not the actual explanations for Israel-related antisemitism.²⁵¹ It is no coincidence that support for the Palestinians and anti-Zionism are among the predictors of the A-score, since they measure almost the same thing as anti-Israel antisemitism. Basically, this is a tautological analysis, since all three attitudes (anti-Zionism, rejection of Israel, solidarity

²⁵⁰ Imhoff, “Linker antiisraelischer Antisemitismus”, p. 162.

²⁵¹ Ibid.

with the Palestinians) are dependent variables that ultimately represent different manifestations of a certain attitude, which should be explained by the ideological convictions of the Left.

Some final remarks

In the factor analysis carried out by Imhoff, which is not presented in his article, all of the 43 items on Israel and on Jews, of which only a part is mentioned in the study, loaded highly on one factor. However, only amongst a minority of 12% did the various manifestations condense into clear anti-Israel antisemitism. Within this number, there are to have been at least 4% who could also be described as (secondary) antisemites, since their perception of the Israeli side is transferred onto Jews. Perhaps Imhoff arrives at 4% because he interprets the item “*The compensation paid to Jewish Holocaust survivors is too low*” (recoded – as high) in Table 2 as an antisemitic statement relating to all Jews, but it is not clear to what extent this should be considered a transfer of an anti-Israel attitude onto Jews (see the second research question above). Another 19% cannot clearly break free from anti-Jewish resentment in their attitude toward Israel. The greatest explanatory power for anti-Israel antisemitism on the Left is solidarity with the Palestinian side in the Middle East conflict. The more one leans toward this on the 7-point scale of the corresponding item, the clearer the anti-Israel antisemitism becomes.²⁵² The question here is how solidarity with the Palestinians, the rejection of Israel, and anti-Zionism are related among the leftists. Is the solidarity to blame for a distorted image of the Israeli side and for anti-Zionism, as Imhoff apparently assumes, because so far as he sees it complete solidarity with the Palestinians is not possible otherwise. Or do leftists show solidarity toward the Palestinian side because they reject Israel as a Jewish state as antisemites (it should work this way for extreme-right antisemites, because their antisemitism is the reason they side with the otherwise-despised Muslim Palestinians)? In the first case, Israel-related antisemitism essentially results from taking sides in the Middle East conflict; i.e., it is not an expression of a genuine, pre-existing left-wing hatred of Jews. When Imhoff writes that identification with the Palestinian side can be understood as another expression of Israel-related antisemitism, it seems that he is saying that this variant of antisemitism is the cause for the Left’s partisanship. Is this plausible, when classical and secondary antisemitism are less

²⁵² Here, Imhoff writes “antisemitic way of thinking”, but what he means is anti-Israel antisemitism, since he is relating compassion for the Palestinians to a hatred of Israel and not to hatred of Jews in general (ibid., p. 164).

common on the Left than in other population groups, as many studies have shown?²⁵³ Imhoff's study has found that there are high correlations between solidarity with the Palestinians and Israel-related antisemitism – but causal relationships cannot be derived from correlation analyses. The results of his own study suggest that support for the Palestinian side, anti-Zionism, and Israel-related antisemitism are dependent not independent variables. One should, therefore, look for determinants for them, which Imhoff has done in his study of elements of Left ideology, such as anti-imperialism, a personalized critique of capitalism, and a backward-looking critique of capitalism. He agrees with Salzborn and Voigt that one should look for Israel-related antisemitism in the anti-imperialist and orthodox communist sections of the Left, as his study shows that almost all anti-Israel antisemites are anti-imperialists. Since the correlations are too low, orthodox communism cannot be the root cause of Israel-related antisemitism. Even anti-imperialism does not necessarily lead to antisemitic attitudes, though almost every anti-Israel antisemite is also an anti-imperialist.²⁵⁴

At the end of his study, Imhoff returns to the connection between anti-Israel and classical antisemitism (actually, he used items that measure secondary not classical antisemitism) by addressing the correlations between the A-score and the four anti-Jewish items and two other questions. First of all, one notes that the frequency of approval is significantly lower than for the Israel-related items of the A-score, and the number of respondents (*n*) is also in some cases very low. The correlations with the A-score are partly high, partly medium. He concludes that “1) on the Left there is a definite connection between criticism of the State of Israel and a negative image of the Jews, and 2) correspondingly, the distinction between criticism of Israel and criticism of Jews is in a certain sense an artificial one, which does not exist so strictly on the Left”.²⁵⁵ Yet this is based on imprecise item wording and some exaggerated interpretations. The thesis that antisemitic attitudes do also exist among leftists has been established in a whole series of empirical studies, which Imhoff did not take note of (see above). However, such attitudes are less common here than in the other political camps.

Ultimately, Imhoff reduces the question of anti-Israel antisemitism to the question of whether these left-wing critics of Israel can accept the fact that Jews feel connected to Israel without condemning them for it. If this is the central question, one wonders why it was not included in

²⁵³ Imhoff himself has found that only 4% of those harboring anti-Israel antisemitism can be classified as also being anti-Jewish (p. 163). After all, antisemitic criticism of Israel would only partially apply to Jews in general, which is the core of the definition of antisemitism (ibid., p. 165).

²⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 163.

²⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 165.

the study as such. No respondent was asked whether this attachment is viewed negatively. Regarding the questions about the loyalty of Jews in Germany to Israel or Germany (see Table 2), no conclusions can be drawn from the answers given as to whether the interviewees hold a negative view of Jews being committed to Israel's interests or whether they regard such commitment as legitimate.

A negative evaluation of a state's policies does not even mean that one evaluates its citizens negatively – or did the fierce criticism of the USA in the Vietnam War also mean being against American citizens, some of whom were themselves opposed to the policies of their government? This is probably also true with regard to negative attitudes toward the State of Israel: they do not necessarily apply to all citizens of Israel, let alone to Jewish citizens in other countries. Such a transfer certainly may occur, but whether or not it has must be proven empirically.

10. Antisemitism in contemporary Great Britain. A study of attitudes towards

Jews and Israel (2017)


In 2017, L. Daniel Staetsky, Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Jewish Policy Research in London, published the report *Antisemitism in contemporary Great Britain*, which also dealt with the connection between antisemitic and anti-Israel views.²⁵⁶ Staetsky introduced a promising new way of thinking about the level of antisemitism in a society, existing as it does at different degrees of intensity. By differentiating a more or less coherent “learned antisemitism” (antisemitic ideas and images) from open dislike for Jews, he proposed the concept of an “elastic view”. After first analyzing the unfavorable opinions about Jews and the specific ideas about and images of Jews in the British population, he examined the image of Israel in the population and then related the antisemitic attitude to the anti-Israel one.

The emotional dimension of prejudice toward Israel was measured by the item “I’d like you to consider how you feel about certain countries overall. Please tell me if you have a very

²⁵⁶ The survey of attitudes towards Jews and Israel among the general population of Great Britain was conducted by the Institute for Jewish Policy Research. The report is based on a dataset of 4,005 observations, which combined face-to-face and online samples (Staetsky, *Antisemitism in contemporary Great Britain*, p. 15).

favourable, somewhat favourable, somewhat unfavourable, very unfavourable opinion of the following countries” (List of 7 countries). The results regarding Israel were as follows:

Figure 1: Opinions held by the population of Great Britain about Israel and about Jews




Staetsky, *Antisemitism in contemporary Great Britain*, combined and abbreviated version of p. 16, figure 1, and p. 27, figure 9.

Compared with their attitudes toward Jews, the respondents displayed a negative emotional reaction toward Israel much more frequently: 33% had an unfavorable/somewhat unfavorable view compared with 5.4% displaying an unfavorable/somewhat unfavorable attitude toward Jews. Conversely, sympathy toward Israel was quite limited (17%) compared with 39% displaying sympathy toward Jews. As the distribution of “sympathies declared by the population of Great Britain in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict” also reveals, only 6% of respondents stand on the side of Israel, while 18% lean toward the side of the Palestinians.

Figure 2: Sympathies declared by the population of Great Britain in relation to Israeli-Palestinian conflict

Question: Thinking of the continuing conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, do your own sympathies lie more with the Israelis or with the Palestinians?



Staetsky, *Antisemitism in contemporary Great Britain*, p. 28, figure 10.


In general, however, one can characterize the attitude of the British population toward Israel “as one of uncertainty or indifference, but among those who hold a view, people with sympathies towards the Palestinians are numerically dominant”.²⁵⁷

²⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 28

Figure 3: Opinions held by the population of Great Britain on specific statements about Israel²⁵⁸

Question: I'd like to show you some statements that people have made about Israel. Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with each one.

²⁵⁸ In 2019, David Graham and Jonathan Boyd analyzed the same survey data, calculating correlations between anti-Jewish attitudes and agreement with statements about Israel on this list, with results ranging from .57 to -.42. There are medium-strength positive correlations between anti-Jewish statements and the following negative statements about Israel: "Israel exploits Holocaust victimhood for its own purposes" (.57); "Israel is the cause of all the troubles in the Middle East" (.49); "The interest of Israelis are at odds with the interests of the rest of the world" (.46); "Israel has too much control over global affairs" (.41); "People should boycott Israeli goods and products" (.37); "Israel is deliberately trying to wipe out the Palestinian population" (.35); "Israel is committing mass murder in Palestine" (.30); "Israel is an apartheid state" (.23). There are also negative correlations with positive statements about Israel: "The State of Israel has every right to exist" (-.42); "The State of Israel makes a positive contribution to global society" (-.27); "The State of Israel is the historic homeland of the Jewish People" (-.18); "Israel is the only real democracy in the Middle East" (-.03). (All coefficients are statistically significant, Spearman's $p < .01$) (David Graham/Jonathan Boyd, "The apartheid contention and calls for a boycott", *Jpr/analysis*, Institute for Jewish Policy Research, January 2019, p. 12, table 1).




Note: Due to rounding, percentages may not always add up to 100%. The items are ordered here according to the proportion of strongly agree responses.

Staetsky, *Antisemitism in contemporary Great Britain*, p. 29, figure 11.

Figure 4: Opinions held by the population of Great Britain on specific statements about Jews

Question: Below are a few statements that people have made about Jews in the UK. Some people may agree with them, some may disagree and some may not have an opinion at all. Please tell me to what extent you would agree or disagree with someone who said the following statements.




Due to rounding, percentages may not always add up to 100%.

Staetsky, *Antisemitism in contemporary Great Britain*, p. 22, figure 5.

As the Figures above show, negativity toward Israel in the British population is significantly more common than negativity toward Jews. While the level of endorsement of antisemitic statements is in the range of 2–15%, it is much higher in the case of anti-Israel statements (9–24%).

Figure 5: Volume of specific anti-Israel statements held by the population of Great Britain




Due to rounding up, the sum increases to over 100%.

Staetsky, *Antisemitism in contemporary Great Britain*, p. 30, figure 12.

Parallel to the connection between the emotional and cognitive dimensions in the case of attitudes toward Jews, Staetsky conducted the same process for attitudes toward Israel. All in all, the pattern for both attitudes is pretty similar: the large majority of those holding a favorable opinion of Israel (63%) don't agree with any anti-Israel statements, and "[a]gain, as was the case with attitudes toward Jews, the profile of those who claim neutrality in relation to Israel, or who did not respond to the question, is much closer to those with a favourable opinion of Israel than to those with an unfavourable opinion".²⁵⁹ While the pattern is quite similar, the proportion of those agreeing with at least one anti-Israel statement is somewhat larger than in the case of attitudes toward Jews (favorable: 37% compared with 26%; neutral: 36% compared with 24%). So a positive or neutral feeling toward Israel coexists with at least one of the anti-Israel attitudes more often than a positive or neutral feeling about Jews coexists with at least one of the anti-Jewish attitudes.

Figure 6: Association between opinion of Israel and the volume of specific anti-Israel ideas held by the population in Great Britain

²⁵⁹ Staetsky, *Antisemitism in contemporary Great Britain*, p. 30.




Staetsky, *Antisemitism in contemporary Great Britain*, p. 31, figure 13.

Attitudes toward Jews and Israel: are they linked?

The findings show that more respondents agree with the negative statements concerning Israel than those concerning Jews, although a large part of the British respondents agrees with the positive statements about Israel, too (Palestinians and Israelis are entitled to a state of their own; historic homeland of the Jewish people).

Figure 7: Opinion held by the population of Great Britain on specific statements about Jews and Israel (strongly agree and tend to agree) %




Staetsky, *Antisemitism in contemporary Great Britain*, p. 34, figure 15.

To test how antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes are connected, Staetsky compared the degree of endorsement of antisemitic opinions in the general population with that of those respondents holding anti-Israel attitudes. We can see that the two attitudes are connected since holding anti-Israel attitudes has a reinforcing influence on antisemitic attitudes. Those holding strong anti-Israel attitudes (enlarged Anti-Israel Index 0–9) showed a significantly higher approval for all items on the Antisemitism Index. On average, the agreement of the general population to the seven items in Figure 8 is 8.7%, while for those holding strong anti-Israel

attitudes it is on average 36.1%. The order of succession of the items in the two tables remains essentially unchanged except for one item: those holding an anti-Israel view put the item “Jews exploit Holocaust victimhood for their own purposes” at the top of the list. One can assume that what lies behind this is the idea that Jews use the Holocaust to ward off criticism of Israeli policies. For Staetsky, this is a “very significant insight into the mindset of the segment of the population espousing strong anti-Israel attitudes”, because invoking the Holocaust as a political weapon is especially objectionable in the eyes of many Jews.²⁶⁰

Figure 8: Endorsement of antisemitic opinions among those with strong anti-Israel attitudes (score 7–9 on the AI Index) and in the general population of Great Britain (strongly agree or tend to agree combined) %



Staetsky, *Antisemitism in contemporary Great Britain*, combined version of figure 17, p. 36.

In Figure 9 below, Staetsky uses a cross-tabulation between the Antisemitism and Anti-Israel Indices. Based on this approach, he states “that the existence of an association between the

²⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 36.

antisemitic and the anti-Israel attitudes tested, is unambiguous”.²⁶¹ One can see that comparing the columns, the higher the percentage of anti-Israel opinions, the higher the percentage of people with antisemitic attitudes, a result that confirms the findings of Kaplan and Small (see Section 2). Those who exhibit only low levels of anti-Israel attitudes (in the top left quadrant) score low or zero on the Antisemitism Index, while those in the top right quadrant, who exhibit a high level of anti-Israel attitudes (6–9), include only a small number (21–33%) of those scoring zero on the Antisemitism Index. Staetsky rightly points out that this association is demonstrated at “a *population* level, not at an *individual* one”. As can be seen in Table 10, 30% of those holding strong anti-Israel attitudes (scores 6–9) score only 0–1 on the Antisemitism Index. Staetsky therefore concludes that this finding “does not mean that an individual holding even the highest volume of anti-Israel opinions is *necessarily* antisemitic; rather it indicates that the *probability* of such an individual being antisemitic is considerably higher than an individual who does not hold anti-Israel opinions”.²⁶²

Figure 9: The association between anti-Israel and antisemitic attitudes: % holding antisemitic attitudes of different intensities, by intensity of anti-Israel attitudes

²⁶¹ Ibid.

²⁶² Ibid., p. 35.

		Anti-Israel (AI) Index										
		low									high	
		0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
Antisemitism (AS) Index	low	0	86	70	65	61	47	45	33	31	21	21
	1	11	18	19	19	22	19	17	21	16	2	
	2	2	5	7	9	10	12	23	10	6	10	
	3	1	4	4	6	7	13	9	8	10	12	
	4	1	2	2	3	8	6	9	9	12	10	
	5	0	1	1	2	3	4	7	11	14	12	
	6	0	1	1	0	3	2	1	4	10	17	
	7	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	6	9	14	
	high	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2
Sum,	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
%												
Sum,	n	1,744	791	410	312	210	167	139	112	78	42	

Staetsky, *Antisemitism in contemporary Great Britain*, p. 35, table 1.

Figure 9 shows this connection between antisemitism and an anti-Israel attitude more clearly. Out of a sample of 4,005 respondents, 9.2% (371) scored high on the Anti-Israel Index (scores 6–9); of these, 71% (6.6% of the total sample; $n = 265$) also held at least one antisemitic attitude. But 15% of those scoring zero on the Anti-Israel Index also displayed at least one antisemitic prejudice (6.5% of the total sample; $n = 261$), while a clearly larger portion (29% of the total sample; $n = 1,159$) agreed with one or more anti-Israel statements but with none of the antisemitic statements. The percentage of British respondents who did not agree with any antisemitic or anti-Israel statements was 38%. If we understand antisemitism and anti-Israelism in a very broad sense (so that one can be classified as antisemitic or anti-Israel if one has agreed with even just one negative item), both kinds of prejudice overlap in 24% of the British population.


Focusing on those scoring high on both indices – 6–9 on the Anti-Israel Index (9.2% of the total sample; $n = 371$) and 5–8 on the Antisemitism Index (3.6% of the total sample; $n = 147$)

– we see that 1.6% of the total sample are just antisemitic and 7% are just anti-Israel. High scores on the two attitudes overlap in 2% of the total sample, and 89.4% of the British respondents do not harbor very strong antisemitic or anti-Israel attitudes.

Figure 10: The diffusion and overlap of antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes: a summary

Panel A: Maximal diffusion of antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes: at least one attitude


Panel B: Strong-antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes



Note: People with strong anti-Israel attitudes are those who score 6–9 on the Anti-Israel Index (9.2% of the total sample; $n = 371$); people with strong antisemitic attitudes are those who score 5–8 on the Antisemitism Index (3.6% of the total sample; $n = 147$).

Source: Staetsky, *Antisemitism in contemporary Great Britain*, p. 37, figure 18.

Figure 11: The association between anti-Israel and antisemitic statements: an alternative cast



Note: Score on Anti-Israel Index: scoring 0, $n = 1,744$; scoring 1–3, $n = 1,513$; scoring 4–6, $n = 519$; scoring 7–9, $n = 232$.

Staetsky, *Antisemitism in contemporary Great Britain*, p. 36, figure 16.

The frequency with which antisemitic attitudes occur is closely related to political beliefs; this is even more so for anti-Israel attitudes. As far as antisemitic attitudes are concerned, we find


a pattern in the British survey that we also observe in Germany and other countries, namely an increasing frequency from “fairly left-wing” to “very right-wing”. There is a deviation with regard to the radical Left, in which antisemitic attitudes are somewhat more common than in the range from the moderate Left to the political center.²⁶³ People who classify themselves as “fairly right-wing” and “very right-wing” clearly display antisemitic attitudes most frequently.

As far as anti-Israel attitudes are concerned, the figures show a significantly different distribution. On the one hand, anti-Israel attitudes are more pervasive than antisemitic attitudes in all political groups; on the other hand, the distribution also shows a different pattern. While antisemitism showed the lowest frequencies in the moderate Left to moderate Right range, the distribution of anti-Israel attitudes has shifted to the Right: now it is the groups from the “centre” to “fairly right-wing” that occupy the low frequencies. The Far Right is the only group on the British political map to combine high levels of both antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes.


Figure 12: Antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes across the Left–Right spectrum

²⁶³ Staetsky is surprised that those on the far-left of the political spectrum, who it might be assumed would be more likely than the general population to hold anti-racist attitudes, do not display this in relation to antisemitism (ibid., p. 46). In my opinion, this is likely due to these people’s anti-capitalist attitude, since for them Jews are not among the disadvantaged groups affected by racism but are instead on the side of the racists and imperialists. This attitude is also behind the anti-Israel attitude that is particularly prevalent in this group.

Panel A: Maximal diffusion: percentage holding at least one antisemitic/anti-Israel attitude



Panel B: Percentage holding strong antisemitic/anti-Israel attitudes



Notes: (1) The boundaries of ranges are limits of the 95% confidence intervals, so the ranges should be understood as an indication of where an accurate estimate for each group is likely to be situated, with the higher figure (in blue) indicating the likely maximal level and the lower figure (in orange) indicating the likely minimal level. See Figure 23 for group sizes. (2) The dotted red line shows the level of diffusion of antisemitic attitudes (maximal diffusion of 30%, with 3.6% holding 5-8 attitudes) and anti-Israel attitudes (maximal diffusion of 56%, with 9% holding 6-9 anti-Israel attitudes), in the general population.

Reprinted from: L. Daniel Staetsky, *Antisemitism in contemporary Great Britain*, p. 45, figure 24.

Staetsky calls this combination “unusual”, but it is to be expected that particularly antisemitic persons will also have a negative attitude toward Israel as a “Jewish state”.²⁶⁴ The fact that the moderately left-wing respondents, and especially those on the radical Left, are more likely to display anti-Israel attitudes than people on the Right, indicates what Kempf has emphasized – namely, the role of political (i.e. anti-imperialist, pro-human rights) orientations in this spectrum. But these survey results also show that the respondents in this spectrum, in particular on the radical Left, are not completely exempt from antisemitic attitudes. The fact that anti-Israel attitudes are significantly more widespread than antisemitic ones and that, apart from very right-wing respondents, they are also distributed differently across the political spectrum suggests that the two attitudes only partially overlap. That is to say, criticism of the State of Israel is to a considerable extent not motivated by antisemitism. At the same time, it obviously makes a difference what political beliefs the criticism of Israeli policies is based on.²⁶⁵ The study of other ideological dimensions, such as religious affiliation or degree of religiosity, shows no difference for the Christian denominations in either dimension; only the Muslim group shows a 1.3 to 2 times higher frequency with regard to antisemitic attitudes and as much as 3 to 4 times higher with regard to a strong anti-Israel attitude.²⁶⁶ Unlike the Christian denominations, in the case of Muslims greater religiosity is associated with stronger antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes.²⁶⁷

As the following figure shows, as approval for anti-Israel statements increases, the proportion of those who agree with at least one item on the Antisemitism Index increases dramatically. This is most noticeable among Muslims and the extreme Right, while the values for the radical Left only increase gradually, which leads Staetsky to suggest that there must be “some

²⁶⁴ In their research, Kempf and his colleagues were able to show that the extreme Right not only holds antisemitic, anti-Zionist, and anti-Israel attitudes, but also anti-Palestinian ones (Kempf, “Anti-Semitism and criticism of Israel”, p. 18 – see also Section 8).


²⁶⁵ Through his research, Kempf was able to show that one and the same statement – for instance, the comparison of Israeli policy towards the Palestinians with that of National Socialism towards the Jews – can arise from antisemitic motives but can also simply serve as a means of dramatization in order to proclaim the need for action in the Middle East conflict (Kempf, “Über die Bedeutung von NS-Vergleichen im Israel-kritischen Diskurs”, p. 5).

²⁶⁶ Staetsky, *Antisemitism in contemporary Great Britain*, p. 49. Similar differences between Christians and Muslims are apparent in a study conducted in Norway, where the difference between the two groups in terms of prejudice against Jews is 1:3.4, whereas on the Anti-Israel Index, it is only 1:1.4. Compared with the UK, Norwegian Muslims show significantly higher levels of anti-Jewish prejudice, but only slightly higher levels of anti-Israel prejudice, which may be due to the fact that Muslims in Norway tend to have immigrated from different countries than those in the UK (Werner Bergmann, “How Do Jews and Muslims in Norway Perceive Each Other? Between Prejudice and Cooperation”, in: Hoffmann/ Moe (eds.), *The Shifting Boundaries of prejudice. Antisemitism and Islamophobia in Contemporary Norway*, Oslo 2020, pp. 211–253, here p. 221, figure 7.7 and p. 248).

²⁶⁷ Staetsky, *Antisemitism in contemporary Great Britain*, p. 57.

counterbalancing factors” that “make it more resistant to antisemitism”.²⁶⁸ Thus, Staetsky comes to the conclusion that the “association between antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes is well defined in all subgroups”, but that the study cannot “determine the causal mechanisms of this association”, because it is possible that “antisemitic ideas drive anti-Israel ones, that anti-Israel ideas drive antisemitic ones, or that both types of attitudes reinforce each other”.²⁶⁹

Figure 13: The association between anti-Israel and antisemitic attitudes among Muslims, the Far Left and the Far Right: % holding at least one antisemitic attitude, by intensity of anti-Israel attitudes



Note: Score on Anti-Israel Index: scoring 0, *n* = 1,744; scoring 1–3, *n* = 1,513; scoring 4–6, *n* = 519; scoring 7–9, *n* = 232. Very left-wing (*n* = 529) on Anti-Israel Index: score 0, *n* = 116; score 1–3, *n* = 196; score 4–6, *n* = 138; score 7–9, *n* = 79. Very right-wing (*n* = 355) on Anti-Israel Index: score 0, *n* = 143; score 1–3, *n* = 115; score 4–6, *n* = 47; score 7–9, *n* = 50. Muslims (*n* = 995) on Anti-Israel Index: score 0, *n* = 250; score 1–3, *n* = 225; score 4–6, *n* = 264; score 7–9, *n* = 256.

Staetsky, *Antisemitism in contemporary Great Britain*, p. 50, figure 29.

In addition to its exceptionally large dataset, what is noteworthy about Staetsky’s meticulous study is that it takes into account both the emotional and cognitive dimensions of attitudes toward Jews and Israel, which are then compared with one another. It also takes into account the stated sympathies of the British population in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

²⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 49.

²⁶⁹ Ibid.

Unlike in most other studies, the Antisemitism Index and the Anti-Israel Index combine the emotional and cognitive dimensions and examine the association between anti-Israel and antisemitic attitudes at different levels of agreement. The overlap of both attitudes is presented in a differentiated way in the study, depending on whether one takes a maximal diffusion or a minimal diffusion of antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes as a basis. Staetsky emphasizes that in both cases there is a relatively large overlap between the two attitudes but that they do not overlap completely; most respondents who have one or more anti-Israel attitudes do not hold any antisemitic attitude.²⁷⁰ The cross-tabulation between the Antisemitism and Anti-Israel Indices shows the higher the percentage of anti-Israel opinions, the higher the percentage of people with antisemitic attitudes. Staetsky makes the important point that the association demonstrated here occurs at “a *population* level, not at an *individual* one”, and that this does not mean that “an individual holding even the highest volume of anti-Israel opinions is *necessarily* antisemitic; rather it indicates that the *probability* of such an individual of being antisemitic is considerably higher than an individual that who does not hold anti-Israel opinions”.²⁷¹

10.1 The Left, the Right, Christians, Muslims and Detractors of Israel – who is antisemitic in Great Britain? (2020)

In 2020, Daniel Staetsky published an article in which he used the data from the 2017 study presented above (Section 10) to investigate the relationship between antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes using the statistical method of logistic regression.²⁷² The dependent variable in the multivariate analysis is antisemitic attitudes, which are measured here by means of the Antisemitism Index, which is composed of eight attitudinal variables covering a wide range of affective and cognitive attitudes relating to Jews – however, not a single one relates to Israel (see Section 10, Figure 4). From this index of eight items, Staetsky created a composite binary variable for the logistic regression registering the presence and/or absence of antisemitic attitudes: all those who did not agree with any of the eight items were assigned the value 0 ($n = 2,759$; 69%), those who agreed with 1–8 items were assigned the value 1 ($n = 1,246$;

²⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 37.

²⁷¹ Ibid., p. 35.

²⁷² L. Daniel Staetsky, “The Left, The Right, Christians, Muslims and Detractors of Israel: Who is Antisemitic in Great Britain in the Early 21st Century?”, in: *Contemporary Jewry* 40/2 (2020) (<https://archive.jpr.org.uk/object-1329>).

31%).²⁷³ Attitudes toward Israel were measured by the Anti-Israel Index, which consists of 12 items (see Section 10, Figure 3). As with the Antisemitism Index, Staetsky created a binary variable: those who did not agree with any of the 12 items were assigned the value 0 (43.5%), those who agreed with at least one anti-Israel attitude were assigned the value 1 (56.5%). As such, Staetsky employed a very broad concept of antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes, since agreement with one negative item was sufficient for classification. Normally, however, people who agree with only one or two items out of a list of eight or twelve items would not be classified as outspoken antisemites or enemies of Israel.

In an initial descriptive analysis, Staetsky first examined the relationship between anti-Israel and antisemitic attitudes for religious and political groups; the results are particularly striking for the very left-wing, very right-wing, and Muslim groups. The following 4-field tables present the results for these groups.

²⁷³ Ibid., p. 267.

Table 1: Joint distribution of antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes by selected political and religious groups. %

British population as a whole			Very left-wing			Very right-wing			Muslims		
	Does not endorse any antisemitic attitudes	Endorses at least one antisemitic attitude		Does not endorse any antisemitic attitudes	Endorses at least one antisemitic attitude		Does not endorse any antisemitic attitudes	Endorses at least one antisemitic attitude		Does not endorse any antisemitic attitudes	Endorses at least one antisemitic attitude
Does not endorse any anti-Israel attitudes	37	6	Does not endorse any anti-Israel attitudes	19	3	Does not endorse any anti-Israel attitudes	30	10	Does not endorse any anti-Israel attitudes	21	5
Endorses at least one anti-Israel attitude	32	25	Endorses at least one anti-Israel attitude	48	30	Endorses at least one anti-Israel attitude	19	41	Endorses at least one anti-Israel attitude	23	52

Staetsky, “The Left, The Right, Christians, Muslims and Detractors of Israel”, p. 274, table 4.

The distribution in the individual groups contains some surprises; for example, the proportion of those who do not agree with any antisemitic or anti-Israel statements is roughly the same for the very left-wing as for the Muslims – but is lower than for the very right-wing. In the case of the very left-wing, it can be seen that only a negligible proportion displays antisemitic attitudes without also displaying anti-Israel attitudes. Almost half indicate anti-Israel attitudes without being antisemitic at the same time. One can assume that among the very left-wing, a negative view of Israel is the primary motive and that this is then transferred onto Jews in

general.²⁷⁴ Accordingly, an antisemitic attitude is clearly less prevalent (33%) than an anti-Israel one (78%). Conversely, among the very right-wing, the proportion of those who have both an antisemitic and an anti-Israel attitude is very high at 41%. One can assume that they transfer their antisemitic attitude onto Israel as a Jewish state. At 51% and 60%, antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes occur with similar frequency.²⁷⁵ The distribution of opinion among Muslims is more similar to that of the very left-wing, but here anti-Israel attitudes are combined much more frequently with antisemitic attitudes, and rejection is less frequently directed against Israel alone (23% compared with 48% among the very left-wing). While among the very left-wing the proportion of those who display only anti-Israel attitudes is significantly higher than the proportion of those who display both anti-Israel and antisemitic attitudes (48% to 30%), it is the other way around for the very right-wing and Muslims: 19% to 41% and 23% to 52%, respectively. I.e., both attitudes are more closely linked here. Staetsky rightly notes the close connection between antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes, as only 6% of the British population have an antisemitic attitude without also having an anti-Israel attitude. In the British population the ratio between those 6% with antisemitic attitudes only and the 25% with antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes is 1 to 4, compared with 1 to 9 for the very left-wing (3% to 30%) and Muslims (5% to 52%), and 1 to 5 for the very right-wing (10% to 41%).²⁷⁶ In other words, among the general population, antisemitic and anti-Israeli attitudes go together more often than among the left-wing and Muslims, and to a similar extent as among the right-wing.

Besides the relationship between antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes among political and religious groups, Staetsky examines the influence of a number of other independent variables on antisemitic attitudes: the effect of socio-demographic variables (age, sex, place of residence, place of birth, education, religion, and political preference), the influence of social and political attitudes and personality dispositions, and the influence of violent extremist attitudes.

²⁷⁴ Staetsky stated in his concluding remarks that the level of antisemitism on the very left-wing is not different from the societal average, but at the same time is affected by an anti-Israel attitude. "It is, however, important to understand that old-style antisemitism is present in the Left and that it is intertwined with anti-Israel attitudes." (Ibid., p. 283).

²⁷⁵ In his concluding remarks, Staetsky comes to the same conclusion that "although anti-Israel attitudes have some presence on the far right, this is not what makes the far right antisemitic". Their antisemitism is an "aspect of the more general negative attitude towards people defined as foreigners, on the one hand, and of violent extremist predispositions of some groups on the far right" (ibid., p. 282).

²⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 274.

Table 2: Social and political attitudes expressed by the British population (percent)

How much you agree or disagree	Strongly agree / Tend to agree	Strongly disagree / Tend to disagree / Neutral or “Don’t know”	Total	
Political correctness is stifling free speech in the UK	58.0	42.0	100.0	
The law should always be obeyed, even if a particular law is wrong	45.2	54.8	100.0	
Britain would be stronger if we stopped immigration completely	22.0	78.0	100.0	
We can only have a fairer society by overthrowing the capitalist system	21.7	78.3	100.0	
Anti-Israel Index	Endorses at least one anti-Israel attitude	Does not endorse any anti-Israel attitude	Total	Total
Whether or not endorses at least one anti-Israel attitude	56.5	43.5	100.0	
Violent Extremist Attitudes	Does not justify violence under any circumstance	Tends to justify violence somewhat	Tends to justify violence strongly	
Whether or not tends to justify violence in support of political causes	45.0	44.0	11.0	100.0

Source: Staetsky, “The Left, The Right, Christians, Muslims and Detractors of Israel”, p. 270, table 3.

Since the four political opinions do not measure the same latent construct (Cronbach’s Alpha is low at 0.4) they cannot be combined into one binary variable; i.e., “all four attitudes feature in the analysis as four independent variables”.²⁷⁷ The “violent extremist attitude” variable is a composite developed on the basis of the Violent Extremist Attitude Scale (VEAS-4), which

²⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 271.

measures violent tendencies under different scenarios.²⁷⁸ The logistic regression analysis for holding antisemitic attitudes is carried out in four steps: In a first basic model (A), only the influence of socio-demographic variables is determined. In a next step, social and political attitudes are added in the second model (B). In the third model (C), the influence of violent extremist attitudes is added. Finally, anti-Israelism is added in the fourth model (D). The respective effects are shown in odds ratios; i.e., a characteristic value is set to 1, the other characteristic values can then assume higher, equal, or lower values. For example, if the characteristic “female” is set to 1, then odds ratios above/below 1 indicate a higher/lower chance of having the attitude to be measured (in the present example, antisemitic attitudes).²⁷⁹

Table 3: Regression results: four models predicting holding antisemitic attitudes (odds ratios)

Variable	Categories	Basic Model (A)	+ Social attitudes (B)	+ Violent extremism scale (C)	+ anti-Israelism (D)
Age	35–54 years	1.06	1.01	1.03	0.94
	55–64 years	1.37	1.34	1.40	1.21
	65 years and over	1.55	1.47	1.51	1.35
Sex	Male	1.66	1.65	1.63	1.71
Sample type	Online sample	1.36	1.21	1.17	1.08
Residence	Lives in London	1.44	1.50	1.47	1.54
Place of birth	Born abroad	1.99	2.16	2.26	2.37
Religion	Christian	1.01	1.00	1.03	1.10
	Muslim	2.25	2.51	3.12	2.45
	Other religion	0.98	0.93	0.93	1.02
Political Preference	Very left-wing	0.99	0.97	0.88	0.67
	Fairly left-wing	0.71	0.73	0.66	0.56

²⁷⁸ Ibid. “VEAS-4 was developed by the investigators of the ‘Zurich Project of Social Development of Children, z-proso’, focusing on youth’s pathways to violence and delinquency” (ibid.). For further information, see: A. Nivette/M. Eisner/D. Ribeaud, “Developmental predictors of violent extremist attitudes: a test of general strain theory”, in: *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency* 54/6 (2017), pp. 755–790.

²⁷⁹ Staetsky, “The Left, The Right, Christians, Muslims and Detractors of Israel”, p. 275.

	Fairly right-wing	1.12	1.01	0.92	1.00
	Very right-wing	2.30	1.76	1.62	1.74
	Other political preference	0.71	0.71	0.68	0.73
Education	Education below academic degree	1.21	1.01	1.04	1.14
	No educational qualifications	1.57	1.23	1.22	1.35
	Other educational qualifications	0.32	1.17	1.15	1.22
Socio-political Attitudes	Overthrow capitalism		1.52	1.47	1.31
	No to immigration		2.27	2.19	2.07
	No to political correctness		1.35	1.29	1.25
	Law should be obeyed		1.02	1.01	0.99
Violent extremist tendencies	Violent extremism scale, 1–5 tendencies			1.03	0.96
	Violent extremism scale, 6–12 tendencies			1.73	1.53
Anti-Israel Attitudes	Endorses a least one anti-Israel attitude				4.43
	Constant	0.19	0.16	0.16	0.06
	Nagelkerke <i>R</i> Square	0.08	0.13	0.14	0.24

(1) The reference categories are: 16–34 years (age); female (sex); face-to-face sample (sample type); lives outside London (place of residence); born in the UK (place of birth); no religion (religion), center (political preference), degree-level education (education); not having an attitude (socio-political attitudes); does not justify violence (violent extremist tendencies); does not endorse anti-Israel attitudes (anti-Israel attitudes).

(2) Bold print relates to the level of statistical significance of the obtained results: $p < 0.05$.

Staetsky, “The Left, The Right, Christians, Muslims and Detractors of Israel”, p. 276, table 5.

The most striking result is the strong association between anti-Israel attitudes and volume of antisemitic attitudes, all other factors being equal. This result remains even when controlling for a large number of socio-demographic variables and political beliefs. “The odds of having antisemitic attitudes are 4.4 times higher among those with anti-Israel attitudes than among those without such attitudes (model D).”²⁸⁰

²⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 275.

As far as the effect of political attitudes is concerned, rejection of immigration as an expression of xenophobia stands out as having the strongest influence: The odds of holding antisemitic attitudes are about two times higher as compared with those who do not have this attitude. This attitude, similar to the rejection of political correctness, will be more prevalent in the right-wing and conservative political camps, while the anti-capitalist attitude, which also has a reinforcing effect on antisemitic attitudes, will be more prevalent in the left-wing camp. Antisemitic attitudes are also more likely to occur in association with the justification of the use of violence to achieve political goals, but only when this tendency is strong.

In his analysis of the relationship between antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes and political preferences, Staetsky arrives at new and highly differentiated assessments for both the Right and Left political camps. Compared with the value of the political centre set as 1, those who classify themselves as very right-wing show a significantly higher value of 2.30 in Model A; i.e., this attitude is associated with a higher volume of antisemitic attitudes. However, if we control for political attitudes and violent tendencies (Models B and C), this relationship becomes more tenuous. Although the effect remains with 1.74 in Model D, it is no longer significant.²⁸¹ For Staetsky, this identifies the drivers of the relatively high negativity toward Jews on the Far Right: “(1) the very right-wing segment harbors political attitudes associated with antisemitism, first and foremost anti-immigration views; and (2) the very right-wing segment contains a violent or potentially violent element, and the violent tendency is linked to antisemitism”.²⁸² Based on these findings, Staetsky considers it fruitful, both politically and analytically, to look at the political Right in a more differentiated way, as it seems to consist of several sectors, not all of which are distinctly antisemitic: “First, the self-identified fairly right-wing individuals, for example, are no more antisemitic than the political Centre, and that stands in contrast to the very right-wing. Then, even within the very right-wing, there are more or less antisemitic elements.”²⁸³

The results for the fairly left-wing respondents correspond to the findings of several other studies presented here. These respondents are significantly less antisemitic than the center, across all four models. This tendency is reinforced when the various socio-political attitudes, violent extremist tendencies, and attitudes toward Israel are controlled for. This does not apply to the Far Left in Models A and B, which does not differ significantly from the center.

²⁸¹ Ibid.

²⁸² Ibid., pp. 275–276. This conclusion is supported by the case of odds having antisemitic attitudes, “from 2.30 to 1.76 in transition from model A to model B, and from 1.76 to 1.62 in transition from model B to model C”.

²⁸³ Ibid., p. 276.

Only when the approval of violent extremist tendencies and anti-Israel attitudes are included (Models C and D) do the odds ratios decrease, so that antisemitism is less pronounced in the Far Left than in the political center. Staetsky concludes that it is the presence of anti-Israel attitudes in a segment of the Left that masks the fundamentally anti-antisemitic character of the rest of the Left. There is thus a clearly anti-antisemitic segment of the Left, especially among those who classify themselves as fairly left-wing, and to a lesser extent among the very left-wing. However, there is also an anti-Israel/antisemitic segment on the Left, which is found mainly on the Far Left but also to a lesser extent among the fairly left-wing.²⁸⁴

While adherents of the Christian religion and most other religions do not differ from the non-religious with regard to negative attitudes toward Jews, “being Muslim is associated with greater antisemitism. The odds of holding antisemitic attitudes among Muslims are about 2.5 times higher than among people without religion in the full model (model D)”.²⁸⁵ As Staetsky himself notes, this finding is not new. What is new, however, is the fact of the relative stability of the odds ratios across different statistical models (A–D), indicating that British Muslims are more likely to be antisemitic irrespective of their demographic characteristics, political preferences, presence of violent tendencies, and even anti-Israel attitudes. This result shows that there is more to the story than the common assumption that antisemitism among Muslims is caused by the political conflict with Israel. While surveys show that the level of anti-Israel attitudes among Muslims is exceptionally high, these negative attitudes toward Israel are not the only reason why antisemitism is more widespread among Muslims. As Model D shows, the pure effect of being Muslim (odds ratio of 2.45) remains even when anti-Israel attitudes are excluded. Future research will have to clarify what other reasons are responsible for this.²⁸⁶ Pointing in the same direction is the much more widespread antisemitism among immigrants, many of whom come from political-cultural contexts – especially Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe – where negative attitudes toward Jews are widespread. “The odds of holding antisemitic attitudes are at least two times higher among those born abroad than among the UK-born.” A value that corresponds to the

²⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 277. In his concluding remarks, Staetsky points out that “[i]f these two elements are not identified and separated, [...] then this segment of the Left appears to be no different from many political subgroups to the right” (ibid. p. 284).

²⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 277.

²⁸⁶ Ibid. Among the possible reasons for this, Staetsky suggests the effect of Islam as a religion, which entails a certain theological opposition to Judaism, and the political culture in which Muslims are socialized, which may contain a certain amount of animosity toward non-Muslims and especially toward Jews.

effect of the Muslim category. Again, the effect persists regardless of other demographic characteristics, social and political preferences, and attitudes toward violent tendencies.²⁸⁷

The influence of the age and sex demographic variables remains in all models. Accordingly, men and older respondents show a higher tendency to harbor antisemitic attitudes than women and younger persons. According to Staetsky, the less pronounced rejection of Jews among women could be an “aspect of their more general, relatively less forward, milder, political predisposition”. As far as the age effect is concerned, Staetsky, following the theses of Inglehart and Welzel, sees an explanation in the fact that tolerance of different peoples and lifestyles is a function of material prosperity and political stability.²⁸⁸ The influence of education is associated with having more liberal values, including more tolerant attitudes toward ethnic and religious minorities; this positive educational effect is only apparent in Model A, and it fades when controlling for social and political attitudes toward immigration, capitalism, etc.. Education loses its statistical significance in Models B, C, and D.²⁸⁹

In order to illustrate the influence of the most important variables on antisemitic attitudes, in particular the high probability in the case of anti-Israel attitudes, Staetsky presents a chart with the predicted probabilities of having antisemitic views. For this purpose, he creates an average person with certain characteristics, which is used as a benchmark:

Such an average person is a man or a woman aged 35–54 years, a Christian, with education below degree level, born in the UK and residing outside London; this average person is a centrist in political terms, does not display violent extremist tendencies and does not hold anti-Israel views; equally, he/she does not hold anti-capitalist, anti-immigration or anti-political-correctness positions. The probability for such a person to have antisemitic attitudes is 9%.²⁹⁰

Figure 1 shows how the probability of harboring an antisemitic attitude changes as a result of changing a person’s characteristics away from this average, one at a time.


²⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 279. The “London effect” – i.e., the higher level of antisemitism among Londoners compared with the rest of the country (1.5 times higher) – is also an expression of the “immigration effect”, as London has a 40% non-white population (1.3% classified as Arab) compared with only 10% in the rest of the country (0.3% classified as Arab) (ibid., p. 280).

²⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 279; Ronald Inglehart/Christian Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy*, New York/Cambridge 2005.

²⁸⁹ Staetsky, “The Left, The Right, Christians, Muslims and Detractors of Israel”, pp. 280-281.

²⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 281.

Figure 1: Predicted probabilities of having antisemitic views



Staetsky, “The Left, The Right, Christians, Muslims and detractors of Israel”, p. 283, figure 3.

As a result of his study, Staetsky found that anti-Israel attitudes increased the likelihood of having antisemitic attitudes more than any of the other factors examined here – three times higher than that of the assumed average type. The next most influential factors, at roughly the same level, were birth outside the UK, being Muslim, and having anti-immigration views. For these characteristics the probability of being antisemitic was twice as high as that of the average type. According to the results of this British study, extreme-right attitudes have less of an impact on the likelihood of holding antisemitic attitudes than anti-Israel attitudes and being Muslim – 1.5 times higher than the benchmark average. For the fairly right-wing respondents there is not even any difference from the benchmark, while a moderate and even a radical left-wing attitude actually reduces the likelihood of an antisemitic attitude as compared with the average person.

Similar to the results of the regression analyses presented elsewhere in this article, the regression results of the four models in Table 3 show that “[t]he major part of the picture of determinants of antisemitism remains hidden”. At most, 24% of the variance (R^2) of the

dependent variable could be explained; i.e., 76% remains unexplained by the variables used. Therefore, Staetsky rightly calls for the results of historical, sociological, anthropological, and psychological research on the determinants of attitudes to be used in future in order to come up with new proposals for variables for survey research on antisemitism, with which the explained variance with regard to antisemitic attitudes can be increased.²⁹¹

11. Perceptions of the Middle East conflict, anti-Israel and antisemitic attitudes in

Norway (2017)

In Norway, two investigations into antisemitism were carried out by the Norwegian Center for Holocaust and Minority Studies in the past decade, in 2011 and 2017. In addition to antisemitic attitudes, attitudes toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and toward Israel were also surveyed. The following presentation of the results on the relationship between antisemitism and hostility toward Israel is limited to the 2017 study, *Attitudes Towards Jews and Muslims in Norway 2017. Population Survey and Minority Study*, edited by Christhard Hoffmann and Vibeke Moe,²⁹² and on an essay by Ottar Hellevik based on the study data.²⁹³

While the studies presented so far have limited themselves to examining the connection between antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes, the Norwegian study also examined the influence of Islamophobia on perceptions of the different parties in the Middle East conflict. As another possible (background) variable, xenophobic views were included in the analysis. Attitudes toward the two parties in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict were measured both by asking which side one supports in this conflict, and also by elaborating three indices using six items about Israel and the Palestinians: a Pro-Israel Index, an Anti-Israel Index, and a Pro-Palestinian Index.

²⁹¹ Ibid., p. 287.

²⁹² Published by the Center for Studies of the Holocaust and Religious Minorities, Oslo 2017. The author and Ottar Hellevik were both part of the Project Team. The survey of the Norwegian population was conducted online using GallupPanellet, Kantar TNS access panel. The number of interviews was 1,575 (response rate 54%). The survey was representative in terms of education, gender, age, and geographical region (p. 22). The target population for the survey among Muslims consisted of immigrants from ten countries – Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iraq, Iran, Kosovo, Morocco, Pakistan, Palestine, Somalia, Turkey – with at least five years of residence in Norway. TNS Kantar used addresses selected from the National Registry, and randomly selected 7,000 individuals disproportionately pre-stratified based on previous survey response rates from the various national groups. After two reminders there were 826 replies, for a response rate of 12 percent. Of these, 584 answered “Muslim” to the question of religious affiliation, and this was the sample used in the analyses.

²⁹³ Ottar Hellevik, “Antisemitism and Islamophobia in Norway. A Survey Analysis of Prevalence; Trends and Possible Causes of Negative Attitudes towards Jews and Muslims”, in: Hoffmann/ Moe (eds.), *The Shifting Boundaries of Prejudice: Antisemitism and Islamophobia in Norway 2017*, Oslo 2020, Chapter 4, pp. 108–154.

Half of the Norwegian population sample either does not take a side or cannot answer the question: “People have conflicting views on the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. Which side do you support most?” If the population takes a side, it does so mainly for the Palestinians (32.3%), with far fewer (13.3%) siding with Israel.

Table 1: People have conflicting views on the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. Which side do you support most? (percent)

Year	to some extent			impossible to answer/ neither no answ.	to some extent			Sum	
	solely	mostly	extent		extent	mostly	solely		
	I s r a e l				P a l e s t i n i a n s				
2017	2.1	6.7	4.5	31.9	22.5	10.5	18.3	3.6	100.1

Hoffmann/Moe (eds), *Attitudes Towards Jews and Muslims*, p. 84, table 36.

The positioning on the Middle East conflict is correlated with the emotional attitude; in this case, dislike/antipathy toward Jews and Muslims. The influence can, of course, go both ways: Israel’s policies may affect which side one supports, which may also lead to a dislike of Jews. The emotional dimension was measured using the item “I have a certain dislike of Jews”; 7.5% indicated that this statement fits in whole or in part with their own opinion, 81.2% indicated that this does not fit in whole or in part with their opinion, and 11.3% did not or could not answer the question.

Table 2: “I have a certain dislike of Jews” (How well does this statement fit with you own opinion?) and Position on the Middle East conflict (percent)

Dislike / Position on Middle East conflict (%)	Pro-Israel	Neither/ No response	Pro-Palestinian	Total n
Not at all / rather badly	15	54	31	1,279
Impossible to say / no response	4	76	20	178
Completely /	7	27	66	118

rather well

Author's own calculation, based on data from Hoffmann/Moe (eds), *Attitudes Towards Jews and Muslims*.

The emotional attitude toward Muslims was measured using the same item, "I have a certain dislike of Muslims"; 30.4% indicated that this statement does fit with their opinion, 56.0% indicated that this does not fit with their opinion, and 13.5% did not or could not answer the question.

Table 3: "I have a certain dislike of Muslims" (How well does this statement fit with your own opinion?) and Position on the Middle East conflict (percent)

Dislike / Position on the Middle East conflict	Pro-Israel	Neither / No response	Pro-Palestinian	Total n
Not at all / rather badly	9	49	42	873
Impossible to say / no response	8	69	23	229
Completely / rather well	24	57	19	473

Author's own calculations based on data from Hoffmann/Moe (eds), *Attitudes Towards Jews and Muslims*.

Table 2 shows that the emotional attitude toward Jews plays a role in taking sides with Israel, as twice as many respondents who disagreed with the "dislike" question were pro-Israel as compared with those who agreed with the question. On the other hand, rejecting the "dislike" question does not mean taking Israel's side, as 85% either did not take sides or sided with the Palestinians. The connection is clearer for those who expressed an emotional aversion toward Jews, since two-thirds of them sided with the Palestinians and only 7% with Israel.

Concerning the emotional attitude of the population toward Muslims, the distribution in terms of taking sides in the Middle East conflict is as expected. Those respondents who dislike Muslims were more likely to have a pro-Israel attitude than those who were neutral or positive in this regard, while those who dislike Muslims sided with the Palestinians less often than those who have a positive attitude toward Muslims – and vice versa. Those who did not take

sides in the Middle East conflict (more than half of the sample), however, did so largely regardless of their emotional attitude toward Muslims.

In addition to the question of which side one supports, attitudes toward the two parties in the Israel-Palestinian conflict were measured using the following six items.

Table 4: Statements on the Middle East conflict (percent in 2017)

How well do these statements about the Middle East conflict fit with your own opinion?	Not at all	Rather badly	Impossible to answer / no response	Rather well	Completely	Total	Rather well + Completely
Israel's leaders genuinely want to find a solution to the conflict	10.0	31.2	37.0	17.8	4.1	100.1	21.9
Israel is at the forefront of the war on Islamic terrorism	8.0	20.9	51.9	14.7	4.5	100.1	19.2
As long as the State of Israel exists there can be no peace	13.2	20.9	45.6	15.8	4.6	100.1	20.4
Israel treats the Palestinians just as badly as the Jews were treated during World War II	9.9	20.5	37.4	25.4	6.9	100.1	32.3
Both the Israelis and the Palestinians are entitled to a state of their own	2.2	4.4	23.1	30.9	39.5	100.1	70.4
The Palestinian leaders genuinely want to find a solution to the conflict	7.3	19.2	40.4	28.2	5.0	100.1	33.2

Population $N = 1,575$; based on Hoffmann/Moe (eds), *Attitudes Towards Jews and Muslims*, p. 85, table 37.

A factor analysis of the six statements resulted in three dimensions, each with a pair of the statements. When the answers for each statement are coded from 0 to 4, this gives three additive indices with scores ranging from 0 to 8. A Pro-Israel Index (statements 1 and 2) is built out of the following two statements: “*Israel is on the forefront of the war on Islamic terrorism*” and “*Israel’s leaders genuinely want to find a solution to the conflict*”; the Anti-Israel Index (statements 3 and 4) is built out of the items “*Israel treats the Palestinians just as badly as the Jews were treated in World War II*” and “*As long as Israel exists there will be no peace*”; and a Pro-Palestinian Index (statements 5 and 6) similarly contains two items: “*Both*

the Israelis and the Palestinians are entitled to have a state of their own”²⁹⁴ and “*Palestinian leaders genuinely want to find a solution to the conflict*”. Table 5 shows the distribution on the indices and how they are dichotomized. The scale is divided just above the midpoint so that scores of 5 to 8 are defined as high values on the index.

Table 5: Indices for opinions on the Middle East conflict (Percent. Population sample)

Index	Year	Index score										Total	High 5–8
		0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8			
Pro-Israel attitudes	2017	3.0	5.8	15.2	14.6	40.8	10.3	6.6	2.3	1.4	100.0	20.6	
Anti-Israel attitudes	2017	5.2	5.4	12.2	11.2	38.7	12.6	9.3	3.4	2.0	100.0	27.2	
Pro-Palestinian attitudes	2017	1.2	1.3	3.0	5.3	28.8	19.3	21.8	15.7	3.8	100.2	60.5	

Hoffmann/Moe (eds), *Attitudes Towards Jews and Muslims*, p. 86, figures 30–32.

Given this cutoff point, 27.2% of the population ($n = 428$) display a high level of anti-Israel attitudes.²⁹⁵ Once again, the answers make it clear that the respondents in the general population are more inclined to support the Palestinian side in the Middle East conflict: 60.5% ($n = 952$) compared with only 20.6% siding with Israel ($n = 324$).

The six negative items in Table 6 were used to build a Prejudice against Jews Index, in which respondents who answered “rather well” received one point on the scale and those who answered “completely” received 2 points. This results in a scale ranging from 0 to 12. If we place the cutoff point between 3 and 4 to differentiate the low from the high scorers, we get 8.3% scoring high on this Prejudice against Jews Index.

²⁹⁴ The statement about the right to have a state of their own is seen here as being pro-Palestinian in its content, since it is for the Palestinians that such a right is not fulfilled at present. This interpretation is supported by the results of the factor analysis.

²⁹⁵ See *ibid.*, Section 7.

Table 6: Percent who find that the statement fits rather well or completely with their own opinion

	Population sample
Jews have too much influence on the global economy	13
Jews consider themselves be better than others	18
World Jewry is working behind the scenes to promote Jewish interests	14
Jews have enriched themselves at the expense of others	12
Jews have always caused problems in the countries in which they live	8
Jews largely have themselves to blame for being persecuted	8

Population N = 1,575

Table 7: Attitudes toward Jews (percent)

	0 Low	1-3	4-6	7-9	10-12 High	Total
Index scores						
Prejudice	69.2	22.5	5.0	1.9	1.4	100.0
Index scores	0 Low	1	2 High			
Dislike	93.3	5.2	1.5			100.0
Index scores	0 Low	1	2	3	4 High	
Social Distance	91.6	2.5	4.0	0.3	1.6	100.0
Index Scores	0 Low	1	2	3 High		
Combined Index	86.7	7.9	3.4	2.1		100.1

N = 1,575

Table 8: Anti-Israel attitudes by Prejudice against Jews (percent)

Prejudice against Jews	0	1-3	4-6	7-9	10-12	<i>n</i>
Anti-Israel attitudes						
Low scorer 0-4	81.0	64.2	40.4	27.6	13.1	1,147
High scorer 5-8	19.0	35.8	59.7	72.4	86.9	428
<i>n</i>	1,089	354	77	29	23	1,575

The table above reveals a clear connection between antisemitic prejudice and anti-Israel attitudes: the more pronounced antisemitic prejudices are, the more often respondents also display a negative attitude toward Israel. On the other hand, however, a substantial number (19% and 36%, respectively) of those who either have not agreed with any antisemitic item or have only a minor agreement also displayed a negative attitude toward Israel. If we look at the absolute numbers (*n*), then of the 428 respondents who are high scorers on the Anti-Israel Index, 324 do not fall within the high scorer category on the Prejudice against Jews Index. This means that three-quarters of the respondents (75.7%) who have a negative attitude toward Israel are not classified as harboring antisemitic prejudices. The number of those who score zero on both indices is rather small (*n* = 72). The moderate correlation between the Anti-Israel Index and the Prejudice against Jews Index is $r = 0.35$.²⁹⁶

When we use the Combined Index of Antisemitism, which was created from the indices for emotional rejection, social distance, and cognitive prejudice, the negative values are lower than in the Prejudice against Jews Index (see Table 6). This can be explained by emotional rejection and social distance usually being expressed less frequently than prejudice. The Combined Index of Antisemitism is an additive index created from the three dichotomized sub-indices, scored 0 and 1. On this index, high scorers (2-3 points on the index) accounted for 5.5%.

²⁹⁶ This correlation is significant on the $p < 0.001$ level.

First, we have to ask about the correlation between anti-Israel and antisemitic attitudes. The correlation between the Anti-Israel Index and the Combined Index of Antisemitism is only moderate with $r = .32$ (significant $p < 0.001$), but there is no significant correlation between the Combined Index of Antisemitism and a pro-Palestinian attitude ($p < .06$). Among the high scorers on the Combined Index of Antisemitism (5.5%) there is clear support for the Palestinians in the Middle East conflict (12% compared with 2% for Israel), but while 7% display strong pro-Palestinian attitudes, 9% display weak pro-Palestinian attitudes.

Of the high scorers on the Anti-Israel Index (5–8), 5.3% also score high on the Combined Index of Antisemitism;²⁹⁷ that is to say, 94.7% of those with an outspoken anti-Israel attitude do not score high on the Combined Index of Antisemitism. One finding that stands out is that 12.4% of high scorers on the Anti-Israel Index are also high scorers on the Islamophobia Index. In other words, a negative attitude toward Israel does not necessarily go hand in hand with a positive attitude toward Muslims.²⁹⁸ This is due to the fact that both antisemitism and Islamophobia are in part expressions of the general background variables xenophobia and distrust toward immigrants.²⁹⁹


The connection between antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes is also clearly apparent from the fact that respondents scoring high on the Anti-Israel Index (5–8 points) were far more likely to agree with anti-Jewish items than those scoring low on the index.

²⁹⁷ The negative correlation between the Combined Index of Antisemitism and a pro-Israel position on the Middle East conflict is also not very high ($r = -.17$). All correlations are significant on the $p < 0.001$ level.

²⁹⁸ This is also supported by the fact that the Combined Index of Antisemitism has no significant correlation ($r = .06$) with a pro-Palestinian attitude in the Middle East conflict.

²⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 139; see also p. 142, table 4.19.

Figure 1: Endorsement of antisemitic statements among those with strong anti-Israel attitudes (scores 5–8) and those without strong anti-Israel attitudes (scores 0–4 – agree completely and rather well) (%)



High scorers on the anti-Israel attitudes index: $N = 428$; low scorers: $N = 1,147$

This study also examines Islamophobia as a possible factor influencing attitudes toward Israel and the Palestinians. In parallel to what was done for antisemitism, three indices were created to measure emotional rejection (see below, Table 10), social distance,³⁰⁰ and prejudice (Table 9) against Muslims. A Combined Index of Islamophobia was then formed from these three indices.

³⁰⁰ The Dislike of Muslims Index is built out of two items: “I have a certain dislike of Muslims” (30.4 5%) and “I have a particular sympathy for Muslims” (14.4%). Those who agree with both the dislike statement and the sympathy statement are not counted as having negative feelings towards Muslims. This reduces the amount of high scorers to 27.8%.

The Social Distance Index (ranging from 0 to 4) is built out of two items: “To what extent would you like or dislike having Muslims as neighbors” and “To what extent would you like or dislike having Muslims in your circle of friends”. For each question the answer “dislike it a little” was scored 1, and “dislike it a lot” scored 2; respondents were counted as high scorers when they got more than one point. 19.6% scored high on this index.

Table 9: Percent who find that the statements fit rather well or completely with own opinion.³⁰¹

	population in %
Muslims pose a threat to Norwegian culture	40
Muslims do not fit into modern Western society	36
Muslims have themselves to blame for the increase in anti-Muslim harassment	48
Muslims consider themselves morally superior to others	46
Muslims want to take over Europe	31
Muslims are more violent than others	29

N = 1,562

Table 10: Attitudes toward Muslims (percent)

Index scores	0 Low	1–3	4–6	7–9	10–12 High	Total
Prejudice	37.1	28.9	14.8	9.7	9.7	100.2
Index scores	0 Low	1	2 High			
Dislike	72.3	20.5	7.3			100.1
Index scores	0 Low	1	2	3	4 High	
Social Distance	72.2	8.2	9.1	2.1	8.4	100.0
Index Scores	0 Low	1	2	3 High		
Combined Index	59.2	13.8	13.4	13.6		100.0

N = 1,562

In addition to being dichotomized in multivariate analyses, the indices are trichotomized in some tables. Then low values will denote scores 0–2, medium values 3–5, and high values 6–8.

³⁰¹ In this case, the population sample is *N* = 1,562.

Table 11: Variation in antisemitism and Islamophobia (Percentage with high scores on the combined indices). (Population sample)

Variable	Values Index Scores	High	High	Percent of sample	n
		Antisemitism	Islamophobia		
Support for parties in the Middle East	Solely/mostly Palestinians	12	13	22	345
	To some extent Palestin.	6	18	11	165
	Neither/no opinion	3	28	54	856
	To some extent Israel	5	47	5	70
	Solely/mostly Israel	2	60	9	138
Pro-Israeli attitudes	Strong (6–8)	3	52	10	162
	Medium (3–5)	4	24	63	1,035
	Weak (0–2)	11	26	23	378
Anti-Israeli attitudes	Strong (6–8)	22	36	15	231
	Medium (3–5)	3	23	66	984
	Weak (0–2)	2	34	24	360
Pro-Palestinian attitudes	Strong (6–8)	7	20	41	650
	Medium (3–5)	4	31	53	840
	Weak (0–2)	9	45	5	85
All		5	27	100	1,575

Hellevik, *Antisemitism and Islamophobia in Norway*, abridged version of table 4.18, pp. 138–139.

“Which side the respondents support in the Middle East conflict and what opinions they hold on the conflict clearly correlate with antisemitism and Islamophobia in the expected direction.”³⁰² Looking at the correlations between Islamophobic attitudes and attitudes toward Israel and the Palestinians, we find only a low positive correlation with a pro-Israel attitude ($r = .12$) and also a quite low negative correlation with a pro-Palestinian position ($r = -.18$). This is in contrast to the influence of antisemitism, which has a moderate significant positive

³⁰² Hellevik, “Antisemitism and Islamophobia in Norway”, p. 139.

correlation with anti-Israel attitudes ($r = .32$) but also a weaker negative correlation with a pro-Israel attitude ($r = -.17$).³⁰³ The exception is that the correlation between pro-Palestinian attitudes and antisemitism is weak ($r = .06$) but significant at the $p = .02$ level. This “finding indicates that having pro-Palestinian attitudes is not necessarily a result of antisemitism”.³⁰⁴ Strong anti-Israel attitudes and strong pro-Israel attitudes alike can be accompanied by Islamophobia. Because of this ambivalence, the correlation between Islamophobia and anti-Israel attitudes is not significant ($r = .009$).

If one correlates partisanship in the Middle East conflict with the Combined Index of Antisemitism, then of the 5.5% ($n = 86$) who are high scorers (2 + 3 points on the index), 51% support the Palestinian side and only 14% support Israel, the rest do not take a position for either side or cannot answer the question. Even of those who score only one point on the index ($n = 124$), 37% are on the side of the Palestinians and only 4.8% on the side of Israel. Islamophobia has a less polarizing effect. Of the 27% ($n = 436$) who are considered high scorers here (2 + 3 points on the index), there are still 17.4% on the side of the Palestinians but more (27.5%) on the side of Israel.

In order to compare the importance of the different explanatory variables, Hellevik performs two bi- and multivariate regressions with antisemitism and Islamophobia on the one hand and with anti-Israel attitudes on the other as dependent variables.³⁰⁵ To facilitate a comparison between the importance of the different explanatory variables they are dichotomized in the multivariate analysis:

The exception is which side respondents supported in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, which is represented by two dummy variables, with not taking sides as reference group. With the dichotomised indices of antisemitism and Islamophobia, coded 0 for low value and 1 for high value, as dependent variables, the linear regression coefficients equal proportion differences. When multiplied by 100 as shown in the table, the coefficients can be interpreted as percentage differences. The bivariate association between gender and antisemitism in Table 12 (-4.9) for example corresponds to the difference in percentage points between women and men ... (3 - 8 = -5).

³⁰³ All four correlations are significant: $p < 0.001$.

³⁰⁴ Hellevik, “Antisemitism and Islamophobia in Norway”, p. 139. Although Hellevik does note that “the ambiguity of one the indicators, the statement supporting the right to a state for both parties to the conflict, may also have contributed to this result” (fn 26).

³⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 142, table 4.19.

The variables in the table are divided into two categories. The first contains the social background variables and belief in God, the second opinion on the Middle East conflict, xenophobia and distrust toward immigrants. The latter group of variables lie closer to antisemitism and Islamophobia in the causal chain, and can be considered as intervening variables between the first group of variables and negative attitudes toward Jews and Muslims. They represent potential mechanisms that may explain the correlation between them.

It could also be possible that the influence works in the opposite direction; for instance, that Islamophobia leads to distrust toward immigrants, or that it works both ways, meaning that these phenomena stimulate each other. This is impossible to determine with the available data.³⁰⁶

Regardless of causal direction, it is interesting to identify the extent to which these characteristics coexist in people.

The multivariate analysis is performed in two stages. In the first stage, the social background variables and belief in God are included. Changes in the bivariate correlation for a variable show how much of this correlation can be explained by the other variables in the group. For some, such as gender and age, this part of the association will be indirect effects. For others it may also be a case of spurious (non-causal) association caused by variables in the group prior to them in time. In the second stage, all the variables are included, and the remaining association constitutes the direct effect of the variable in question, given the variables included in the model and its assumptions of causality.³⁰⁷

³⁰⁶ Ibid., pp. 140–141.

³⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 141.

Table 12: Bivariate and multivariate regression analysis with dichotomized indices of antisemitism and Islamophobia as dependent variables (Regression coefficients multiplied by 100)*

Variable	High value (index score)	Antisemitism			Islamophobia		
		bivariate	multivariate		bivariate	multivariate	
Gender	Female	-4.9	-4.8	-4.4	-14.2	-14.0	-5.1
Age	<44 years	-2.4	(-2.2)	(-0.5)	-11.5	-9.9	-5.1
Education	University	-3.5	-2.9	(-1.7)	-12.7	-12.7	(-0.8)
Belief in God	Yes	(0.5)	(0.3)	(1.9)	6.1	4.9	-2.6
Middle East conflict (2 dummy variables) (Refer. Group: Do not take sides)	Support Israel	(-2.6)	(-1.3)		33.0	13.9	
	Support Palestinians	6.6	5.4		-18.7	-8.0	
Pro-Israeli attitudes	Strong (5–8)	(-2.6)	(-1.9)		12.7	(0.6)	
Anti-Israeli attitudes	Strong (5–8)	12.6	10.3		5.0	5.5	
Pro-Palestinian attit.	Strong (5–8)	(0.3)	(-1.6)		-11.1	(-0.3)	
Xenophobia Scepticism towards immigrants	Strong (7–12)	15.9	14.6		64.1	39.9	
	Strong (3–4)	6.2	(1.0)		54.4	36.4	
Explained variance (adjusted R^2)			0.016	0.130		0.056	0.419

* In brackets: Not significant (5% level).

Hellevik, *Antisemitism and Islamophobia in Norway*, p. 142, table 4.19.

The results of the final multivariate analysis show that anti-Israel attitudes and supporting the Palestinians in the Middle East conflict have an effect on antisemitism, which confirms the results of the study by Cohen et al., but that a general xenophobic attitude has a stronger effect. Being a woman reduces the chances of scoring high on antisemitism. While supporting the Palestinian side has only a very small effect on the level of antisemitism (5.4), supporting Israel in the Middle East conflict increases the chance for a high level of Islamophobia much more (13.9), and supporting the Palestinians also reduces the chances more (-8.0) (as does being a woman or young of age). But the effect of one's position on the Middle East conflict is much smaller than the effect of xenophobia on the level of Islamophobia. Also in terms of effect on Islamophobia, xenophobia is followed closely by distrust toward immigrants, which had little effect on the incidence of antisemitism.

The variables used in this multivariate regression have a relatively low explanatory power (explained variance) with regard to antisemitism – i.e., xenophobia and the attitude toward Israel explain little in this case – this is also true of the demographic variables. It is different in the case of Islamophobia, for which xenophobia and distrust toward immigrants have a high explanatory power. Support for Israel in the Middle East conflict also plays a certain role, although there is an (albeit small) positive correlation with anti-Israel attitudes.

We have seen in Table 12 that anti-Israel attitudes go together with antisemitic attitudes. However, since the influence of antisemitism on attitudes toward Israel is particularly relevant to our question, we changed the direction of our view and calculated a multivariate regression in which anti-Israel attitudes were the dependent variable (Table 13).

Table 13: Bivariate and multivariate regression analysis with dichotomized index of Anti-Israel attitudes as dependent variable (Regression coefficients multiplied by 100)

Variable	high value	anti-Israel attitudes	
		bivariate	multivariate
Gender	Female	(3.2)	(5.6)
Age	Under 44	-8.5	-6.3
Education	University	-8.2	-8.8
Belief in God	Yes	(-1.6)	(0.1)
Israeli-Palestinian conflict (2 dummy variables)	Support Israel	-23.5	-15.8
	Support Palestinians	26.6	23.5
Xenophobia	Strong (7–12)	(7.1)	(0.9)
Scepticism towards Immigrants	Strong (3–4)	(4.8)	7.6
Antisemitism	Strong (2–3)	48.3	37.9
Explained Variance (adjusted R^2)			0.155

() not significant (5% level)

Unpublished calculation by Ottar Hellevik specifically for this article, based on the data collected for the study of Hoffmann/Moe (eds), *Attitudes Towards Jews and Muslims*.

The results of the multivariate analysis show that antisemitism has the strongest effect on anti-Israel attitudes, followed by support for the Palestinians in the Middle East conflict. Siding with Israel in the Middle East conflict reduces the chances of being anti-Israel, as does being young of age and having a university education of four or more years. The attitudes of men and women differ with regard to Jews and Israel, but not significantly. The influence of the variable gender (women) is opposite in the two bi- and multivariate regressions above. While being a woman reduces the chances for a high score in the case of antisemitism, being a woman increases the chances in the case of an anti-Israel attitude. The indices for antisemitism and an anti-Israel attitude also show that women (3%) rarely display antisemitic attitudes compared with men (7.9%); the opposite is true in the case of anti-Israel attitudes. On the Anti-Israel Index, women are more likely to be high scorers (28.8%) than men (25.6%). While xenophobia has no direct influence on anti-Israel attitudes (except possibly via its indirect influence on antisemitism), distrust toward immigrants did. Overall, however, the explained variance in the case of antisemitism as well as in the case of anti-Israel attitudes is quite low at 0.130 and 0.155, while the variables included in the regression analysis can explain the variance in the case of Islamophobia much better at 0.419.

Some of the aforementioned studies on the link between antisemitism and Islamophobia have shown that antisemitic attitudes are significantly more common among the right-wing, while negative attitudes toward Israel are more common among the right-wing and the left-wing. The results for the Norwegian population differ in some respects from this pattern and are less clear.

Table 14: Anti-Israel attitudes and Party Vote in the last election (percent)

	DNA	Frp	Høyre	KrF	SP	SV	Venstre	Rødt	Greens	No Resp.
0-4 Low	70.6	73.5	72.6	91.5	70,4	70.0	84.0	46.7	76.9	69.4
5-8 High	29.4	26.5	27.4	8.5	29.6	30.0	16.0	53.3	23.1	30.6
<i>n</i>	365	174	367	38	81	65	52	27	32	144


N = 1,376, missing 198

DNA = Labour Party / Frp = Progress Party / Høyre = Conservative Party / KrF = Christian Democratic Party / SP = Centre Party / SV = Socialist Left Party / Venstre = Liberal Party / Rødt = Red Party / Greens = Miljøpartiet De Grønne. The Kystpartiet (Coastal Party), Other, and “Don’t know” are omitted because of very small numbers (*n* = 3, 14, and 3, respectively)

Table 15: Combined Index of Antisemitism and Party Vote (percent)

	DNA	Frp	Høyre	KrF	SP	SV	Venstre	Rødt	Greens	No response
0-1 Low	95.0	88.3	94.0	100	96.3	98.4	98.3	91.3	89.7	94.3
2-3 High	5.0	11.7	6.0	0.0	3.7	1.6	1.7	8.7	10.3	5.7
<i>n</i>	365	174	367	38	81	65	52	27	32	144

Figure 2: Antisemitism and Anti-Israel attitude by Party Vote (percent)



DNA = Labour Party / Frp = Progress Party (far-right) / Høyre = Conservative Party / KrF = Christian Democratic Party / SP = Centre Party / SV = Socialist Left Party / Venstre = Liberal Party / Rødt = Red Party (far-left) / Green Party = Miljøpartiet De Grønne. Rødt and the Greens are put in brackets and italics because the very small samples mean the confidence levels for the results for antisemitism are +/- 11.0 for Rødt and +/- 10.3 for the Greens – too large to reliably draw any conclusions.

The distribution of supporters of Norwegian political parties with regard to their attitudes toward Jews and Israel shows that supporters of the Liberal Party (Venstre) and the Christian Democratic Party (Kristelig Folkeparti) have low values in both dimensions, albeit based on different motivations. Christian Democrats support Israel for religious reasons, while Liberals do so more because of their political positions. Supporters of the Labour Party (Arbeiderpartiet), the liberal-conservative Høyre, and the more rural Senterpartiet (Sp) fall within the population average. Voters for the far-left Rødt party display a high level of anti-Israel attitudes, which does indeed correspond to the results for radical-left parties in other countries, but here the number of cases ($n = 27$) is too small to be able to draw any valid conclusions.³⁰⁸ The latter also applies to the center-left Green Party. Supporters of the right-wing populist Progress Party comprise the highest proportion of antisemitic high scorers but fall within the population average when it comes to anti-Israel attitudes. This is not surprising, as the party positions itself against immigration but is economically liberal and advocates greater cooperation with the USA and Israel. This corresponds to the positioning of right-wing populist parties in other European countries (for instance, the Netherlands, Germany, and Austria), which mainly target immigrants, especially those from Muslim countries, but

³⁰⁸ On the other hand, the Rødt voters are atypical, since their political position is also associated with a higher proportion of antisemitic attitudes, but the confidence interval for this dimension is very large.

take pro-Israel positions. Nonetheless, antisemitic attitudes are far more common among their supporters than among the general population.

12. Antisemitism as anti-modern resentment and Israel-related antisemitism (2020)

Since 2002, Oliver Decker and Elmar Brähler, in cooperation with other colleagues, have regularly published empirical studies on right-wing extremism in Germany. In 2020, the Leipzig Study on Authoritarianism³⁰⁹ included a chapter that examines the convergence of three dimensions of antisemitism.³¹⁰ In a departure from international practice, research on antisemitism in Germany usually distinguishes between three dimensions: traditional or classical antisemitism, secondary or defense-against-guilt antisemitism, and Israel-related antisemitism (for definitions, see above, Section 3.2). The authors have added a further, fourth dimension – indirect communication or detour communication – within the dimension of traditional antisemitism.³¹¹ The four dimensions were each measured using three items.³¹²


³⁰⁹ Published as: Oliver Decker/Elmar Brähler (eds.), *Autoritäre Dynamiken. Neue Radikalität – alte Ressentiments. Leipziger Autoritarismus Studie 2020*, Gießen 2020. For the 2020 study, 2,503 people in Germany were interviewed. The survey was conducted by the opinion research institute USUMA. “The participants were selected as a stratified random sample [...] The interviewers assigned there were entrusted with selecting the households using the random-route method to determine the target person in the household with the Swedish key. The response rate this year was 47.3%, which is to be rated as high.” The questionnaire used for the study was answered in writing by the respondents. The interviewer helped them with the demographic information. When answering the second, content-related part of the questionnaire, the interviewer was only available in an advisory capacity (pp. 27–28).

³¹⁰ The following presentation refers to chapter 7 of the study by Decker/Brähler: Johannes Kiess/Oliver Decker/Ayline Heller/Elmar Brähler, “Antisemitismus als antimodernes Ressentiment”, in: Decker/Brähler, *Autoritäre Dynamiken*, pp. 211–248 (in English: “Antisemitism as an anti-modern resentment”).

³¹¹ As a fourth dimension, the authors have introduced the form of indirect communication or detour communication, which is based on the social ostracism of antisemitism in public, measured by three items. “It is easy for me to understand that some people are uncomfortable with Jews”, “It is better not to talk about the Jews”, “Jews are naturally part of the German population”. Since the level of approval for these items hardly differs from the approval for the items that are supposed to measure traditional antisemitism, the authors merged both dimensions and therefore speak of “extended traditional antisemitism” (ibid., p. 221f and p. 223, table 1).


³¹² Ibid., pp. 225–227, figures 1–4.

Figure 1: Manifest and latent approval for traditional antisemitism



Kiess et al., “Antisemitismus als antimodernes Ressentiment”, p. 225, figure 1.

Figure 2: Manifest and latent approval for traditional antisemitism in indirect communication




Kiess et al., “Antisemitismus als antimodernes Ressentiment”, p. 225, figure 2.

The possible answers on a 5-point scale (1–5) range from complete rejection of the statement (1) to complete agreement (5). The middle category (3) consists of the answer “in part”. Those who chose this answer category were classified as latently antisemitic and those who chose answer categories 4–5 were classified as manifestly antisemitic.³¹³

The two different dimensions of traditional antisemitism overlap, “both in the formulation of the items and in their content”, and they were therefore combined into a single dimension for the other models, called “extended antisemitism”.³¹⁴

Figure 3: Manifest and latent approval for defense-against-guilt antisemitism



Kiess et al., “Antisemitismus als antimodernes Ressentiment”, p. 226, figure 3.


For many years, standard items have been used in German antisemitism surveys to record

³¹³ In a previous Mitte study, the qualitative procedure of the “group discussion” was used to verify whether or not those who had chosen the answer category “in part”, in the middle of a 5-point scale, were more inclined to agree with right-wing extremist attitudes. The authors suspected that with this type of answer the neither negative nor approving response to the extreme-right statements (including items on antisemitism) might be evidence of socially desirable response behavior; in other words, in this case they suspected at least some “covert” approval for right-wing extremist statements. “This assumption was confirmed in the group discussion following the quantitative study with respondents from the survey.” “Some” means, however, that not all respondents who chose this answer category could also be classified as latently antisemitic. (Oliver Decker/Elmar Brähler, *Bewegung in der Mitte. Rechtsextreme Einstellungen in Deutschland*, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Berlin 2008, p. 15f; Oliver Decker/Katharina Rothe/Marliese Weissmann/Norman Geißler/Elmar Brähler/Franziska Göpner/Kathleen Pöge, *Ein Blick in die Mitte. Zur Entstehung rechtsextremer und demokratischer Einstellungen in Deutschland*, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Berlin 2008.)

³¹⁴ Kiess et al., “Antisemitismus als antimodernes Ressentiment”, p. 230.

defense-against-guilt antisemitism (secondary antisemitism), so it comes as some surprise that new items were developed for this study. What's more, two of the three items are formulated in such a way that a reference to Jews is not apparent and need not necessarily have been intended by the respondents. In other words, it is by no means certain that they were comparing the expulsion of Germans and the bombing of German cities to the persecution of the Jews, just as the preference for addressing contemporary problems rather than events seventy years past does not necessarily mean that it is the memory of the persecution of the Jews that is being warded off.

Figure 4: Manifest and latent approval for Israel-related antisemitism



Kiess et al., "Antisemitismus als antimodernes Ressentiment", p. 227, figure 4.

The characteristic values of the internal consistency of the four dimensions, which the authors measured using McDonald's Omega ω , are in the adequate to very good range. Traditional antisemitism achieved the lowest values in detour communication with $\omega = .75$ (see Figure 2), which is why the six items for traditional antisemitism (Figures 1 and 2) have been combined so that we get three instead of four dimensions. In the following, instead of four only three dimensions will be discussed (Model 2). The lowest internal consistency in Model 2 shows the defense-against-guilt antisemitism dimension having $\omega = .77$, indicating a good reliability.³¹⁵ This is higher for the combined traditional antisemitism, which has $\omega = .88$, and for Israel-related antisemitism, which has $\omega = .81$. All three dimensions show a very high internal consistency of $\omega = .92$.³¹⁶


In Figure 5, which shows the 3-dimensional model of the antisemitic worldview, the standardized factor loadings with which the three dimensions load on the overarching factor antisemitism are provided.³¹⁷

³¹⁵ As previously mentioned above, two of the three items in this dimension measure a general tendency to defend oneself against guilt rather than a specific anti-guilt antisemitism. Items 1 and 3 in Figure 3 have a significantly lower share of the shared variance (.67 and .68) of the dimension defense-against-guilt antisemitism than item 2 (.82), which mentions victims of the Holocaust.

³¹⁶ Kiess et al., "Antisemitismus als antimodernes Ressentiment", p. 232, table 2: Internal Consistency (McDonald's omega) for the individual dimensions of antisemitism.

³¹⁷ Ibid., p. 231, figure 6. In contrast to xenophobic resentment, antisemitism is understood here as an anti-modern worldview in which Jews are regarded as "symbols of modernity" and are made responsible for all the problems associated with modernity (ibid., p. 217).

Figure 5 Three-Dimensional Model of the antisemitic worldview



Note: The path coefficients represent the standardized factor loadings. The variance of the latent variables was set to 1 for the analysis. Calculations with $N = 2,354$ and maximum likelihood estimation method.

From: Kiess et al., “Antisemitismus als antimodernes Ressentiment”, p. 231, figure 6.

The statements on Israel-related antisemitism have a very high factor loading of .99 on the overall phenomenon of antisemitism; i.e., after squaring the factor loading, 98% of the variance in Israel-related antisemitism is congruent with the overall phenomenon. The extended traditional antisemitism dimension shows less overlap with the overall phenomenon of antisemitism, but still reaches 62.4% shared variance after squaring the factor loading of .79. In contrast, the association of defense-against-guilt antisemitism is quite low with only 38.4% shared variance. The authors rightly see this as an indication that this dimension is co-determined by other factors not included in the model.³¹⁸ This result is likely due to the formulation of three new items for defense-against-guilt antisemitism, which have already been commented on critically above. These items measure a general tendency to ward off historical responsibility rather than to ward off guilt for the persecution of the Jews. There is

³¹⁸ Ibid., p. 233.

no reference to Jews in either item. The fact that agreement with the items in the defense-against-guilt dimension is significantly higher than in the other two dimensions can also be seen as a sign that the respondents had motives other than hostility toward Jews when answering these questions.³¹⁹

The fact that what is referred to as “defense-against-guilt antisemitism” may be a specifically West German dimension of antisemitism is suggested by the fact that when calculating separately for East and West Germany, the dimensions of Israel-related and defense-against-guilt antisemitism cannot be clearly separated from one another. This suggests that the different ways of dealing with the Nazi past in the GDR, and perhaps also the specific experiences of the East Germans after 1990, did not lead to an increase in defense against guilt. This would also mean that in other countries this dimension will only be found to a limited extent or not at all.³²⁰

For this reason, the intercorrelations between the three dimensions are also calculated separately for East and West Germany. All correlations prove to be significant, but the statistical correlations are lower for the East Germans. Overall, the authors state that one can speak of a coherent phenomenon of antisemitism, which consists equally of the three dimensions provided – at least among West Germans.³²¹

As has been proven in the other studies reviewed here, this study also confirms the connection between traditional and secondary (defense-against-guilt) antisemitic attitudes and severe criticism of Israel, which proves to be one element of an overarching antisemitic worldview. Since rejection of Jews is widespread among right-wing extremists, it may be expected that they would have a similar attitude toward the Jewish State of Israel. It will be interesting to see which of the respondents’ demographic and political characteristics have an influence on the results in the three dimensions.

³¹⁹ The authors’ explanation of this is to point to the distribution properties in this dimension, since defense-against-guilt antisemitism meets with approval much more frequently than the other two manifestations of antisemitism and is also less skewed. Such characteristics may be reflected in the factor analysis (Kiess et al., “Antisemitismus als antimodernes Ressentiment”, p. 233).

³²⁰ Ibid., p. 234.

³²¹ Ibid., p. 224f. The connection between extended traditional antisemitism and defense-against-guilt antisemitism is noticeably weaker in both East and West Germans than that between the other dimensions (Pearson’s correlation $r = .37$; $r = .40$).

Table 1: Interscale correlations of the dimensions of antisemitism for East and West Germany

	Defense-against-guilt Antisemitism		Israel-related Antisemitism	
	East	West	East	West
Israel-related antisemitism <i>n</i>	.479** 491	.523** 1,951		
Enlarged traditional antisemitism <i>n</i>	.372** 491	.400** 1,958	.607** 492	.645** 1,945

Pearson Correlations with pairwise exclusion of cases ** $p < .01$

Kiess et al., "Antisemitismus als antimodernes Ressentiment", composed of Tables 4 and 5, p. 235.

Next, the authors ask about the factors that might possibly influence the three dimensions of antisemitism. For each of the three dimensions, an overall total of the respective 5-point scale was formed for each respondent. In the defense-against-guilt antisemitism and Israel-related antisemitism dimensions the scale consisted of 3 items, so that the scores ranged from 3 (total rejection) to 15 (total agreement). In the case of enlarged traditional antisemitism there were 6 items, so that the values could be between 6 and 30. As a cutoff value the authors chose 12 in the first case and 24 in the second. Those who achieved or exceeded this score were classified as manifestly antisemitic.

Table 2: Percentage of manifest support for antisemitism along three dimensions in the different socio-demographic groups

	Defense-against-guilt Antisemitism		Israel-related Antisemitism		Enlarged traditional antisemitism	
	%	<i>n</i>	%	<i>n</i>	%	<i>n</i>
<i>age groups</i>						
14–30 years	25.0**	152	9.4	57	2.5	16
31–60 years	34.8	451	8.7	112	3.3	36
61 and older	27.7	156	9.8	55	2.4	14
<i>gender/sex</i>						
Female	29.1	381	7.9	102	2.7	36
Male	32.7	378	10.6	122	2.6	30
<i>educational level</i>						
Abitur	19.8**	149	6.0**	45	1.5*	11
No Abitur	35.5	607	10.6	179	3.2	55
<i>Unemployment</i>						
Never	28.8**	361	7.2**	90	2.1*	26
Once	29.9	156	9.7	50	2.7	14
Several times	37.5	195	13.5	70	4.6	24
<i>Survey area</i>						
East	39.3**	194	12.0*	59	5.4**	27
West	28.6	565	8.4	165	2.0	39
<i>personal economic situation</i>						
Good or mixed	29.9	603	8.4	168	2.2	44
Bad	37.8**	145	14.0**	53	5.5**	21
<i>national economic situation</i>						
Good or mixed	26.9	446	6.9	113	1.6	26
Bad	40.1**	286	13.9**	98	5.1**	36
<i>Self-positioning on the Left–Right political spectrum</i>						
Far left	16.6	36	11.7	25	4.1	9
Left	20.9	129	7.2	44	1.0	6
Center	32.1	367	7.4	84	1.8	20
Right	49.3	167	14.7	50	5.9	20
Far right	66.7	34	26.0	13	17.6	9

Pearson's chi-squared ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$; the results of the political self-positioning are in all three dimensions significant at the $p < .01$ level

Kiess et al., “Antisemitismus als antimodernes Ressentiment”, composed of tables 6, 8, and 11, pp. 237, 239, 242 (respectively).

Unfortunately, the information on the proportion of manifest antisemites among the total sample (N) in the three dimensions is not provided; nonetheless, it is clear to see that the degree of agreement with the items in the three dimensions differs greatly.³²² This may also have been caused – as I have already noted critically – by the item formulations, which seem to measure not only antisemitism but also a general attitude of rejecting or warding off guilt. The level of approval for Israel-related antisemitism is only between a third and a quarter, and enlarged traditional antisemitism receives no more than a tenth as much approval as defense-against-guilt antisemitism. Overall, it is clear that a number of influencing factors in all three dimensions have an effect in the same direction (except for the political self-positioning). For example, people are more likely to agree with antisemitic items in all three dimensions if they have a middle or lower educational level (no Abitur), were more often unemployed, assess their personal and the national economic situation as “bad”, or live in eastern Germany.

The picture is less clear for political self-positioning, which is of particular interest here. For defense-against-guilt antisemitism, there is a clear pattern of a stepwise increase from the Far Left to the Far Right.³²³ Both Israel-related and traditional antisemitism show a similar Left–Right distribution, which, however, deviates from the pattern of defense-against-guilt antisemitism. Here, respondents who classify themselves as far-right express the highest level of approval – as is to be expected – followed by those who classify themselves as right-wing; but even those who position themselves on the Far Left display a higher level of approval than those who see themselves as left-wing or in the center. In surveys on antisemitism in Germany, the same distribution is often found. The lowest levels of approval are among respondents with a moderate left-wing attitude or who are in the political center, while an antisemitic attitude increases in frequency toward the Right, but antisemitism also occurs somewhat more frequently on the Far Left as compared with those who see themselves as

³²² Elsewhere in the same book, regarding traditional antisemitism, a 3.6% level was determined for all respondents – 5.4% for East Germans and 1.8% for West Germans. (Oliver Decker/Johannes Kiess/Julia Schuler/Barbara Handke/Gert Pickel/Elmar Brähler, “Die Ergebnisse der Leipziger Autoritarismus-Studie 2020”, in: Decker/ Brähler [eds.], *Autoritäre Dynamiken*, p. 46, figure 8).

³²³ Looking at party preferences, the picture is less clear. While voters for the far-right Alternative für Deutschland (62.7%), the non-voters (42.4%), and respondents uncertain as to their participation in the election (35.9%) show the highest levels of approval, the voters for the conservative Christian Democratic parties (28.7%), the Free Democrats (28.3%), the Social Democrats (24.9%), and the Die Linke party (25.4%) are practically the same – only the Greens deviate very clearly downwards with 15%. While the right-wing AfD clearly has the most antisemitic voters in terms of percentage, most antisemites still vote for the other (not far-right) parties, which together have a significantly higher number of voters than the AfD. That is, an antisemitic attitude is only one motive among many that influence the decision to vote for a party.

moderately left-wing or in the center.³²⁴ However, in this case this does not apply to defense-against-guilt antisemitism.

Table 10, which shows the “Percentage of manifest support for antisemitism in the three dimensions according to party preference (the party you would vote for in the next election)”, is not very helpful in answering our question, since for Israel-related antisemitism and enlarged traditional antisemitism the case numbers for some parties are too low to be statistically significant. What can be safely said is that in these two dimensions, too, right-wing voters (in this case AfD voters and non-voters) are the most likely to agree, while voters for the left-wing alternative Greens are the least likely to agree in all three dimensions. Supporters of the Die Linke party are less likely to agree with Israel-related antisemitism than voters for the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and Social Democrats (SPD). The values here are not significant, however, as has already been mentioned.³²⁵

³²⁴ For West German respondents in 1991, see: Bergmann/Erb, “Anti-Semitism in Germany”, p. 312, figure 12.3. The figures of the Allgemeine Bevölkerungsumfrage (ALLBUS) for 2006 also show an increase for the left-wing West German respondents as well as for the voters for the left-wing Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), the successor party to the SED (Werner Bergmann/Verena Münch, “Antisemitismus in Deutschland 1996 und 2006: Ein Vergleich 1996 und 2006”, in: *Jahrbuch für Antisemitismusforschung* 21 [2012], pp. 325–369, here p. 344, figure 2 and p. 348, figure 3); The results of the long-term study on group-focused enmity also show the same pattern. In 2004, there was also an increase in the political self-positioning of far-left compared with moderate-left respondents (11% compared with 6%) in terms of “classical antisemitism”, but only a small difference in terms of “Israel-related antisemitism” (19% compared with 18%) (Heyder et al., “Israelkritik oder Antisemitismus?”, p. 154, figure 1).

³²⁵ These findings are interesting in so far as in the 1990s in Germany it was mainly politicians from the Green Party – and since then it has mainly been politicians from the Die Linke party – who attracted attention due to their criticism of Israeli policy or participation in pro-Palestinian actions (such as the Gaza Flotilla), which were condemned as antisemitic by parts of the public.

Table 3: Percentage of manifest support for antisemitism in the three dimensions according to religious affiliation

	Defense-against-guilt Antisemitism*		Israel-related Antisemitism**		Enlarged traditional antisemitism ²	
	%	<i>n</i>	%	<i>n</i>	%	<i>n</i>
Catholic church	31.2	214	7.1	48	1.5	10
Protestant church	27.0	171	5.2	33	1.4	9
Islamic religious community	27.8	32	40.5	47	4.3	5
Others ¹	27.8	27	7.3	7	4.3	4
None	34.1	304	9.4	83	4.0	36

¹ This category includes members of other Christian denominations and Jewish, Buddhist, and Hindu interviewees.

² Due to the small number of cases, a statistical significance test was not carried out.

Pearson's chi-squared. * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$

Kiess et al., "Antisemitismus als antimodernes Ressentiment", p. 238, table 7.

The high level of approval for Israel-related antisemitism among Muslim interviewees is striking, though not surprising, as anti-Israel attitudes have become widespread in anti-Western Islamist ideology and as the Middle East conflict also sometimes plays a more central role for them due to their countries of origin. The surveys in Great Britain and Norway show similar results (see above, Sections 10 and 11).³²⁶

Similar to other studies discussed previously, this study also confirms that the three dimensions of antisemitism distinguished here are more or less closely related. The finding

³²⁶ The results are surprising, in that Muslims and members of other religious communities, a large number of whom have immigrated to Germany in recent decades, are just as likely to agree with defense-against-guilt anti-semitism, even though this is primarily motivated by a defense against German guilt for the Holocaust and war crimes committed in the Second World War. On the other hand, many other studies show higher approval of forms of antisemitism among members of religious communities than among those with no religious affiliation. The reason why it is different in this case is probably to be found among the East German interviewees, who have higher levels of approval in the three dimensions of antisemitism and who for the most part do not belong to any Christian church or community (Kiess et al., "Antisemitismus als antimodernes Ressentiment", p. 244).

the authors emphasize (that there actually is an Israel-related antisemitism that can be delimited in terms of content) has already been empirically established in many studies. In the context of discussions, especially in Germany, about an Israel-related antisemitism on the political Left, it is emphasized that such attitudes can in fact be found there (particularly on the Far Left), albeit much less often than on the Right and Far Right.³²⁷ The authors emphasize, however, that it is by no means found only on the radical political fringes, but to a lesser extent also among respondents from the political center (see Table 2). The fact that certain forms of “criticism of Israel”, for which this study chose particularly blatant items, can be motivated by antisemitism is by no means new or surprising. However, the results show that Israel-related antisemitism is a less widespread attitude than secondary antisemitism, while it is much more widespread than the classical form of antisemitism.

³²⁷ The study by Heyder et al. (“Israelkritik oder Antisemitismus?”) shows that a “critical of Israel” attitude that does not correlate significantly with antisemitic attitudes is more common among leftists (85% agreement) than in the center (80%) or among respondents who place themselves further to the right (79%) or the far right (70%); see above, Section 3.1.

13. Conclusions

What is particularly striking so far, going over the available empirical studies on the connection between attitudes toward Jews and the State of Israel, is that in many cases there is little or no reference to previous works. This speaks to a very low degree of integration in this field of research. The especially frequent attention to this topic in studies on antisemitism in Germany is also striking. This may be due to the fact that a lot of attention is paid to the Middle East conflict in the media and that a commitment to the security of Israel is very important in German politics and to the public. What is also noticeable is the fact that over the years a certain consensus has arisen with regard to the items used to measure antisemitic attitudes (there is a pool of frequently used items, even if the exact formulations in the individual studies may differ somewhat). Regarding the measurement of anti-Israel attitudes, on the other hand, only partially similar items can be identified, which may also be due to the low integration in this field of research. With regard to attitudes toward Israel, the available studies distinguish between several – at least two, in some cases even four – different dimensions: Israel-related or Israel-focused antisemitism, political anti-Zionism, statements that draw a comparison to National Socialism (Nazi analogy), and critical statements about Israel that do not use antisemitic tropes. In some cases, these dimensions are not differentiated, the corresponding items simply being combined into one scale. Other studies (Cohen et al., see Section 7) even take a completely different approach by measuring willingness to support Israel instead of negative statements about it. Depending on the dimensions from which items are chosen or what approach is used to measure anti-Israel attitudes, the proximity of the correlation with the dimensions of antisemitism will also vary. It would therefore be necessary for further research to arrive at a unified approach in this regard or to reflect on the choice of items selected in each case.

The connection between antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes

All available studies clearly show that there is a correlation between antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes, which varies in strength between a relatively low correlation in Norway ($r = .32$), a medium-strength correlation of $.48$ in Great Britain, and $.56$ in Germany (in 1987) – and an even stronger correlation of $.65$ among West Germans and $.61$ for East Germans in 2020.³²⁸ The overlap between both attitudes increases almost linearly with greater strength;

³²⁸ See Bergmann/Erb, “Antisemitism in Germany”, p. 184 and Kiess et al., “Antisemitismus als antimodernes Weltbild”, p. 235. Another study from 2005 finds correlations of $.45$ and $.51$ for anti-Israel attitudes and manifest and latent antisemitism in Germany: see Frindte et al., “Old and New Anti-Semitic Attitudes”, p. 251f. The result

i.e., the “greater the extent of anti-Israel sentiment revealed, the higher the likelihood of associated anti-Semitism”,³²⁹ and vice versa.³³⁰ On the other hand, the studies also show that antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes are two distinct sets of attitudes, which only partially overlap.³³¹ The study by Kempf shows that in their extreme forms, antisemitic and anti-Zionist attitudes occur together, but there are also cases where a clear rejection of antisemitism is accompanied by strong anti-Zionist attitudes (Section 8). The factor analyses yield different results in the various studies examined here. While in some studies antisemitic and anti-Israel factors load on two different factors (Frindte et al., Table 1) or find only one item that loads on both factors (Longchamp et al., Table 1; Kempf, Table 2),³³² in other studies either all items load on one factor (Imhoff, see Section 9) or the three differentiated dimensions of antisemitism show very high standardized factor loadings on the overarching factor antisemitism (Decker et al., see Section 12, Figure 5). The very fact that in most of the studies the respondents displayed an anti-Israel attitude much more frequently than a classical antisemitic one proves that the two are only partially present together.³³³ In Staetsky’s study, the proportion of those who had an anti-Israel attitude (32%) without being antisemitic was much larger than the overlap between the two attitudes (24%), and it was also much larger than the proportion of respondents who were only antisemitic (6%).³³⁴ In the Norwegian survey, only 5.3% of the high scorers on the Anti-Israel Index also scored high on the

of Cohen et al.’s study also comes down to a similarly moderate correlation between antisemitism and “support for Israel” (which is used to measure opposition to Israel) of $-.42$ ($p < .01$). The German Group-Focused Enmity Studies also find a very high correlation between “classical antisemitism” and “Israel-focused antisemitism” ($r = .70$) and a lower correlation between the latter and “Nazi analogy” ($r = .36$) (Heyder et al., “Israelkritik oder Antisemitismus?”, p. 160). However, it must be noted that Israel-related antisemitism actually measures a deterioration in attitudes toward Jews due to Israeli policies and does not directly measure the attitudes toward these policies themselves, unlike the Nazi analogy items.

³²⁹ Kaplan/Small, “Anti-Israel sentiment predicts anti-Semitism”, p. 555. See also Sections 1, 10, 10.1, and 11.

³³⁰ See Bergmann/Erb, “Antisemitism in Germany”, p. 184. In his study, Staetsky was careful to ensure that the Anti-Israel Index did not contain any direct reference to Jews; just as, conversely, the Antisemitism Index should not contain any reference to Israel. Not all studies have taken this precaution (see Sections 10 and 10.1).

³³¹ The authors of the Swiss study, Claude Longchamp et al., point out that antisemitic attitudes may well include strong anti-Israel opinions, but that these are also found among people who clearly cannot be considered antisemitic. An equation of the two attitude complexes has not been empirically confirmed. See also Section 8 (Kempf), Section 10 (Staetsky), and Section 11 (Hoffmann/Moe (eds.)).

³³² If studies also differentiate between anti-Israel attitudes and anti-Zionism, the items load on three factors (Frindte et al.) or were measured using different subscales (Kempf).

³³³ The picture is less clear in post-communist Hungary, where respondents in 2006 agreed with the items indicating political, discriminatory, or religious antisemitism just as much as they disagreed with the pro-Israel items (Kovács, *The Stranger at Hand*, p. 126, table 65 and p. 127, table 66). This may be due to the fact, mentioned above, that among the “old antisemites” there are many older former Communist Party members who do not see Israel so much as a Jewish state but as a Western state. In the study by Decker et al., too, approval for Israel-related antisemitism is higher than for “traditional” antisemitism but is significantly lower than defense-against-guilt antisemitism (Section 12, Table 2).

³³⁴ In Britain, the overlap between respondents with strong antisemitic and strong anti-Israel attitudes is 2%, while 7% are just anti-Israel and 1.6% are just antisemitic (Staetsky, see Section 10, Figure 10).

Combined Index of Antisemitism, while 94.7% did not.³³⁵ Also, in the study by Decker et al., the degree of agreement with the items for the three dimensions of antisemitism (traditional, secondary, and Israel-related) differed greatly (Section 12, Table 2).³³⁶

While most of the studies dealt with here record an antisemitic and an anti-Israel attitude dimension separately, Imhoff measures attitudes toward Israel (at least in part) using items that are otherwise used to measure resentment directed against Jews; i.e., these items are supposed to directly measure anti-Israel antisemitism by using typical antisemitic statements, in which “Israel” is used instead of the word “Jews” – a procedure that is not entirely unproblematic, as prejudice against a mostly quite small and powerless minority is equated here with opinions about the actions of a state. In this exploratory study, in which only the attitudes of respondents with a decidedly left-wing attitude were surveyed, Imhoff also came to the conclusion that roughly 12% of these leftists are anti-Israel antisemites, while only 4% are classified as antisemites and another 19% fall within a “grey zone” displaying anti-Israel tendencies. As in the other German studies (and in the British study, see Sections 10, 10.1), the proportion with negative attitudes toward Israel is greater than the proportion displaying traditional antisemitism; this is not true of secondary antisemitism, however, which is only treated as a separate dimension different from traditional antisemitism in German studies.

³³⁵ A pronounced anti-Israel attitude need not necessarily go hand in hand with a positive view of Muslims; for instance, 12.4% of the respondents with a pronounced anti-Israel attitude are even more likely to have a pronounced Islamophobic attitude than an antisemitic one.

³³⁶ A recently published survey on antisemitism in sixteen European countries, which appeared only after the completion of the work on this article, also proves that in all of them antisemitic hostility against Israel is more widespread than classical (primary) and secondary antisemitism. The authors confirm that “the distribution of antisemitic hostility against Israel differs country to country from what we saw for primary and secondary antisemitism”. Whereas the population in Poland and Greece show the highest proportions of both antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes (42% to 74% and 48% to 70%), the agreement with antisemitic hostility against Israel in the range of 55% to 62% in Belgium, France, Austria and Spain shows a particularly large difference of 39 to 45 percentage points to the extent of primary antisemitic attitudes between 16% and 31%. Even in the case of the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom, which only achieve values between 3% and 6% for primary antisemitism, antisemitic hostility against Israel reaches a magnitude between 31% and 36%, i.e., the difference is between 25 and 33 percentage points. The difference is lowest in Italy, Germany and Latvia, where antisemitic attitudes range from 15% to 19%, while negative attitudes towards Israel range from 36% to 45%. Here the difference is only between 21 and 27 percentage points. Kovács and Fischer interpret the higher levels of antisemitic hostility against Israel as an expression of latent antisemitism, but there may be reasons other than antisemitism why negative attitudes towards Israel are more widespread than primary and secondary antisemitism, as the studies presented here show (András Kovács/György Fischer, *Antisemitic Prejudices in Europe. Survey in Sixteen European Countries*, Vol. I and II, Budapest 2021, Vol I., pp. 54 and 56 - <https://apleu.org/european-antisemitism-survey/> – accessed 10th October 2021).

The emotional dimension of antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes

The British study by Staetsky (Section 10, Figures 1 and 2) also shows a large quantitative difference between the negative emotional reaction toward Israel (33% had an unfavorable/somewhat unfavorable view) compared with that toward Jews (5.4% displayed a negative attitude). This is also true in the opposite direction, as sympathy toward Israel was significantly lower (17%) than sympathy toward Jews (39%). There seems to be a connection here with Israeli policies, as only 6% of Britons sided with Israel (18% tended to side with the Palestinians). As Table 2 in Section 1 shows, sympathy for Israel varies greatly depending on the situation in the Middle East conflict. If Israel is seen to be under threat, sympathy rises significantly; if Israel is seen as an aggressor, as in the Lebanon War in 1982, sympathy drops significantly. The British study by Staetsky (Section 10, Figure 6) also shows a clear correlation between support for negative cognitive judgements about Jews and about Israel. Those with a positive and neutral attitude toward Israel, as well as those who answered “don’t know”, did not agree with any negative statement about Israel by about two-thirds and three-quarters, respectively, while this is true for only 28% of those who expressed antipathy.

The emotional dimension taken into account in the Swiss study indicates that attitudes toward Israel are at least in part less firmly entrenched than antisemitic feelings and depend more on events, reacting to the state of relations between Israel and the Palestinians. In a factor analysis, the positive emotions (respect and admiration) toward Jews were allocated to one factor and all the negative ones (lack of understanding, disappointment, rejection, contempt, hatred) were loaded on a second factor. With regard to emotions toward Israel, however, we find three factors: the first factor is also composed of positive emotions, while only strongly negative emotions (hate, rejection, envy, and contempt) load on the second factor. The third factor is allocated emotional reactions that are situation- and event-dependent, such as disappointment, anger, and a lack of understanding.³³⁷ On this emotional dimension, which is also negative, respondents agreed with the individual items much more frequently than on the second factor (anger: 20%; lack of understanding: 49%; disappointment: 43% – the latter primarily among older respondents and people in left-wing circles). The authors of the study interpreted this to mean that the negative reactions toward Israel were more differentiated, with event-related (political) feelings such as anger or disappointment about Israel’s policies being expressed that do not necessarily imply a general attitude toward the State of Israel. The

³³⁷ However, these feelings may also be caused by the fact that Jews, victims of persecution and violence, are today committing injustice against Palestinians, who are now seen as victims.

greater event-dependence of these negative emotions coincides with the findings of the other studies discussed here, according to which the attitudes of some of the (rather non-antisemitic) interviewees are determined by the political situation in the Middle East conflict rather than by a stable anti-Jewish attitude. It is mainly people in anti-imperialist circles who see Israel as the “extended arm of the USA in the Middle East”; at the same time, it is also here that disappointment about Israel’s policies is particularly widespread.³³⁸

The question of the causal direction

The question of the causal direction – i.e., whether negative attitudes toward Israel reinforce a negative attitude toward Jews or whether, conversely, a stronger negative attitude toward Jews leads to a more negative attitude toward Israel – cannot be answered by bivariate correlations alone. However, the results of the experimental studies by Florette Cohen et al. (Section 7) show that the activation of mortality salience reinforces both antisemitic attitudes and the rejection of “support for Israel”, whereby, in addition to the direct effects, the activation of antisemitism as a mediator has a subsequent effect of reducing support for Israel. Conversely, it is also true that reducing support for Israel as a mediator increases antisemitism. In other words, the causal influence between antisemitism and hostility toward Israel runs in both directions: Antisemitic attitudes reinforce the rejection of Israel, while the rejection of Israeli policies reinforces antisemitic attitudes. This is also confirmed by the two multivariate regressions in the Norwegian study, where antisemitism had an effect on anti-Israel attitudes and vice versa (Section 11, Table 12). Two surveys asked directly how the respondents assessed Israeli policy and whether it had a negative impact on their attitudes toward Jews, or whether it was assumed that it could have a negative impact on people’s opinion of Jews in general. The results show that Israeli policy has a negative influence on attitudes toward Jews among some of the respondents in Germany and other European countries.³³⁹ In the 2005 GFE survey, 31.7% (see Heyder et al.; Zick et al.’s survey in 2014 found 20.1%) of respondents agreed with the statement “Israeli policies make me feel increasingly unsympathetic towards the Jews.” It is interesting that this Israel-focused antisemitism is much more widespread among right-wing respondents (48%) compared with left-wing respondents (19%) (Section 3.1: Figure 1), a finding that is confirmed in the study by Decker et al. (Section 12). Right-wingers obviously use Israeli policies as a pretext or explanation for their antisemitic views. This seems to be especially true for the dimension of

³³⁸ Longchamp et al., “Kritik an Israel”, p. 42.

³³⁹ Heyder et al., “Israelkritik oder Antisemitismus?”; Anti-Defamation League, *Attitudes towards Jews in Twelve European countries*, New York 2005, p. 10f. – see above, Section 1.

secondary antisemitism (see Zick et al., Section 3.2). In the ADL Study that same year, an average of 29% of the European respondents said their opinion of Jews was “influenced by actions taken by the State of Israel”, and 53% said their opinion had worsened. The regression analysis carried out in the Norwegian study can also provide us with an indication of the direction of influence. When we look at the mutual influence of antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes, the multivariate regression analyses show that antisemitism in Norway is most strongly influenced by xenophobia, followed by anti-Israel attitudes and support for the Palestinian side in the Middle East conflict.³⁴⁰ Anti-Israel attitudes are influenced to a much greater extent by antisemitic attitudes, followed by support for the Palestinians and scepticism toward immigrants, while support for Israel reduces the chances of anti-Israel attitudes (negative correlation of -15.8). Unlike in the case of antisemitism, younger age (under 44 years) and higher education also have a mitigating effect. Thus, we can say that antisemitism has a stronger influence on anti-Israel attitudes than, conversely, anti-Israel attitudes have on antisemitic attitudes. It must be added, however, that in terms of both antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes, the variance explained by the variables included in the regression analysis is quite low (for example, compared with the case of Islamophobia). One reason for this might be that the seemingly central variable “political orientation” was not included in the regression analysis.

The Swiss study, which examined the connection between anti-Jewish and anti-Israel attitudes on the emotional level, provided interesting results. When interviewees were asked about the connection between their personal emotional attitudes toward Jews and Israel, two-thirds disagreed with the statement that the behavior of the State of Israel should have an influence on attitudes toward Jews; only one in four respondents accepted such influence. By using a two-dimensional scale (MDS), it became “very clear that on an emotional level – i.e. unconsciously – the population hardly distinguishes between Jews as a people and Israel as a state”.³⁴¹ People in right-wing political circles and people who attend church regularly were most likely to admit to this transfer of emotions, as were more men than women – the very groups of people who are most likely to harbor traditional antisemitism. In cases in which

³⁴⁰ A different picture emerges in the British study by Staetsky. Here, an anti-Israel attitude increases the likelihood of also having an antisemitic attitude by 28%, while opposition to immigration (xenophobia) increases the likelihood by only 16% (see Section 10.1, Figure 1). Specifically among people with very left-wing politics, in the British study only a very small percentage (3%) have an antisemitic attitude without also having an anti-Israel attitude, while another 30% have an antisemitic attitude and are also anti-Israel (another 48% of them have an anti-Israel attitude without being antisemitic). Among those with very right-wing politics, on the other hand, the negative attitude toward Israel is likely to result primarily from their antisemitism (Section 10.1, Table 1).

³⁴¹ Longchamp et al., “Kritik an Israel”, p. 37.

Israel's policies trigger strong emotions, these rub off on the attitude toward Jews by creating disappointment and lack of understanding toward Jews.³⁴² The Swiss results also show that the cognitive level is different from the emotional level, in that it does not obviously reveal a clear identification of Jews with the State of Israel. The factor analysis separates anti-Jewish attitudes from views critical of Israel, since the cognitive views and the situational emotions toward Israel are distinct from hostile views toward Jews, but the factor analysis also shows that there are two "bridges" that connect both phenomena – the stereotype of "excessive Jewish/Israeli influence in the world" and the very pronounced negative emotions of hate, envy, and anger.³⁴³

To summarize, it can be said that antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes correlate to various degrees in the US and the European countries studied so far, with the influence going in both directions. The correlation between the two attitudes increases as the two attitudes become more pronounced (Section 1, Figure 1; Section 2, Figure 1; Section 10, Table 9). If antisemitism strengthens a negative attitude toward Israel in the Middle East conflict, Islamophobia has the opposite effect and reinforces a pro-Israel attitude.

Are anti-Israel statements simply antisemitism expressed via detour communication?

The available German studies, with the exception of the studies by Kempf (and in part also Frindte et al.), do not see anti-Israel attitudes as an independent phenomenon reinforced by factors other than antisemitism; rather, they often see in them a form of indirect or detour communication or another dimension of an antisemitic worldview, complementing traditional or classical antisemitism and secondary or defense-against-guilt antisemitism, through which one's own antisemitic attitude can be expressed without needing to fear the sanctions that might occur in the case of antisemitism.³⁴⁴

In their analyses of the 2011 GFE data, Zick et al. and Leibold et al. (see Section 3.2, above) used two items from the Motivation to Act without Prejudice Scale to examine whether the social norm of not saying anything negative about Jews (communication latency) is applicable to all three dimensions of antisemitism. The results show that those who report following the norm of not expressing prejudice toward minorities in society have lower scores than those

³⁴² Ibid., p. 36.

³⁴³ Ibid., p. 41.

³⁴⁴ This concept of a kind of detour communication is not found in the studies in other countries. It is based on a study on communication latency published by Bergmann and Erb in 1986 ("Kommunikationslatenz, Moral und öffentliche Meinung"). See above, fn 111.

who do not agree with the norm in terms of both traditional and secondary antisemitism. In the case of Israel-related antisemitism, however, this difference is very small. Therefore, the authors come to the conclusion that the expression of prejudices against Israel is less taboo and that this may thus be a suitable way of articulating antisemitic beliefs.³⁴⁵ This is, of course, one possible explanation, but the authors ignore the fact that the two items from the Motivation to Act without Prejudice Scale refer to attitudes toward minorities in society and may therefore not really be suitable for measuring attitudes toward the policies of a state.³⁴⁶ It could be that this is the reason why the influence of this motivation turns out to be so much less significant.³⁴⁷ In addition, given the aforementioned Israelization of antisemitism, the question arises as to whether the assumption that negative statements about Israeli policies are less taboo than those about Jews still applies today, since many criticisms of Israeli policies are also subjected to accusations of antisemitism. In any case, the assumption that negative statements about Israel are always “covert” antisemitism is problematic.³⁴⁸

Wilhelm Kempf and his colleagues do not exclude the possibility that criticism of Israel could have an antisemitic motivation, but they adopt a conflict-theory perspective according to which criticism of Israel could also derive from a variety of other sources. In other words, they place attitudes toward Israel in the broader context of attitudes toward the Middle East conflict, in which both parties to the conflict seek to mobilize support and thus employ various means to delegitimize and demonize the other side. In this way, a much more complex picture of the connection between antisemitism and criticism of Israel emerges, as the pattern of positioning toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is now introduced into the analysis as an essential factor behind attitudes toward Israel.

Indeed, it is surprising that this important reality – the ongoing conflict between Israelis and Palestinians – has in fact only been included in some of the studies (Kempf, see Section 8; Imhoff, see Section 9; Staetsky, see Section 10; Hoffmann/Moe, see Section 11), while it has received no attention in others, even though attitudes toward Israel are hardly likely to exist independently of positions on the Middle East conflict.

³⁴⁵ Leibold et al., “Mehr oder weniger erwünscht?”, 192f.

³⁴⁶ The fact that a critical-toward-Israel attitude, unlike an antisemitic one, does not correlate closely with a rejection of minorities in the GFE studies might be an indication of this difference. See above, footnote 74. (Schmidt et al., “Ist die Kritik an Israel antisemitisch?”, p. 214).

³⁴⁷ As explained above (Section 3.2), the scale for measuring unprejudiced behavior, which consists of only two items, has low reliability and low validity. The multivariate regression (Section 3.2., Table 8) also determined the same value for all three dimensions for the influence of the motivation to act without prejudice (-.11; -.12).

³⁴⁸ The assumption is likely to apply mainly to right-wing antisemites, whose rejection of Jews can be assumed to include rejection of a Jewish state. Their criticism of Israel is thus also an expression of their antisemitism.

Kempf suggests that support for Israel as a state of the victims of National Socialism and support for the Palestinians on the basis of human rights or international law are both key factors motivating people to take sides in this conflict. The study confirms the overlap between strong antisemitism and strong anti-Zionism identified in all studies, as well as the strong rejection of antisemitic and anti-Zionist attitudes. Nevertheless, Kempf emphasizes that anti-Zionism cannot be regarded as a mere manifestation of antisemitism, but that they are two different attitudinal dimensions (Frindte et al., see Section 4; Kovács, see Section 5; Longchamp et al., see Section 6; Cohen et al., see Section 7).³⁴⁹ In contrast to Kaplan and Small, however, he does not see a linear relationship between the two attitudes, since he can identify two clusters of attitudes in which the relationship is reversed and anti-Zionist attitudes are more pronounced while antisemitic prejudices are more rejected. Kempf identified four clusters: Supporters of Israeli policy, who share a tendency to harbor resentments against Palestinians and Muslims and to support the secondary-antisemitic call to “close the book”. Another group displays a latent antisemitic avoidance of criticizing Israel and abstains from taking a position on the Middle East conflict, but they tend toward negative attitudes toward Palestinians and Muslims as well as tending toward antisemitic, anti-Zionist, and anti-Israel attitudes. Concerning criticism of Israel, Kempf identified two groups with different motivational systems. First is the antisemitic critics of Israel: these respondents have very strong antisemitic prejudices and are more likely to be politically on the extreme Right or the center-Right; they are less likely to be found among voters for left or liberal parties. They are generally more prejudiced and also display anti-Muslim and anti-Palestinian resentments. Kempf therefore concludes that the antisemitic dimension of their hostile attitude toward Israel is not so much a result of an attitude directed specifically against Jews as of a comprehensive racism, which is also directed against Muslims (see also the multivariate regression in the Norwegian study that shows that xenophobia has a strong effect on both antisemitism and Islamophobia: Section 11, Table 12). The other cluster of critics of Israeli policy are pro-human rights and reject antisemitic prejudices. These respondents have strong pacifist attitudes and compared with the antisemitic critics of Israel they have a more consistent human rights orientation and take a stronger stand for the victims of human rights violations.³⁵⁰ In the studies by Cohen et al., in which the effect of mortality salience on both

³⁴⁹ It is interesting that in the studies by Kempf (Section 8, Table 2) and Longchamp et al. (Section 6, Table 1) antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes load on two different factors, with only one overlap: the idea of Jewish world domination or a worldwide Jewish conspiracy.

³⁵⁰ In this respect, it is surprising that Imhoff suspected that left-wing pacifists would be more tolerant than other leftists of terrorist attacks against Israelis, even though the use of violence should in fact contradict their pacifist

antisemitism and attitudes toward Israel is assumed, it can also be seen that a negative attitude toward Israel is reinforced by antisemitism as a mediator, but that there is also a direct negative impact of mortality salience on attitudes toward Israel without increasing antisemitism. Terror Management Theory predicts that mortality salience will not only increase identification with one's own group (which contributes to the strengthening of antisemitism) but also the willingness to condemn moral transgressions. Cohen et al. interpret this reduction of support for Israel in respondents who do not display antisemitism as a response to Israel's human rights violations.³⁵¹

The Norwegian study also takes the Middle East conflict into account by examining attitudes toward the two adversaries in the conflict in relation to both Islamophobia and antisemitism. Each has the expected influence on which side in the conflict the respondents support more often, while antisemitism has a more polarizing effect than Islamophobia. Although the connection between antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes is moderate ($r = .32$), this does not mean that antisemites predominantly sided with the Palestinians ($r = .06$). A xenophobic attitude is probably responsible for this.³⁵² This means that taking sides with the Palestinians is not necessarily a consequence of antisemitism (see the results for the German parties in 1991: Section 1); just as, conversely, either a strong anti-Israel or a strong pro-Israel attitude may also be associated with Islamophobia (see Section 11, Table 23). This is because antisemitism and Islamophobia are positively correlated, which is due to the common underlying xenophobic attitude (the Combined Index of Antisemitism and the Combined Index of Islamophobia correlate with $r = .24$).³⁵³

worldview. But since the mean value of 3.05 for the variable on terrorist attacks in Israel is higher among the pacifists than in the rest of the sample (2.34), Imhoff considers his hypothesis 6 ("Left-wing pacifists are more tolerant of terrorist attacks in Israel") confirmed (p. 160, table 4). According to him, pacifists apply a double standard with regard to violence, in that they pity the victims of violence on the Palestinian side, but are indifferent to the victims on the Israeli side (ibid., p. 147).

³⁵¹ Cohen et al., "Modern Anti-Semitism", pp. 292 and 303. But Cohen et al. also stress that in the case of violations of peoples' or human rights there is a stronger rejection of Israel than there is of other countries, such as Russia. They attribute this to antisemitic attitudes.

³⁵² The Norwegian study also shows that xenophobia and scepticism toward immigrants explained most of the variance in antisemitic and Islamophobic attitudes in Norway (Section 11, see Table 23).

³⁵³ See Hellevik, "Antisemitism and Islamophobia in Norway", p. 129, table 4.9. See also the results of the multivariate regressions in Table 23 in Section 11. In the Norwegian study, the underlying xenophobic attitude can be seen very clearly in the positioning of the supporters of the various political parties. The xenophobic, anti-immigration Progress Party scores highest on the Antisemitism Index and shows average scores on the Anti-Israel Index, and the conservative party Høyre also shows above average scores on both, while the supporters of the center, liberal, and left parties show average and below-average values on both (Section 11, Figure 2).

Influence of demographic factors

If people can apparently display an anti-Israel attitude without at the same time being antisemitic, the question arises how this can be explained. In the studies presented here, a whole range of possible influencing factors are examined. In addition to the usual demographic factors (age, gender, income, place of residence, political orientation, education, religion, economic situation, place of birth, violent extremist tendencies), some studies included attitudes toward the Middle East conflict, attitudes toward other groups (immigrants), general xenophobia, contact with Jews, etc., and explanatory approaches from social psychology looking at personality factors like anomie, authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, and ethnocentrism.

As far as demographic factors are concerned, the results differ in part due to the different timing and country-specific features, in part for other reasons. Gender differences,³⁵⁴ place of residence, income level, and differences between Christian denominations have little or no influence and will not be considered here again in detail. Age, education level, political orientation, and religious differences between Muslims and Christians are more important.

As to the influence of age on the acceptance of classical antisemitism and Israel-focused antisemitism, there is the typical distribution that the approval of prejudices increases with age. This does not apply to the critical attitude toward Israel (which is weaker than Israel-focused antisemitism), where we find only very small differences between age groups. For secondary antisemitism and the Nazi analogies, differences between the age groups are small too. In recent German studies, age differences are becoming even less important. In Decker et al. (Section 12) they only play a role in secondary antisemitism but are no longer significant for traditional or Israel-related antisemitism, while Zick et al. find only weakly significant differences between the age groups when it comes to traditional antisemitism. In the case of Hungary, the deviations from the Western European pattern are interesting. There, the group of non-antisemitic but anti-Israel respondents consists of young people with universalist liberal convictions, while the second antisemitic middle-aged group, socialized in communist times, is simultaneously pro-Israel. The reason is that the latter see Israel as part of the developed West, which has to assert itself against backward Arab neighbors (Kovács, see

³⁵⁴ In recent studies in Norway and Germany, men harbor traditional antisemitic beliefs slightly more frequently, while women display anti-Israel beliefs slightly more frequently. However, the differences are very small and can hardly be explained convincingly. In the British study, antisemitic attitudes are more widespread among men (Section 10.1).

Section 5).

While age and gender have either no influence or only a very marginal influence on attitudes toward Jews and Israel, in bivariate analyses education proves to be an important variable in many of the studies presented here, with higher education reducing antisemitic and anti-Israel resentment. However, in some cases this influence seems to disappear in multivariate regression analyses, or else it only exerts an indirect influence via other variables (Section 3.2), while it exerts a certain mitigating influence in the Norwegian survey (Section 11).

Political Beliefs

The frequency with which antisemitic attitudes occur seems to be closely related to political beliefs, and this is even more true for anti-Israel attitudes. While the distribution of antisemitic attitudes on the Left–Right political spectrum remains very similar across different Western European countries, there are certain country-specific variations in anti-Israel attitudes. In all surveys, the figures concerning anti-Israel attitudes show a significantly different distribution than the antisemitic attitudes. As far as antisemitic attitudes are concerned, in most of the studies we find an increasing frequency from “fairly left-wing” to “very right-wing”. People who classify themselves as “fairly right-wing” and “very right-wing” clearly display antisemitic attitudes most frequently. There is a deviation with regard to the radical Left, in which antisemitic attitudes (of the classical but not of the secondary variety) are somewhat more common than within the moderate Left (in some studies also more common than within the political center – see Staetsky, Section 10, Figure 12).

Anti-Israel attitudes are not only more widespread than antisemitic attitudes, they are also distributed differently in terms of their connection to political orientation. While antisemitism showed the lowest frequencies in the moderate Left to moderate Right range, the lowest values for anti-Israel attitudes are found among respondents from the center to the fairly right-wing; i.e., we see a shift to the political Right here. Among the radical Right, on the other hand, approval for anti-Israel attitudes is again as widespread as among the radical Left. Here, the studies show certain differences: while in the UK anti-Israel attitudes range from the radical Left to slightly left-of-center and then only reach high levels of approval again among the extreme Right, the studies in Germany show somewhat different patterns. There, almost all studies (with the exception of Heyder et al., 2005 and Zick et al., 2011)³⁵⁵ show somewhat

³⁵⁵ We don't find a clear political pattern across the entire political spectrum in these two studies. Israel-related antisemitism increases steadily from Left to Right but, overall, rather moderately. Thus, they show a similar pattern to secondary antisemitism, although the values increase more clearly from Left to Right. This result is

higher values for the radical Left than for respondents who classify themselves as slightly left or center. The values then rise again toward the Right, with the “Far Right” combining high levels of antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes. The fact that the politically moderate left-wing respondents, and especially the radical Left, are more likely to display anti-Israel attitudes than people on the moderate Right, indicates what Kempf has emphasized, namely the role of political – i.e., anti-imperialist, pro-human rights – orientations within this political spectrum.³⁵⁶ Kovács also arrives at a similar conclusion for Hungary. Imhoff’s study of radical leftists also identifies the influence of anti-imperialist thinking (leading to anti-Zionism), a backward-looking and personalized critique of capitalism, and strong solidarity with the Palestinian side in the Middle East conflict, whereby he sees an anti-imperialist orientation as a motivation for anti-Israel attitudes, and in some cases even for antisemitic attitudes – especially on the Far Left. The fact that anti-Israel attitudes are significantly more widespread than antisemitic ones and that, apart from very right-wing respondents, they are also distributed differently across the political spectrum, suggests that criticism of the State of Israel is partly not motivated by antisemitism and also that it obviously makes a difference what political position such criticism is coming from. Several of the available studies, such as the study by Frindte et al., show that anti-Israel attitudes are most strongly represented on the extreme Right and the extreme Left. However, among the 78% of the very left-wing respondents with anti-Israel attitudes in Britain, 48% show no antisemitic attitudes.³⁵⁷ Among the 60% of very right-wing respondents with anti-Israel attitudes, the proportion is only 19%.³⁵⁸ As Wilhelm Kempf has emphasized, the demographic differences present a mixed picture, so that anti-Israel resentment presumably does not form a homogeneous attitudinal dimension, but rather results from a mixture of antisemitism and anti-Zionism on the one hand and political motives on the other. While antisemitism and hostility toward Israel converge in the extreme Right, parts of the Left have negative attitudes toward Israel and its policies, but most of them do not agree with negative judgements about Jews. This means that approval for

presumably due to the fact that in this study attitudes toward Israel combine two dimensions: an Israel-focused antisemitism, which basically does not signal attitudes toward Israel but the repercussions of Israeli policy on attitudes toward Jews in general, and the dimension of hostility toward Israel, which is measured via items with a Nazi analogy. The multivariate regression analysis shows, however, that there is no significant correlation between Left–Right political orientation and Israel-related antisemitism.

³⁵⁶ Among the British population, anti-Israel attitudes are much more widespread than antisemitic attitudes (57% to 31%). The difference is particularly large among the radical Left (78% to 33%), while it is less pronounced among the radical Right and Muslims (60% to 51% and 75% to 57%, respectively). I.e., among the latter the overlap between the two attitudes is very high (see Section 10.1, Table 1).

³⁵⁷ See also Staetsky, Section 10.1., Table 1. This is different in Hungary, where left-wing voters are more likely to display a pro-Israel attitude.

³⁵⁸ For a very detailed study of the distribution of antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes in the Far Left and Far Right in Britain, see Staetsky, Section 10.1.

sharply critical statements about Israel does not always indicate an antisemitic motive. It follows that the empirical results do not provide a basis for deciding the most controversial question in the political arena – namely, whether or not a statement critical of Israel should be considered antisemitic – since one and the same statement, such as “Israel is waging a war of annihilation against the Palestinians”, can in one case be an expression of an antisemitic attitude (for example, to reduce one’s own guilt by accusing Israel/Jews of the same crimes) but in another can be based on humanitarian or anti-imperialist convictions.

Most of the studies find both antisemitic and anti-Israel prejudice as well as anti-Palestinian prejudice to be most widespread among less educated and more right-wing respondents, while those scoring low on antisemitism as well as anti-Israel attitudes are for the most part younger (under 45 years old), have a high-school diploma, and classified themselves as more to the left or left-of-center on the political spectrum.³⁵⁹ The recent survey by Oliver Decker et al. in Germany confirms the further spread of anti-Israel attitudes (as well as antisemitic ones) among those surveyed with lower education levels and a politically right-wing orientation, but also with a negative assessment of their personal and of the national economic situation and with frequent experience of unemployment, while in the case of the anti-Israel attitudes they no longer find any differences in age.

To date, the only analysis of the relationship between antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes conducted in an Eastern European country shows a partly similar, partly divergent pattern (Kovács, see Section 5). Similar to the Western European countries, antisemitic attitudes are most widespread among the elderly and conservative or right-wing people who also harbor radical attitudes. The political orientation of this Israel-critical group seems to differ from that in Western European countries, where we find a critical view of Israel to be particularly pronounced in the radical and moderate Left. In Hungary, such views are more common among liberal younger people who hold universalist values and are critical of the old communist Left and the nationalist politics that followed the fall of communism. According to Kovács, it was difficult “to identify in Hungary the phenomenon usually known as left-wing antisemitism”.³⁶⁰ According to Kovács, the role of hostility toward Israel is different in

³⁵⁹ In the 1991 study by Bergmann/Erb, the age distribution differs between the Anti-Zionist Index and the Anti-semitism Index. The clear generational gaps found for antisemitism are lacking. In Germany, this was still the case in 2013, the older generations being clearly more often antisemitic than the younger, but concerning Israel’s policies toward the Palestinians, there were no significant differences between the age groups (Steffen Hagemann/Roby Natanson, *Deutschland und Israel heute. Verbindende Vergangenheit, trennende Zukunft?* Bertelsmann Stiftung 2014, p. 41, figure 19).

³⁶⁰ Kovács, *The Stranger at Hand*, p. 135.

Hungary than in Western countries; in the former, rejection of Jews is not transferred onto the Jewish state and does not lead to support for the Palestinians. It would be interesting to see if this pattern applies to the other post-communist countries as well.³⁶¹

Other factors influencing antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes

Almost all of the studies at hand limit their analysis of possible factors influencing antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes to the usual demographic variables; some also include the Middle East conflict or contact with Jews. The exceptions are the study by Zick et al. (Section 3.2) and (to a certain extent) those of Kaplan and Small (Section 2), Staetsky (Section 10.1), the Norwegian study (Section 11), and Decker et al. (Section 12), which all include other factors.

The regression analysis by Zick et al. shows that socio-demographic factors in combination with the other factors play virtually no role in explaining antisemitism in any of the three dimensions.³⁶² The only exception is political orientation, which exerts an influence on traditional and secondary antisemitism but does not exert significant influence on attitudes toward Israel.³⁶³ If we look at the basic social and political attitudes and personality dispositions, with the exception of individual relative deprivation these have a significant reinforcing effect on antisemitism, but not all of them exert an equal influence in all dimensions. The fact that “political powerlessness” and an “economistic attitude” are the only two factors (with the exception of motivation for unprejudiced self-expression) that exert influence in all three dimensions may be a result of the indirect influence of the education, age, income, and political orientation factors. The combination of a low level of education, lower income, older age, and a right-wing political orientation is characteristic of those parts

³⁶¹ In their recently published survey on antisemitism in sixteen European countries, András Kovács and György Fischer also examined a number of post-communist states (*Antisemitic Prejudices in Europe*, Vol. I, pp. 37 and 54-58). For them the results show that some of the post-communist societies, “that appear to be significantly more antisemitic than average in the other dimensions examined, antisemitic hostility against Israel is relatively moderate” in Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and the Czech Republic. With the exception of the Polish population, where a very high prevalence of classical antisemitic attitudes (42%) goes hand in hand with an even higher level of antisemitic hostility against Israel (74%), the populations of the other post-communist countries show only slightly higher levels of hostility towards Israel compared to classical antisemitic attitudes (Czech Republic 36% to 46%; Hungary 42% to 53%; Romania 38% to 49%; and Slovakia 39% to 58%). Because the figures of antisemitic hostility against Israel are in part at the same level as in Western countries like France, Spain and Italy), and in part considerably higher compared to Sweden, the Netherlands and Great Britain), one has to conclude that even in post-communist countries a rejection of Jews goes hand in hand with a rejection of Israel.

³⁶² Education and income have no significant direct influence on antisemitism; secondary antisemitism tends to increase with age, but the influence of age is also low overall. Gender also has only a minimal influence, with men tending slightly more toward traditional antisemitism than women, who in other studies tend slightly more to an anti-Israel attitude (Zick et al., *Verbreitung von Antisemitismus*, pp. 49–50). For different results in the British case, see Staetsky, Section 10.1, Table 3).

³⁶³ At first glance, this seems surprising, but the apparently minor influence results from the fact that some respondents from all political camps agree with anti-Israel items but do so for very different reasons.

of the population that agree with antisemitic and anti-Israel items more often than other demographic groups (Kempf; Zick et al.; Decker et al.). In the case of traditional antisemitism, a feeling of disorientation (anomie), social dominance orientation,³⁶⁴ and economic attitudes, as well as feelings of political powerlessness, have a similar degree of influence; however, this influence is not particularly high. In the case of secondary antisemitism, on the other hand, authoritarianism, an economic orientation, and (especially) the subjective feeling of powerlessness in the political sphere are influential. Here, on the other hand, the social dominance orientation – i.e., the belief in natural hierarchies – is irrelevant, since secondary antisemitism is about warding off guilt and responsibility for the past crimes of one's country and is only indirectly about Jews as a collective. Questions of superiority and subordination do not play a decisive role. This also applies to attitudes toward Israel. It is striking that in the case of Israel-related antisemitism, the basic personality dispositions (anomie, authoritarianism, and social dominance) show non-existent or only weak influences overall. Accordingly, the proportion of variance explained by the selected possible influencing factors is also very low for Israel-related antisemitism, with $\text{adj. } R^2 = .12$ (12%), only half as large as for the other two dimensions. For the traditional and secondary factors, the explanatory power is 24% and 29% respectively.³⁶⁵ This means that as things stand, we can say very little about what factors are responsible for a negative attitude toward Israel. The authors therefore conclude that only a limited part of antisemitism can be explained by the factors considered here using the GFE data from 2011. In the Norwegian study, too, the explained variance for anti-Israel attitudes is not very high (15.5%); although here,³⁶⁶ in addition to antisemitism, attitudes toward the Middle East conflict (support for Palestinians) were included in the regression analysis. These account for the largest share of explanation of the variance, together with a smaller influence from scepticism towards immigration. The clarification of the variance for both attitudes toward Jews and Israel might be improved if the surveys included attitudes toward the Middle East conflict as well as

³⁶⁴ On the basis of the GFE data from 2002–2011, Leibold et al. used an explanatory model to investigate the influence of authoritarian aggression and social dominance on traditional antisemitism. They found that both authoritarian aggression and antisemitism are “to a large extent explained by the tendency towards social dominance”, while the individual tendency toward aggressive authoritarianism in itself explains only a small part of the differences. The explained variance in the model is between 26.8% and 38.6%. For secondary antisemitism, on the other hand, authoritarian aggression is more important than social dominance. This is also shown in the results of Zick et al., table 8 and Leibold et al., pp. 177–198, 187f.

³⁶⁵ See Zick et al., Section 3.2, Table 8. The study by Leibold et al, “Mehr oder weniger erwünscht?”, comes to similar results: While social dominance, authoritarian aggression, and the motivation to act without prejudice explain 41.9% of the variance in classical and as much as 57% in secondary antisemitism, the R^2 value in the attitude toward Israel (Nazi analogy) is only around 183 (18.3%). See Section 3.2, Table 9.

³⁶⁶ In this case, the explanation of the variance for antisemitic attitudes (13%) is less than in the case of anti-Israel attitudes. This is because only items about the Middle East conflict and xenophobia are used here, without any items on personality factors or one's personal situation.

personality factors (authoritarianism, social dominance, anomie), xenophobia, and personal situation (unemployment, assessment of one's own economic situation, etc.).

Unlike the other surveys, Kaplan/Small asked about the influence of anti-Israel attitudes on antisemitic attitudes and also examined a number of other possible influencing factors in a multifactor logistic model. The influence of anti-Israel attitudes on antisemitic attitudes persisted after controlling for the influence of these other factors. The effect of the strength of the anti-Israel attitudes on antisemitism was by far the greatest (chi-squared 195.67). Since the variable to be explained in the model is antisemitic attitudes, the influence of the additional factors examined in the other surveys presented in this paper – such as age, gender, religion, income, intolerance toward immigrants – is also evident here. In addition, the degree of commonality with other religions/races and contact with Jews are also included in the model. The following chi-squared were calculated for these factors: the effect of attitudes toward immigrants (97.50), religion (76.73),³⁶⁷ the prevalence of antisemitism in the respective European countries (75.22), sharing a lot in common with other races or religions (60.41),³⁶⁸ and age (48.62).³⁶⁹ Income (19.73)³⁷⁰ and contact with Jews (23.90 – not significant) are of only minor importance (see Section 2). Staetsky's logistic regression analysis (see Section 10.1, Table 3), which is only concerned with the prediction of antisemitic attitudes, shows that besides demographic variables (such as age and gender) and political attitudes (such as rejection of immigration and political correctness, anti-capitalism, and violent extremist tendencies), being born outside the country and religious affiliation (in the case of Muslims) also have an influence. The greatest influence, however, was an anti-Israel attitude. However, even in this case, the explained variance (R^2) is low at .24.

Concluding remarks

So far, there are empirical studies on the connection between antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes for some Western European countries, the USA, and for only one Eastern European country. The study by András Kovács on Hungary (Section 5) shows different results, with antisemitic attitudes having less of an impact on attitudes toward Israel and different connections to various political orientations. It would therefore be important to conduct

³⁶⁷ Compared with Christians, Muslim respondents are much more likely to harbor antisemitic views, while other religions or those reporting no religion show no statistically significant differences compared with Christians (Kaplan/Small, "Anti-Israel Sentiment", p. 557).

³⁶⁸ The proportion of antisemitic responses increased the less one felt one shared in common with other races/religions.

³⁶⁹ The proportion of antisemitic responses increased with age.

³⁷⁰ The proportion of antisemitic responses declined as income increased.

research in Eastern European countries, where the Middle East conflict seems to elicit less political interest, and in Arab countries where this conflict is of great importance.³⁷¹

Finally, the low explanation of variance of Israel-related antisemitism determined in the regression analyses in this study (as in some other studies) compared with traditional and secondary antisemitism leads to the question of whether the assessment of a state and its policies can be meaningfully recorded with instruments developed to analyze the devaluation of ethnic, religious, sexual, or other minorities within a society, especially given that in these latter cases they tend to produce significantly better empirical explanations of variance. This raises the question of whether attitudes toward the policies of a state might not represent something categorically different from prejudices or resentments against minority groups that are (unlike a state) regarded as weak. Therefore, there are grounds to doubt whether the thesis of the State of Israel being a “collective Jew”, which emerged twenty years ago, is actually justified. Brian Klug has rejected this notion, which is associated with the thesis of the “new antisemitism directed against Israel”, seen as a new form of hostility against Jews. In his view, this claim implies an equivalence between “(a) the individual Jew in classical antisemitism and (b) the state of Israel in the new modern variety”. Klug argues that this concept is distorted and that its use provides a distorted picture of the facts. He sees hostile attitudes toward Israel not as a new form of antisemitism, but as a “function of a deep and bitter political conflict. The depth and the bitterness of this conflict is sufficient to explain, for the most part, the strength and intensity of the polemic against the state.”³⁷²

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³⁷² Klug, “The collective Jew”, pp. 117 and 133.



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